Optimal Private and Public Warning Decisions in a Dynamic Context

Navid Ghaffarzadegan (presenter), David F. Andersen

Abstract: 

A normative approach to security problems can give important insights into what the most proper 
security policies are for a given set of circumstances. Pinker (2007) proposes a framework for 
optimizing the short term policies of guard allocation and private and public warning issuance. 
In this paper we focus on the issuance of public and private warnings by extending Pinker’s model 
to a dynamic setting. We propose a simulation model based on Signal Detection Theory that enables 
the determination of optimal private and public warning decisions. Through the extended model we 
show that optimal solutions are sensitive to two major assumptions: sensitivity to false alarms 
and terrorists’ perceptions of public sensitivity. The results show that an underestimation of 
these effects can result in biases in optimal solutions