“Immigration, Crime and Terrorism”

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Immigrants are routinely blamed for increasing crime in many societies and after the al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States, migration was increasingly linked to international terrorism in the press, policy community and the public imagination. The association of migration to crime and terrorism is often overblown for political purpose.

Nevertheless, the reality remains that increasing international migration and mobility has enabled the expansion of transnational organized crime. Certain forms of crime, such as human smuggling, have facilitated cross border movements of people. More generally, the insecurity experienced by people living in countries with high crime rates may be a significant emigration push factor. Similarly, terrorists travel internationally in running their organizations and carrying out missions, missions that often themselves target the transportation systems and conveyances of international travel. Moreover, terrorists may cross international borders within flows of migrants and can hide within immigrant communities. The failure of immigrant integration and corresponding social alienation of certain individuals may be reasons for them to join terrorist organizations. Terrorist attacks may also provide reasons for emigration. In like fashion, some states that compete for high-skilled immigrants have pointed to the lack of terrorist attacks and their relative security as part of their recruitment strategies.
The association of migration with crime and, even more so, terrorism has been politically controversial and given rise to a growing literature on “the securitization of migration” that is critical of such linkage and implicitly, if not explicitly, critical of those policymakers who depict migration as a security issue (Doty 1999; Huysmans 2000; Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002; Tirman 2004). Such arguments about the political linkage of migration to security are not new. Migration scholars have long argued that public perceptions in host countries, which may or may not be well-founded, that migrants increase employment competition, challenge religious, cultural or ethnic homogeneity, increase crime or threaten national security may be used by politicians to influence domestic political contests and thereby influence policy making (e.g., Miller 1981; Freeman 1985; Heisler and Schmitter Heisler 1985; Hollifield 1992; Thraenhardt 1993; 1997; Betz 1994). When the perception of migration as a threat leads to more general changes in migrant destination state policies, migration can have a significant impact on foreign policy (Weiner 1993; Tucker, Keely and Wrigley 1990; Weiner 1993; Teitelbaum and Weiner 1995).

Not only have many migration scholars have reluctant to consider migration within the context of security, they have been slow to analyze the phenomenon of human smuggling. Part of the problem is that migrants are all too often implicitly or explicitly identified with criminality in political rhetoric when in fact migrants are more likely to be the victims than the perpetrators of crime (Miller 1998). For example, some conservative members of the U.S. Congress have been quick to point out that undocumented aliens are criminals by virtue of their illegal crossing or visa overstay, and certain European politicians have attributed the spread of organized criminal activity in Western Europe to
increasing migration from the former Soviet Union. In the face of the exaggeration of immigrant criminality and the propensity of politicians to allow immigrants to become scapegoats in the heat of election campaigns, it is tempting for migration scholars to overcompensate for such knee-jerk reactions by avoiding any discussion of crime among migrants.

There is a propensity for those who consider the relationship between migration and crime or migration and terrorism to so within the context of policy debates, whether pro or anti-immigration. These relationships, however, are much more complicated and deserve much more sober analysis. To this end, this chapter will explore some of the ways in which international migration intersects with the issues of crime and terrorism. The chapter proceeds in four steps: First, I will consider the ways in which crime and terrorism have precipitated particular international movements across borders; second, I will focus more specifically on one form of crime - human smuggling; third, I will consider some of the consequences international migration for crime and, finally, I will explore the relationships between migration, mobility and terrorism.

