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A model of Social Security Disability Insurance using matched SIPP/Administrative data

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ABSTRACT

We study Disability Insurance (DI) application behavior in the US using matched SIPP and administrative data over 1989–1995. Certain state-contingent earnings projections and eligibility probabilities are central to the analysis. We find evidence for a small work disincentive effect of DI that seems to be restricted to a subset of the DI beneficiaries, including low earning groups such as blue collar workers and those subject to economic dislocation. Processing time, Medicare value, unemployment, private health insurance, and health shocks are some of the major factors that affect application propensity. The behavioral response of female workers to various parameters of the DI program is found to be quite different from that of males.

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Executive summary

We estimate an econometric model of Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) application behavior, using the 1990, 1991, and 1992 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) matched to Social Security Administration data for 1989–1995. The resulting matched file captures a rich set of individual-specific antecedents of the application decision, including: demographics, self-reported health and activity limitations, household composition and family finances, earnings histories, program eligibility status, occupational characteristics, disease-specific Medicare expenditures, and hypothetical DI benefits. Exploiting these data, we focus less on population-wide effects than on subgroup effects with direct policy implications. State-contingent earnings projections and eligibility probabilities as well as individual-specific benefit calculations are all central to the analysis. The main findings are:

- No more than 37% of DI beneficiaries would return to sustained work if they did not receive DI benefits. Using the labor force participation rate of rejected disability applications as a benchmark, Bound (1990) estimated that less than 50% of the DI beneficiaries would have returned to sustained work were they not receiving DI benefits. When pre-application differences in the labor market attachment of allowed and denied applicants are considered along with the observed

work efforts by beneficiaries, the estimated work disincentives associated with DI benefits are notably smaller.

- Our estimated elasticity of applications with respect to benefit size is significant only for males (0.496). The overall elasticity is small compared to previous estimates based on cross-sectional data, explaining little of the extraordinary DI enrolment growth over the period.
- We find significant differences in the effect of DI benefits on applications not only by gender, but by pre-application earnings level. The effect is greatest for low earners. Our findings suggest that the moral hazard problem associated with DI is mainly restricted to males and, among males, it is mainly restricted to low earners, such as blue collar workers and those more subject to economic dislocation or stagnant real wages. Hence, the work disincentive associated with the DI benefit may contribute to recent growth in allowances via the vocational grid, which is often an eligibility path for low earners with blue collar jobs. We infer that such subgroups may be good candidates for vocational rehabilitation and return-to-work incentives.
- Individual medical eligibility probabilities have a substantial direct effect on the propensity to apply. Our estimate of the elasticity is 1.54 – much larger than earlier studies. The findings underscore the fundamental role of medical factors in the application decision, notwithstanding the role of vocational and economic elements for key applicant subgroups. We do not find state level variation in allowance rates to be significant in explaining application behavior at the individual level.
- The Medicare variable has a large, statistically significant effect on the decision to apply for DI benefits, with an elasticity of 0.24. Our analysis dispels any presumption that all DI applicants have

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uniformly high health costs. For example, the costs of persons with cancer or AIDS are several times higher than those of persons with mental problems or a stroke and ten times higher than those of persons with hypertension or deafness. Based on diagnosis-specific cost information, in our sample the average expected value of Medicare for applicants is more than 50% higher than that of non-applicants. The availability of Medicare benefits boosts the average probability of application by nearly 12%. Ours is the first study to capture the effect of the expected value of medical insurance on application behavior.

- Local area unemployment rates significantly affect applications. The elasticity is 0.30 for males and females combined; however, the effect is higher for males (0.42). Our unemployment variable explains a large part of the growth in disability applications in the early 1990s. This finding suggests the need for a policy focus on rehabilitation, return to work (including the Ticket to Work effort), and the vocational grid.
- We find a significant effect for variations in processing time across states and over time on applications. The elasticity is significant for males (0.40), but not for females.
- Overall, the disability application equation for females is quite different from that for males. Although medical eligibility probability has a significant impact on both females and males, key policy variables like the DI benefits and processing time do not seem to affect female application behavior. This is consistent with the fact that whereas the male labor force participation rate has decreased during last few decades, the opposite is true for women. The singular behavioral response of female workers to parameters of the DI program is intriguing and warrants further research.

1. Introduction

Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) are the two largest federal programs providing cash benefits to people with disabilities. Both are administered by the Social Security Administration. Established in 1954, DI provides cash assistance to people with disabilities (and their dependents or survivors) under the age of 65 who have enough work experience to qualify. Created in 1972, SSI is a means-tested income assistance program that provides monthly payments to adults or children who have disabilities and whose income and assets fall below statutory levels. During 1982–2002, the number of disabled workers receiving benefits under DI doubled (increasing from 2.6 million to 5.5 million), while annual payments quadrupled (increasing from about \$13.8 billion to \$55.5 billion). By 2002, another 2.8 million working-age individuals with disabilities were receiving \$18.5 billion in annual SSI federal benefits. The associated medical costs under Medicare and Medicaid programs for the disabled amounted to an additional \$132 billion. Entitlement spending on this scale, growing unabated in more recent years, argues not only for more analysis of economic incentives underlying applications decisions, but also for an expanded focus on the complex procedure for determining eligibility. Not surprisingly, researchers both within the Social Security Administration (SSA) and in academia have been trying to understand the causes of program growth so that policy makers can respond.¹

The growth of the disability programs is the consequence of both decreasing terminations and increasing applications and

awards. The declining death rates of beneficiaries and the lower average age of new awardees are generally considered to be the main reasons for the falling terminations. On the other hand, changes in eligibility rules, the adjudicative climate, and business cycle effects are considered to be the predominant reasons for increasing applications, see [Rupp and Stapleton \(1995\)](#). The DI Program, like all insurance programs, is susceptible to an unintended consequence—the so-called moral hazard problem. With the male labor force participation rate falling during the last three decades, economists have sought to explain this phenomenon by the availability and increasing generosity of the DI program, cf. [Parsons \(1980\)](#). Recent economic research on disability has attempted to measure the impact of a few key policy parameters on application behavior, e.g., the disability benefit level, the individual-specific eligibility probability, and the average processing time for disability applications. Here we focus on these factors and many others, but we do so in a way that tests for differential behavior for subgroups within the pool of potential DI applicants. This approach acknowledges and accommodates the heterogeneity of DI applicants.

Historically, researchers have faced a daunting data problem in studying the growth in disability programs. On the one hand, administrative data, tied to day-to-day operations, have no information at all on non-applicants and, for applicants, little socioeconomic information needed to understand application behavior. On the other hand, household surveys provide information on non-applicants and on a range of socioeconomic details; however, it has been difficult to determine the pool of prospective DI eligibles based on self-reported survey responses. In this paper we study DI application behavior using matched Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and SSA administrative data files representing 1989–1995.

Our study offers several advantages over previous studies: (1) Most previous studies have used data from the 1960s and 1970s, even though the nature of DI enrollment has dramatically changed since 1984. (2) We match SIPP data with SSA disability determination records in such a way that the majority of our sample members are observed in the survey before the time of application. One endemic problem with almost all studies mentioned above is that application decisions were observed many years before socioeconomic and health information were collected from the survey respondents. For instance, in [Kreider \(1999\)](#) and [Kreider and Riphahn \(2000\)](#), the disability application dates are 2–7 years before the survey window. (3) The value of Medicare coverage for Social Security Disability Insurance beneficiaries is almost 50% of the average DI benefit level. We have estimated the expected value of medical care under Medicare for each individual by using recent research on disease-specific capitation rates (cf. [Ash et al. \(2000\)](#)) and used it successfully in the application equation. (4) We pay special attention to pre-application health shocks in the earnings equations such that they are not subsumed as part of unobserved heterogeneity and self-selection. There is a great deal of variation in earnings streams prior to application, and in recovery rates based on the earnings of denied applicants. Moreover, these earnings profiles are not based on self-reports, but are obtained from SSA's Summary Earnings Records (SER) data. (5) Three counterfactual earnings projections are central to the analysis: projected earnings if not applying, if allowed, and if denied. The projection of earnings if not applying used in this paper is based on non-applicants after correcting for application self-selection. Unlike the aforementioned studies we generate the hypothetical benefits if allowed from an SSA benefit calculator, rather than estimating it by regression methods using self-reported data. Typically researchers have generated potential disability benefits for all sample members from the self-reported disability receipts of the beneficiaries. (6) Our sample covers both

¹ See, for example, [Halpern and Hausman \(1986\)](#), [Leonard \(1986\)](#), [Haveman et al. \(1991\)](#), [Arts and de Jong \(1992\)](#), [Lahiri et al. \(1995\)](#), [Kreider \(1999\)](#), [Gruber and Kubik \(2002\)](#), [Benítez-Silva et al. \(1999\)](#), [Hu et al. \(2001\)](#), and [Autor and Duggan \(2006\)](#). Further references are available in recent survey articles by [Bound and Burkhauser \(1999\)](#) and [Haveman and Wolfe \(2000\)](#).

men and women over the ages 18–64. Most previous studies are restricted on gender/age dimensions due to limitations in sample design, cf. Gruber (2000). (7) Building on our previous research (see Lahiri et al. (1995) and Hu et al. (2001)) we pay special attention to the disability determination process in generating the eligibility probabilities. The resulting probabilities are critical in obtaining the correct estimates of other behavioral parameters, especially the medical and vocational factors inherent in the medical determination. After all, as Gruber and Kubik (1997) point out, if the SSA's eligibility determination process were foolproof, there would be no moral hazard problem. (8) Because our final analytical sample is obtained after matching a number of different data sources, we utilize a much larger number of meaningful explanatory variables in all structural equations compared to other studies. For example, we consider variables such as blue collar occupation and occupations with a strength requirement.

The results of this study indicate that the estimated elasticity of applications for men with respect to benefit size is approximately 0.5 which is much smaller than the estimates reported in Kreider (1999), but similar to those based on time series data, see Bound and Burkhauser (1999). We find this value to be quite robust to a wide variety of alternative specifications. Furthermore, magnitudes of the effect vary over different groups of individuals classified by gender and by their pre-disability earnings. Our results suggest that the moral hazard problem associated with the Social Security Disability Insurance program is restricted to those with lower earnings during the pre-disability period. Perhaps some low earners may have less attachment to the labor force than those with high earnings, and, of that group, some may be prone to 'shirking'.

Furthermore, estimates from our endogenous switching Tobit earnings model indicate that effects of selection are important in modeling earnings for the denied. The results imply that unobserved factors (e.g., taste for work, motivation, skill) affect application and eligibility decisions as well as earnings of the denied. Ignoring these effects would underestimate the true earnings projections of the denied. The direction of these effects and the differential pre-application labor market attachment of the denied and the beneficiaries suggest that the labor supply disincentive effect of DI in Bound (1989) may be overestimated.

2. Data sources

In this study, we use three major sources of data: the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), the Master Beneficiary Record (MBR), and the Summary Earnings record (SER). The SIPP is a recurring national survey designed as a continuous series of national panels, with sample sizes ranging from approximately 14,000–36,700 interviewed households. Both the MBR and SER are SSA administrative data files. The MBR contains the information needed to generate Social Security benefit checks under the Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program. The MBR has one record for each Social Security claim number. An MBR record is created whenever an individual first applies for OASDI benefits and the initial decision is made. Hence the record indicates the final decision regarding the initial claim, including denials, based on information from the 831 data on medical determinations generated by state Disability Determination Service agencies. The SER contains annual summaries of Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) earnings received by individuals. A record is created when a new social security number (SSN) is issued.

