

**“International Migration and Human Mobility as Security Issues”**

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## Introduction

Some international relations scholars like Barry Buzan have long called for broadening the concept of security to include non-military threats.<sup>2</sup> In the aftermath of the Cold War, Buzan joined by Ole Waever and others of what came to be known as the Copenhagen School and developed the concept of “societal security” that broadened the range of legitimate topics of security analysis beyond such traditional topics as military capabilities, diplomacy and political events, to topics such as ethnicity, national identity and migration.<sup>3</sup> As Barry Buzan put it, “The threat of migration is fundamentally a question of how relative numbers interact with the absorptive and adaptive capacities of society...The fear of being swamped by foreigners...is easy to mobilize on the political agenda as a security issue.”<sup>4</sup> At the time, statements of policymakers, such as British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, provided excellent examples of the political use of migration as a security issue. Hurd said that he and his fellow European Union (EU) foreign ministers deemed that migration, “among all the other problems we face - is the most crucial.” Like nineteenth century America, “Europe is a magnet for people seeking greater opportunities, from the east and south....We have already seen, most obviously in Germany but also elsewhere in the Community, the tensions and antipathies which can result from the inflow.” But unlike nineteenth century America “ours is not an empty continent.”<sup>5</sup> Martin Heisler’s contribution to the volume *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* elaborated on Buzan’s point, “Immigration can present threats to security in the receiving countries, albeit generally not directly of a military kind. The

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<sup>2</sup> See Buzan 1983.

<sup>3</sup> Waever, et al. 1993.

<sup>4</sup> Waever, et al. 1993, 45.

<sup>5</sup> Quoted in Savill 1992.

capacity of social, economic, political and administrative institutions to integrate large numbers of immigrants, and the resistance of some immigrant communities to assimilation, affects the stability of society and therefore the ability of receiving states' governments to govern."<sup>6</sup> On the one hand, Buzan and his colleagues were describing how changing state behavior dealing with international migration could provide empirical support for one theory or the other of international relations.<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, they were critically highlighting the political usage of the linkage of international migration and security in the discourse of policymakers and, increasingly, the public at large.

Analysis of the politics of linking migration and security has spawned an expanding literature on the "securitization of migration," that is critical of such linkage and implicitly, if not explicitly, critical of those policymakers who depict migration as a security issue.<sup>8</sup> Implicit in the arguments made about the securitization of migration is the notion that migration was not a security issue and has only been made one by the discourse of policymakers. This "new security issue" is real inasmuch as the discourse of policymakers does indeed have consequences but it is not real in terms of being a real threat to security. That is, the securitization of migration is presented as essentially a cynical ploy of policymakers to incite fear of migration by making it a security issue through their discursive linkage. The logical implication of this argument is that migration was not a security issue until policymakers made it so.

Such arguments about the political linkage of migration to security are not new. Migration scholars have long argued that public perceptions in host countries, which may

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<sup>6</sup> Waever, et al. 1993, p. 161.

<sup>7</sup> See e.g., Weiner 1995; Waever et.al. 1993; Koslowski 1998.

<sup>8</sup> See, e.g., Doty 1999; Huysmans 2000; Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002; Tirman 2004.

or may not be well-founded, that migrants increase employment competition, challenge religious, cultural or ethnic homogeneity, increase crime or threaten national security may be used by politicians to influence domestic political contests and thereby influence policy making.<sup>9</sup> When the perception of migration as a threat leads to more general changes in migrant destination state policies, migration can have a significant impact on foreign policy.<sup>10</sup> Those who argue in terms of the “securitization of migration” have essentially placed this longstanding argument of migration scholars within a broader context of other “securitizations” and made the claim that migration is a “new” security issue.

Although this discourse analysis of migration as a security issue is interesting and has important implications for threat analysis and the construction of threats in national security studies, the phrase “securitization of migration,” however, begs the question, “What was migration before it was securitized?” What, if anything, does it tell us about migration itself, both before and after it has been securitized in discourse? More importantly, what, if anything, does it tell us about the relationship between migration and international security beyond the fact that politicians use the linkage to incite xenophobic sentiment to mobilize supporters and voters?

There has long been a tendency to consider international migration as an economic phenomenon of individuals moving to better paying jobs and the state playing various roles in recruitment in good economic times and attempting to restrict immigration in economic downturns. Hence, in works of traditional international

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<sup>9</sup> See Miller 1981; Freeman 1985; Heisler and Schmitter Heisler 1985; Hollifield 1992; Thraenhardt 1993; 1997; Betz 1994.

<sup>10</sup> See Weiner 1993; Tucker, Keely and Wrigley 1990; Weiner 1993; Teitelbaum and Weiner 1995.

relations literature long dominated by the realist conceptual framework, if international migration was discussed at all, it was relegated to the “low politics” of international economics rather than the “high politics” of international security concerns. Migration was understood to have its primary impact on domestic politics, with only marginal consequences for international relations. For example, from a realist or neo-realist standpoint, the migration of unarmed refugees and guest workers across international borders should not enter into security considerations because such migrations only effect the distribution of capabilities at the margin, if at all. Those who criticize the securitization of migration implicitly agree with the neo-realist position that migration is not a security issue but rather a matter of “low politics.”

