

## Internal Migration

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In the pre-reform era, China practiced a policy of rural-urban segregation and rigorously controlled rural-to-urban migration. The rapid structural change of the Chinese economy and its transition from a planned to a market economy in the recent two decades have eroded many of the previous migration barriers, resulting in a dramatic rise in population mobility. Like many other developing countries, China now faces mass population exodus from the countryside. This is the joint outcome of a number of factors. Most importantly, rural decollectivization has unleashed hidden surplus labor previously locked up in the countryside. At the same time, the rapid expansion of the urban economy, especially in labor-intensive industries, has generated tens of millions of low-skilled jobs. Such a match in supply and demand was made possible by the concurrent relaxation of migratory controls and the development of urban food and labor markets. As migration started to be more prevalent, migrants have also developed extensive networks, which in turn facilitates more flows (see Mallee 1988; Nolan 1993; Chan 1994; Zhou 1996).

The mobility change has not only altered the demographics of many places but has also reshaped the configuration on which China's social and economic system used to be based and carries great importance to China's future. This chapter is an overview of internal migration in China. It first reviews the institutions controlling migration and then examines the recent migratory patterns and characteristics. The final section discusses relevant policy issues.

### The *Hukou* System and Migration

Any meaningful analysis of Chinese migration must start by looking at the *hukou*, or household registration system, which affects migration in many important ways.

In China, migration has been an area of heavy state control and regulation. Those wanting to change residence are by law required to obtain permission from the public security authorities. A change in residence is deemed official and approved only when it is accompanied by a transfer of one's *hukou* to the destination. The transfer confers legal residency rights and, most importantly, eligibility for many urban jobs and accompanying subsidized welfare benefits (Cheng and Selden 1994; Mallee 1995). Such a change is granted only when there are good reasons, especially when the move serves, or at least is not at odds with, the state's interests stated in various policies, such as controlling the growth of large cities.

In essence, the *hukou* system in the pre-reform era functioned as a de facto internal passport mechanism. While approvals for migration because of marriage or for seeking support from a family member within the rural areas or within the same level of urban centers were often granted, rural to urban migration was strictly regulated and suppressed in the 1960s and 1970s. In those days, much of this type of migration was reserved for bringing in the necessary labor force in support of state-initiated programs. An approval for self-initiated relocation to a city from the countryside was only a dream for ordinary peasants. Today, peasants can move to many places, but getting a formal approval to register in a medium-sized or large city is still largely beyond their reach.

State-initiated and directed migrations, such as the cadres *xiafang* and youth rustication movements in the late 1960s, were, in large part, involuntary moves, a feature common to pre-reform China and other centrally planned economies (Chan 1994). By contrast, in the reform era, especially in recent years, almost all migratory flows, even including state-initiated migrations within the plan, are voluntary.

Based on whether or not local *hukou* is conferred in migration, three major categories of population flows can be differentiated (Chan 1996b; 2000): 1) migration with local (*hukou*) residency rights (hereafter, *hukou* migration); 2) migration without *hukou* residency rights (non-*hukou* migration); and 3) short-term movements (visiting, circulation, and commuting).

Only *hukou* migration is officially considered as *qianyi* ("migration"). The other two types of mobility are merely labeled *renkou liudong* (population movement or "floating"); the people involved in the latter are called *liudong renkou* ("floating population"). The term implies a low degree of expected permanence; the transients are not supposed to (and are legally not entitled to) stay at the destination permanently, and they are often termed, perhaps not appropriately considering the actual length of stay of many of them, "temporary" migrants. They are not the de jure residents, despite the fact that many non-*hukou* migrants may have been at the destination for years. *Hukou* migration, on the other hand, is endowed with state resources and often called "planned" migration (*jihua qianyi*). Floaters are a "self-flowing population" (*ziliu renkou*) whose mobility takes place outside the state plans. In the eyes of many central planners, these types of movement are "anarchical" and "chaotic," which is why the officially controlled media in China often use the derogatory term *mangliu* (blind flow) in referring to non-plan mobility.