The sample used in the core of this study is selected from the 1990, 1991, and 1992 SIPP panels. The 1990 and 1991 panels consist of eight waves covering thirty-two months from late 1989 through early 1992 and from late 1990 through early 1993. The 1992 panel consists of ten waves covering forty months from late

Table 1
Derivation of analytical sample

'90 Panel	'91 Panel	'92 Panel	Total
At risk (individuals with health problems)			
6383	3445	4138	13,966
Drop SS beneficiaries; drop age < 18 as of 1st of month or ages > 64 (last month of survey)			
4883	2681	3428	10,992
Drop pure SSI; drop not insured non-applicants; drop those who filed before age 18 or after age 65			
3723	2087	2663	8,473

1991 through early 1995. The sample from each panel is drawn from the longitudinal file and from topical modules 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7. Various health-related questions including functional limitations, activities of daily living, medical care utilization, and work disability appear in topical modules 3 and 6 for the 1990 panel, topical module 3 for the 1991 panel, and topical module 6 for the 1992 panel. Topical module 1 or 2 includes employment history questions. The longitudinal and core files are used to obtain demographic, economic, program-participation, and labor force variables. The total number of individuals interviewed in all of the waves (number of records in longitudinal files) is 176,217 (69,432, 44,373, and 62,412 observations in the 1990, 1991, and 1992 panels respectively).

We matched these SIPP samples with the MBR in order to obtain disability application and adjudication status, and with the SER to obtain historical earnings records for members of the SIPP sample. Applicants are selected based on the first observable application from the 831 file. The 831 file includes information on application (initial and reconsideration) dates from the late 1970s to the present. Since the paper focuses on applications filed in the 1990s, our application date can be considered to be the very first one. We include both pure DI and concurrent applicants. Concurrent beneficiaries receive SSI as well as DI benefits, reflecting their low income and assets. In order to match SIPP information (health, earnings, employment, etc.) dated prior to application, and also maintain a reasonable sample size, we included DI applicants who were interviewed in SIPP any time during a 32-month window prior to the date of application. Information on the latest allowance status of the initial applications was obtained from the MBR which contains the latest official payment information. The matched MBR files used in the study were extracted in 2002.

In addition, we added information on: occupational characteristics from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT); workload from DDS Staffing and Workload Analysis (SWA) reports; and staffing, workload, processing time, and demographics at the district office level from the Profiling System Data base (PSD) of the SSA Office of Workforce Analysis. See Hu et al. (2001) for further details on the occupational variables. Since all of the information regarding disability application and adjudication were obtained from the 2002 MBR, they can be considered as final—including re-applications and decisions at the reconsideration and administrative law judge (ALJ) levels. An important issue is how one selects the sample of non-applicants. The disability non-applicant sample of 7375 individuals was selected because they are: (1) at-risk of disability application because they report some type of health condition or limitation, (2) disability insured,² (3) non-participants in DI or SSI, and (4) working age (18–64). Even though our initial dataset contains a large number of person-wave observations, our final sample consists of one observation each for a total of 8473 individuals—7376 individuals who have not applied for DI benefits, 381 denied DI applicants, and 716 allowed DI applicants, see Table 1.

² To be DI insured, a worker over age 30 must have 20 quarters of coverage (based on annual payroll deductions) during the last 40 calendar quarters ending in disability. Special rules apply for younger workers.

Table 2
Sample characteristics

Variables	ALL		Non-applicants		Denied applicants		Allowed applicants	
	Mean	Std. D.	Mean	Std. D.	Mean	Std. D.	Mean	Std. D.
OBS	8473		7376		381		716	
PHILADELPHIA	0.097	0.296	0.099	0.298	0.063	0.243	0.095	0.293
ATLANTA	0.185	0.387	0.174	0.379	0.252	0.434	0.255	0.436
CHICAGO	0.203	0.402	0.207	0.405	0.173	0.378	0.176	0.381
KANSAS	0.065	0.246	0.065	0.247	0.063	0.243	0.058	0.235
DALLAS	0.106	0.307	0.105	0.306	0.141	0.349	0.095	0.293
DENVER	0.037	0.188	0.037	0.190	0.028	0.167	0.030	0.172
SANFRANCISCO	0.129	0.334	0.130	0.336	0.126	0.332	0.113	0.317
SEATTLE	0.045	0.207	0.046	0.211	0.034	0.181	0.029	0.168
ACCIDENT	0.130	0.336	0.116	0.321	0.280	0.450	0.187	0.390
AGE_35–	0.310	0.462	0.333	0.471	0.233	0.423	0.108	0.311
AGE_35–44	0.274	0.445	0.280	0.449	0.249	0.433	0.216	0.412
AGE_45–54	0.230	0.421	0.222	0.415	0.204	0.404	0.325	0.468
AGE_55+	0.186	0.389	0.163	0.370	0.312	0.464	0.349	0.477
AGE	41.960	11.732	41.169	11.624	45.440	12.504	48.296	10.042
AIME	1.428	0.921	1.461	0.931	1.010	0.778	1.301	0.813
LENIENCY	0.391	0.068	0.390	0.067	0.381	0.066	0.395	0.069
EARNINGS ^a	15.831	14.342	16.602	14.520	7.712	10.337	12.203	12.293
BED_DAY	0.162	0.368	0.139	0.346	0.254	0.4362	0.347	0.476
BENEFICIARY	0.085	0.278	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.000
WORK_HAZARD	0.303	0.459	0.283	0.450	0.393	0.489	0.452	0.498
WAIT_TIME	0.876	0.215	0.879	0.214	0.860	0.222	0.855	0.218
DOCTOR_VISITS	0.749	1.186	0.674	1.049	1.071	1.503	1.345	1.910
VOLUNTARY_U	0.154	0.361	0.136	0.343	0.320	0.467	0.243	0.429
EARNINGS_DROP ^a	1.713	11.420	0.363	10.711	7.296	11.230	12.644	11.832
INC_VARIABILITY	1.773	2.347	1.687	2.289	2.497	2.549	2.260	2.677
FAMILY_SIZE	2.985	1.488	3.005	1.470	2.818	1.578	2.865	1.601
FAMILY_INC	22.122	21.968	22.597	22.322	17.559	16.455	19.652	20.368
HEALTH_INS	0.787	0.409	0.805	0.395	0.627	0.484	0.676	0.468
IADL	0.063	0.242	0.038	0.192	0.147	0.354	0.266	0.442
BLUE_COLLAR	0.456	0.498	0.435	0.495	0.538	0.499	0.614	0.487
WHITE_COLLAR	0.218	0.412	0.228	0.420	0.149	0.357	0.139	0.346
PHYSICAL_JOB	0.151	0.357	0.152	0.359	0.139	0.346	0.134	0.341
LIFE_INS	0.658	0.47	0.675	0.468	0.469	0.499	0.581	0.493
LIFTING	0.153	0.359	0.114	0.318	0.370	0.483	0.434	0.496
MALE	0.470	0.499	0.457	0.498	0.506	0.500	0.581	0.493
MARRIED	0.658	0.474	0.663	0.472	0.611	0.488	0.629	0.483
MEDICAID ^a	2.947	2.487	2.682	2.217	4.324	3.147	4.934	3.409
MEDICARE ^a	2.322	1.789	2.131	1.613	3.453	2.232	3.681	2.348
CHRONIC	0.175	0.380	0.138	0.345	0.385	0.487	0.439	0.496
CONGENITAL	0.024	0.152	0.017	0.130	0.065	0.247	0.071	0.257
ACUTE	0.217	0.412	0.196	0.397	0.280	0.450	0.392	0.488
MENTAL	0.079	0.270	0.075	0.264	0.057	0.233	0.128	0.334
METRO	0.719	0.449	0.729	0.444	0.666	0.472	0.638	0.480
NETASSET ^a	82.310	150.290	84.928	152.290	55.200	123.430	69.720	140.240
NEVER_MARID	0.174	0.379	0.180	0.384	0.147	0.354	0.124	0.330
LABOR_ATTACH	7.315	2.866	7.402	2.785	5.992	3.532	7.110	3.098
POOR_HEALTH	0.068	0.251	0.036	0.187	0.189	0.392	0.328	0.469
BENEFIT_SIZE ^a	7.918	3.426	8.049	3.443	6.251	3.123	7.452	3.117
POVERTY_RATE	0.205	0.066	0.202	0.066	0.219	0.069	0.218	0.069
SCHOOL_YRS	12.930	2.597	13.095	2.542	11.801	2.802	11.824	2.626
STRENGTH	0.384	0.486	0.364	0.481	0.512	0.500	0.523	0.499
UNEMPLOYMENT	0.054	0.019	0.053	0.019	0.055	0.018	0.058	0.021
USE_AIDS	0.022	0.146	0.012	0.108	0.042	0.200	0.115	0.320
WALKING	0.142	0.356	0.104	0.306	0.372	0.484	0.487	0.500
NON_HAZARD	0.067	0.250	0.066	0.248	0.107	0.310	0.060	0.237

Variable definitions are given in the Data Appendix.

^a In \$1000.

Selected descriptive statistics for our analytical sample, categorized as non-applicants, denied applicants and beneficiaries, are presented in Table 2. Compared to non-applicants, the disability applicants tend to be older, poorer, sicker (both mentally and physically), and less educated. It is noteworthy that the number of doctor visits and bed days immediately prior to the disability application is nearly double the average number for non-applicants. In terms of occupation, significantly more applicants come from occupations classified as hazardous, blue collar or having a strength requirement. Also, more non-applicants have some form of health insurance and more family income. Applicants tend to come from high unemployment areas. The socioeconomic status of the applicants on the average is consistently lower than that of the

non-applicants. Sharp differences between the denied and allowed applicants (beneficiaries) are also noticeable most of the time. Allowed applicants are sicker than the denied across every measure of health and disability. The net asset position of the denied applicants (\$55,201) before application is substantially less than that of the allowed applicants (\$69,723), which in turn is less than that of non-applicants (\$84,928).³ All the statistics are consistent with

³ Interestingly, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) have suggested an optimal disability insurance system where an applicant is granted a benefit only if his/her assets fall below a specified maximum. Our evidence, however, indicates that more severely disabled applicants have higher pre-application assets.

our expectations and suggest that disability application behavior is more than a medical phenomenon—it also has social and economic dimensions. However, as we see later, these dimensions do not manifest themselves uniformly for all subgroups within the applicant pool.

3. Structure of the disability application model

To guide our empirical exploration, a structural econometric model similar to that of Kreider (1999) or a fully dynamic life-cycle model (Rust et al., 2003) is needed to understand the tradeoffs involved in the decision to apply for DI and the role of different explanatory variables that should enter specific equations of the model. Given the latest health status, a DI insured worker is assumed to make a rational decision whether to apply for DI benefits based on a comparison of expected discounted lifetime utility when applying and when not applying. These lifetime utilities in turn depend on expected total income when applying and not applying, at the time of the decision. The expected future income when applying involves not only the expected probability of eligibility, expected DI and medical benefits when eligible and expected subsequent earnings when denied, but also the foregone earnings during the application process. The major components of the application model are: the medical determination (eligibility probability), disability benefit amount, earnings projections, Medicare value, and other exogenous factors. In our model, individual health, socioeconomic incentives and family conditions induce individuals to apply for disability benefits. We include individual health conditions directly from the survey (SIPP) to control for health factors. We also use the following four components to capture the financial incentive for disability application: subjective probability of being allowed, Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), expected future earnings if not applying and expected future earnings if denied.

