Internal Migrants' Self-Employment in China: Who are They and How do They Stratify?

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Abstract

As the 2000s witnessed a rapid growth of internal migrants from rural areas in China, they also experienced a compositional rise of self-employed migrants within this increasing population. However, little is known about this migrant group in general. This paper attempts to tap into this group in terms of the entry, their market payoffs and stratification, particularly alone the line of political capitals individuals obtained from rural areas.

Our results show that human capitals and social\political capitals of migrants are negatively associated with entry into self-employment in urban areas. Moreover, the migrant entrepreneurs tend to work longer hours and receive lower average hourly wages (hourly wages in loglinear form). Particularly, among rural-urban migrants, former cadres tend to receive higher absolute values of hourly income, and this advantage is preponderantly attributable to the larger earnings of the cadres among the self-employed; moreover, among the self-employed migrants, cadres' earning advantage is more pronounced at the high end of the income rung. Our study provides a case where political capitals accumulated in rural areas are able to transfer into economic capitals in the labor market of urban areas in China.

Introduction

The typical image of internal migrants in China is about to change. For the past few decades, migrant workers in China have been conceived as young workers with factory uniforms who work extended hours in assembly lines, or those working in construction fields by the side of skyscrapers in a metropolis. These conceptions might be altered in the near future as a result of changes in occupational compositions of migrant workers – the most recent decade has witnessed a rise of migrant entrepreneurs from rural areas, who are participating primarily small-business service sectors in the urban areas. According to China 2005 One Percent Sample Survey, by 2005, there were about 24% of internal migrants who were self-employed. However, little is known about this increasingly sizable migrant group, while their migrant labor counterparts continue to draw major attention from both the public and academia.

With little knowledge about this self-employed migrant group that is both large in size and increasing in numbers in academia, this paper attempts to tap into this group, particularly from rural to urban areas in China, in terms of the entry, their market payoffs and stratification. Specifically, I ask three questions regarding this group: who they are, how they fair in urban areas, and how they stratify along the line of political capitals. The first two questions outline the patterns of migrant entrepreneurs in the context of rapid urbanization in China and engage in theoretical conversations with studies on immigrant entrepreneurs, and the last question addresses a peculiar context in China – how rural political capitals might play into the later life economic attainment for the large population of migrant workers.

This paper carries importance at least in three areas. First, as migrant labor becoming more expansive in urban China, rural entrepreneurs in urban areas is at the same time becoming increasingly prevalent. However, against this backdrop, little is known in academia about the entry of this self-employed group and their economic standings. Second, examining the entry and market payoffs of the self-employed in the Chinese context at the same time tests theories of immigrant entrepreneurs that derived from other social contexts. Last but not least, it shed light on social stratification in post-socialist Chinese society for the internal migrant group in contemporary China. Over a decade has passed since the former cadre/cadre status was found to have a boosting effect on the earnings of the self-employed in urban areas in later stage of reform. Blanks remains as to 1) whether rural political capitals plays a role in an urban setting, as shown in the migrant group; 2) whether positioning power still has an effect in the market payoffs in the most recent years of China.

Payoffs of migrant entrepreneurs

Although there are theoretical debates on definitions of migrant self-employers, the controversy rarely reach an empirical level (Portes and Zhou 1996). In consistent with most of previous empirical studies, we use self-employment migrants, migrant entrepreneurs and migrant business owners interchangeably here. In congruent with these notions, rural-urban migrant workers who are self-employed is the operational definition.

There was a debate on the market payoffs of immigrant entrepreneurs while the prevalence of immigrants engaging in self-employment in the destination countries was addressed. The optimist camp argues that self-employment, especially when it is in ethnic enclaves, gives better economic rewards; the other camp, on the other hand, argues that the prevalence of self-

employed is not a result of high market returns but more of language barriers presented to the first generation migrants as they tried to venture into mainstream labor market (eg. Borjas 1990, Wilson and Portes 1980). Attempting to resolve the debate, Portes and Zhou (1996) underscores the importance of the choice of functional form in the equation for economic payoffs. Specifically, when the average rate of earnings (income as loglinear form) is concerned, the self-employed immigrants were in a disadvantaged condition; when absolute economic return is considered (income as linear form), the positive outliers, or the successful entrepreneurs would pull the whole self-employed population into a higher wage group than the employed immigrants. Logan et al. (2003) later reached similar conclusion. This study adopts this approach and examines both loglinear and linear forms of hourly income.