1. Crime and Terrorism as Factors of Migration

The relationship between crime and migration can be very direct. Be convicted of a crime and be put on a boat bound for far-flung colonies. For several centuries, the English, then British, monarchy employed a policy of forced migration of convicts. As early as 1618, Englishmen convicted of crimes, including armed robbery and manslaughter, were given an option to settle in Jamestown, Virginia. In 1619, the King ordered that 100 convicts be shipped to Virginia. Increasing numbers of convicts were shipped off after Parliament passed legislation in 1717 “for more effectual transportation
of felons” and it has been estimated that some 50,000 convicts were sent to North America in the 18th century (Hackett Fischer and Kelly 2000, 54-58). In addition to Virginia, Georgia became a major destination. The British government stopped sending convicts to North America before the American Revolution partly due to the fact that, not surprising, they tended to side with the American rebels against the King. As the doors closed in North America, British convicts were diverted to Australia, with some 160,000 sent between 1767-1868. Portuguese convicts were sent to Brazil until the 1820s and, inspired by the British experience in populating Australia with convicts, the French government sent over 100,000 convicts to French Guiana and New Caledonia between 1852 and 1938 (Eltis 2002; Forster 2002). While World War II may have brought an end to the policy of forced migration of convicts to populate colonies, the exportation of troublesome criminals did not end then. In 1980, Fidel Castro responded to US propaganda criticizing the Cuban government’s restriction of emigration by declaring that any Cubans who wanted to leave could do so from the port of Mariel. The Cuban government released an estimated 20,000 prisoners into a much larger flow that has become known as the Mariel Boat lift.

Despite the forced migration that occurred within the long history of colonization, migration is commonly thought of as an economic phenomenon of the voluntary movement of people from countries mired in poverty and unemployment to lands of economic opportunity. Migration not just an economic phenomenon but also a matter of people moving across borders from parts of the world that not secure to areas of the world that are more secure. Barbara Schmitter Heisler and Martin Heisler conceptualized the relationship of migration and security by making the simple point that people tend to
move from areas of insecurity to areas of security and putting this in a broader argument that refugees and migrants are attracted to the political stability and the peace of areas Karl Deutsch called “security communities” (Schmitter Heisler and Heisler 1989; Deutsch, et. al., 1957). Deutsch argued that security communities developed in the North Atlantic area comprised of North America and Western Europe. Security communities were defined as areas in which states no longer resort to war in order to resolve disputes and took two forms—amalgamated, meaning “the formal merger of two or more independent units into a larger unit” and pluralistic denoting, “legal independence of the separate governments” (Deutsch et. al. 1957, 6). Much as the Pax Romana drew migrants into the Roman Empire from beyond the Rhine and Danube, over the past few decades the security communities of the North Atlantic area have been drawing refugees and migrants from more conflict prone regions to the south and east.

In extraordinary times, international and civil wars threaten personal security and drive the “escape from violence” of forced migration of asylum seekers and refugees (Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo 1989). In less dramatic fashion, increasing crime, particularly, violent crime becomes a reason for people to move. Differences in crime rates among areas within states lead to internal migration, as was the case in the US where increasing crime (and the popular perception of increasing crime) led to “urban flight” to the suburban and even exurban areas around cities (Sampson and Wooldredge 1986; Cullen and Levitt 1999). Similarly, people move across international borders from areas in which they (or their families) are subject to high risks of becoming victims of violent crime to areas in which these risks are lower. Of course, there may be a high correlation between security and economic prosperity in the migration receiving country
while relatively high rates of violent crime are strongly correlated to the poverty of the
sending country. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to interpret the actions of a migrant
moving from relatively poor countries to wealthier countries simply in terms of economic
push and pull factors. Indeed, many highly-skilled migrants and entrepreneurs with
capital, who could, like many political refugees, enjoy a relatively high standard of living
in their home country; often opt to emigrate in order to ensure the safety of their families,
even if they are only able to get poor paying jobs for which they are overqualified.

The increasing crime and growing violence among gangs in Mexico that has
killed many innocent bystanders is spurring many Mexicans to move to the US.
Recently, kidnapping has increased dramatically and kidnappers have specifically
targeted Mexicans who have relatives living in the US in the expectations that they will
be able to extort large ransoms. As a Mexican migration scholar, Rodolfo Garcia
Zamora, has stated, “Hundreds of families are emigrating out of fear of kidnap or
extortion, and Mexicans in the U.S. are doing everything they can to avoid returning.
Instead they’re getting their relatives out” (Quoted in Dillon 2009). The severity of the
insecurity caused by crime in Mexico is reflected by the fact that government officials
have moved across the border for their personal safety. For example, the police chief of
Palomas, a Mexican border town that became the scene of battle between rival drug
gangs, crossed into the US and asked for “political asylum” and according to Department
of Homeland Security officials, there were three such cases in Spring 2008 (McKenna
2008).