In developing these components, we exploited SSA administrative data to obtain our estimates in several ways. The allowance probabilities were estimated using a disability determination model that we developed in Lahiri et al. (1995). Whereas other authors have used survey self-reports without demonstrating how their disability screen relates to SSA's definition of disability, we used wide-ranging information on health and disability from separate waves and modules of SIPP to learn how these subjective and objective self-reports can be used to predict the SSA disability determinations, see Lahiri et al. (1995). To estimate benefits we used a benefit calculator—a modified version of the calculator used by SSA. We then validated the calculator using SSA administrative data. In predicting future earnings we used SSA data, first, to distinguish applicants/non-applicants and allowed applicants/denied applicants and, second, to project earnings based on individual specific earnings histories.

A variable often used to capture the net economic benefit of applying for disability benefits is the so-called 'replacement ratio'. In the DI context, the replacement ratio is typically defined as the ratio of (expected) disability benefits to historical earnings, i.e., Primary Insurance Amount divided by the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (*AIME*). The *PIA* and *AIME* represent the disability benefit and level of past covered earnings, respectively. The *PIA* is the monthly benefit amount payable to a worker upon retirement at the normal retirement age or upon entitlement to DI benefits. The *PIA* is derived from the worker's *AIME* and is designed to provide a higher replacement ratio to workers with a lower *AIME*. This replacement ratio seems inappropriate in capturing the effect of the net economic benefit in applying for disability benefits because the *AIME* does not necessarily reflect future expected earnings after the onset of disability and health shocks.

A more appropriate measure of replacement ratio in the context of disability application is the expected payoff if applying to expected lifetime earnings that one can earn if not applying, see Kreider (1999). This latter variable is defined as the weighted average of *PIA* and expected discounted future earnings if denied with expected eligibility probability as the weight. One would hypothesize that the higher the expected payoff, the higher will be the incentive to apply, and the higher the expected earnings if not applying, the lower will be the incentive of application, holding other factors constant. Hence this payoff variable includes not only potential disability benefits and potential earnings if denied; it also incorporates individual specific allowance probability. Unlike the conventional definition of replacement ratio that measures the percentage of long-term historical earnings replaced by disability benefits, this replacement ratio measures the percentage of expected future earnings replaced by disability benefit in a prospective sense. Needless to say, because future earnings for a disabled person are conditioned very seriously by current and past health shocks, projected earnings capacity conditional on current health is more relevant than past earnings in predicting a disability application decision.

In order to construct the replacement ratio variable, we need to predict (1) eligibility probabilities for all sample members including non-applicants, (2) expected labor earnings if not applying, (3) expected labor earnings if denied, and (4) expected disability benefit if allowed. The subjective allowance probability – the probability that an individual will be found medically eligible – is obtained from the disability determination model. This model predicts probabilities based on a sub-sample of disability applicants. Caution is necessary because allowance and application probabilities are expected to be jointly distributed. That is, those who are more likely to be allowed tend to have a higher probability of applying for disability benefits—even after we control for observed characteristics. Unlike Kreider (1999) and Kreider and Riphahn (2000), we find no such correlation in unobserved heterogeneity in the application and eligibility equations. We offer a justification for this finding in terms of the sequential nature of the disability determination process. Halpern and Hausman (1986) did not allow for this effect in their model.

Unlike other studies, we calculate *PIA* based on individual past earnings reported in the matched SER file using a benefit calculator modeled on how SSA actually computes benefits. The benefit calculation method actually used by SSA to derive a disability benefit is described in Myers (1993) and the SSA Annual Statistical Supplement (various issues). The first step in calculating the *AIME* and *PIA* is determining the number of computation years. The number of computation years for disability applicants equals the number of years that have elapsed since 1950 (or, if later, the year of attainment of age 21) and before the year in which the worker attained age 62 (or earlier if the person dies or becomes disabled) minus the drop-out years. The drop-out years can be between zero and five depending on age at disability (Myers, 1993, pp. 68–71). The next step is calculating the *AIME* using the number of years with highest indexed earnings regardless of the beneficiary's age. The indexing year is the second year prior to the year in which the individual attains age 62 (or earlier in cases of death or disability). The average wage for the indexing year is divided by the national average wage in each year to get the factor for that year. Then the factors are multiplied by the actual covered earnings to obtain the indexed earnings. After the indexing, the highest indexed earnings corresponding to the number of computation years are selected and totaled. Then the total is divided by the number of calculation months to obtain the *AIME*. The last step in calculating the *PIA* is to put the *AIME* into a piece-wise linear concave benefit formula involving bend points, which are different based on the calendar year of disability. Then the *PIA* is rounded to the next lower ten cents.

In calculating the PIA, we assign the disability-onset year by choosing one year after the most recent non-zero earnings in the SER file for those who show recent years of no earning activities. For others who show consistent earnings activity, the year prior to the application is assigned as the disability-onset year. The application years for non-applicants were assigned randomly based on the distribution of applicants over sample years, see Kreider (1999).

The remaining two variables required to impute the replacement ratio are post-application earnings capacity if not applying and if denied. The strict sequential process of application and adjudication separate the sample into three distinctive groups—non-applicants, allowed applicants, and denied applicants. We allow for the possibility of joint determination of the application decision and earnings. The observed earnings could be endogenous and they are also observed conditional on the labor force participation status of individuals. Hence, we use an endogenous switching Tobit model in obtaining predicted earnings for applicants as well as non-applicants. The Tobit model is used because for many individuals, particularly women, the recorded earnings are zero in many years.

Our model consists of four equations—application, eligibility, earnings of non-applicants, and earnings of denials:

1. Application (1: apply, 0: else)

$$I_{iA}^* = X_{iA}\beta_A + F(\text{eligibility, benefit, earnings}) + e_{iA}$$

$$= \Delta_{iA} + e_{iA}$$

$$I_{iA} = 1, \text{ if } I_{iA}^* \geq 0; \quad I_{iA} = 0, \text{ otherwise.}$$

2. Medical determination model (1: eligible, 0: else)

$$I_{iE}^* = X_{iE}\beta_E + e_{iE} \text{ (if application = 1)}$$

$$= \Delta_{iE} + e_{iE}$$

$$I_{iE} = 1, \text{ if } I_{iE}^* \geq 0; \quad I_{iE} = 0, \text{ otherwise.}$$

3. Earnings model:

Non-applicants: $Y_{in}^* = X_{in}\beta_n + e_{in} = \Delta_{in} + e_{in}$
 $Y_{in} = \max(0, Y_{in}^*)$.

4. Earnings model:

Denied applicants: $Y_{id}^* = X_{id}\beta_d + e_{id} = \Delta_{id} + e_{id}$
 $Y_{id} = \max(0, Y_{id}^*)$.

Since the benefit projections will be done using the actual SSA benefit calculator, we will not estimate the earnings equation for the beneficiaries. Due to sample selection problems, error terms in the eligibility (medical determination) and remaining two earnings equations will be jointly distributed, and are censored. As a result our model contains two Probit, and two Tobit equations. We did not require a two-limit Tobit model because the number of individuals reaching the maximum taxable income was negligible.

Based on the non-linearity in the functional forms implied by von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility theory, Kreider (1999) has shown that all of the coefficients of this model are technically identified (up to scale for the binary application and eligibility equations) without any arbitrary exclusion restrictions. Since we found that the estimated eligibility probabilities are highly variable across individuals, the application and the earnings equations are identified. Additionally the identifiability of the earning equations can be justified by the joint normal distributional assumption or the non-linearity of the selection equations. Due to the rich and diverse data sources used in this study, assumed non-linearity in the functional form and normality in errors assure identification of all model parameters.

4. Estimation method

Our model essentially represents a recursive system of multiple equations with correlated errors. The strategy here is to estimate the four endogenous Tobit equations together by full-fledged FIML. The likelihood function of the model is:

$$\ln L = \sum_{\text{non-applicants, } y=0} \ln \left[\int_{X_A\beta_A}^{\infty} \int_{X_n\beta_n}^{\infty} \phi_2(e_n, e_A) de_n de_A \right]$$

$$+ \sum_{\text{non-applicants, } y>0} \ln \left[\int_{X_A\beta_A}^{\infty} \phi_2(Y_n - \Delta_n, e_A) de_A \right]$$

$$+ \sum_{\text{applicants-allowed, } y=0} \ln \left[\int_{-\infty}^{X_A\beta_A} \int_{-\infty}^{X_E\beta_E} \int_{X_d\beta_d}^{\infty} \phi_3(e_a, e_E, e_A) de_a de_E de_A \right]$$

$$+ \sum_{\text{applicants-allowed, } y>0} \ln \left[\int_{-\infty}^{X_A\beta_A} \int_{-\infty}^{X_E\beta_E} \phi_3(Y_a - \Delta_a, e_E, e_A) de_E de_A \right]$$

$$+ \sum_{\text{applicants-denied, } y=0} \ln \left[\int_{-\infty}^{X_A\beta_A} \int_{X_E\beta_E}^{\infty} \int_{X_d\beta_d}^{\infty} \phi_3(e_d, e_E, e_A) de_d de_E de_A \right]$$

$$+ \sum_{\text{applicants-denied, } y>0} \ln \left[\int_{-\infty}^{X_A\beta_A} \int_{X_E\beta_E}^{\infty} \phi_3(Y_d - \Delta_d, e_E, e_A) de_E de_A \right]$$

which can be rewritten as

$$\ln L = \sum_{\text{non-applicants, } y=0} \ln [\Phi_2(-\Delta_{iA}, -\Delta_{in}; \rho_{An})]$$

$$+ \sum_{\text{non-applicants, } y>0} \ln \left[\frac{1}{\sigma_n} \phi \left(\frac{Y_{in} - \Delta_{in}}{\sigma_n} \right) \right]$$

$$\times \Phi_1 \left(\frac{\Delta_{iA} + \frac{\rho_{An}}{\sigma_n} (Y_{in} - \Delta_{in})}{\sqrt{1 - \rho_{An}^2}} \right)$$

$$+ \sum_{\text{applicants-allowed, } y=0} \ln [\Phi_3(\Delta_{iA}, \Delta_{iE}, -\Delta_{id}; \rho_{AE}, -\rho_{Ea}, -\rho_{Ad})]$$

$$+ \sum_{\text{applicants-allowed, } y>0} \ln \left[\frac{1}{\sigma_a} \phi \left(\frac{Y_{ia} - \Delta_{ia}}{\sigma_a} \right) \right]$$

$$\times \Phi_2 \left(\frac{\Delta_{iA} + \rho_{Aa} \frac{Y_{ia} - \Delta_{ia}}{\sigma_a}, \Delta_{iE} + \rho_{Ea} \frac{Y_{ia} - \Delta_{ia}}{\sigma_a}}{\sqrt{(1 - \rho_{Aa}^2)(1 - \rho_{Ea}^2)}}; \frac{\rho_{AE} - \rho_{Aa}\rho_{Ea}}{\sqrt{(1 - \rho_{Aa}^2)(1 - \rho_{Ea}^2)}} \right)$$

$$\times \sum_{\text{applicants-denied, } y=0} \ln [\Phi_3(\Delta_{iA}, -\Delta_{iE}, -\Delta_{id}; -\rho_{AE}, \rho_{Ed}, -\rho_{Ad})]$$

$$+ \sum_{\text{applicants-denied, } y>0} \ln \left[\frac{1}{\sigma_d} \phi \left(-\frac{Y_{id} - \Delta_{id}}{\sigma_d} \right) \right]$$

$$\times \Phi_2 \left(\frac{\Delta_{iA} + \rho_{Ad} \frac{Y_{id} - \Delta_{id}}{\sigma_d}, -\Delta_{iE} + \rho_{Ed} \frac{Y_{id} - \Delta_{id}}{\sigma_d}}{\sqrt{(1 - \rho_{Ad}^2)(1 - \rho_{Ed}^2)}}; \frac{\rho_{AE} - \rho_{Ad}\rho_{Ed}}{\sqrt{(1 - \rho_{Ad}^2)(1 - \rho_{Ed}^2)}} \right)$$