The "floating population" thus comprises those staying in places other than the place of their *hukou* registration. This is a relatively diverse bundle that includes tourists, business travelers, traders, sojourners, peasant workers contracted from other places, beggars, and other unemployed people. The *People's Daily* in 1995 reported that there was a floating population of 80 million, with about half registered with the public authorities as "temporary population" (*Renmin Ribao* 1995). Two major but different groups of floaters are most prevalent. The first group are "rural migrant workers" (*mingong*). Most of them are unskilled laborers, and a small percentage of them are skilled craftsmen and traders, often self-employed. The other major group consists primarily of short-term visitors using urban facilities, including overnight tourists and business travelers (Li and Hu 1991). Some *mingong* are seasonal, operating in synchronization with the farm work schedule (with more outflows during the winter off-season).<sup>1</sup>

### Social and Economic Characteristics of Migrants

As in many other developing countries, job change and family reasons are the two most important causes of migration. The socio-demographic and economic characteristics of migrants are significantly shaped by their motivations and opportunities for migration. It appears that economic factors have prevailed in most migration in China today. As stated before, *hukou* and non-*hukou* migrants face starkly different opportunities and constraints, and their contrasts are clearly shown below. The analysis that follows uses mainly data from the one-percent surveys of the 1987 and 1995 national population and from the 1990 census carried out by the State Statistical Bureau (SSB), supplemented by information from two national surveys of *mingong*, one by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Agricultural Bank of China (Li 1994; Li and Han 1994) and the other by the Ministry of Agriculture (Zhang et al. 1995), and a local survey in Jinan, Shandong (Liu 1995). The SSB surveys and the census defined migrants as those crossing county-level boundaries and with a minimum stay of six months or one year in their destination. The *mingong* surveys generally used a broader definition of migrant. They often included migrants within counties and with a shorter duration of stay in their destination. Details of the data are explained in each table; interpretations of these statistics should take their definitional differences into account.

Table 14.1 indicates that non-*hukou* migration accounted for about 46 percent of all migration during the period 1985–1990 as shown in the 1990 census. The table also depicts that non-*hukou* migration is mainly employment-driven. Male non-*hukou* migrants of working age in particular were close to full participation in work, compared to only 57 percent in the same age group of *hukou* migrants (Yang 1994). While *hukou* work migrants were almost all in the "work transfer" or "assignment" categories (i.e., within-plan or approved labor transfers between enterprises), non-*hukou* migrant workers sought almost exclusively *wugong jingshang* ("employment in industry and business"). This refers to self-sought employment and self-employment totally outside

TABLE 14.1 Reasons for Migration

	1982-1987	1985-1990		
	All	All	<i>Hukou</i> Migrants	<i>Non-hukou</i> Migrants
Work Reasons				
Job transfer	20.6	14.5	18.0	4.6
Job assignment	5.1	4.7	10.4	2.7
Employment in industry and business	8.2	29.7	1.8	50.3
Family Reasons				
Migration with family	19.8	10.8	13.7	7.9
Marriage	15.8	14.2	15.6	11.3
Living with relatives and friends	13.3	10.6	6.6	13.2
Other Reasons				
Study or training	8.7	7.8	21.4	2.8
Retirement or resignation	2.6	1.5	2.1	1.0
Other	6.0	6.5	10.4	6.3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Size (millions)	30.5	34.1	18.3	15.8

NOTE: For 1982-1987, migrants were defined as those crossing village, town or city boundaries staying at least for six months at the destination. The *hukou* and non-*hukou* migration figures are from the 1% migrant sample of the 1990 census tabulated by the author. Migrants were defined as those crossing county or city boundaries staying at least one year at the destination.

SOURCE: For 1982-1987, SSB 1988. For 1985-1990, the total figures are from SC and SSB 1993, volume 4.

of the state plans. Conversely, about 70 percent of all the *hukou* migrants in the 1985-1990 period moved for reasons other than starting a job. About 36 percent of *hukou* migration was due to family-related reasons (marriage, migration with family, or living with relatives or friends); marriage migration includes a significant number of rural-to-rural migrants. Another 21 percent was related to study or training. Among the non-*hukou* migrants, family-related reasons were also the second most important, accounting for about one-third of all the non-*hukou* migration.

The age and sex selectivity of migrants is clearly shown in the data. Life cycle events such as starting a job, changing jobs until one settles on a career, getting married, and going away to college are all closely associated with migration and with reaching young adulthood. The age structure of Chinese migrants is typical of a migrant population. Rural migrant labor tends to be concentrated in the most economically active age group, particularly between the ages 15 to 34. Males dominate labor migration at the national level. They are especially pronounced in the rural migrant labor population (including short-term floaters), where male migrants outnumber females by three to one. This, however, masks some notable regional exceptions such as Guangdong, where migrants from the countryside are predominantly female. Excluding the short-term floaters and including other non-work-related migrants, the 1990 census figures show that male migrants slightly outnumbered female ones. Marriage migration, however, was almost exclusively a female affair (Fan and Huang 1998).