The self-employed in China

Wu (2006) provides an important story for the role of positioning power in the reforming age of rural and urban China respectively. He found that in urban China, in general cadres are less likely to become self-employed because of the heavily subsidized political sector they were able to enjoy. Nevertheless, as reform proceeded, due to structural changes in urban market that lends self-employment more legitimacy and a greater role in economic operations, the cadres were more likely to become self-employed and received higher earnings than do other groups. These results highlight the prominent and sustaining role of positioning power in China, particularly reflecting the change of market opportunities in urban and rural China during reform era. In Wu (2006) analysis, separate models were performed for residents with and without rural migrants respectively; and yet the focus is the structural change of urban labor market versus rural market in a temporal manner, and how urban cadres and rural cadres behave in their separate domains.

The role of migrant workers in this analysis was only served to test the sensitivity of the models, not as a particular group to examine.

Nevertheless, greater heterogeneity exists between the general urban labors and migrant labors originated from rural areas in urban area. Compared to their urban counterparts, those with rural origins have to face a number of institutional and non-institutional discrimination when entering in urban labor markets. First, household registration system (*hukou*) restricts those with rural *hukou* the access to a number of job opportunities within public and political sectors (Wan 2008). Second, compared to local urbanites, a migrant status (aka. non-local hukou) also limits their job opportunities in a number of industries as well. Third, for those with dialects or non-local accents, some rural migrants were discriminated against even in those industries available to them but require interactions with local people. Moreover, this approach, while applied in pre-21centuray Chinese society, might be sensible because the wave of internal migration was still on a limited rise. And yet, as China entered into the "age of migration" in the 21st century (the 2010 census reports 221 million rural-urban migrant workers nationwide) and self-employed among migrant workers take an ever larger share in this group, it becomes increasingly important to investigate the patterns of self-employed within this growing group.

A few studies have indirectly addressed this group of self-employed migrant workers regarding their selectivity and economic standings. For example, using a survey conducted in Pearl River Delta Region, Wan (2008) studied the migrant workers working in "informal industries" and found that over 60% of the informal workers were "forced" into informal industry because of lack of options as a result of limited capitals, education and old age. In other words, there are certain thresholds for entering formal industries for the migrants. The China case thus may present as a similar phenomenon as argued by Light and Rosenstein (1995), who stated that self-

employment may serve as the second-best option for migrants whose capitals are limited and not able to help them break into the mainstream labor market. Thus, we propose our first hypothesis to test.

H1: Among rural-urban migrant workers, human capitals and social\political capitals are in general negatively associated with entry into self-employment.

Human capital is mainly demonstrated by individual's educational attainment. Besides being a former cadre, a party member suggests a positive selection along individual's social and political capitals, and joining the military has been considered a pathway for upward mobility in China as well. Thus the status of being a former cadre, being a veteran and a party member jointly indicates rural individual's social and political capitals here.

Similar with their international counterparts, such as immigrant-run small businesses in the U.S., most migrant small businesses operate with low capitalization, and profit preponderantly on the extended hours the self-employers are willing to commit to work. Self-exploitation might be the major way of making a difference in their earnings. Thus, when measured in relative hourly rates (loglinear form of hourly wages), the self-employed may receive lower returns. However, given the broad range in migrants' entrepreneurial economic payoffs, a certain proportion of this population might be rewarded exceptionally high as self-employers in the market. So when measured in absolute rmb and outlying values are considered, the self-employed migrants might receive more monetary payoffs. Li (1996)'s conclusion based on a survey in Jinan, Shandong Province in 1994 suggests this possibility in such context- he suggests that the small business owners and self-employed are among the top of the income stratification with labor employees at the bottom. Thus we derived our second hypothesis.

H2: Among rural-urban migrant workers, the self-employed tend to work longer hours (H2.1) and receive lower relative returns (loglinear hourly wages) (H2.2), but receive higher absolute rmb values (linear hourly wages) (H2.3) than do the migrant labor employees.

Finally, we examine how the self-employed migrants stratify along the line of political capitals. We first argue that former cadres in general receive higher hourly income in its absolute value in urban market, but such advantage is only attributable to the larger earnings of the cadres among the self-employed. As suggested by Wu (2006), local cadres remain to assert a powerful influence in the self-employment in urban areas in late reform eras, and they in general enjoy higher financial returns than do others. And yet, in urban labor markets where skills and energy levels are the major determinants of wages, the status of being former cadres in rural area rarely affects individual's income level. Further, among the self-employed migrants, given the advantages former cadres might enjoy, their earnings tend to concentrate on the higher end of the income levels, or the positive outliers. Thus, hypothesis 3 is derived.