Generally speaking, states grant political asylum to those with well-founded fears
of individual persecution by their own governments and some states may additionally
provide refuge to those fleeing civil wars. Fleeing violent crime that is not politically motivated or related to the government in power is neither politically motivated forced migration captured in statistics of refugee flows nor is it purely “voluntary” migration of those seeking a better standard of living for themselves and their families. In certain cases, such as public officials applying for asylum in fear of criminal gangs or asylum claims of victims of domestic violence or violence based on sexual orientation in which the home state failed to protect individuals, crime can be considered factor explaining refugee flows. Migration spurred by individual victimization by criminals or more general fears of crime is often simply subsumed within economic migration.

Effective acts of terrorism induce a sense of insecurity in a population and spur individuals to move abroad. The September 11th attacks led to a real estate boom in the Hudson Valley north of New York and in the eastern counties of Pennsylvania as well-to-do New Yorkers moved their families out of the city. While it is unlikely that the attacks induced very many Americans to emigrate, political violence in many countries has spurred people to leave; whether this violence is considered “terrorism” may be another matter. Given that, as the saying goes, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” the unconventional asymmetric warfare of civil conflicts may lead individuals to leave their country of birth or nationality. For example, a large number of Israelis have left Israel – many for the United States and one of the reasons for the outflow has been the ongoing political violence of the Middle East (Gold 2003).

States that have remained neutral in the international conflicts around them have long been destinations for the war-weary, as the history of Switzerland and, to a large extent, the United States before 1914, have well born out. While classical immigration
countries have a tradition of refugee resettlement offered to those who wish to leave the
region of their insecure homelands, some states have taken a further step of recruiting
immigrants by appealing to their sense of insecurity. In December 2006 the New
Zealand Ministry of Labour adopted a “new business model,” which included in its
public relations campaign to attract high-skilled migrants an attempt to make a virtue of
the country’s remoteness by emphasizing that New Zealand had not been a target of any
terrorist acts and was unlikely to become one. Furthermore, the approach promoted by
officials paired changes to its high-skilled migration program with proposals to use
enhanced information technologies and biometric data collection to emphasize that those
who came to New Zealand could be assured that everyone else who was there, was also
not a security threat.¹

2. Human Smuggling

Human smuggling is an individual’s crossing of a state’s international border
without that state’s authorization and with the assistance of paid smugglers. International
human trafficking occurs when an individual who has been smuggled across a border is
coerced, especially into forced labor or prostitution.² Human trafficking across
international borders is often a subset of human smuggling, which is itself a part of the
broader phenomenon of what is variously termed “irregular,” “unauthorized,”
“undocumented,” or “illegal” migration. Illegal migration can be the result of individuals
entering states through authorized ports of entry by fraud or concealment within
conveyances, crossing states’ borders without authorization between ports of entry or

¹ Author’s interview with NZ Department of Labour officials in December 2006.
² For official definitions of human trafficking and human smuggling, see UN 2000.
entering though ports of entry with appropriate authorization and/or a visa but then overstaying the terms of entry. Trafficked individuals who are forced into prostitution or labor may have initially voluntarily engaged the services of a smuggler to cross international borders illegally but then upon arriving find themselves coerced into labor through violence directed at them and/or their families back home. The key difference between human smuggling and trafficking is coercion, whether through direct application of physical force or the threat of the use of force.