Overall, migrants and rural migrant workers are better educated than the average population. This is partly an effect of the age structure of the migrants (young adults tend to be better educated than older adults). Despite the general similarity of the age structure between *hukou* and non-*hukou* migrants, there is a clear polarization of the two groups in educational attainment. *Hukou* migrants are disproportionately better educated (high school level and up) than non-*hukou* migrants and rural migrant labor who are heavily concentrated in the educational levels of junior high and primary schools. The most pronounced disparity is seen in the college-educated cohort. While only less than 2 percent of the nation's population aged six and above had a college education in 1990, close to one-quarter of the *hukou* migrants were college graduates! This clearly attests to the highly selective nature of the *hukou* migration.

Despite the lower educational level of rural migrant workers compared to *hukou* migrants, the former are nevertheless likely to be better educated than the average rural population. More than half of the rural migrant workers have at least junior high school education. Those who are better educated and have special vocational skills also tend to have a higher propensity to leave than people with no or little formal education (Li and Han 1994).

There are also occupational and sectoral similarities and contrasts between *hukou* and non-*hukou* migrants. The occupational structure of *hukou* migrants (who move to predominantly urban destinations except for marriage-related migrants) broadly resembles that of the urban population as a whole, but they are significantly over-represented in professional and technical positions. In contrast, 95 percent of the non-*hukou* migrants had employment at the clerical level or lower. Common jobs were manufacturing frontline workers, construction workers, nannies, and sales and service workers (Yang 1994). There are a lot of self-employed craftsmen and small vendors. In fact, self-employment has become a more favored sector for rural migrants (Liu and Chan 1998). The significant number of farmworkers among *hukou* migrants—about a quarter of total migrants—largely reflects the rural-to-rural marriage migration of women.

Among the urban migrants without *hukou*, a handful might make it and move upward through connections or entrepreneurship, but the great majority are marginalized. They are often shut out of more desirable urban positions and have to take up the dangerous and "dirty" jobs, a situation commonly faced by immigrant labor (especially illegal, undocumented workers) in many developed countries. In short, a dual urban social structure has emerged: On the one hand are people for whom jobs, housing, education, subsidized food, and medical care are an entitlement, and on the other, are those who must scramble for such goods and services or even do without them (Solinger 1995; Chan 1996a). Table 14.2 sums up the contrasts in their social and economic status due to the *hukou* divide. In many ways, this parallels the formal/informal sectoral dualism found elsewhere in the developing world and the local/foreign labor dichotomy in many developed countries.

TABLE 14.2 *Hukou* and Non-*hukou* Rural-Urban Migrants

<i>Characteristics</i>	<i>Hukou Migrants</i>	<i>Non-hukou Migrants</i>
Household registration status	nonagricultural and local	agricultural and nonlocal
Entitlement to state-supplied social benefits and opportunities	full	none or temporary entitlements
Legal urban resident status	yes	no or temporary
Socioeconomic sector the migrants move to	state and nonstate sectors	mostly to nonstate sector, also as temporary workers in state enterprises
Mechanism of migration	transfers determined by bureaucratic decisions within plan limits	"spontaneous," based on personal contacts and market information
Stability of moves	permanent	seasonal or semi-permanent
Labor characteristics of principal migrants		
Skill level	skilled and low-skilled workers	mostly unskilled or low-skilled laborers
Employment type	mostly permanent jobs	temporary or semi-permanent jobs in nonstate enterprises, or self-employment
Housing	same as other urban residents	low-cost shelters or homeless

SOURCE: Chan 1996a

## Geography of Migration

Significant disparities in wages and living standards between the urban and rural sectors and between the coastal and inland regions underlie most of the migratory flows in the reform era. Economic factors have prevailed in most of the moves in this era, in contrast to migration in the pre-reform era where administrative factors played a decisive role. Peasant migrants in the 1990s expect to benefit from the large wage differentials, often in the range of one to three or four, between an urban unskilled job in a coastal city and a farm job in an inland province (see Liu 1994; Liu 1995). According to the 1990 census, a total of 34 million domestic migrants crossing county-level units were recorded over the 1985–1990 period. 23 million, or two-thirds, of whom moved within their respective provinces. Guangdong and Sichuan provinces had both the largest intraprovincial and interprovincial migration. But they were at the opposite ends of internal migration flows: Guangdong was the largest recipient, whereas Sichuan was the biggest sender. The same broad pattern was repeated for the 1990–1995 period (NPSSO 1997).