Historically speaking, however, migration has always been a security issue. Those who argue that migration has recently become a security issue through the discourse of contemporary policymakers conveniently ignore much of world history. Moreover, the phenomenon of migration not just an economic phenomenon but also a matter of people moving across borders from parts of the world that not secure (due international and civil war, political or religious persecution or pervasive street crime) to areas of the world that are more secure.<sup>11</sup> Also, many international relations theories routinely assume state sovereignty and territorial integrity but not all of the world’s states have the capability, and their policy makers the political will, to stop the citizens of other countries from entering and staying without authorization.<sup>12</sup> This is particularly the case

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<sup>11</sup>Schmitter Heisler and Heisler 1989.

<sup>12</sup>Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield 1994.

in many developing countries where roughly half of the world's migrants live<sup>13</sup> and where illegal migrants often not only remain but also acquire citizenship.<sup>14</sup>

The “securitization of migration” argument offers certain appealing features to scholars who understandably wish to critique the illiberal policies toward immigrants taken by governments in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks. Unfortunately, those who point to the post-9/11 linkage of migrants to terrorism by policymakers as the basis of their “the securitization of migration” arguments misunderstand the contemporary security situation as much as the politicians who use terrorism as another reason to push their anti-immigration political agendas. The “new security issue” is not migration per se but rather global mobility more generally speaking and the terrorist travel within global flows of tourists and business travelers more specifically.

I will make these arguments in the following six steps: first, I argue that, contrary to short shrift given to migration within the international relations literature, migration has played a central role in questions of war and peace for some time now. Perhaps most fundamentally, as will be detailed in the second section of the paper, migration facilitated the rise of European dominance over the rest of the world. In the third section, I explain how, migration was fundamental to the subsequent redistribution of power within the international system from the Western European core to the American and Russian periphery. The fourth section explains how refugee movements are security issues in terms of both the fact that they are the consequence of a lack of security as well as the political dynamics and foreign policy consequences they produce. The fifth section considers how political émigrés and economic immigrants continue to influence the

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<sup>13</sup> UN 2006.

<sup>14</sup> Sadiq 2009.

course of their home countries' domestic politics, foreign affairs and the foreign policies of their host countries. Finally, the paper makes the distinction between international migration and human mobility and explains how terrorist travel within global flows of tourists and business travelers is the real "new security issue" that is being confronted by border control authorities and foreign policymakers, a distinction that has apparently not yet been fully grasped by international relations scholars and other political analysts.

### **Migration, IR Theory and World History**

Human migration has long influenced the course of world politics but has received scant attention in major general works of contemporary international relations (IR) or international relations theory, whether that of neo-realists,<sup>15</sup> liberals<sup>16</sup> or constructivists.<sup>17</sup> Neo-Marxist and world systems theorists have discussed migration but they have primarily focused on explaining the phenomenon of migration under modern capitalism in terms of unequal exchange and dependency<sup>18</sup> rather than on the consequences of migration for international politics. As the Cold War drew to a close and neo-Marxist analysis declined within the discipline of international relations, realism, liberalism and constructivism emerged as the three leading paradigms of contemporary IR theory.<sup>19</sup> At the same time, international migration increasingly became a concern of foreign policymakers but this did not resonate within the discipline. While some members of the Copenhagen School pointed to the growing importance of "societal

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<sup>15</sup>Waltz, 1979.

<sup>16</sup> Keohane, 1984; Doyle, 1986; 1997.

<sup>17</sup> Onuf, 1989; Wendt, 1999.

<sup>18</sup> Wallerstein 1974; Portes and Walton, 1981.

<sup>19</sup> see Walt, 1998; Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner, 1998.

security” in the post-Cold War environment and highlighted migration as a “new security issue” (Waeber, et al. 1993), neo-realists downplayed the significance of migration as a security issue (Walt, 1991) and neo-liberal institutionalists downplayed the factor of labor migration in the international economy (Keohane and Milner, 1996: 259, fn. 1).

Although some constructivists noted that migration is an issue that has “reemerged as deeply politicized from relatively taken-for-granted conventions of nationalism and citizenship...and could induce expansion in the conceptualization of security affairs,”<sup>20</sup> they shied away from analysis of “new security issues” like migration so that their arguments will be taken seriously by mainstream neo-realists and neo-liberals.<sup>21</sup>

If one pauses to consider that migration has had a much more profound impact on world politics in the past than in the present, thorough consideration of migration in international relations involves more than adding an emerging “new issue” into our repertoire, calling attention to the linkage of migration and security in recent political discourse or criticizing the policymakers who leverage such linkage for political gain. Throughout pre-modern history, migration influenced the political dynamics within and between the civilizations that were the most important political units of the pre-modern world. Before the advent of printing, postal systems and telecommunications technology, human migration played a much larger role in technology transfer and the translocation of political models. Before the development of the germ theory of disease, public health systems and modern medicine, the transportation of microorganisms by migrating

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<sup>20</sup> Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, 1996: 73.

<sup>21</sup> Katzenstein 1996a: 7-11. For a more comprehensive review of the literature on migration and international relations, see Koslowski, 2000: 1-29.

humans led to recurrent population-decimating epidemics that proved fateful to the decline of some civilizations in relation to others.

The omission of past migration from contemporary international relations analysis is understandable because when we look back from our advanced technological societies, it is easy to miss the millennia of transfers and borrowings fostered by migration. Looking back from an era that experienced a population explosion, it is also difficult to imagine that until quite recently, survival, let alone expansion, of populations involved war, not only with other humans, but also with microorganisms that were often far more deadly. Contact between populations that had developed immunities to a deadly disease with those that had not often led to disastrous epidemics which devastated civilizations. The centrality of disease transmission to the interaction of societies is underscored by the fact that until the end of the nineteenth century more soldiers died from disease and infection than died in battle. Hence, wars were often decided as much by advantages in immunities to diseases and proper sanitation as by guns, ammunition and morale.