Given the complexity of the likelihood function, a good set of starting values is important for smooth convergence without

interruptions. Thus we first estimate the model by the two-stage method. Then we use two-stage estimates as starting values for FIML. To implement the two-stage method, we rewrite the equations as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 I_{iA}^* &= X_{iA}\beta_A + e_{iA} \text{ (application)} \\
 I_{iE}^* &= X_{iE}\beta + \sigma_{AE} \frac{\phi(X_{iA}\beta)}{\Phi(X_{iA}\beta)} + \varepsilon_{iE} \text{ (eligibility)} \\
 Y_{id}^* &= X_{id}\beta + \sigma_{Ad} \frac{\phi(X_{iA}\beta)}{\Phi(X_{iA}\beta)} + \sigma_{Ed} \frac{-\phi(X_{iE}\beta)}{1 - \Phi(X_{iE}\beta)} \\
 &\quad + \varepsilon_{id} \text{ (earnings of the denied)} \\
 Y_{in}^* &= X_{in}\beta + \sigma_{An} \frac{-\phi(X_{iA}\beta)}{1 - \Phi(X_{iA}\beta)} + \varepsilon_{in} \text{ (earnings of non-applicants)}
 \end{aligned}$$

where $\phi(\cdot)$ and $\Phi(\cdot)$ are standard normal density and distribution functions; σ_{AE} , σ_{An} , $\sigma_{A\alpha}$, σ_{Ad} , $\sigma_{E\alpha}$, and σ_{Ed} are error covariance terms of application and eligibility, application and non-applicants earnings, application and allowed applicants earnings, application and denied applicants earnings, eligibility and allowed applicants earnings, and eligibility and denied applicants earnings, respectively. Note that for convenience (and only in the two-stage estimation of the model), we have assumed $\sigma_{AE} = 0$ in the third equation above, cf. Maddala (1983, p. 282). Also, the Heckman-corrected Probit regression above is inconsistent, but the two-step estimates are used as convenient starting values for FIML which is consistent and asymptotically efficient.

Two-stage estimates can be obtained by the following sequential steps. First, we estimated the reduced form application equation over the whole sample and obtain two inverse Mills ratio terms ($\frac{\phi(X_{iA}\beta)}{\Phi(X_{iA}\beta)}$ and $\frac{\phi(X_{iA}\beta)}{1 - \Phi(X_{iA}\beta)}$). Second, the eligibility equation is estimated over the applicant sub-sample including an inverse Mills ratio from the estimated application equation ($\frac{\phi(X_{iA}\beta)}{\Phi(X_{iA}\beta)}$), and obtained two additional inverse Mills ratios ($\frac{\phi(X_{iE}\beta)}{\Phi(X_{iE}\beta)}$ and $\frac{\phi(X_{iE}\beta)}{1 - \Phi(X_{iE}\beta)}$). Third, two separate Tobit earning regressions – one for non-applicants and the other for denied applicants – are estimated. For the non-applicant earnings regressions, an inverse Mills ratio from the application equation is added: ($\frac{\phi(X_{iA}\beta)}{1 - \Phi(X_{iA}\beta)}$). For the denied applicant earnings regression, two inverse Mills ratios – one from the application and the other from the eligibility equation – are added as additional regressors: ($\frac{\phi(X_{iA}\beta)}{\Phi(X_{iA}\beta)}$ and $\frac{\phi(X_{iE}\beta)}{1 - \Phi(X_{iE}\beta)}$).

Since the structural application equation allows for direct feedback from the eligibility and the earnings equations, as step 1 we estimate the above system using a reduced form application equation. In step 2, we generate earnings projections based on the step 1 estimation after correction for multiple selectivity. In step 3, we re-estimate the whole system after re-specifying the application equation with the estimated eligibility probability and income projections as explanatory variables. The starting values were obtained from a two-step sample selection procedure. Finally, using these estimates as starting values we maximized the likelihood function directly without using the estimated eligibility probabilities and the projected earnings on the right hand side of the application equation. This way, parameter estimates and their standard errors will be consistent.

5. Imputed value of Medicare coverage

Enrollment in the DI program entitles the disabled worker to Medicare coverage after a two-year waiting period. Under the conventional assumption that a disabled person is expected to have significantly higher health care costs than the non-disabled, the implied insurance value of the Medicare coverage under DI

should be an important factor in explaining application behavior.⁴ Yelowitz (1998) has attempted to incorporate the incentive effects of Medicaid on SSI participation probabilities by using the average state Medicaid expenditure as a proxy for the value of Medicaid for the SSI recipient. As Bound and Burkhauser (1999) note, since Medicare is a nationally-run program with little variation in per capita expenditure across states, finding a simple relationship between Medicare benefits and application propensity has proven to be difficult. In addition, since the health conditions amongst the disabled can be widely different, the state averages may not accurately proxy the valuation of the health insurance by a specific individual. The value of Medicare for the sick is not just the dollar value of benefits, but also the insurance value. The cost of being uninsured is the possibility of having to pay large medical bills. The individuals having full knowledge of their diseases will be the best judge of such insurance value of the medical coverage, and thus the insurance value will be an important determinant of application propensity, cf. Bound et al. (2005). By linking 1984–86 SIPP and 1980 NMCUES data, Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) constructed a family specific “heterogeneity” index for Medicaid’s value based on individual health status, expected utilization, cost of medical care and other characteristics, and found that it had significant effect on AFDC participation. In this study we estimate the expected cost of medical care for each member in our sample using a different approach.

Since 1985 the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), now the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), has sponsored much research to develop Diagnostic Cost Group (DCG) models that make risk-adjusted capitated payments to HMOs that enroll Medicare beneficiaries. DCG models use age, sex, and clinical diagnoses generated from patient encounters with the medical delivery system to predict health-based “expected cost” of medical care for an individual due to the presence of a disease. We utilize the DCG/HCC (Diagnostic Cost Group/Hierarchical Condition Category) model of Ash et al. (2000) which incorporates multiple diagnoses in computing the expected health care cost of an individual.⁵ The strong predictive relationship between diagnoses and future medical costs for the disabled makes this approach particularly useful in our context, Kronick et al. (2000).

The DCG/HCC model maps over 1500 diagnostic codes from ICD-9-CM to 118 condition categories (CC) that are medically related, and have similar expected costs. We use the cost estimates for the Medicare beneficiaries under age 65 (Ash et al., 2000, Table 2). The cost associated with each condition category is an incremental cost associated with that particular health problem. These are estimated based on regression methods using Medicare’s 5% research sample from 1991 and 1992, with over 1.3 million records. The model allows for the presence of multiple conditions and age/sex groups.

The health and disability module of SIPP provides many details on functional limitations, activities of daily living, and instrumental activities of daily living, and diagnostic medical conditions associated with respondent work limitations. Corresponding to each reported limitation, the respondent has the option of choosing up to three of the 30 health conditions (e.g., paralysis, stroke, kidney) that caused it. We mapped these 30 health conditions to one of 118 condition categories of Ash et al. (2000). In Table 3 we

⁴ For instance, during 1998, the total Medicare amount spent on Hospital Insurance and Supplemental Medical Insurance was \$23,855 million, and the total DI benefits paid to disabled workers, spouses and children was \$48,173 million. Thus the ratio of Medicare benefits to total DI benefits was 0.495. In 1990 the ratio was 0.475. (See *Social Security Bulletin*, Annual Statistical Supplement, 2000).

⁵ Apart from 112 health condition categories (CC), the model includes 30 age/sex dummies and a number of Age/CC interaction dummies.

Table 3
Mapping of diagnostic medical categories from DCG/HCC to SIPP

SIPP	DCG/HCC
Code	Category ^a
01	Alcohol or drug problem or disorder (\$1,122)
02	AIDS or AIDS related Condition (ARC) (\$6653)
03	Arthritis/rheumatism (\$1218)
04	Back/Spine problems (\$2070)
05	Blindness or vision problems (difficulty seeing well enough to read a newspaper, even with glasses on) (\$242)
06	Broken bone/fracture (\$993)
07	Cancer (\$3,272.75)
08	Cerebral palsy (\$1671)
09	Deafness or serious trouble hearing (\$147)
10	Diabetes (\$2375)
11	Epilepsy (\$896.5)
12	Head or spinal cord injury (\$858.5)
13	Heart trouble (including heart attack (coronary), hardening of the arteries (arteriosclerosis)) (\$3128.6)
14	Hernia or rupture (\$730)
15	High blood pressure (hypertension) (\$281.5)
16	Kidney stones or chronic kidney trouble (\$4505.75)
17	Learning disability (\$348)
18	Lung or respiratory trouble (asthma, bronchitis, emphysema, respiratory allergies, tuberculosis, or other lung trouble) (\$1640.66)
19	Mental or emotional problem or trouble (\$1181)
20	Mental retardation (\$2544)
21	Missing legs, feet, arms, hands, or fingers (\$1256)
22	Paralysis of any kind (\$5737)
23	Senility/dementia/Alzheimer's disease (\$1851)
24	Speech disorder (\$348)
25	Stiffness or deformity of the foot, leg, arm, or hand (\$2070)
26	Stomach trouble (including ulcers, gallbladder, or liver conditions) (\$3377)
27	Stroke (\$1377)
28	Thyroid trouble or goiter problems (\$1348.5)
29	Tumor, Cyst, or Growth (\$2473)
30	Other (\$1783.75)

^a Dollar values in the parentheses are the incremental costs (excluding the intercept and age/sex dummies) associated with each particular health condition for disabled Medicare beneficiaries.

present the categories with the incremental costs associated with each SIPP condition. Since Ash et al. (2000) provide cost estimates at much finer categories of conditions, whenever necessary, we took a simple average of the finer category costs to assign to the broader SIPP category. For instance, the SIPP health condition # 07 (cancer) corresponds to four neoplasm categories (from metastatic to lower cost cancers) in Ash et al. (2000). In our sample, the average predicted value of Medicare coverage is \$2322. It is \$2132 for non-applicants, \$3454 for the denied applicants and \$3682 for the DI beneficiaries. This latter estimate compares favorably with Ash et al. (2000) where the predicted mean cost for the sample Medicare beneficiaries was \$3778.⁶

This approach challenges the conventional belief that the disabled uniformly have high health care costs. As expected, the CMS data show that costs for certain conditions are prodigious (\$6,653 for AIDS, \$3128 for heart trouble, and \$3273 for cancer).


⁶ Utilizing the work of Kronick et al. (2000, Table 6) we also created another health-care heterogeneity index based on estimated cost of illness for Medicaid beneficiaries. Like the Medicare variable, this variable was also highly significant with expected sign in the application equation with all other covariates maintaining their values and significance. This result is not entirely unexpected in view of the finding in Ash et al. (2000) that the incremental cost estimates for different condition categories based on Medicaid and Medicare data are very similar.

However, the costs reported for some conditions – often congenital conditions – suggest that few treatments are available (\$242 for blindness; \$896 for epilepsy). For other conditions initial trauma-related costs may be substantial, but most bear the much lower costs of ongoing maintenance (\$993 for broken bones; \$858 for head or spinal cord injuries). Our approach reflects this heterogeneity in expected medical costs across diagnostic subgroups.

6. Estimation results

6.1. Reexamining the disincentive effects of DI

Before modeling the earnings equations for the purpose of projections, we looked at the dynamics of annual earnings of denied and allowed DI applicants 7 years before and after their applications. As noted earlier, we utilized 2002 MBR records to reflect the final decisions on initial claims, including denials, reconsiderations and ALJ adjudications. Hence our earnings estimates will not suffer from an important limitation noted by Parsons (1991) of Bound (1989) that many of the denials could have been in the process of reapplication and appeals. We use SSA 831 files to identify the initial DI applicants that were 35–60 years old at



Source: Authors' tabulations using the 1990, 1991, and 1992 Survey of Income and Program Participation matched with Social Security Administration's Summary Earnings Record, Master Beneficiary Record, and 831 files.