It is very difficult to disentangle the processes of human smuggling from the trafficking of people because these processes are generally handled by networks of intermediaries rather than end-to-end by the same individual or organization. Consider a typical situation in which a young Moldovan woman is told by an Italian trafficker’s Moldovan recruiter that he has friends in Italy that can get her a job working illegally in an Italian restaurant in Germany. The recruiter makes arrangements with a series of smugglers (who may or may not know that he is a recruiter working for an Italian trafficker) in order to transport the woman to Italy. The Moldovan woman might be transported across the Adriatic in an Albanian smuggler’s speedboat together with Turkish men seeking to work in the Netherlands, and Iraqis fleeing sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing. In the instance of the crossing, all the individuals are being smuggled as they are simply paying a fee for an illegal border crossing. However, when the Moldovan woman arrives in Italy, has her passport seized and is forced into prostitution, what on the face of it was an act of human smuggling becomes an act of trafficking for forced prostitution.
Most media coverage, legislation and past international treaties on human trafficking focus on the trafficking of women and children into forced prostitution. Although such exploitation of women and children is the most reprehensible variant of trafficking, it is only a part of the trafficking of all forms of labor. Debt bondage and involuntary servitude are defining features of human trafficking as opposed to just smuggling people across borders for a fee. Due to very high smuggling fees, migrants who have been smuggled from China are more likely than other smuggled migrants to enter into debt bondage arrangements backed up by threats of violence against them and their families in China. The 260 passengers of the smuggling ship, *The Golden Venture*, which washed ashore a New York beach in 1993, agreed to pay an average fee of $35,000 to be smuggled to the US. The fee for passage from China to New York City in 2004 is as high as $65,000. Typically, customers pay smugglers a down payment (usually $1,000 - $1,500) and then family members, relatives or friends pay the balance of the fee upon arrival and the migrant repays the debt at no or relatively low interest rates. A smaller percentage of migrants become indebted to organized crime groups and loan sharks who charge much higher interest rates and back up debt repayment with enforcers. Generally, the migrants work in garment factories and Chinese restaurants, often up to 80 hours/week and live in very small spaces where it is not uncommon that they share beds by sleeping in shifts (Chin 2001; Kwong 2001).

While in the New York City area, debts might be primarily held by relatives and friends (whose treatment of the migrant may also vary), in American Samoa and the U.S. Territories of the Northern Mariana Islands, Chinese, Taiwanese and Korean employment agencies, migrant traffickers and unscrupulous sub-contractors in the territories exploit
migrants through debt bondage arrangements to cheaply produce “made in the U.S.A.” garments which can be sold at high profits. With fees of up to $65,000 for the promise of work in the U.S. and Europe, the potential for exploitative debt bondage arrangements among smuggled Chinese migrants is all too great. This is reflected in the increasing number of cases of Chinese workers found working in exploitative and dangerous conditions, whether in U.S. sweatshops, Italian shoe factories or picking cockles along UK beaches.

It is very difficult to estimate the extent of human smuggling and trafficking worldwide owing to their clandestine nature. Nevertheless, there has been an increase in reported cases, which researchers, particularly those associated with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), have been gathering; regional estimates from around the world paint a picture of increasing migrant smuggling (Salt and Stein 1997). In 1997, IOM estimated that as many as 4 million people are smuggled across borders on an annual basis (IOM 1997).

As far as the subset of the human smuggling estimate that is composed of those who are trafficked, the 2003 US State Department Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP) estimated that between 600,000 to 800,000 people are trafficked across international borders each year and this estimate was repeated until the 2007 report, which (based on a 2006 US government sponsored study), set the estimated number at 800,000 and this estimate was repeated in 2008. Instead of providing estimates for international trafficking, the 2009 TIP report references International Labor Organization (ILO) estimates that at least 12.3 million adults and children are in forced labor, bonded labor,

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3 See the testimony of Nicolas M. Gess, Michael S. Teitlebaum and Steven Galster before the U.S. House Committee on Resources, 106th Congress, Thursday, September 16, 1999 http://resourcescommittee.house.gov/106cong/fullcomm/99sep16/990916agenda.htm
and commercial sexual servitude at any given time; at least 1.39 million of whom are victims of commercial sexual servitude, both transnational and within countries. Some of the early estimates of trafficking did not include trafficked men and the underlying assumptions and definitions of trafficking (vs. smuggling) were not as clear in earlier estimates as those made after the adoption of the UN definitions of smuggling and trafficking in the Transnational Crime Convention. All of these smuggling and trafficking estimates must be taken with more than a grain of salt as such global estimates have historically often been made by officials without any background data and analysis, reported in the media as authoritative and then read and repeated again by other officials.5