H3: Among rural-urban migrant workers, former cadres tend to receive higher absolute values of hourly income (3.1), and this advantage is attributable to the larger earnings of the cadres among the self-employed (3.2). Moreover, among the self-employed migrants, cadres' earning advantage is more pronounced at the high end of the income rung (3.3).

Data and method

This paper uses a 12-City Migrant Survey conducted in 2009 in four major urbanized regions that attract the majority of internal migrants. The four regions are the Pearl River Delta, the Bohai Bay Area, the Yangtze River Delta and the Chengdu-Chongqing region respectively. In each of these four regions, three cities were randomly selected, including one megalopolis

(population over a million), one large city (population between half a million and one million), and one small/medium-sized city (population below half a million). Eventually, twelve cities were selected: Guangzhou, Zhongshan and Dongguan in Guangdong Province, Yanjiao in Hebei Province, Jinan and Weifang in Shandong Province Ningbo and Yueqing in Zhejiang Province, Jiangyin in Jiangsu Province, Chongqing, Nanchong and Chengdu in Sichuan Province. In small cities all urban districts are included in the sampling frame while in megalopolis where population is huge, one urban district is randomly selected. Migrant registration lists provided by local Public Security Bureau which holds about 70% to 90% of migrants in each city served as the sampling frame. 200 migrants in each city were randomly selected from these lists which yielded about 2400 migrant individuals in the total sample. Finally, migrants here defined as those whose Hukou is not registered in the city they live in at the time of survey, and have left their Hukou registration places for more than three days. The survey collects rich information on migrants' demographic characteristics, employment, income, housing, social network, and various aspects of livelihood.

Respondents were asked whether they had been local cadres, in military before and if they were party members at time of survey. They were also asked the year they started their first non-agricultural job and among the self-employed, the year they started their business.

Working hours per week for the employee rural migrants are obtained by multiplying the reported actual working hours per day and actual working days per week. Given a small discrepancy in the ways the questions are asked for the working hours of the two migrant groups, for the self-employed rural workers, weekly working hours are obtained by multiplying working hours per day with working days per month and converging it into a weekly scale.

Variables related with human capitals (gender, age, age squared, marital status, educational attainment, years in non-agricultural job, whether engaged in self-employment previously back in hometown) and social capitals (had been a cadre before, has been in military before, being a party member) are used in logistic regression to predict probability of entry into self-employed. Both logged hourly income and hourly income in its absolute values were then predicted with the same set of human and social capitals, together with self-employment status. Finally, the same sets of variables as well as different occupation categories of self-employment were employed to predict hourly income (in both its own and its logged form).

Finally, it is worth noting that given the cross-sectional nature of the data, we are not able to pick up the cases who failed their business and either go into labor market or back to their rural hometowns. This might affect the results in the way that the risk of starting a self-employed business is underestimated by just looking at the standard deviation of income and extended working hours.

Preliminary results

By 2005, there were about 24% of internal migrants who were self-employed (China 2005 One Percent Sample Survey). This percentage is consistent with our sample of which about 24.61% are currently participating in self-employed business; and among the rural born migrants, this percentage is slightly higher (25.35%). In other words, at least for the past few years, every one in four rural-urban migrants is participating in self-employed businesses in urban areas, instead of being employed. These self-employed businesses are usually small in scale with many of them being just family businesses and in this sample, with the average initial fund around 10,000 rmb （table not shown here).

The businesses these self-employed migrant workers are engaging are quite diverse. Table 1 shows categories of business the self-employed are participating. About one third of the self-employed have business of convenience store, indicating large urban demands and migrants' relative easy entry into business of such kind. Food/grocery peddlers come as second and take about 15.79% of the total population. About 9.17% are able to enter into the more lucrative restaurant business, while the same percentage congregates in the clothing resale and cleaning industry. Besides these major businesses, about 37% are dispersed in tricycle transportation, recycling, shoe repair, moving, housing decoration and other various businesses. The spectrum of businesses these migrant self-employers participate suggests the various market niches left and available for these rural migrants in urban China.