As the great human migration to the unpopulated areas that could sustain hunter-gatherer societies came to an end about 8000 B.C., an era marked by the development of agriculture, civilization, and the conquest and enslavement of other peoples began. William H. McNeill notes that within an already occupied world, migration could take four different forms: one population destroys and replaces another population; one population enslaves the other; one population conquers the other, but the conquerors develop a symbiotic relationship with the conquered; outsiders infiltrate a population, but do not displace the ruling group. Radical destruction was typical of nomadic pastoral societies, which had a minimal division of labor and were delineated by kinship lines.

The other three forms of migration were typical of agricultural societies with greater division of labor and based on hierarchical polyethnic social order,<sup>22</sup> which became known as civilizations. While all three forms of migration were prevalent in ancient civilizations, conquest and slavery reached new heights during the early modern period of European colonialism but then subsided in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In contrast to migration in the pre-modern and early modern periods, in the contemporary era, migration is less a complement to military conquest and more the penetration of a population that does not displace the ruling group by people seeking economic gain or political refuge.

### **The Rise of Europe vis-a-vis the Rest of the World**

The Middle East contained the world's predominant civilizations before 500 BC but roughly at that time four civilizations in the Middle East, Greece, India and China emerged. During the next two millennia to 1500 AD, these four civilizations developed a rough equilibrium among themselves that was rocked by four shocks (McNeill 1967, 121-124).<sup>23</sup> The first two, expansion of Greek civilization to the Middle East and the expansion of Indian civilization to China and Japan, ended up leaving relatively little lasting influence. The expansion of the Middle Eastern civilization with the rise of Islam and its spread to North Africa and Spain and then India, Eastern Europe and Central Asia left a more permanent mark, particularly on the development of Indian civilization. However, it was the final shock that overturned the balance among the civilizations. This process began when West Europeans first conquered the Americas and explored the

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<sup>22</sup> McNeill, 1987: 18.

<sup>23</sup> See McNeill 1967, p. 124.

world's coastlines and then in the period between 1700 to 1850 when what came to be known as Western civilization established an economic and military superiority over the rest of the world that enabled its political expansion through the projection of the European states system to the entire globe. Migration played a crucial role in this expansion, particularly with the transportation of disease.

Conquest, trade, crusading and slaving across the disease pools of Mediterranean, the Middle Eastern, Indian and Chinese civilizations led to a gradual sharing of diseases and the development of common sets of immunities. Epidemic diseases that led to catastrophic die offs gradually became endemic diseases which took a proportion of each generation's children, but immunized surviving populations. This cross-immunization, however, did not stop the spread of diseases from previously isolated regions, nor was this cross-immunization of familiar diseases global in scope.

The consequences of uneven cross-immunization of the world populations was most dramatically illustrated as Europeans came into contact with populations who had not been exposed to crowd diseases (most importantly, smallpox). Essentially, relatively few Spaniards were able to conquer the Aztec and Inca civilizations because European migration to the New World crossed disease pool boundaries<sup>24</sup> and the demographic consequences were immense. "(I)t will be recalled that in 1500 the world population is approximately 400 million, of whom 80 million inhabit the Americas. By the middle of the sixteenth century, out of these 80 million, there remain ten. Or limiting ourselves to Mexico: on the eve of conquest, its population is about 25 million; in 1600, it is one

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<sup>24</sup> See Crosby 1972, pp. 47-58; McNeill 1977, pp. 1-5, 176-208; Braudel 1981, pp. 36-38.

million.”<sup>25</sup> In like fashion, diseases carried by Europeans wiped out much of the native populations in Siberia, Australia, Southern Africa and New Zealand. The introduction of European diseases worked in tandem with the introduction of European plants and domesticated animals that managed to drive out native species. The migration of Europeans, their plants, animals and pathogens fundamentally transformed the ecosystems of three of the Earth’s continents in a way that led to the biological domination of European species and Europeans themselves in the world’s temperate regions.<sup>26</sup> By the end of the great migration to the New World, in which an estimated 50 million migrants came between 1820 and 1924, people of European origin who lived outside of Europe constituted one eleventh of the world’s population.<sup>27</sup>

The crucial role of migration in the European conquest of the Americas, Australia, Oceania and Southern Africa has important implications for international relations theory. The expansion of European civilization through conquest, or (depending on one’s point of view) the devastation of native civilizations and the ecosystems that supported them by European barbarians was not simply the result of superior military forces or differential technological and economic development that could then be utilized militarily.<sup>28</sup> Rather, mere human contact (or the transportation of intermediary animal hosts) fostered infections among disease inexperienced populations. When populations that had become immune to childhood diseases opposed those who had not developed

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<sup>25</sup> Todorov 1982, p. 141.

<sup>26</sup> Crosby 1986, pp. 294-308. The thesis that disease experience enables “civilized” peoples to easily conquer more primitive peoples (which has come to known as McNeill’s law) is supported by the counterfactual evidence that contemporaneous European forays to disease experienced civilizations such as China, Japan and the Ottoman Empire were more easily rebuffed. See Crosby 1986, pp. 132-144.