Fig. 1. Average earnings of SSDI applicants during pre- and post-application years.

the time of application.⁷ Since the applications are scattered over the 1980's and the 1990's, the annual earnings were deflated to 1990 values using national average-wage levels.


The 15-year earnings profiles with the application year at the center for both denied and allowed DI applicants are depicted in Fig. 1. The so-called "Ashenfelter dip" at $t = 0$ can be explained by the fact that to be eligible to apply for disability the monthly earnings during the five months before application should be below the substantial gainful activity amount (SGA—during 1997 it was \$500 per month for the non-blind).⁸ Fig. 1 also displays a remarkable difference in the average earnings between the denied and the allowed in the pre-application years. During the 5–7 years before application, whereas the average annual earnings of the allowed was \$17,490, it was only \$12,939 for the denied—a difference of about \$4550. Even though the drop in earnings for the denied applicants begins earlier than that of the allowed, the earnings drop for the latter group is much more dramatic during the last two years before application because of its higher pre-application earnings.⁹ The denied applicants partly recover their pre-application earnings within 2–3 years, but the recovered level is, on average, almost half the pre-application level. Interestingly, cross tabulations revealed that a vast majority of the denied applicants with low pre- and post-application earnings are women.

In Fig. 2 we also present the percentage distributions of individuals in specific earnings ranges: \$0, \$1–\$6000, \$6001–\$12,000, \$12,001–\$24,000, and above \$24,000 for the allowed and the denied group separately. The remarkable difference between the two groups in every earnings range is noteworthy. During the 5th year prior to application, 6.15% of the allowed applicants had no labor earnings, and 21.38% earned less than \$6000 per year (SGA amount for 1990). By contrast, 17.18% of the denied had no earnings and 38.93% earned less than the SGA amount. Fig. 2 also shows that 50.24% of the denied applicants had no earnings even seven years

⁷ Unlike in Bound (1989), since our sample is restricted to DI insured workers, some of the zero earnings cannot be attributed to "uncovered" workers, see Parsons (1991). Also, the age restriction 35–60 avoids the problem of having zero earnings that occur before the first year of working or retirement.

⁸ Note that the lowest earnings level for the allowed is slightly to the right of the same for the denied because the allowed–denied status is based on the latest MBR records where the earnings were recorded in real time.

⁹ Using monthly SIPP earnings data during the 12 months before the application, Bound et al. (2003) found that earnings fell by more than 30% for males, while for females the drop was a little less.



Source: Authors' tabulations using the 1990, 1991, and 1992 Survey of Income and Program Participation matched with Social Security Administration's Summary Earnings Record, Master Beneficiary Record, and 831 files.

Fig. 2. Earnings distribution of DI applicants during pre- and post-application years.

after the decision and 65.46% had earnings less than \$6000 per year. These numbers are somewhat worse than those reported in Bound (1989). The latter percentage suggests that close to 34.54% of the denied applicants do some amount of gainful labor market activity after their denials. Since the reported health status of the allowed is considerably inferior to that of the denied across all dimensions (see Table 2), one can infer that an upper bound estimate of the labor force non-participation effect of the DI program is 34.54% of the allowed if the labor-force participation is defined as earning at least the SGA amount. This is Bound's (1989) methodology where he found using data from the 1970's that fewer than 50% of the rejected applicants work.

However, the differential pre-application labor market activity between the allowed and the denied as presented in Fig. 2 clearly suggests that this 34.54% upper bound estimate can be an underestimate. Table 2 shows that the lower level of labor market activity of the denied in the pre-applications years cannot possibly be all explained by worse health including the incidence of chronic, congenital, acute or mental conditions. Given the residual functional capacity, the occupational demands (e.g., WORK_HAZRD, BLUE_COLLAR, PHYSICAL_JOB, and STRENGTH) of the denied applicants cannot explain the discrepancy either because these characteristics are seen to be, in fact, less demanding for the denied group. Thus, there must be other unobservable factors (taste, motivation, etc.) that contribute towards the lower labor market attachment of the denied applicants. Since historically the allowed applicants are seen to be more attached to the labor market, it may be reasonable to expect that the labor market activity of these workers would have continued to be more than that of the denied in the absence of the DI program.¹⁰

¹⁰ In view of the fact that prior to application, the labor market attachment of the applicants was not very strong, the 5-month waiting period cannot possibly

Against this, we have also to factor in the fact that 21.78% of the allowed applicants have had very little labor market activity in the 7th pre-application year (i.e., earning less than \$6000 per year). One will not expect this group of people to work in the absence of the DI program. Thus, this observed pre-application history of earnings differentials has to be considered before the denied can be treated as the control group. This is where our assembled data differs substantially from Bound's (1989), where he found these differences to be "not dramatic". When this differential in the (7th year) pre-application labor market attachment between the allowed ($100 - 21.78 = 78.22$) and the denied ($100 - 36.86 = 63.14$) is factored in while projecting the expected labor market activity of the allowed in the absence of the DI program, we can conclude that the upper bound effect of the DI program is $(78.22/63.14) * 34.54 = 42.78\%$. Here we are implicitly assuming that the allowed applicants that worked 7 years ago before application would work at the same rate as the denied that were working 7 years before application. As an alternative to this proportional adjustment, one could assume that the additional 15.08% (i.e., $78.22 - 63.14$) of the allowed applicants that worked 7 years ago all have very high levels of attachment, so that $34.54 + 15.08 = 49.62\%$ of the DI-accepted population would have worked in the absence of DI. In the latter case, we simply apply the pre-application difference to the post-decision outcomes. Even though the proportional adjustment seems to us to be a more reasonable assumption, we will take the mid-point of these two polar values, i.e., 46.20% as our estimate of the disincentive effect of the DI program.

Note also that in the post-adjudication years, over 9% of the beneficiaries are seen to be working to earn more than the SGA amount per year. This is similar to what Chen and van der Klaauw (2008) found. Fig. 2 shows that in the 7th year after application, 9.61% of the beneficiaries are earning more than SGA amounts. Subtracting this observed labor market participation rate of the beneficiaries from the above estimate (46.20%), we conclude that the DI program could not have deterred more than 36.59% of the beneficiaries from some (SGA) amount of labor market activity. We consider this to be an upper bound estimate because the health shocks that trigger the allowed applicants to apply can safely be assumed to be more severe than those of the denied, and hence, in the post-application period, the earnings differential between the allowed and the denied may be less than that in the pre-application period. This will be trivially true if the SSA work disability screening procedure is even partially valid. If we take zero earnings rather than the SGA amount as the threshold for no labor market attachment, then the upper bound for the DI disincentive effect will be a few percentage points higher.¹¹ Thus, according to our estimate, the labor market disincentive effect of the DI program in the 90's has been somewhat less than Bound's estimate that not more than 50% of the DI beneficiaries would have returned to sustained work were they not receiving DI.

6.2. Earnings equations

The analysis in the previous section makes it clear that the earnings profiles of the denied applicants differ from others in

affect the post-application earnings of the denied and the allowed by any significant amount. For instance, during 10 years prior to application, the number of years of non-zero earnings was only 5.99 for the denied and 7.11 for the allowed. Thus, staying out of SGA during the 5-month waiting period is not very exceptional for many of these DI applicants.

¹¹ Chen and van der Klaauw (2008) find the disincentive effect to be even smaller. This may be due to the inclusion of SSI applicants in their sample. Moreover, their sample does not rule out the pending disability applicants as part of the denied group.

Table 4
Results from earnings equations—endogenous switching Tobit model

Variables	Non-applicants		Denied applicants	
	Estimate	Standard error	Estimate	Standard error
Constant	-3.2275	0.8209	-12.1232	5.1404
AGE	-0.6175	0.1097	-0.0596	0.5656
AGE_45-54	1.1180	0.2389	-1.4154	1.4144
SCHOOL_YR	0.2970	0.0448	0.0194	0.2199
FAMILY_INC	-0.3723	0.2362	-1.2190	1.2914
LABOR_ATTACH	0.5811	0.0384	0.5752	0.1816
WHITE_COLLAR	2.3653	0.2428	1.1754	1.4183
AIME	1.2938	0.0162	0.8442	0.0859
FAMILY_SIZE	0.0571	0.0721	0.2064	0.3816
INCOME_VAR	-1.6298	0.0416	-1.1339	0.2376
USE_AIDS	-2.1859	0.7803	-3.7480	2.9150
WALKING	-0.0287	0.3922	0.7904	1.5376
IADL	-0.9305	0.5869	1.0312	1.9510
DOCTOR_VISIT	-0.0475	0.1136	-0.3940	0.4570
ρ_{Ad}	-	-	-0.4161	0.1732
ρ_{Ed}	-	-	0.4967	0.1393
ρ_{An}	0.1168	0.0975	-	-
Sigma	8.4085	0.0628	10.3354	0.8689

characteristics unrelated to health, and it is these characteristics that lead to the low labor force attachment of the denied group. One important issue in modeling pre-application earnings is how much of the drop in earnings should be attributed to self-selection in order to apply for benefits, and what portion should be attributed to health shocks and sudden deterioration in health. Since we are modeling disability behavior, our approach, following Sickles and Taubman (1986) and Riphahn (1999), is to introduce as many pre-application health related variables as possible to explain the earnings drop, and the residual is attributed to self-selection. As the dependent variable in the earnings equation, we use average earnings for the first and second year prior to application. In that way the earnings reflect the major part of the drop without being determined by the SGA amount.

Two different switching Tobit earnings equations are specified for non-applicants and denied applicants because the denied group seems to be characteristically quite different from the non-applicants. We attribute the difference in the earnings between the denied and the non-applicants in the pre-application years to both differences in their endowments and also to the processes generating earnings due to the taste for leisure and other unobservables. We, however, introduced the same set of variables in both equations: age (*AGE*, *AGE_45-54*), education (*SCHOOL_YR*), health (*USE_AIDS*, *WALKING*, *IADL*, *DOCTOR_VISIT*), past labor force performance (*AIME*, *LABOR_ATTACH*, *INC_VAR*), and others (*FAMILY_INC*, *WHITE_COLLAR*). *AIME* acts like a comprehensive lagged dependent variable representing past earnings. Note that *FAMILY_INC* is defined as income of other family members, and thus is not endogenous. *INC_VAR* and *LABOR_ATTACH* are defined over many years before the first recorded application, and are determined more by health status, skills, and occupational characteristics rather than by self-selection and preference for leisure. Hence *INC_VAR* and *LABOR_ATTACH* can be treated as exogenous to current earnings. We report the results of these earnings equation estimates in Table 4. All estimated coefficients carry expected signs: health problems depress earnings and past work experience predicts current earnings.¹²

Estimated coefficients on the selection terms (ρ_{Ad} and ρ_{Ed}) for earnings if the person applies, then is denied, are significant. The

¹² Following the conventional labor literature, we first modeled log earnings as a double hurdle model. But in terms of in-sample prediction errors, a simple Tobit model of earnings fitted these data better. Note that all explanatory variables are dated before the date of application.

coefficient of the selection term associated with the application decision is negative, indicating that application selection reduces the observed earnings of the denied. The coefficient of another selection term associated with the eligibility decision is positive, indicating that the eligibility selection further reduces the observed earnings of the denied. Hence the total effect of selection undoubtedly reduces observed earnings, that is, unobserved factors lower observed earnings of the denied. In the absence of the selections, the earnings of the denied should be higher than what is observed. Interestingly, the coefficient of the application selection term in the earnings equation for non-applicants is positive but not statistically significant, indicating that the application selection has no significant effect on the earnings of non-applicants.