Although it may be difficult to verify the IOM estimate of four million smuggled per year, given that the percentage of illegal migrants that use smugglers increases as border control authorities increasing place obstacles in their way, these multi-million estimates may not be that far off the mark. For example, the United States has the largest migrant population in the world including 11.9 million illegal migrants, as estimated by the Pew Hispanic Center. Roughly 45% of the illegal migrations in the US entered legally but overstayed the terms of their admission and 55% of the illegal migrants in the US entered clandestinely between ports of entry or evaded Customs and Border Protection officials at ports of entry. Inflows of illegal migrants averaged 800,000 a year from 2000 to 2004, but fell to 500,000 a year from 2005 to 2008 (Passel and Cohn 2008). The European Commission estimates that there are an estimated 8 million illegal migrants in the European Union, half of which entered clandestinely (European

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4 See US Department of State, *Trafficking in Persons Report* (various years) at: http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/
5 For a useful discussion of the methodological problems with these estimates, see Laczko and Gramegna 2003 and GAO 2006.
Commission 2008) and the Russian Federal Security Service estimated that there are over 10 million illegal migrants in Russia (RIA Novosti 2008).

As the percentage of illegal border crossers composed of those who are smuggled increases, the scale of illegal migration can, to a certain extent, be indicative of the extent of human smuggling. For example, the US Border Patrol apprehends 1 million illegal border crossers annually\(^6\) but for each illegal crosser that Border Patrol Agents catch they say two or three get away (King 2006). This does not mean that there are two to three million additional illegal migrants added to the illegal migrant stock, due to the fact that those who successfully enter the US often do so after having been apprehended and returned several times (Pew 2006). Illegal migrants who entered the US clandestinely are predominantly Mexican and a large-scale sociological study conducted in the 1990s indicated that three-quarters of clandestine border-crossers from Mexico paid “coyotes” to help them on their first trip across the border and two-thirds did soon subsequent trips (Singer and Massey 1998). A more recent study indicates that four-fifths of undocumented migrants from Oaxaca, Mexico used smugglers to cross during 2000-2007 (Cornelius 2008). With increasing border security measures, particularly in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks, it has become is next to impossible for a first-time migrant to cross the US-Mexican border clandestinely without the assistance of a smuggler. Therefore, the number of those are smuggled into the US each year has become increasingly close to the number of those who cross illegally.

Border security officials contend that the multi-billion dollar profits of human smuggling now rival the drug trade. According to 2006 reporting based on interviews with US border control officials, smugglers as well as illegal migrants themselves (Lee

\(^6\) This figure is a 5-year average of FY 2004-2008, see DHS 2008, Table 35.
2006), fees to charged to Mexicans to be smuggled across the US southern border are about $3,000, which is about the same for non-Canadians to be smuggled across the northern border. The costs go up with increasing obstacles and distances from the US: $7,000 from Guatemala; $12,000 from Ecuador, Peru and Brazil; $30,000 from Eastern Europe and South Asia; $35,000 from Northern China and $60,000 from Fujian, China. The large difference between fees charge to Fujianese and Chinese from northern China is that northern Chinese are more likely to be able to acquire a visa to travel legally and then overstay the visa to work whereas Fujianese are more likely to be denied visas and have no recourse but to pay higher smugglers’ fees for a clandestine entry. A compilation of estimated smuggling fees in other parts of the world indicate that they range widely, e.g. $14,000 from Russia to Poland; $37,000 from China to the UK; $35,000 from Russia to Japan; $60,000 from Nigeria to Italy. All of the fees charged to all of those smuggled to destination countries add up. The UN has estimated total global revenues from smuggling to be $10 billion (UN 2006) up from a 1994 UN estimate of $3.5 billion (IOM 1996).

Increasing human smuggling is a function of more and better border controls. As border controls are strengthened by states, smugglers find evermore ingenious ways to defy them and if prospective migrants wish to succeed in a clandestine crossing they have little recourse but to pay smuggling fees. By all indications, as international migration increases around the world, human smuggling will increase along with it.