<sup>27</sup> Thomas 1961, p. 9.

<sup>28</sup> Kennedy 1987 and Gilpin 1981.

similar immunities, the disease inexperienced populations lost. In other words, during the conquest of native American, Siberian, Australian and New Zealand peoples, European armies, missionaries, traders and colonists unconsciously deployed biological weapons in addition to the conventional armaments of their soldiers.

The commonplace understanding of migration as an economic phenomenon of individual migrants moving in response to the push of poverty and the pull of job opportunities was largely based on largest migration in human history that of the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century migration of Europeans to the New World. This migration provided the empirical basis for liberal neo-classical economics analysis that depicted international migration in positive terms of moving labor to where it could be most efficiently used in order to increase the collective GDP of those states open to migration flows. While American and European economists, policymakers and publics may have viewed this migration as primarily an economic phenomenon, from a different perspective, that of the native Americans, this migration was very much a security issue.

### **The Balance of Power**

The idea of the balance of power is the *sine qua non* of many international relations theorists. Few stop to consider that past migration was critical to the distribution of power within the contemporary international system. The southern migration of Russians in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the eastward migration of Russians across Asia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the westward migration of Americans and new immigrants from Europe across North America in the

nineteenth century provided the demographic basis for the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as superpowers in the twentieth century.

The potential for this development was perhaps first recognized by Tocqueville. In the conclusion to the first volume of *Democracy in America*, Tocqueville speculated that due to emigration from Europe to the United States and rapid population growth and eastward migration of Russians, the United States and Russia would each “one day...hold in its hands the destinies of half of the world.”<sup>29</sup> Similarly, Morgenthau recognized the importance of migration to the United States as he made the point that immigration was critical to the development of American power and the international distribution of power *vis-a-vis* Western Europe.<sup>30</sup> These insights have been lost on subsequent theorists who took the demographic basis of power for granted and instead focused more exclusively on military capabilities, as well as the technology and economics of military capabilities.

The rapidity and scope of the migrations that fueled the rise of the United States and Russia to great power status were not simply a function of the superior technology and military capabilities of the conquering populations. Indigenous populations of North America, the western steppe lands of Eurasia and the forests of Siberia had been decimated by waves of epidemics before European populations began to grow after 1750. These epidemics left much ostensibly “empty” lands open for the later settlement of millions of migrants.

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<sup>29</sup> de Tocqueville 1969, p. 413.

<sup>30</sup> “Free immigration from 1924 and, more particularly, from 1874 to 1924 is mainly responsible for the abundance of manpower which has meant so much for the national power of the United States in war and peace. Without this immigration, it is not likely that the population of the United States would amount to more than half of what it is today. In consequence the national power of the United States would be inferior to what 214 million people make it today.” Morgenthau 1973, p. 131.

Smallpox and other childhood diseases carried by Spanish and French explorers, traders and missionaries in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries killed off native American populations of the western, midwestern and southern regions of North America, before the arrival of eighteenth century English colonists and subsequent American pioneers.<sup>31</sup> Those native Americans who had not come in contact with diseases brought into the North American interior by European explorers or other native Americans infected with European diseases were highly susceptible to the diseases carries by westward moving American settlers during the nineteenth century.

Disease and migration played a similar role in the expansion of Moscovy both to the southwest and to the east. The bubonic plague is best known for killing off a third of Western Europe's population, however, the plague took its greatest toll, proportionally speaking, on the nomadic peoples of the steppes from where the disease was initially spread. By 1500, the steppe lands drained by the Don and lower Volga were relatively empty, devoid of significant agricultural communities or even large-scale nomadic grazing, even though the land was ideal for both.<sup>32</sup> After Ivan the Terrible took Kazan and Astrakhan from the Tartars (1552-1556), Moscovy gained control of the entire Volga and Russian pioneers began to settle the black earth region.

Moscovy's growing power *vis-a-vis* Poland, Sweden and Prussia was supported by Moscovy's eastward expansion. Paul Kennedy argues that Russia's "status as a 'gunpowder empire' enabled it to defeat the horsed tribes of the east, and thus to acquire additional resources of manpower, raw materials, and arable land, which in turn would

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<sup>31</sup> Crosby 1986, pp. 209-215.

<sup>32</sup> McNeill 1977, p. 171.

enhance its place among the Great Powers.”<sup>33</sup> The rapid advance of Russian pioneers, who were beyond the Urals by the 1580s and reached the Pacific by 1640, was not simply a function of gunpowder. The horsemen of the eastern steppes had already been decimated by the plague<sup>34</sup> and much like Native Americans, isolated Siberian peoples had not developed immunities to the childhood diseases of Eurasian civilization. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Siberians suffered deadly epidemics upon contact with Russian pioneers. By “1911, Siberia’s population was 85% Russian, and the percentage has increased greatly since then.”<sup>35</sup>

The role of migration in the balance of power remained a critical factor until the close of World War II.<sup>36</sup> By decreasing the relative importance of mass armies, the nuclear revolution led to a discounting of demography in the calculation of military capabilities and the omission of discussions of demography in the security studies literature.<sup>37</sup> Nevertheless, as Hedley Bull points out, a certain demographic critical mass is necessary for superpower status. “A population of 100 million or more today is not sufficient to confer superpower status upon a nation, but it is widely thought to be necessary for this status.”<sup>38</sup> Given that many international relations theorists contend that their theoretical frameworks explain international politics before and after the development of nuclear weapons, the importance of international migration in the development of subsequent capabilities should be recognized in general theories. Some

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<sup>33</sup> Kennedy 1987, p. 95.