Descriptively, there is stark difference between the group of self-employed and the employee migrant workers (Table 2). The self-employed are in general older, more likely to be male and married. Although the self-employed have a higher mean of annual income, the standard deviation is far larger than that of the other group (s.d. 134791.9 yuan vs. sd. 34214.7 yuan), suggesting the high level of heterogeneity within the self-employed group as well as a financially unstable and risky prospect for the potential self-employed. The self-employed also tend to work significant longer hours (76.9h/w vs. 55.9h/w). Thus the decision to make oneself self-employed may not be an easy one. Extended working hours, income instability, general inaccessibility to labor welfare and health insurance may make self-employed business fairly unattractive to many migrants, with possible exception of those equipped with capitals and more predictable prospects. Therefore, without controlling for other covariates, most human and social capital indicators seem to be negatively associated with entry into self-employment –they are in general less educated, less likely to be a veteran or a party member, probably results of negative selection.

There are also exceptions though. The self-employed migrants are more likely to be a cadre (or used to be a cadre) and more likely to be in self-employed back in their hometown. These latter findings might foreshadow the fact that individuals of these characteristics are selected into the higher strata of the self-employed, into the more successful entrepreneurs.

Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients for the logit models predicting entry into self-employed among the rural-urban migrants. As to educational selection, the less educated have more propensity to enter into the self-employed industry; years staying in non-agricultural jobs are associated with decreased probability of engaging in self-employed. History of self-employed or small entrepreneurship back in the rural hometown does not seem to be significantly associated with individual participating in self-employed in the urban area. With regard to social\political capital, while former cadre status and being a party member does not seem to be associated with self-employment status, veterans are less likely to be involved in self-employed activities than others. This could be the results of favorable job policies toward veterans after they retired from military, and social capitals that veterans accumulated as solders and are able to utilize after they are out of military. Hence, these evidences lend supports to hypothesis 1.

To further test the hourly wages and working hours of the self-employed migrants versus the employee migrants, regression models were performed to predict weekly hours and migrants' hourly income (both in loglinear form and its absolute values), as presented in Table 4 and Table 5 respectively. Results in Table 4 confirmed H2.1 that the self-employed migrants work extra19 hours than other migrants each week. Model 1a in Table 5 demonstrates that as hourly wages in loglinear form, the self-employed migrants receive 0.83 yuan short of hourly income than the other migrant group. This finding is consistent with previous findings on immigrant entrepreneurs in the U.S. and H2.2. However, as shown in Model 1b in Table 5, when the

original values are used to predict hourly wages for the same model, although the self-employed migrants tend to receive more hourly rate than other migrants, the advantage in its outlaying values are not statistically significant. H2.3 is thus not proved. This finding suggests an even tougher economic condition for the self-employed migrant group in China than their international counterparts in the U.S. where the successful immigrant entrepreneurs pulled the income of the whole population of immigrant self-employed to a statistical significant level.

Regarding the role of ever being a local cadre in their labor market outcomes in the urban area, while they do not appear to receive higher relative earnings (as shown in Model 1a), former cadres receive about an extra 7 yuan per hour than the others in general (as shown in Model 1b). H3.1 is thus confirmed. To further test H3.2, Model 2a and 2b in Table 4 present models with an interaction term between migrants' cadre status and self-employment status. After controlling for the interaction term, the positive sign for cadre status in Model 1a turns into negative in Model 2a; and this pattern is further clarified in Model 2b where the extra hourly wages that a former cadre would make disappeared after taking into account of the interaction term, indicating that the advantage of hourly rate a former cadre receive in the urban area is overwhelmingly attributed to the high surplus hourly wages the former cadres received in the field of self-employment. We are able to confirm H3.2. To further clarify the earning advantage of the former cadres, we performed analyses to predict loglinear (Model a) and linear (Model b) forms of hourly wages among the self-employed migrants only (Table 5). Results show that while in relative terms (Model a), former cadres do not present a significant part in improving migrants' hourly income; however, when positive outliers are considered and the linear values of hourly income is predicted, an former cadre experience give a substantial 24 yuan advantage in migrants' hourly income in the urban areas while being self-employed. We are thus able to confirm H3.3.