The estimates of the selection terms are consistent with our analysis of the pre-application earnings differentials between the allowed and the denied that were found to be mostly unrelated to observable differences in health and occupational characteristics. As we have seen, this creates a problem in using the labor market activity of the denied as a control group for measuring the disincentive effect on DI beneficiaries, cf. Bound (1989).

While the effect of age in the earnings of the denied is not significant, the effect is large and significant in the earnings of non-applicants. The effects of past work experience (*LABOR_ATTACH*, *AIME*) are large and significant in both regimes. The coefficient of earnings variability (*INC_VAR*) is highly significant for both groups as well. Among the health variables, *USE_AIDS* is significant in both equations; in addition, *IADL* is significant in the non-applicant equation. Overall, the estimated earnings equation for the non-applicants looks quite conventional, but the fit for the denied is worse. This can be a result of very low average pre-application earnings of the denied coupled with relatively high variability.

6.3. Medical eligibility equation

Even though the SSA eligibility procedure is strictly a 5-step sequential process, to keep the estimation complexity manageable, in this paper, we specify the eligibility equation as a reduced form relying on health, demographic traits, occupational factors, and regional variables, see Hu et al. (2001). The dependent variable is the medical eligibility outcome including reconsiderations, appeals and Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decisions: 0 for denied, 1 for allowed. We report the FIML estimates in Table 5.

The estimated coefficient on the selection term associated with the application decision is small and statistically insignificant. Dummy variables representing different age groups (*AGE_55+*, *AGE_45–54*, and *AGE_35–44*) are all positive and significant at the five percent level. The several indicators of disability have major effects on eligibility outcomes; that is, coefficients of *IADL*, *POOR_HEALTH*, *MENTAL*, *USE_AIDS*, *DOC_VISIT*, and *ACUTE* are all positive and statistically significant. The presence of *POOR_HEALTH* is consistent with Lahiri et al. (1995) and Benítez-Silva et al. (2004) who have shown that self-reported health status matches well with survey indicators of the true SSA disability status. Temporary health problems caused by accidents have negative effects on eligibility outcomes. As noted by Hu et al. (2001), accident victims seldom satisfy the duration criterion for DI medical allowance.

Disability determination depends not only on the severity of the disability but also on vocational factors, such as worker's age, job characteristics, skill, etc. (see Lahiri et al. (1995)). Our results indicate that individuals with less hazardous occupations (*NON_HAZARD*) are less likely to be allowed; further, individuals with physically demanding jobs (*PHYSICAL_JOB*) or blue-collar occupations (*BLUE_COLLAR*) are more likely to be allowed. This is consistent with the fact that the proportion of vocational grid allowances has nearly tripled under the DI Program, increasing from 18% to 51% percent of all initial awards during 1983–2004. We

Table 5
Results from the eligibility equation

Variables	FIML method	
	Estimate	Standard error
Constant	−0.6475	0.3409
AGE_55+	0.3878	0.1624
AGE_45–54	0.6769	0.1653
AGE_35–44	0.3305	0.1452
MALE	0.0076	0.0947
IADL	0.2684	0.1385
POOR_HEALTH	0.2342	0.1149
ACCIDENT	−0.3747	0.1077
MENTAL	0.7781	0.1735
USE_AIDS	0.6547	0.1768
DOC_VISIT	0.0437	0.0293
ACUTE	0.0585	0.0976
NON_HAZARD	−0.3585	0.2519
PHYSICAL_JOB	0.3343	0.1929
BLUE_COLLAR	0.2864	0.1004
LABOR_ATTACH	0.0317	0.0151
EARNINGS_DROP	0.2614	0.0434
PHILADELPHIA	0.1061	0.1960
ATLANTA	−0.1219	0.1448
CHICAGO	−0.1524	0.1539
KANSAS	−0.0803	0.2120
DALLAS	−0.2864	0.1710
DENVER	−0.1262	0.2913
SANFRANCISCO	−0.2203	0.1599
SEATTLE	−0.1204	0.2785
LENIENCY	1.9047	0.7329
ρ_{AE}	−0.0855	0.1278

include regional variables that represent census regions to capture local adjudicative climate and other unobserved factors. Although it is possible that splitting these regions into smaller districts would yield different results, variations in allowance rates among the census regions are not significant, except for Dallas.

Although both past work experience (*LABOR_ATTACH*) and labor market performance (*EARNING_DROP*) are not directly relevant for the medical eligibility determination, our results indicate that these variables positively affect the eligibility outcome. Since all DI applicants are required to show that they are unable to engage in substantial gainful activity (SGA) during the five-month waiting period, applicants' earnings during the waiting period are required to be less than the SGA regardless of their pre-disability earnings. Hence, given an applicant's health condition, the higher the pre-disability earnings, the higher is the opportunity cost of application. Furthermore, all applicants are faced with a non-zero probability of denial, and the denial may cause additional costs (e.g., rejected applicants returning to work can face a possible spell of unemployment and less favorable wage offers than if not applying, see Kreider (1998, 1999)). So high pre-disability earnings, given application, indicates that the disability is more severe and the application is more likely to meet SSA's disability criteria. This result is consistent with our previous earnings regression result. The observed earnings of the denied are lower than expected because of both application and eligibility selections. Thus applicants with high observed pre-application earnings are unlikely to willingly self-select into the applicant pool, so we infer that their disability must be severe such that they have little choice but to apply for disability. Note that statutorily SSA does not consider the extent of labor market attachment or earnings drop as part of the determination criteria. Also, the denied status in our data is the final adjudication after appeal. Thus, *LABOR_ATTACH* and *EARNING_DROP*, defined over several years before the first application, can be treated as exogenous to the eligibility equation; they are used as convenient proxies for the likelihood that an application will be allowed. Generating precise estimates of individual eligibility probabilities is critical in specifying the application equation.

By contrast, some with lower wages or unemployed due to a plant closing may self-select into the applicant pool with less severe impairments and they are more likely to be denied. In Table 8 we have recorded SIPP information on the evolution of earnings and various employment statuses of the denied and the allowed during the month of application, and 6 months and 12 months before. We see that even though the employment status and personal earnings of all applicants steadily deteriorated over the year, there is a substantial wedge between the allowed and the denied.

6.4. Application equation

We report the estimation results of our application equation in Tables 6 and 7. The dependent variable is application status: 0 for non-applicants and 1 for applicants. Apart from including a large number of variables representing economic incentives and health, the specification includes many demographic and economic characteristics of individuals and also region and time-invariant variables. Following Kreider (1999) the expected payoff variable, $PAYOFF_APPLYING$, defined as $ELIGIBLE_PROB * DI_BENEFIT + (1 - ELIGIBLE_PROB) * EARNINGS_DENIED$, is included to capture the effect of disability program generosity on application. We introduce the payoff variable as a composite variable (Table 6) as well as three of its constituent components (Table 7). In the Table 7 equations, the benefit-amounts variable ($DI_BENEFIT$) is interacted with dummies representing pre-disability earnings levels.¹³

Our results indicate that there are significant variations among different demographic groups in their propensities to apply for disability benefits. A number of health variables including *LIFTING*, *WALKING*, *IADL*, *BED_DAY*, *DOC_VISIT*, *ACUTE*, and *CONGENITAL* are significant. Also, disabled people from metro areas are less likely to apply, possibly because there are better job prospects or more accommodations in metro areas. In either event, better options for persons with disabilities in urban areas may reduce dependency on disability benefits. Higher education (*SCHOOL_YR*) has a negative impact and age dummies (*AGE_55+*, *AGE_45–54*, and *AGE_35–44*) have positive impacts on the application. In particular, *AGE_55+* may reflect the waning health of aging blue collar workers, in combination with the special provisions of the vocational grid which takes into account age, education, and work experience in determining medical eligibility. Whites are less likely to apply than are non-whites. Both married (*MARRIED*) and never married (*NEVER_MARRIED*) are less likely to apply than those divorced or widowed. Having life insurance (*LIFE_INS*) has a negative effect on application, perhaps suggesting that those with life insurance may be more conscientious about preventative health care. It may also suggest a positive relationship between risk aversion and disability behavior. As expected, net assets (*NET_ASSET*) have a negative impact on the application as well, suggesting that health-impaired people with high financial assets are less likely to apply for DI. This result is consistent with the dramatic fall in earnings of the disability applicants 12 months before the application date as reported in Fig. 1 and Table 8. See also Bound et al. (2003).

The effect of local unemployment rate is positive and significant, consistent with Rupp and Stapleton (1995). Note that our *UNEMPLOYMENT* variable is defined at the level of Social Security District Office (DO). Since there are more than 1000 DO's in the continental US, ours is a much more refined measure of local area unemployment than the state level unemployment and may be picking up some social interaction effects. It is worth noting that

Table 6
FIML estimates of the application equation (Kreider-like specification)

Variables	Constrained		Unconstrained	
	Estimate	Std. E.	Estimate	Std. E.
Constant	-1.1732	0.1767	-1.7486	0.1916
AGE_55+	0.5794	0.0728	0.2827	0.0775
AGE_45–54	0.4586	0.0666	-0.0064	0.0782
AGE_35–44	0.2198	0.0639	0.0006	0.0671
MALE	0.2634	0.0484	0.2806	0.0499
WHITE	-0.2100	0.0595	-0.2037	0.0607
MARRIED	-0.1197	0.0563	-0.1075	0.0574
NEVER_MARRIED	-0.1260	0.0735	-0.1950	0.0755
FAMILY_SIZE	-0.0144	0.0149	-0.0145	0.0153
SCHOOL_YR	-0.0159	0.0088	-0.0145	0.0091
NET_ASSET	-0.3560	0.1611	-0.4731	0.1654
LIFE_INS	-0.1823	0.0472	-0.1696	0.0481
HEALTH_INS	-0.1584	0.0522	-0.1754	0.0531
LIFTING	0.2979	0.0589	0.2873	0.0600
WALKING	0.3389	0.0564	0.3589	0.0573
IADL	0.2878	0.0733	0.0976	0.0774
BEDDAY	0.2250	0.0522	0.2138	0.0534
DOC_VISIT	0.1393	0.0150	0.0985	0.0163
ACUTU	0.1361	0.0492	0.0513	0.0508
CONGENITAL	0.2950	0.1022	0.2028	0.1044
CHRONIC	0.0501	0.0591	0.0795	0.0603
STRENGTH	0.0826	0.0509	0.0461	0.0520
WORK_HAZARD	0.0841	0.0537	0.0293	0.0549
UNEMPLOYMENT	3.2913	0.9800	2.3219	1.0177
METRO	-0.1332	0.0445	-0.1346	0.0454
MEDICARE	0.6759	0.1131	0.6758	0.1153
WAITING_TIME	-0.3146	0.1016	-0.2273	0.1046
INCOME_NOT_APPL	-0.0520	0.0074	-0.0354	0.0124
PAYOFF_APPLYING	0.1109	0.0207	-	-
ELIGIBLE_PROB	-	-	2.0041	0.1373
EARNINGS_DENIED	-	-	0.0215	0.0250
DI_BENEFIT	-	-	0.0199	0.0159

Probit regression with $n = 8473$ (applied 1097, didn't apply 7376). Males 3986, females 4487. $PAYOFF_APPLYING = ELIGIBLE_PROB * DI_BENEFIT + (1 - ELIGIBLE_PROB) * EARNINGS_DENIED$.

we spent considerable effort testing the significance of a number of unemployment/lay off variables from SIPP prior to application, but quite surprisingly these individual-level employment-status variables were not significant in the regression. This may be due to the fact that over 25% of the applications were already out of the job market one year before applications (see Table 8).