<sup>34</sup> McNeill 1977, pp. 171-173.

<sup>35</sup> Crosby 1986, p. 39.

<sup>36</sup> See Kulischer, *Europe on the Move*.

<sup>37</sup> See Freedman 1991, pp. 7-9.

<sup>38</sup> Hedley Bull, “Population and the Present World Structure,” in William Alonso, ed., *Population in an Interacting World* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 79.

theorists contend that the mere possession of nuclear weapons does not inherently tip the scales in the overall computation of capabilities and is therefore not necessarily a decisive factor in international politics.<sup>39</sup> For those theorists who discount the nuclear factor, international migration should be even a greater consideration.

### **Refugees and International Security**

Barbara Schmitter Heisler and Martin Heisler conceptualized the relationship of migration and international security particularly as it relates to refugees. They point out that beyond the commonsensical notion that people move from areas of insecurity to areas of security, refugees are attracted to the political stability and the peace of areas Karl Deutsch called “security communities.”<sup>40</sup> Deutsch argued that security communities developed in the North Atlantic area comprised of North America and Western Europe. Security communities were defined as areas in which states no longer resort to war in order to resolve disputes and took two forms—amalgamated, meaning “the formal merger of two or more independent units into a larger unit” and pluralistic denoting, “legal independence of the separate governments.”<sup>41</sup>

Over the past few decades the security communities of the North Atlantic area have been drawing refugees from more conflict prone regions to the south and east. This is not to say that the North Atlantic area as a whole has been a magnet for refugees for a very long time. Indeed, until the 1960s Europe generated the majority of the world’s refugees who resettled in the classic immigration countries of the United States, Canada

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<sup>39</sup> Waltz 1979, pp. 180-183.

<sup>40</sup> Schmitter Heisler and Heisler, 1989, Heisler 1992; Deutsch, et. al. 1957.

<sup>41</sup> Deutsch et. al., 1957, p. 6.

and Australia. That is to say the security communities of the New World became the refuge from the conflicts of the Old.

North America has long drawn refugees from religious and political conflicts in Europe. As Deutsch and his associates point out, the United States was a successful pluralistic security community, between 1781-1789. An amalgamated security community was initiated in 1789 but was torn asunder by civil war. Eventually, the United States became a successful amalgamated security community by 1877. The United States-Canada became a successful pluralistic security community during the 1870s and the United State-Mexico became a successful pluralistic security community in the 1930s.<sup>42</sup> The security of North America drew European refugees starting with the first the migrations of English dissenters of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Religious dissenters, such as the Anabaptists (Mennonites), came from other countries as well. As European states developed a larger degree of religious homogeneity, the axis of refugee generation changed from the religious to the political. Political refugees began to come to the United States beginning with the tens of thousands of refugees generated by the French Revolution; British sympathizers and Irish Catholics came as well.<sup>43</sup> During most of the nineteenth century, the United States had an open migration policy which permitted migration from Europe regardless of whether the reason for leaving was poverty, religious or political persecution, or ethnic conflict. Hence, it is difficult to disaggregate refugees from other migrants.

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<sup>42</sup> Deutsch et. al., 1957, p. 29.

<sup>43</sup> Archdeacon 1983, pp. 28-30. The total number of refugees fleeing the revolution was approximately 200, 000. See Moch 1992, pp. 105-106.

Before World War I over a million Europeans emigrated yearly; after the US restricted immigration in 1924 only a tenth of that number did so.<sup>44</sup> The closing of immigration to the New World and deteriorating economic conditions in Europe during the 1930s led to the rise of xenophobic reactionary movements, particularly Hitler's call for increasing Germany's *Lebensraum*, to which growing numbers of Europeans responded.<sup>45</sup> Moreover, the lack of countries willing to receive European refugees led to the isolation of minority groups who were used as internal enemies to sustain mass movements which became a central feature of totalitarian rule.<sup>46</sup> In this way, the closing of migration to the New World fostered the domestic conditions conducive to the propagation of a foreign policy of expansion as well as the development of totalitarianism, therefore, also influencing the way in which World War II was conducted.

At the outset of World War II, millions of refugees tried to out run advances of the German army into Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and France, but to no avail. During the war, Hitler's regime forced the migration of millions of civilians within the territories controlled by Germany who were slated for forced labor, extermination, or both. As the war came to a close, those who were still alive tried to go home or migrated West along with the millions of ethnic Germans fleeing in the wake of the Soviet army. By 1950, 12 million German refugees had made their way to occupied Germany.<sup>47</sup>

A widespread security community did not develop across Western Europe until after World War II. The formation of NATO provided security from the Soviet threat,

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<sup>44</sup> See Kulischer, *Europe on the Move*, p 4.

<sup>45</sup> See Kulischer, *Europe on the Move*, chapters. 5-8.

<sup>46</sup> Arendt 1951.