3. Migration as a Factor of Crime

Dramatically increasing international migration has coincided with the expansion and proliferation of transnational criminal organizations and these are not completely
unrelated phenomena. That is, the rapidly advancing information, communication, and transportation technologies that are driving economic globalization and propelling international migration are also fostering transnational crime (Naim 2006). When such criminal activity takes place in two or more countries, it is then considered transnational in nature. In a sense, transnational organized crime groups are not all that different from transnational corporations (TNCs) in that they both run border-transcending economic enterprises--the major differences are that TNCs’ business is legal whereas organized crime groups deal in illegal trade (drugs, stolen goods, prostitution) and use illegal means (extortion, theft, money laundering, murder) to realize their profits (Williams 1995). Just as technological change has globalized production and markets of legal goods and services; it has a similar impact on illegal production and markets. As Susan Strange pointed out, local and national crime organizations have expanded to global operations; the expansion is often a response to expanding markets for illegal commodities; increasing revenue has facilitated favorable treatment by states (i.e., corruption); and the globalization of financial markets and services facilitates the financing of illegal trade and the laundering of ill-gotten gains into “legitimate” businesses and investment instruments (Strange 1996, 110-21).

Just as it is preposterous to assert that all Sicilian immigrants in the United States are members of the Mafia, it is also foolish to contend that none are. The fact of the matter is that local criminal organizations may expand their operations abroad through emigration and recruitment within migrant communities abroad and the transportation and communications revolutions are facilitating this process. For example, the numbers of foreign-born Russians in New York City and Berlin who are involved in criminal
organizations with origins in Moscow may be rather small; however, their activity has expanded the scope of Russian organized crime beyond Russia's borders. Some members of these organizations may be native-born Americans and Germans, but many are indeed migrants from Russia (Finckenauer and Waring 1996; Finckenauer 2001). Mexican drug trafficking organizations have not only supplanted Colombia's Cali and Medellín cartels as the primary suppliers of illicit drugs to the US (CRS 2008), Mexican drug trafficking organizations are active within every region of the US and they have come to dominate the illicit drug trade of every region except the Northeast (NDIC 2008).

It is important to note that the expansion of local gangs to become border-spanning transnational criminal organizations through the migration of members is not always a matter of migration to the advanced industrialized countries of the West from former Communist countries in the East and developing countries of the South. For example, stepped-up enforcement of the U.S. policy of deporting noncitizens who have completed their prison sentences that began in 1996 inadvertently led to the expansion of Los Angeles gangs, Mara Salvatrucha or MS-13 and the 18th Street gang (or MS-18) to El Salvador. Having fled the Salvadoran civil war as children in the 1980s, these gang members often had few connections to the country of their birth and spoke very little Spanish. The US deported an estimated 20,000 young criminal nationals of Central American countries to their “home” countries, often without notifying law enforcement authorizes in these countries. Many deportees no longer had close family members and faced bleak job prospects in economies recovering from years of conflict (Arana 2005). Without jobs, but with considerable survival skills learned on the streets of Los Angeles and in U.S. prisons, many deportees turned to crime in an environment characterized by
relatively weak civilian law enforcement (Rohter 1997). These Los Angeles gangsters then recruited local Salvadoran youths into the American gang culture and maintained ties with their associates from back in the United States, often returning to the United States illegally. In short order, MS-13 became pan-Hispanic in membership and established branches in Seattle, San Francisco, Washington, and El Salvador (Sontag 1997).

Within a decade, information derived from interviews of MS-13 gang members at the time of their arrests indicated that members of MS-13 became involved in smuggling migrants from Central American countries, through Mexico to the United States and MS-13 gang members themselves had been smuggled into the United States utilizing the services of established human smuggling networks (Swecker 2006). Early on, MS-13 established itself on the Mexican-Guatemalan border where gang members attacked and robbed those migrants heading north to the US who did not hire MS-13 affiliated smugglers that charged $5,000 to $8,000 fees for smuggling them to the US. Then MS-13 expanded its operations into Mexican states all the way to the US border and struck alliances with new Mexican drug cartels in order to help the Mexican cartels to expand their operations in the growing number of US cities in which MS-13 was well established (Arana 2005).

Moreover, members of human smuggling organizations in receiving countries and the employers who illegally hire the smuggled labor are often migrants themselves. For example, most “enforcers” who collect debts from illegal Chinese workers in New York or the owners of the sweatshops or restaurants who employ them are from the Chinese immigrant community (Chin 2001; Kwong 2001). Similarly, immigrants owned and
operated the Houston-based “transportation companies” that moved smuggled Mexicans and Central Americans to Washington, D.C. (Moreno 1998). It is believed that the trafficking of central and Eastern European women to Western Europe has been primarily controlled by Russian and Ukrainian organizations; the women are then forced into prostitution by various local gangsters, many of whom are not nationals of the countries in which they operate. For example, Viennese police arrested Turkish and Yugoslav gangsters holding Hungarian and Slovak women, and, in a major sweep of twenty locations in North Rhine Westphalia, twenty-four women from Eastern Europe were freed from German, Albanian, Turkish, and Italian gangsters (IOM 1998b).