Available data allow us to study more specifically the flows in and out of the provinces. Based on the 1990 census data, the thirty largest interprovincial migration flows in 1985–1990 are mapped in Figure 14.1. Generally, in net migration terms, most of the coastal provinces (such as Guangdong, Beijing, Shanghai, and Jiangsu) gained from provinces in central and western regions (see Table 14.3 for definitions). The inland-coast flows are consistent with the existing large differences

TABLE 14.3 Composition of Rural Migrant Labor, 1993

Region	Total Rural Labor (1,000)	Out-Migration Rate (%)	No. of Migrants (1,000)	%	Regional Total (%)		
					Within Counties	Within Provinces	Toward Urban Centers
Eastern <sup>a</sup>	154,505.9	8.5	13,133	25.6	28.4	66.3	82.0
Central <sup>b</sup>	143,295.6	15.9	22,784	44.4	40.6	70.4	83.3
Western <sup>c</sup>	113,755.6	13.5	15,357	30.0	37.0	76.4	66.5
All Regions	411,557.0	12.5	51,274	100	36.4	71.1	77.9

NOTES: Rural migrant labor refers to rural laborers who migrated from villages for work in 1993.

<sup>a</sup>Eastern = Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan.

<sup>b</sup>Central = Neimenggu, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Hunan, and Jiangxi.

<sup>c</sup>Western = Xinjiang, Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, and Tibet.

SOURCE: Li 1994.

in the level of economic development and with the fact that a more open economy is at work in central areas. The current pattern is almost opposite to that in the pre-reform era as illustrated in Figure 14.2. In the Cultural Revolution era (1966–1976), for example, interprovincial migration was overwhelmingly toward the inland because of the government's various campaigns to send urban youth and cadres "down to the villages and up to the mountains."

The 1995 one-percent National Population Survey also provides valuable data to gauge the size of the non-*hukou* migrants who stayed more than six months in places outside of their place of original *hukou* registration. Assuming that these people had moved from their places of original *hukou* registration, one can work out the "stock" of non-*hukou* migrants as of October 1, 1995, and their presumed flows. At the interprovincial level, the 1995 data indicate that Guangdong was the province with the largest number of non-*hukou* migrants from outside, estimated to be at 1.9 million, followed by Shanghai (666,000) and Beijing (658,400). On the other hand, Sichuan had the greatest number of out-migrants (1.5 million), followed by Henan (680,200) and Hunan (666,100) (NPSSO 1997). The pattern of interprovincial flows of non-*hukou* migration is very similar to that in Figure 14.1 because non-*hukou* migration crossing provincial boundaries tends to be more concentrated in a number of provinces and therefore dominates the largest flows. The economic forces (wage gaps) were so powerful that these migrants were willing to travel hundreds, if not thousands, of miles to very different places.<sup>2</sup>

The geography of non-*hukou* migrants can also be studied based on a survey of "rural migrant labor" (*mingong*) conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1993 (see Table 14.3). As mentioned earlier, the concept of migrant here is different because it pertains only to labor migrants from the countryside *regardless* of their length of stay at the destination. According to this study, the stock of




FIGURE 14.1 The 30 Largest Interprovincial Flows, 1985–1990  
SOURCE: 1990 Census.

rural migrant labor, consisting of people working elsewhere (*waichu dagong*), reached 51 million at the end of 1993, accounting for about one-eighth (12.5 percent) of the rural labor force. The central region was the largest source of rural migrant labor, with the highest labor out-migration rate (15.9 percent) and volume (22.8 million), followed by the western region (13.5 percent and 15.4 million). The eastern region had the lowest rate (only slightly more than half of that of the central region) and the smallest volume. This pattern is broadly consistent with the findings of other studies (such as Rozelle et al. 1997) of the early and mid-1990s. Because of its large labor force (population), the central region accounted for 44 percent of the estimated total outflows. The low rate of out-migration in the eastern region is attributed to the high level of development of rural enterprises in many villages and townships, which absorbed rural surplus labor. This is not the case for the central or western regions. A great portion of *mingong* movement was to urban areas (78 percent)<sup>3</sup> and within their own provinces (71 percent), although it appears that those crossing provincial boundaries are growing in number in the past several years. Estimates suggest that the volume of the latter rose from about 15 million in 1993 (from Table 14.3) to 25 million in 1994 and 30 million in 1995.<sup>4</sup>






FIGURE 14.2 Estimated Major Interprovincial Migration Flows, 1966–1976  
SOURCE: Chan and Yang 1996.