Conclusions and Discussions

The market payoffs of immigrants in the U.S. has been studied extensively and the conclusions are highly reliant on model specifications as to the choice of functional forms of hourly wages (loglinear or linear). If loglinear and the average rate of return is chosen, the self-employed migrants tended to be rewarded poorly; however, if linear and absolute economic gain is chosen, this group tended to obtain higher hourly return. This discrepancy is the consequence of those successful entrepreneurs who tend to concentrate on the outlying values of the income rung. Our results in the context of internal migrants in China are in general consistent with this pattern with the exception that, when absolute value of income is chosen, the positive sign does not take statistical significance. This might suggest that in urban China, migrant entrepreneurs are facing an even tougher environment. What's more, the self-employment selects migrants that seem to be "unwanted" from the mainstream labor market, aggregating the general economic and social positions of the self-employed migrants, and exposing them to a more marginalized and peripheral situation.

Nevertheless, great heterogeneity exists within the self-employed migrants with regard to their market payoffs. As summarized by Logan et al. (2003), in the U.S, immigrants entering self-employment is "somewhat like a lottery, self-employment has a poor average payoff but a high potential one."(p. 350). A lottery may not exactly describe the situation in China, however. Having a history of being a cadre in the rural area would substantially increase migrant entrepreneur's hourly income by over 24 yuan. In other words, rural political capitals are able to transfer into urban economic capitals in ways of being self-employed in the urban areas.

The reasoning of such high predictive power of cadre status can be derived from two lines. On the one hand, rural cadres might be better prepared and equipped as to the capitals needed for the success of self-employment businesses. For example, they are more likely to maintain larger financial capitals for initial investment than their non-cadre counterparts; and the superb socializing skills they have obtained during cadre work could be conveniently utilized while doing businesses in the urban area. On the other, political capitals might transfer into social capitals that are essential to small businesses. For instance, with the influence and positions in the local rural community, some townsmen might find the former cadres to be reliable and trustworthy, and thus willing to follow along and work in their business while entered urban areas. In another instance, individuals might be posed to a wider connection of the outside world while being a local rural cadre, and even form some kind of cooperation with successful townsmen in urban areas already. Thus, when they decided to enter into urban entrepreneurship, they might be more determined as to where to go and which industry to venture into; a useful hand might also be available to them due to the connections they have formed during their cadreship. Finally, it is also worth noting that there might be a selection effect. Given certain positioning power, those who are willing to forsake current cadre status and enter urban entrepreneurship are usually selected based on their prospect for success. One cannot overestimate this selection though, since it is highly intertwined with the first line of argument.

Table 1. Categories of Occupation among the self-Employed Migrants

Convenience Store	172	29.2
Food/grocery Peddlers	93	15.79
Restaurant	54	9.17
Clothes Retail and Cleaning	54	9.17
Tricycles	23	3.9
Recycling	22	3.74
Shoe Repair	17	2.89
Moving	16	2.72
Housing Decorations	16	2.72
Others	122	20.71
Total	589	100

Table 2. Education and Income by Employment Status

	Self-Employed		Employee	
	Mean	S.D	Mean	S.D
Age	36.8	9.2	30.3	9.9
Annual Income	56999.0	134791.9	39189.2	34214.7
Working Hours/w	76.9	26.6	55.9	18.7
Years working in Non-Agricultural Work	11.2	6.6	7.2	5.8
Years since Starting Business	5.7	4.9	NA	NA
	530		1564	

	Self-Employed	Employee
	Percent	Percent
Male	62.9	54.03
Married	86.82	56.2
Education		
Elementary School or Less	36.91	19.88
Junior School Graduate	46.52	45.65
High School Graduate	13.94	24.87
Being a Cadre before	4.71	3.71
Veteran	4.14	6.2
Being a Party Member	4.52	5.63
Being self-employed in hometown	7.34	4.8
Total	530	1564

Table 3. Logit Regression Coefficients for Entry into Self-Employed among Migrants

Human Capital			
Gender	0.2911	*	0.1170
Age	0.1176	**	0.0421
Age Squared	-0.0012	*	0.0005
Married	0.7677	***	0.1835
Education			
Elementary School or Less (reference)			
Junior School	-0.2425	+	0.1311
Senior	-0.5103	**	0.1776
College and above	-1.0420	**	0.3155
Was Self-Employed in Hometown	0.0391		0.0097
Years in Non-Agricultural Job	-4.3495	***	0.7253
Social/Political Capital			
Being a Cadre before	-0.0154		0.2708
Veteran	-0.6151	*	0.3037
Being a Party Member	0.0910		0.3044
Constant	0.2221	***	0.2166
Number	2089		
Pseudo R2 =	0.1217		