Having health insurance (*HEALTH_INS*) deters disability application. Many authors have emphasized the role of this variable in the application equation; see Kreider and Riphahn (2000) and Gruber and Kubik (2002). As we can see from Table 2, whereas 80% of non-applicants have health insurance, only about 65% of the applicants have the coverage. Most interestingly, in Table 8, we find that loss of health insurance observed during one year before application greatly affects the desire to apply. It seems many workers with less severe impairments are tempted to apply for disability in order to get health insurance coverage. Of course, the loss of health insurance can be associated with the loss of job too. This is one pathway through which the imputed disease-specific Medicare cost variable affects the application propensity. Our *MEDICARE* variable, representing the expected insurance value of *MEDICARE* coverage for a worker with specific medical conditions, is highly significant and found to affect application propensity positively. *MEDICARE* turned out to be one of the very robust explanatory variables across many specifications, and its presence did not affect the sign and significance of other covariates of the model.¹⁴

The effect of disability application processing time (*WAITING_TIME*) is negative and statistically significant. This effect has

¹³ Four groups are defined by their average Social Security earnings in the 4th and 5th years prior to application—less than \$6000, above \$6000 but less than \$12,000, above \$12,000 but less than \$24,000, and above \$24,000 per year.

¹⁴ Note that for risk averse individuals facing uncertain medical costs, the true utility value of Medicare is likely to be underestimated by these 'expected costs', see Rust and Phelan (1997).

Table 7
FIML estimates of the application equation with *DI_BENEFIT* dummies

Variables	Whole sample		Female only		Male only	
	Estimate	Std. E.	Estimate	Std. E.	Estimate	Std. E.
UNEMPLOYMENT	2.4880	1.0241	1.0439	1.4547	3.8502	1.4581
MEDICARE	0.6697	0.1156	0.5708	0.1717	0.7071	0.1654
WAITING_TIME	−0.2279	0.1048	0.0086	0.1486	−0.4611	0.1496
INCOME_NOT_APPL	−0.0322	0.0129	−0.0213	0.0210	−0.0459	0.0176
ELIG_PROB	2.1085	0.1433	1.9188	0.2096	2.3018	0.2013
EARNINGS_DENIED	0.0255	0.0267	0.0197	0.0504	0.0395	0.0344
DIBENEFIT (<6 K)	0.0385	0.0174	−0.0078	0.0256	0.0767	0.0251
DIBENEFIT (6 K–12 K)	0.0240	0.0177	−0.0216	0.0261	0.0614	0.0253
DIBENEFIT (12 K–24 K)	0.0126	0.0167	−0.0256	0.0245	0.0442	0.0242
DIBENEFIT (>24 K)	0.0110	0.0165	−0.0226	0.0250	0.0404	0.0235

The last four variables are *DI_BENEFIT* for applicants with earnings less than \$6000, \$6000–\$12,000, \$12,000–\$24,000 and more than \$24,000 respectively based on average earnings for the 4th and 5th year prior to application. All other explanatory variables used in Table 7 were also included in these regressions, but not reported to save space.

Table 8
Selected characteristics of DI applicants before application dates

Characteristics	12 months before		6 months before		Month of appl.	
	Allowed	Denied	Allowed	Denied	Allowed	Denied
No health insurance (%)	16.1	29.6	19.1	32.5	20.6	36.1
No personal earnings (%)	27.3	45.5	38.9	56.5	76.2	81.4
No family earnings (%)	14.3	24.3	20.4	32.5	41.2	45.4
Employment status (%):						
Employed, no time lay off	73.3	52.9	61.7	46.6	20.6	22.4
Employed, some time lay off	1.2	4.2	1.9	2.6	3.8	2.7
Unemployed, in job market	4.3	8.5	5.6	10.5	7.2	11.5
Unemployed, out of job market	21.1	33.9	30.2	39.8	67.5	62.8
Other	n/a	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.5

SOURCE: Authors' tabulations using SIPP 1990, 1991, and 1992 panels matched with SSA 831 files.

been magnified by the lengthy processing delays that are thought to be largely the result of an SSA staffing reduction of 27,000 (over 30%) during the past thirty years—a period during which disability applications have grown markedly. Obviously long processing times provide a measure of the extent to which recent applicants have been poorly served. It increases the foregone earnings while applying. However, our finding suggests another subgroup that may be ill served by processing delays, namely those who may defer applying due to long processing times because they cannot afford the foregone earnings. Thus, while long waiting times are a critical issue of public concern, we find evidence that they affect application propensity negatively and acts as a screening mechanism that may not be target efficient. While workers with high potential earning capacity (*INCOME_NOT_APPLYING*) are less likely to apply for benefits than are those with low potential earnings capacity, the coefficient of the expected-payoff variable (*PAY-OFF_APPLYING*) is positive and significant at the five percent level - indicating, as expected, that higher benefits affect decisions to apply and, hence, program growth.

In Table 7, we report estimates from an alternative specification of the application equation. In this instance, the expected payoff variable is decomposed into its three components, and the disability benefit amounts (*DI_BENEFIT*) are interacted with dummies indicating levels of pre-disability earnings. The coefficient of individual-specific eligibility probability (*ELIG_PROB*) is large and statistically significant. It is interesting to note that conditional on *ELIG_PROB*, the state level denial rate as in Gruber and Kubik (1997) was found to be not significant. This seems to suggest that if the individual specific eligibility variable is appropriately specified, the state-level aggregate denial or allowance rate loses its power in explaining application decisions. The counterfactual earnings of non-applicants (*INCOME_NOT_APPLYING*) negatively affect the application decision. When we looked at their marginal effects evaluated at the mean values of variables, this effect appears to be much stronger with males than with females. The coefficient of another counterfactual earnings variable (*viz.*, *EARNINGS_DENIED*) is not

significant either for males or females. To focus attention on subgroups at different levels of pre-disability earnings we estimated separate coefficients of benefit amounts for these groups, finding interesting variation among the groups. The magnitude of the coefficients is the largest for groups with the lowest pre-disability earnings and the smallest for groups with the highest pre-disability earnings. These results are observed for both the male-female combined sample and the male-only sample, and indicate that, on average, the disincentive effects of the disability program are more marked for those with little labor force attachment or with low skills. The evidence is consistent with Autor and Duggan (2003) who have argued that the DI program has provided many low-skilled, low-earning workers with a viable alternative to employment. We also note from Welch (1997) that, among males, it is those with the lowest educational attainment that experienced the largest reductions in real earnings during 1967–1992. The evidence suggests, then, that low-skilled, low-earning workers may be promising targets for future rehabilitative and return to work initiatives. On the other hand, our results suggest that the high-earning applications are triggered more by health shocks. Thus, the program growth among the high earners may be affected more by future medical advances, prevention, and medical rehabilitation. But for low earners, employment shocks, economic dislocation, and other economic events may also play a major role.

7. Policy simulations

In this section, we report results of simulations with respect to four policy variables—benefit size (*DI_BENEFIT*), medical eligibility probability (*ELIG_PROB*), processing time (*WAITING_TIME*), and Medicare value (*MEDICARE*). Using estimated coefficients under two alternative specifications, we predict mean application rates corresponding to hypothetical policy changes. We report simulation results over the male-only sample as well as the entire sample.

Table 9
Effects of selected policy changes on disability application rate

Change in policy variable	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.8	1 (base)	1.2	1.4	1.6	1.8
A: Kreider-like specification (constrained)									
DI_BENEFIT	0.0825	0.0921	0.1030	0.1153	0.1290	0.1444	0.1614	0.1800	0.2001
ELIGIBLE_PROB	0.1131	0.1168	0.1207	0.1248	0.1290	0.1335	0.1382	0.1430	0.1480
WAITING_TIME	0.1662	0.1562	0.1467	0.1376	0.1290	0.1209	0.1132	0.1059	0.0991
MEDICARE	0.1053	0.1110	0.1168	0.1228	0.1290	0.1354	0.1420	0.1486	0.1555
B: Alternative specification with DIBENEFIT dummies									
DI_BENEFIT	0.1125	0.1163	0.1203	0.1245	0.1287	0.1331	0.1377	0.1424	0.1472
ELIGIBLE_PROB	0.0310	0.0466	0.0677	0.0950	0.1287	0.1687	0.2142	0.2638	0.3159
WAITING_TIME	0.1535	0.1470	0.1407	0.1346	0.1287	0.1231	0.1177	0.1124	0.1074
MEDICARE	0.1064	0.1118	0.1173	0.1229	0.1287	0.1347	0.1408	0.1470	0.1534
C: Alternative specification with DIBENEFIT dummies—Male separate regression, 3986 obs.									
DI_BENEFIT	0.1031	0.1138	0.1255	0.1383	0.1522	0.1673	0.1836	0.2011	0.2198
ELIGIBLE_PROB	0.0323	0.0506	0.0762	0.1099	0.1522	0.2026	0.2596	0.3211	0.3845
WAITING_TIME	0.2094	0.1938	0.1791	0.1652	0.1522	0.1401	0.1287	0.1181	0.1083
MEDICARE	0.1256	0.1320	0.1386	0.1453	0.1522	0.1592	0.1664	0.1736	0.1809

Based on the composite variable specification (*PAYOFF_APPLYING* in Table 6), the base probability of application for the entire sample is 12.9%, see Table 9A. For the entire sample, the rate of application falls from 12.9% to 11.53% for a 20% decline in the benefit size (*DI_BENEFIT*). The elasticity of application with respect to benefit amount is 0.56, which is smaller than the estimates reported in Kreider (1999) but similar to those based on time series data (see Bound and Burkhauser (1999)). Note that our sample includes both female and younger age groups, that is, it includes all working age adults, 18–64.

For the entire sample, elasticity estimates with respect to *ELIG_PROB*, *WAITING_TIME*, *UNEMPLOYMENT*, and *MEDICARE*, are 0.16, 0.32, 0.24, and 0.24, respectively. During December 2000 to June 2003, the unemployment rate increased steadily from 3.9% to 6.2%—an increase of 59%. During 2000–2004, the worker disability applications increased by nearly 23%. Thus, our estimated application elasticity of 0.24 with respect to the unemployment rate implies that almost 14% of the 23% increase in disability applications can be explained by the worsening of the unemployment situation over this period. During 1990–1998, the amount reimbursed per person served under Medicare (in constant dollars) increased by 11.7%. During the same period, the DI applications grew by 9.5%. Thus, our estimated *MEDICARE* elasticity of 0.24 would imply that 2.8% of the 9.5% growth in applications (i.e., almost 30%) can be explained by *MEDICARE* alone.

Under the alternative specification of Table 7, we separate our sample into four groups by their past earnings—the average of their 4th and 5th years prior to application. Simulation results for the entire sample are reported in Table 9B, and for the male-only sample in Table 9C. Elasticity estimates with respect to *DI_BENEFIT* for the entire sample ranged from 0.12 to 0.20, depending on the group. The largest response to a *DI_BENEFIT* change was observed in the group with the lowest earnings. A 20% decrease in benefit amounts reduced the application rate from 15.48% to 14.87% for the lowest-earnings group, while it reduced the application rate from 9.6% to 9.3% for the highest-earnings group. During 1989–2004, the number of DI applications increased by over 117%. During the same period, the DI benefit has increased nominally by 60.8%. Thus, these low estimated application elasticities with respect to DI benefits explain no more than approximately 10% of the increase in disability applications during this period. Simulated responses with respect to changes in eligibility probabilities are large, and elasticity estimates range from 1.23 to 1.99, depending on the group. Interestingly, the simulated response with respect to changes in eligibility probability was found to be the largest for the group by the highest earnings and the lowest with the group by lowest earnings.