The pattern of *mingong* flows is reflective of the “normal” pattern of migration (predominantly short distance and toward urban centers) that China experienced in the 1950s. According to Chan (1994), there was high net rural-urban migration and rapid urbanization in the 1950s that resembled the “normal” pattern. However, this pattern was distorted in the 1960s and 1970s. There was net urban out-migration in the early 1960s and low net rural-urban migration in the Cultural Revolution period (1966–1976) because of the heavy government intervention in the urbanization process in pursuit of a socialist development strategy. Rural-urban migration accelerated in the late 1970s and gained momentum in the mid-1980s after more open policies were implemented.

Based primarily on the one-year residence criterion, the 1990 census shows that rural-urban migration made up about half of all migration crossing county-level units in 1985–1990 with urban-to-urban migration accounting for another one-third. For 1990–1995, based primarily on the six-month residence criterion, rural-urban migration and urban-urban migration each accounted for about 36 percent of all migration crossing county boundaries. It appears that rural-to-rural migration rose substantially in the 1990s, from about 13 percent of the total migration in 1985–1990 to 24 percent in

1990–1995. This may be a sign of increasing regional specialization of the rural sector (both farm and nonfarm work) (*Singtao Daily* 1997).

## Policy Issues

China's recent economic growth cannot be separated from the active participation of the rural population through migration. Rural migrant labor is really the "muscle" behind China's economic might (Gilley 1997). Migrants have exerted significant impacts on both the rural and urban economies (see Smith 1996; Chan 1998). A number of major development policy issues relate to migration. First, China's development strategy and policies continue to be generally tilted against the rural sector (Oi 1993; Chan 1994; West and Wong 1997), which has not helped bring about a faster transformation of the rural sector. A reconsideration and reorientation of the sectoral priority, along with a set of rural policies that favor agricultural development, rural investment, income growth, and rural infrastructure improvement, is urgently needed. Further expanding agriculture, including opening up marginal land, expanding cash crop and non-crop farming, will increase the capacity to absorb rural surplus labor. The land tenure system will have to be reformed to discourage half-hearted farmers (many of whom now work outside their villages on a seasonal basis). Given that the expansion of agriculture is ultimately constrained by the finite supply of farmland, rural off-farm development and rural out-migration are the only ways out. The push to move out, or to vote by feet, to escape from unfavorable policies will remain enormous in the coming several years. This requires designing a set of appropriate migration policies that take a broad view. Current migration is by and large beneficial to both the rural and urban sectors. It is hard to imagine the recent rapid economic growth in the coastal provinces without those labor transfers. The issue then is how to continue facilitating this absorbable intersectoral flow and at the same time mitigate both the short-term and emerging long-term problems.

In spite of their indisputable contributions to the urban economy, non-*hukou* transients are often treated as outcasts by local governments under the *hukou* system, and they face intense discrimination by many urban residents. This expanding group is often denied access to many basic urban services or forced to pay high fees for such services, such as education and medical care. In fact, the needs of these "have-nots" are often totally left out of service provision and infrastructural planning in many cities (Chan 1997). Such a division of population within cities into those with urban entitlements and those without is bound to nurture social conflicts in the long term and must be changed.

Many of these migrant workers are now an integral part of the urban labor force, but the uncertainties surrounding their residency status give rise to opportunities for employers to exploit migrants' powerless "temporary" position. In many ways, the nature of such exploitation is similar to that of using "temps" and immigrant workers elsewhere: it is probably more blatant and "effective" in China, for many politi-

cal and social institutions discriminate against the transients. The unclear residency status has also fostered some negative behavior among migrants: a sense of alienation and of not being accepted as an urban citizen has arguably contributed to some migrants' less-than-constructive conduct, including vandalism and more disruptive crimes.

An overnight elimination of this discrimination is unrealistic as the increased costs of providing even the basic services to the "have-nots" are beyond the capacity of most urban governments. Such action may run the great risk of triggering a huge exodus from the countryside in the short term, thus crippling the system. But discrimination against this segment of the population needs to be mitigated for equity and efficiency as well as political reasons. The solution lies in doing away with policies that favor certain segments of the population (which are also a major contributor of rural-urban disparities). The government should continue to reduce urban subsidies (e.g., by charging the full costs of urban services) and free up resources that could otherwise be made available for equalization transfers. At the same time, urban governments should develop affordable services for recent migrants and, ultimately, incorporate the entire urban population, regardless of residency status, in their development plans and budgets. China can look to other Asian developing countries for useful lessons and experiences in providing low-cost urban services (Yeung 1991).

