

Macroeconomics I: Mid-Term Exam

1. Overlapping generations model with money and specified utility functions

Time: discrete, infinite horizon

Demography: A mass $N_t \equiv N_0(1+n)^t$, $n > 0$ of newborns enter in every period. Everyone lives for 2 periods except for the first generation of old people who only live for one period.

Preferences: for the generations born in and after period 1;

$$U_t(c_{1,t}, c_{2,t+1}) = \ln(c_{1,t}) + \beta c_{2,t+1}$$

where $c_{i,t}$ is consumption in period t and stage i of life and $\beta > 0$ is the . For the initial old generation $\tilde{U}(c_{2,1}) = c_{2,1}$.

Endowments: Every person receives 1 unit of the perishable consumption good in their first period of life. There is zero endowment of the good in the second period of life. In period 0 the first generation of old are each endowed with H units of money which can be stored but cannot be created.

Institutions: Each period there are competitive markets for the consumption good and money. There is, therefore, only one price per period, p_t , the price of goods in terms of money.

- (a) Write out and solve the Planner's problem for this economy.
- (b) For the decentralized economy, write out and solve the problem faced by the members of generation t . Use M_t^d to represent the nominal money demand of each individual born in period t and solve for the real money demand, $\frac{M_t^d}{p_t}$ as a function of $1 + g_t \equiv \frac{p_t}{p_{t+1}}$
- (c) Write down the market clearing conditions and define a competitive equilibrium.
- (d) Under what conditions is the competitive equilibrium a Pareto optimal allocation?
- (e) Solve for the law of motion for g_t (it should take the form $g_{t+1} = f(g_t)$) and show that there are two steady states, $g = n$ and $g = \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta}$.
- (f) Is either steady state oscillatory? Under what circumstances is each of them stable or unstable?