4. Migration, Mobility and Terrorism

The growing literature on the “securitization of migration” focuses on the political discourse linking migration to terrorism that makes migration a “new” security issue. Contrary to the arguments of certain American politicians and media outlets made after 9/11 that connected immigrants to terrorism, the hijackers who attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 were not immigrants to the US. Of the 19 hijackers, 17 entered on tourist visas, one on a business visa and one on a student visa. Most of the hijackers were tourists. Similarly, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian national travelling on a US tourist visa, attempted to detonate explosives hidden in his underwear aboard a December 25, 2009 Detroit-bound flight. The US government responded by imposing tougher airline screening measures for people flying from 14 countries, including Nigeria. The failed bombing attempt also triggered another round of anti-immigration rhetoric, this time aimed at Nigerian immigrants in the US.
International migration is not, per se, “the new security threat” but rather it is global mobility in general. Global mobility refers to all those who have crossed any international border for any reason or length of time. From the standpoint of official statistics, global mobility can be roughly categorized into international migration, defined by the UN as those who have lived outside of their country of nationality or birth for more than one year and international travel, which also includes those who travel abroad but do not stay in another country for a full year. There are an estimated 191 million migrants in the world (UN 2006) but this is rather small in comparison with the billions of border crossings by tourists, students, business people and commuters who travel internationally for stays of less than a year. With respect to estimating the extent of global mobility beyond the number of migrants, not all states keep records of all authorized international border crossings and there is no centralized collection of border crossing statistics that are collected. UN World Tourism Organization does collect and report international travel statistics with respect to tourism and business travel and estimated that in 2008 there were 924 million international tourist arrivals, which includes travel for leisure, business and to visit friends and relatives (UNWTO 2009). If all these tourists returned home within the same year they left, that would add another 924 million border crossings into their home countries. Many trips, however, involve arrivals in two or more countries for every return entry. Nevertheless, given that many border crossings from neighboring states are not included in the above international tourist arrival statistics, the total annual number of border crossings worldwide most likely exceeds two billion. From a border security standpoint, the increasing number of
travelers is a challenge to border control officials who attempt to identify dangerous individuals within the flows of legitimate travelers.

Contrary to assumptions of many prominent international relations scholars (e.g. Waltz 1979; Mearshiemer 2005) that states with sufficient military capabilities are the only actors of significance in world politics, a handful of people crossing unarmed into another country can have tremendous consequences for international security, as the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 amply demonstrated. The world’s most powerful states are now threatened by the possibility of asymmetric warfare by non-state actors armed with weapons of mass destruction (Allison 2004). Homeland security officials are preparing for distributed simultaneous attacks of suicidal terrorists arriving in airports posing as tourists who then infect themselves with smallpox and spread it to unsuspecting crowds at major tourist attractions. Strategies of nuclear deterrence that dominated international security policy and theories in the second half of the 20th century no longer apply when the opponent is not a state that can be threatened with retaliation but rather a suicidal individual.

The prospect of terrorists being smuggled into target states was considered as a potential threat in some law enforcement circles but it was not until after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington and the Mar. 11, 2003 attacks in Madrid that policymakers began viewing human smuggling as a security threat in a qualitatively different way. For example, it became clear that terrorists could take clandestine routes that transnational criminal organizations use to smuggle illegal migrants into the US. The 9/11 Commission staff detailed linkages between human smugglers and Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups in need of travel facilitation (9/11 Commission 2004a, 61).
Investigations into the Madrid bombing produced reports demonstrating that Ansar al-Islam, an al Qaeda-affiliated group linked to the attack, has been running a human smuggling and document fraud operation to fund terrorist actions as well as to smuggle its own members into countries like Spain and Iraq (Simpson, Crawford and Johnson 2004).