Helping non-*hukou* migrants become permanent residents and encouraging their assimilation into urban society will induce many of them to give up their half-hearted pursuit in agriculture and ease the burden on the rail systems caused by the circularity of "temporary" migrants. It is also likely that this will decrease some of the developmental impacts brought about by circular migration (the transfer of capital, know-how, and modern attitudes to rural areas). It appears, however, that circulation, even in the absence of the *hukou* barrier, will continue to prevail for quite some time at the current stage of development, as it has been in other developing countries (Skeldon 1990). The strong bonds of overseas Chinese to their hometowns, displayed in recent history, appear to support the argument that even as circular migration wanes in China, the economic and social linkages between the migrants and their home villages will not disappear altogether.

At present, there are still many obstacles, beyond the *hukou* system, to rural-urban labor mobility. These include the lack of information about urban job opportunities, restrictive administrative measures adopted by local governments to protect local workers as unemployment becomes a bigger issue, and differing social and cultural traditions. These barriers require more attention and policy action. Establishing more recruitment agencies and enacting policies that ensure the protection of rural migrants' interests can greatly help match the supply and demand of labor and reduce the costs of migration (including unnecessary trips) and job searches. The success of China's recent round of marketization reforms under Premier Zhu Rongji now critically depends on raising the productivity of the labor force. Augmenting labor mobility is crucial to achieving that goal.

There is also a great potential for using labor migration (including organized export of labor and resettlement) to combat poverty, especially in remote and resource-constrained regions. This would represent a shift from the conventional approach, which emphasizes the merits of localized economic development. As pointed out before, the rate of migration is still quite low among the poorest groups in the rural sector and in poor regions. The low rate is related to factors such as low educational achievement, lack of relevant contacts, and the expense of migration. Measures need be designed to help the rural poor overcome major short-term and long-term obstacles. These may include offering low-interest migration loans, encouraging labor recruitment agencies to go to these areas, as well as providing more long-term investment in education. China has already had some experience in this area (World Bank 1992). It should consider launching a bolder and broader migration program to take advantage of this strategy. Financial and logistical problems associated with that approach can be daunting, but what is needed most is a mind-set that sees migration as a healthy mechanism for achieving a better match of regional labor supply and demand and that recognizes migration as a means through which an individual can attain fulfillment and a higher standard of living.

## Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of the Chinese migration system and the characteristics and spatial patterns of migration. I have demonstrated a clear, institutionally based duality in the migrant population. At the macrosocietal level, two different migration streams from different socioeconomic strata operate within fairly distinct "circuits" fixed by social and economic institutions that are based on the hukou system. Although they share some similar demographic characteristics such as age structure, they exhibit dissimilar socioeconomic characteristics and geographies because of the different opportunities and constraints they face. A number of major policy issues surrounding China's internal migration have been examined. I have argued that migration is crucial to China's current reforms and future development. At a deeper level, the "peasant invasion" of cities has challenged the established attitudes and norms of both urban and rural residents and opened up possibilities for new social change and the formation of a more diverse, tolerant, and pluralistic society. As migration relates closely to the rural and urban sectors and to regional development, it has a strategic role to play in China's development in the new millennium.

## Notes

This chapter synthesizes material from a number of my previous papers and also draws on some recently released data. I would like to thank Professor Yang Yunyan for help in procuring data and Ta Liu for assisting with the production of the two maps.

1. Li and Hu (1991) estimate that about half of the floating population in large cities stayed longer than six months, and another one third stayed longer than one year.
2. For most *hukou* migrants (moving within the state sector), economic gains were generally quite small, so out-of-province *hukou* migrants were still quite "conservative," moving over shorter distances than the interprovincial non-*hukou* migrants. One explanation is that *hukou* migrants generally preferred nearby provinces in which culture, languages, and environment were similar and therefore easier to adapt to. See Chan (2000) and also Ding (1994) for detailed maps.
3. Note that this is very different from what has been argued in Qian (1996).
4. Interviews with researchers at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1994 and 1995. Rozelle et al. (1997) also report that in 1995 about one-third of rural migrant workers in their national sample moved for jobs in other provinces.

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