<sup>47</sup> Moch 1992, pp. 167-169.

functioned as a collective security system (principally to forestall a resurgent Germany) facilitated economic reconstruction under the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which eventually gave way to rapid economic growth and the common market of the European Community in 1957. Similarly the migration of Western Europe's post-war refugees and displaced persons to the United States, Canada and Australia during the late 1940s and early 1950s gave way to the acceptance by European countries of Hungarian refugees in 1956 and the importation of workers from Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey and North Africa during the 1960s. After labor recruitment was halted in 1974, the volume of asylum seekers increased markedly, particularly from Turkey, Iran and Poland. The number of refugees and asylum seekers entering the EC accelerated during the 1980s. As communism collapsed in Eastern Europe, the numbers of refugees seeking political asylum in Western Europe increased sharply from 220,000 in 1989 to 690,000 in 1992, with an additional 350,000 people from the former Yugoslavia receiving temporary protected status outside of asylum procedures.<sup>48</sup> In the post-cold war era, the internal security of the European Union continues to draw refugees from the conflict ridden regions of the Balkans, the Caucasus, Africa and the Middle East, however, increasing restrictions have sharply reduced the number of asylum seekers accepted.

Although refugees fleeing to Europe have received much press coverage they are a small percentage of the global refugee population. During the 1960s the locus of refugee generation moved from Europe to the Third World as decolonization, civil wars

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<sup>48</sup> Source: Jonas Widgren, Coordinator of the Intergovernmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies in Europe, North America and Australia. Reported in Edward Mortimer, "Convenient Cracks in the Wall," *The Financial Times*, April 15, 1993. Nexis release.

and superpower proxy wars in the Third World sustained the flows of refugees<sup>49</sup> Nationals of Third World countries who flee to neighboring countries form the bulk of the refugee population. For example, in 1992, there were 5.4 million refugees in Africa, including 1.6 million Mozambiqueans, one million of whom were in Malawi. Six million Afghan refugees were in Iran and Pakistan until May 1992, when over one million refugees began to return.<sup>50</sup> In 1994, hundreds of thousands of Rwanda's Tutsis fled to Burundi in the wake of massacres by Hutu militiamen and after the victory of Tutsi Rebels, approximately two million Rwandans, primarily Hutus fled to Zaire fearing retribution for the previous massacres. Refugee flows from one Third World country to the other offer perhaps some of the clearest examples of migration impinging on international security as several studies have already made abundantly clear.<sup>51</sup>

### **The Globalization of Domestic Politics and International Security**

The combination of international migration, advances in transportation and communications technology and spreading democratization fosters a globalization of the domestic politics of many states that is similar to the globalization of national economies. Just as the spread of new information technologies that connect headquarters, factories and distribution centers has enabled the globalization of production across borders, these

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<sup>49</sup> See Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo 1989.

<sup>50</sup> See the Statement of Warren Zimmerman, Director of the Bureau for Refugee Programs, before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Senate Appropriations Committee, June 30 1993, "Addressing the Needs of Refugees: A High Priority in the Post-Cold War Era," *Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 28, Washington DC: U.S. Department of State, July 12, 1993, *Nexis* release.

<sup>51</sup> See Weiner 1985; 1989; 1992; 1993; Loescher, 1993; Dowty and Loescher 1996; Keely 1996; Posen 1996; Adelman 1997.

technologies have enabled the globalization of domestic politics by connecting emigrants with their kin and political organizations back home.

Classical diasporas include the ancient Greeks, Jews and Armenians and emigrants in diasporas have influenced the domestic politics and the foreign policies of their home countries throughout history. Migrants have also become politically active in the host country to which they migrated, often in order to influence the foreign policies of their host countries toward their homelands. Governments of the homeland or “mother” country may engage their emigrants to further political agendas, view their emigrants as traitors for leaving or simply ignore them. Diasporic politics in its many forms is not new, however, the scope and scale of emigrant political participation in homeland politics is increasing in today’s world as growing ranks of migrants from an increasing number of source countries living in a greater number of host countries produce evermore and increasingly varied diasporas.

When the domestic politics of one state actually takes place in several states, it is a dimension of politics that is neither within individual states nor between several states and this political practice is not captured by state-centric international relations theories that conceptualize the world in terms of international anarchy in contrast to domestic hierarchy. Much like the proliferation of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), emigrant political participation is a transnational phenomenon whose importance was pointed out long ago,<sup>52</sup> but subsequently failed to make much of an impact on the international relations literature because it failed to be seen as having a significant impact on international security. As is often the case with transnational

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<sup>52</sup> see Mansbach, Ferguson and Lampert 1976: ch. 4; Miller 1981.

phenomena, the globalization of domestic politics is, strictly speaking, distinct from international politics as traditionally understood in terms of state-to-state relations. When the actions of émigrés begin to influence the foreign policy-making of their host or home states, however, the boundary between the globalization of domestic politics and international politics as traditionally conceived evaporates.

In the post-war era, East European émigrés and Americans of East European descent lobbied the United States Congress and successive administrations to press human rights issues in their home countries and maintain a hard line against the Soviet Union. American Jews who identified with Russian Jews did likewise with respect to the Soviet Union. The fight against Algerian independence spearheaded by the descendants of nineteenth century French settlers in Algeria led to turmoil in French domestic politics and foreign policy throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s. Cuban refugees joined forces with the CIA and invaded at the Bay of Pigs in a failed attempt to topple the Castro regime. The Clinton administration's initiative in the Northern Ireland Peace process was prompted by years of lobbying by Irish-Americans.<sup>53</sup>

African-Americans working through a coalition of TransAfrica and the Congressional Black Caucus induced a reversal of the Clinton Administration's policy towards Haiti. Contrary to the position espoused by candidate Bill Clinton in the 1992 presidential campaign, President Clinton continued the Bush administration's practice of interdicting Haitian migrants on the high seas so that they would not reach United States territory and thereby receive full asylum hearings and permission to stay in the United States until that hearing took place. Rather, Haitians migrants received only cursory on-