Table 10
Estimated elasticity of applications

Policy variables	Male	Female
DI benefit	0.496	0.00
Eligibility probability	1.64	1.43
Medicare value	0.34	0.21
Unemployment	0.42	0.00
Waiting time	0.40	0.00

The base probability of application for the male-only sample (Table 9C) is 15.22%. The response in application rate with respect to a 20% decline in benefit amounts is larger in this sample than in the entire sample (13.83, compared to 12.45%). The elasticity here with respect to benefit size is 0.71, a relatively high value. Similarly, the elasticity estimates with respect to *ELIG_PROB*, *WAITING_TIME*, *UNEMPLOYMENT*, and *MEDICARE* for the male-only sample are slightly larger than those for the entire sample; they are 0.17, 0.47, 0.30, and 0.25, respectively. Simulation results with the male sample suggested again that those who are more attached to the labor force respond to the individual eligibility probability more.

In Table 10, we have summarized the elasticities of male and female applications with respect to important policy parameters. Eligibility probabilities and the Medicare value are important for both males and females. However, women do not seem to respond to changes in DI benefit size, unemployment, or processing time. The rather small but significant application propensity elasticity of almost 0.5 for males with respect to DI benefits is consistent with the emerging evidence based on data from the 1990's; see, for instance, Ellwood (2001), Campolieti (2004), Bound et al. (2005), and Chen and van der Klaauw (2008). Thus, the major reason for the continuing increase in disability enrollment is not increasing generosity of benefits, but rather a more accepting adjudicative climate as conditioned by the political and legal system, the need for health insurance, and structural changes in the economy such as declining job opportunities for low skilled workers, cf. Autor and Duggan (2003).

Women, like men, appear to respond to medical factors (eligibility probabilities and Medicare value), but, unlike men, they appear unresponsive to financial variables (DI benefit size and the unemployment rate). This is consistent with the fact that the time profiles of aggregate labor force participation rates (LFPR) for men and women have been quite different over the last few decades; whereas it has steadily declined for men, the opposite is true for women, see Ellwood (2001). Moreover, DiCecio et al. (2008) report that (i) unlike men, the LFPR for women is much less responsive to business cycles, and (ii) it is three times more volatile than the LFPR for men. The latter two stylized facts may suggest that for

various reasons many women workers, including those with health impairments, tend to move in and out of the labor force for reasons that have little to do with economic incentives like the benefit level and processing time. Certainly women have lower earnings than their male counterparts, on average, and for that reason they are eligible for lower DI benefits, cf. Haveman et al. (2000). Beyond that, we surmise that to understand women's application behavior it may be necessary to consider their decisions in a family context, taking into account marital status, family composition, any earnings of the spouse, and family asset holdings.

8. Conclusions and implications for policy

Building on Lahiri et al. (1995) and Hu et al. (2001), in this paper we estimate an econometric model of DI application behavior, using the 1990, 1991, and 1992 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) matched to SSA data for 1989–1995. The resulting matched file captures a rich set of individual-specific antecedents of the application decision, including: demographics, self-reported health and activity limitations, household composition and family finances (SIPP); earnings histories (SER); program eligibility status (MBR and 831); occupational characteristics (DOT); disease-specific Medicare expenditures (DCG/HCC data from CMS); and hypothetical DI benefits (SSA benefit calculator). Exploiting these data, we focus less on population-wide effects than on subgroup effects with direct policy implications. State-contingent earnings projections and eligibility probabilities as well as individual-specific benefit calculations are all central to the analysis. The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) data allow us to identify the blue collar workers with certain special occupational characteristics, a key subgroup of interest to policy makers and researchers. The main findings are:

- Not more than 37% of DI beneficiaries would return to sustained work if they did not receive DI benefits. Using the labor force participation rate of rejected disability applications as a benchmark, Bound (1989) concluded that less than 50% of the DI beneficiaries would have returned to sustained work were they not receiving DI. When the pre-application differences in the labor market attachment of the allowed and denied applicants are considered together with the observed work efforts by the beneficiaries, the estimated work disincentives associated with DI benefits are notably smaller. Our estimates use more recent data from the 1990's and Social Security earnings records many years before and after disability applications. Moreover, our matched data does not suffer from some of the data problems in Bound (1989) that were raised by Parsons (1991).
- Our estimated elasticity of applications with respect to benefit size for the whole sample (both male and female) is only 0.171. This is small compared to estimates based on cross-sectional data, and explains little of the extraordinary DI enrollment growth during the last fifteen years. For females the effect is non-significant, but for males it is 0.496 and significant—somewhat smaller than estimates from Halpern and Hausman (1986) or Kreider (1999), but similar to those based on time series data, cf. Bound and Burkhauser (1999).
- We find significant differences in the effect of DI benefits on applications not only by gender, but by pre-application earnings level. The estimated coefficient of the DI benefit is negatively correlated with average earnings 5–6 years before application. The effect is greatest for low earners. Thus, our findings suggest that the moral hazard problem associated with DI is mainly restricted to males and, among males, it is mainly restricted to low earners, such as blue collar workers and those more subject to economic dislocation or stagnant real wages. Hence, the work disincentive associated with the DI benefit may contribute to recent growth in allowances via the vocational grid, which is

often an eligibility path for low earners with blue collar jobs. We infer that such subgroups may be good candidates for vocational rehabilitation and return-to-work incentives.

- The individual medical eligibility probabilities for DI benefits have a substantial direct effect on application propensity. In our preferred specification, the elasticity is approximately 1.54—much larger than those reported by Kreider (1999) and Halpern and Hausman (1986). The findings underscore the fundamental role of medical factors in the application decision, notwithstanding the role of vocational and economic elements for key subgroups within the applicant pool. Interestingly, unlike Gruber and Kubik (1997), we do not find the state level variation in the allowance rate (average screening stringency) to be significant in explaining application behavior at the individual level, although it is possible that the individual eligibility probabilities have a dominant state-level component.
- The Medicare variable has a large, statistically significant effect on the decision to apply for DI benefits, with an elasticity of 0.24. Our analysis dispels any untested belief that all DI applicants have uniformly high health costs. For example, the costs of persons with cancer or AIDS are several times higher than those of persons with mental problems or a stroke and ten times higher than those of persons with hypertension or deafness. Based on diagnosis-specific cost information, in our sample we find that the average expected value of Medicare for applicants is more than 50% higher than that of non-applicants. Furthermore, the effect of Medicare boosts the average probability of application by nearly 12%. Ours is the first study to capture the effect of the expected value of medical insurance on application behavior.
- Local area unemployment rates significantly affect applications. The elasticity is 0.30 for males and females combined; however, the effect is much higher for males (0.42). The unemployment effect is very similar to that obtained by Rupp and Stapleton (1995), who used state level data for 1989–92. Our unemployment variable explains a large part of the growth in disability applications in the early 1990s. This finding suggests the need for a policy emphasis on rehabilitation and return to work, including the new Ticket to Work effort. In addition, we need more analysis of the vocational grid—the special provision of the disability determination process used for older, blue collar workers—to establish its role in recent program growth, see Autor and Duggan (2006) as well as Chen and van der Klaauw (2008).
- We find a significant effect for variations in processing time across states and over time on application behavior. The elasticity is not significant for females, but is significant for males (0.40). This effect was significant in studies that used data from the 1970s, but was not significant in studies based on data from the 1990s.
- Overall, the application equation for females is quite different from that for males. Although medical eligibility probability has a significant impact on both females and males, key policy variables like DI benefits and processing time do not seem to affect female application behavior. The singular behavioral response of female workers to parameters of the disability insurance program is intriguing and warrants further research.

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Table A.1

Variable	Definition	Source
Applicant	Disability benefit applicant	831 file, SSA
BENEFICIARY	Allowed applicants	831 file and MBR (Master Beneficiary Record)
EARNINGS	Two years ($t - 1$ and $t - 2$) average earnings prior to disability application	SER (Summary Earnings Records)
AGE	Age in years	SIPP, SER, MBR
MALE	Gender—Male	SIPP, SER, MBR
SCHOOL_YR	Years of schooling	SIPP
MARRIED	Currently married	SIPP
USE_AIDS	Use aids (cane, crutches, walker, or wheelchair)	SIPP
WALKING	Difficulty in walking up a flight of stairs	SIPP
IADL	Having at least one problem with Instrumental activities of daily living	SIPP
ACCIDENT	Health condition caused by an accident or injury	SIPP
DOC_VISIT	Number of doctor visits during last 3 months	SIPP
AGE<35	Age 35 or less	SIPP, SER, MBR
AGE_35–44	Age between 35 and 44	SIPP, SER, MBR
AGE_45–54	Age between 45 and 54	SIPP, SER, MBR
AGE_55+	Age 55 or more	SIPP, SER, MBR
FAMILY_INC	Income of other family members	SIPP
LABOR_ATTACH	Labor force attachment: number of years positive SS earnings during the last 10 years	SER
WHITE_COLLAR	Managerial or professional occupation	SIPP
BLUE_COLLAR	Blue collar occupation (neither professional nor supporting job)	SIPP
METRO	Metro resident	SIPP
LIFE_INS	Has life insurance	SIPP
HEALTH_INS	Has health insurance from any source	SIPP
NET_ASSET	Net household asset	SIPP
LIFTING	Problem in lifting 10 lbs	SIPP
BED_DAYS	Stayed in bed 5 or more days (last year)—dummy	SIPP
ACUTE	All acute medical conditions: AIDS or ARC, cancer, head or spinal cord injury, heart diseases, paralysis, senility/dementia/Alzheimer, stroke	SIPP, 831 file
CONGENITAL	Congenital medical conditions: cerebral palsy, deafness or serious trouble hearing, epilepsy, learning disability, and mental retardation.	SIPP, 831 file
CHRONIC	Chronic medical conditions: arthritis or rheumatism; back or spine problems including chronic stiffness or deformity of the back or spine, broken bone/fracture, diabetes, hernia or rupture, high blood pressure, stomach trouble including ulcers, gallbladder, or liver conditions, thyroid trouble or goiter, tumor, cyst, or growth.	SIPP, 831 file
STRENGTH	Job with strength requirement, heavy or very heavy work	SIPP, dictionary of occupational titles (DOT)
HAZ_OCCU	Occupation involved four or more hazardous work conditions	SIPP, DOT
UNEMPLOYMENT	% civilian labor force unemployed at SSA District levels	SSA workforce analysis data from census bureau
ALLOWANCE	State allowance rate (leniency)	831 file, MBR
POVERTY_RATE	DO level poverty rate	Census bureau
INC_NON_APPL	Predicted earnings (if non-applicant)	Imputed
POOR_HEALTH	Health condition-poor	SIPP
MENTAL	Mental/emotional, mental retardation	SIPP, 831 file
DALLAS	Census region-Dallas	SIPP
NON_HAZARD	No work place hazard	SIPP, DOT
PHYSICAL_JOB	Physically demanding job	SIPP, DOT
WALKING	Difficulty in walking a quarter of mile	SIPP
ELIG_PROB	Predicted allowance rate	Imputed
PAYOFF_APPLY	Expected income (if applied and denied)	Imputed
DI_BENEFIT	Disability benefit (PIA)—yearly	Imputed, SER
INC_VAR	Earnings variability (during 1–6 years before application)	SER
EARNINGS_DROP	Earnings change (Earnings of $t - 5$ minus earnings of $t = 0$)	SER
MEDICARE	Disease specific expected Medicare cost	Imputed
WAITING_TIME	DI processing time for initial claims (in100 days)	831 file, profiling system data base, SSA records

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This paper is an abridged version of our discussion paper available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1136483>.

Appendix. Variable definitions and sources

See Table A.1.

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