Table 4. OLS Regression Coefficients for Working Hours per Week

Human Capital			
Gender	0.7314		1.0597
Age	-0.5211		0.3643
Age Squared	0.0087	+	0.0047
Married	0.0019		1.5576
Education			
Elementary School or Less (reference)			
Junior School	-0.5500		1.3627
Senior	-5.2768	**	1.6608
College and above	-9.1238	***	2.2612
Years in Non-Agricultural Job	-0.0887		-0.8700
Social/Political Capital			
Being a Cadre before	4.9749	+	2.6774
Veteran	-2.9278		2.4904
Being a Party Member	-1.6794		2.5841
Engaging in Self-Employed	19.8914	***	1.2272
Constant	65.2369	***	
Number	2076		
Adjusted R2 =	0.16		

Table 5. OLS Regression Coefficients for Hourly Wages

	Logged Hourly Wages						Hourly Wages					
	Model 1a			Model 2a			Model 1b			Model 2b		
Human Capital												
Gender	-0.0820	*	0.0387	-0.0827	*	0.0387	-0.4420		0.9747	-0.5024		0.9712
Age	0.0040		0.0132	0.0038		0.0132	-0.1367		0.3344	-0.1412		0.3332
Age Squared	-0.0001		0.0002	-0.0001		0.0002	0.0006		0.0043	0.0006		0.0043
Married	0.1649	**	0.0567	0.1665	**	0.0567	1.3152		1.4323	1.4150		1.4273
Education												
Elementary School or Less (reference)												
Junior School	0.1858	***	0.0497	0.1822	***	0.0497	1.3273		1.2537	1.1313		1.2501
Senior	0.4787	***	0.0604	0.4742	***	0.0605	7.3375	***	1.5260	7.0975	***	1.5216
College and above	0.5454	***	0.0832	0.5444	***	0.0832	7.7709	***	2.0804	7.7394	***	2.0727
Years in Non-Agricultural Job	0.0183	***	0.0037	0.0183	***	0.0037	0.3209	**	0.0937	0.3251	***	0.0933
Social/Political Capital												
Being a Cadre before	0.0512		0.0977	-0.0447		0.1136	7.2434	**	2.4644	1.3141		2.8654
Veteran	0.1390		0.0913	0.1379		0.0913	1.8019		2.2940	1.8168		2.2855
Being a Party Member	-0.1239		0.0944	-0.1254		0.0943	-2.4066		2.3737	-2.6445		2.3656
Engaging in Self-Employed	-0.1837	***	0.0449	-0.1989	***	0.0458	1.4971		1.1342	0.5570		1.1540
Self-Employed×Being a Cadre before				0.3485	+	0.2107				21.0368	***	5.2405
Constant	5.9412	***	0.2206	5.9502	***	0.2206	12.2967	*	5.5604	12.7624	***	5.5411
Number	2026						2049					
Adjusted R2 =	0.06						0.02			0.03		

Table 6. OLS Regression Coefficients for Hourly Wages for the Self-Employed Migrants

	Model a (Logged hourly wages)			Model b (Hourly wages)		
Human Capital						
Gender	0.0014		0.0879	0.0771		3.1303
Age	-0.0270		0.0302	-0.5587		1.0752
Age Squared	0.0002		0.0004	0.0050		0.0135
Married	0.2612	+	0.1351	-0.2738		4.8186
Education						
Elementary School or Less (reference)						
Junior School	0.2061	*	0.0962	1.5326		3.4132
Senior	0.5035	***	0.1376	8.2048	*	4.8857
College and above	0.2801		0.2710	6.6340		9.6497
Years in Non-Agricultural Job	0.0248	**	0.0073	0.9151	***	0.2610
Years since Starting Business	-0.0051		0.0095	0.3380		0.3374
Was Self-Employed in Hometown	0.5513	***	0.1543	19.7554	***	5.5019
Social/Political Capital						
Being a Cadre before	0.2697		0.2079	24.3298	***	7.3442
Veteran	0.2206		0.2426	4.9169		8.5749
Being a Party Member	0.0192		0.2470	-6.0820		8.6211
Constant	16.3244		19.0372	-662.4392		678.5896
Number	508			510		
Adjusted R2	0.07			0.05		

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