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<sup>53</sup> Guelke 1996.

board asylum hearings and nearly all were then returned to Haiti. After the 1993 Governor's Island Agreement between Haiti's military leaders and its elected president Jean Bertand Aristide collapsed, migration from Haiti to the United States increased and the Clinton Administration stepped up interdictions at sea. Prompted by a hunger strike by Randall Robinson, the leader of TransAfrica, the Clinton administration removed the United States State Department official in charge of Haitian policy, insured that Haitian refugees would get fair and extensive asylum hearings and began to house Haitians at the American base at Guantanamo, Cuba. Subsequently, the Clinton administration saw no other acceptable way to reduce refugee flows than to enforce the Governor's Island Agreement by inducing Haiti's military leaders to give up power in advance of an imminent deployment of U. S. troops.

Emigrants have become influential the most salient issues of international security, as role of Iraqi émigrés and refugees in the recent Iraq War amply demonstrates. Iraqis who had fled Iraq's Baathist regime in the 1960s, 70s and 80s were joined in Europe and the U.S. by thousands of Iraqi refugees, primarily Shites and Kurds, who left Iraq during and after the 1990 Gulf War. Some of these Iraqi refugees and émigrés formed the Iraqi National Congress, and then lobbied the U.S. Congress and the Clinton and Bush administrations to depose Saddam Hussein. Ahmed Challabi, a leader of the Iraqi National Congress, argued that Iraqis were ready to be liberated and that the Hussein regime could be easily toppled. The Iraqi National Congress received moral support from the United States with passage of the Iraqi Liberation Act of 1998 as well as covert and then overt military assistance. Challabi was particularly influential within the U.S. Defense Department and particularly with Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, who

initially argued that Iraqis supported by U.S. air power and Special Forces could topple the Hussein regime, much as a U.S.-supported Northern Alliance defeated the Taliban in Afghanistan. Eventually, U.S. forces did invade Iraq. When they did so, armed Iraqi exiles participated in securing and occupying several areas. After the collapse of the Hussein regime, returning Iraqi émigrés and refugees made up half of Iraq's transitional governing council, which is considered the first step toward a new democratic Iraqi government.

Emigrants many also influence home country foreign policy.<sup>54</sup> This influence is perhaps most clearly exemplified in those newly democratized countries where emigrants have assumed foreign policy-making portfolios in new governments. Canadian citizen, Gojko Susak, became Croatia's defense minister, an American, Alexander Eiseln, became the leader of the Estonian Army. Americans, Raffi Hovannisian and Muhamed Sacriby became foreign ministers of Armenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, respectively. Of this group, Susak is perhaps most important, not only for his role in the rise of Croatian nationalism and the breakup of Yugoslavia,<sup>55</sup> but also in the Bosnian war. Susak's so-called "Herzegovina lobby" pushed for Croatian military intervention supporting the ethnic Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina and became what a Western diplomat called a "very substantial power, evidenced by the Croatian Government's commitment to recover what is basically a land of snakes and stones."<sup>56</sup> Susak subsequently became the primary Croatian power-broker in the Washington Agreement which formed the Bosnian Croat-Muslim federation.

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<sup>54</sup> For an overview and detailed discussions of the Armenian and Israeli cases, see Shain and Barth 2003.

<sup>55</sup> Koslowski 2005, p. 14. , 15-16.

<sup>56</sup> Unnamed source quoted in Kifner 1994.

Although the influence of emigrants and their descendants on host and home country foreign policy is the most significant way in which the boundary between the globalization of domestic politics and international politics is breached, the distinction also breaks down when the globalization of domestic politics entails violence between contending parties of a domestic political struggle taking place abroad. Such conflicts may be between factions opposed to the home country government, as when Turkish groups fought one another in Germany and the rest of Europe.<sup>57</sup> Emigrant political groups may also directly target diplomatic institutions or personnel of the home state government. On June 24, 1993, Kurdish nationalists, believed to be coordinated by the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), kidnapped 30 people and attacked Turkish businesses and government offices in 29 European cities. The German government responded by outlawing the PKK and other Kurdish nationalist groups as "terrorist organizations," raiding offices, arresting suspected members and deporting them. Similarly, the attacks of al Qaeda on U.S. military and diplomatic personnel and facilities in Saudi Arabia, Yemen and East Africa can be understood as part of a globalized intra-Saudi conflict between Osama Bin Laden and a Saudi monarchy that Bin Laden condemned for allowing U.S. military to be stationed in Saudi Arabia during and after the first Gulf War. When al Qaeda joined forces with Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the conflict became less of a domestic Saudi conflict and more of an intra-Arab, intra-Muslim world conflict between radical Islamacists and more secular western-oriented governments supported by the U.S. In such cases, parties to the conflict often view these actions in terms of the

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<sup>57</sup> Abadan-Unat 1997.

continuation of domestic political struggles abroad whereas the host countries in which this struggle takes place label it “international terrorism.”

Although terrorist activity has generally come under the purview of cabinet ministers and executive departments dedicated to law enforcement and internal security, in the post-Cold War era, the phenomenon of international terrorism has increasingly become a matter dealt with by foreign and defense ministries. This shift has been largely motivated by the possibility of terrorists gaining access to weapons of mass destruction, particularly from the remnants of the Soviet Union. It was not, however, until the September 11, 2001 attacks that international terrorism became a primary mission of foreign and defense ministries and even, as in the case of the U.S., led to a reorganization of government to provide “homeland security.” Hence, by the mid-1990s, international terrorism became recognized as a significant topic of security analysis. Now the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks have led to a rethinking of national security itself. In this rethinking, it is worth pausing to remember that just as Clausewitz defined war as “politics by other means,” depending on one’s perspective, certain forms of international terrorism may be considered transnational diasporic politics by other means.

### **Global Mobility as a Security Issue<sup>58</sup>**

International migration is the new security threat but rather global mobility in general. Global mobility refers to all those who have crossed any border for any reason for any length of time. From the standpoint of official statistics, global mobility can be roughly split between international migration, defined by the UN as those who have lived

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<sup>58</sup> This section extensively draws on Koslowski 2005.

outside of their country of nationality or birth for more than one year and international travel, which would capture those who travel abroad but do not stay in another country for a full year. There are an estimated 191 million migrants in the world<sup>59</sup> but this is rather small in comparison with the billions of border crossings by tourists, students, business people and commuters who travel internationally for stays of less than a year. With respect to estimating the extent of global mobility beyond the number of migrants, not all states keep records of all authorized international border crossings and there is no centralized collection of border crossing statistics that are collected. UN World Tourism Organization does collect and report international travel statistics with respect to tourism and business travel and estimated that in 2008 there were 924 million international tourist arrivals, which includes travel for leisure, business and to visit friends and relatives (UNWTO 2009). If all of these individuals returned home, their return trips home add another 924 million border crossings, totaling close to two billion border crossings.

From a border security standpoint, the increasing number of travelers is a challenge to border control officials who attempt to identify dangerous individuals within the flows of legitimate travelers. This included the 19 hijackers who on September 11, 2001 attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, 17 of whom entered on tourist visas, one on a business visa and one on a student visa. The 9/11 hijackers were not immigrants to the US. Most of them were tourists. Contrary to the arguments of certain politicians and certain media outlets made after 9/11 that connected immigrants to terrorism, migration is not the “new security issue;” it is the small number of terrorists travelling within the growing international flows of tourists and businesspeople.

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<sup>59</sup> UN 2006.

Contrary to realist assumptions that states with sufficient military capabilities are the only actors of significance in world politics, a handful of people crossing unarmed into another country can have tremendous consequences for international security, as the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 amply demonstrated. The world's most powerful states are now threatened by the possibility of asymmetric warfare by non-state actors armed with weapons of mass destruction.<sup>60</sup> Homeland security officials are preparing for distributed simultaneous attacks of suicidal terrorists arriving in airports posing as tourists who then infect themselves with smallpox and spread it to unsuspecting crowds at major tourist attractions. Strategies of nuclear deterrence that dominated international security policy and theories in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century no longer apply when the opponent is not a state that can be threatened with retaliation but rather a suicidal individual.

The prospect of terrorists being smuggled into target states was considered as a potential threat in some law enforcement circles but it was not until after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington and the Mar. 11, 2003 attacks in Madrid that human smuggling was viewed as a security threat in a qualitatively different way. For example, it became clear that terrorists could take clandestine routes that transnational criminal organizations use to smuggle illegal migrants into the US. The 9/11 Commission staff detailed linkages between human smugglers and Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups in need of travel facilitation.<sup>61</sup> Investigations into the Madrid bombing produced reports demonstrating that Ansar al-Islam, an al Qaeda-affiliated group linked to the attack, has been running a human smuggling and document fraud operation to fund

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<sup>60</sup> Allison 2004.

<sup>61</sup> 9/11 Commission 2004; 61.

terrorist actions as well as to smuggle its own members into countries like Spain and Iraq.<sup>62</sup>

As intelligence screening and visa security is tightened so as to stop terrorists from entering legally with valid visas, the threat of clandestine entry of terrorists using smuggling organizations increases and with it international cooperation to combat terrorist travel and human smuggling. Within weeks of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the UN Security Council “Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,” issued resolution 1373 (2001) on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts that included a provision that “all States shall: . . . Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents.”<sup>63</sup> The Security Council established a Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) in 2004 to strengthen and coordinate the process of monitoring the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001).

In 2000 UN General Assembly adopted the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime’s “Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air” went into effect on January 28, 2004 and now has 116 state parties.<sup>64</sup> The objectives of the human smuggling protocol are twofold - establishing the smuggling of migrants as a criminal offense and facilitating cooperation in the prevention, investigation and prosecution of the crime of smuggling migrants. The protocol provides rules for

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<sup>62</sup> Simpson, Crawford and Johnson 2004.

<sup>63</sup> UN 2001.

<sup>64</sup> For treaty texts, signatures and ratifications, see “UN Signatories to the UN Convention against Transnational Crime and its Protocols” at: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/index.html>

interdicting and boarding ships suspected of carrying illegal migrants, approves of state use of carrier sanctions and encourages information exchanges between states that enable more effective law enforcement. The protocol also calls on states to strengthen border controls and intensify cooperation among border control agencies by establishing and maintaining direct lines of communication, ensuring the integrity of travel documents that they issue and respond to requests to verify the validity of those documents.<sup>65</sup>

**Conclusion (to be written)**

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<sup>65</sup> For further elaboration see Koslowski 2001; forthcoming.

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