As intelligence screening and visa security is tightened so as to stop terrorists from entering legally with valid visas, the threat of clandestine entry of terrorists using smuggling organizations increases and with it international cooperation to combat terrorist travel. Within weeks of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the UN Security Council “Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,” issued resolution 1373 (2001) on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts that included a provision that “all States shall:…Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents” (UN 2001). The Security Council established a Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) in 2004 to strengthen and coordinate the process of monitoring the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001).

Although much of the political discourse linking migration to terrorism in response to the Sept. 11th attacks was wrongheaded and way off the mark, this is not to say that those who live outside of the country of their birth or nationality for more than one year (i.e. migrants) have had nothing to do with terrorism. In a certain sense, many cases of terrorism can be understood as emigrant participation in homeland politics that
becomes violent. Moreover, some terrorists, including some of the 9/11 hijackers, joined terrorist organizations while residing outside of their country of nationality.

The combination of international migration, advances in transportation and communications technology and spreading democratization fosters a “globalization of the domestic politics” of many states (Koslowski 2005). The scope and scale of emigrant political participation in homeland politics is increasing in today’s world as growing ranks of migrants from an increasing number of source countries living in a greater number of host countries produce evermore and increasingly varied diasporas. The globalization of domestic politics can also entail violence between contending parties of a domestic political struggle taking place abroad. Such conflicts may be between factions opposed to the home country government, as when Turkish groups fought one another in Germany and the rest of Europe (Abadan-Unat 1997). Emigrant political groups may also directly target diplomatic institutions or personnel of the home state government. On June 24, 1993, Kurdish nationalists, believed to be coordinated by the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), kidnapped 30 people and attacked Turkish businesses and government offices in 29 European cities. The German government responded by outlawing the PKK and other Kurdish nationalist groups as “terrorist organizations,” raiding offices, arresting suspected members and deporting them. Similarly, the attacks of al Qaeda on U.S. military and diplomatic personnel and facilities in Saudi Arabia, Yemen and East Africa in the 1990s can be understood as part of a globalized intra-Saudi conflict between Osama Bin Laden and the Saudi monarchy that began in 1990 when Bin Laden condemned for allowing U.S. military to be stationed in Saudi Arabia during and after the Gulf War. When al Qaeda joined forces with Ayman al Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic
Jihad in 1998, the conflict became less of a domestic Saudi conflict and more of an intra-Arab, intra-Muslim world conflict between radical proponents of Islamic fundamentalism and more secular western-oriented governments supported by the U.S. In such cases, parties to the conflict often view these actions in terms of the continuation of domestic political struggles abroad whereas the host countries in which this struggle takes place label it “international terrorism.” Just as Clausewitz defined war as “politics by other means,” depending on one’s perspective, certain forms of international terrorism may be considered transnational diasporic politics by other means.

There are also many very important cases of migrants who have become terrorists. For example, Osama bin Laden is one of the world’s 191 million migrants and has been a migrant for most of the past 30 years. Born in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden spent the better part of a decade in Afghanistan before co-founding al Qaeda in Afghanistan during 1988. After assuming unrivalled leadership of al Qaeda, he accepted Sudanese political leader Hassan al Turabi’s invitation in 1989 to move the organization to Sudan. Bin Laden, himself, moved back to his native Saudi Arabia but within a year, he ran afoul of the Saudi government, which then took actions to silence him, including seizing his Saudi passport. In April 1991, bin Laden slipped out of the country and moved to Sudan where he had purchased property and then began setting up a variety of businesses. The rich Saudi immigrant not only engaged in major Sudanese road building projects but supported a series of operations against US military and diplomatic installations abroad. After the Saudi monarchy revoked bin Laden’s citizenship and froze his financial assets, external pressure on the Sudanese government to clamp down on bin Laden mounted and he eventually opted, in May 1996, to move his family and closest supporters to Jallabad,
Afghanistan, where he and his entourage were allowed to stay by local political leaders and, eventually, as guests of the Taliban, once they gained control of most of the country. Bin Laden primarily resided in Afghanistan until the US-led invasion and, by most accounts; he is now an illegal migrant in Pakistan.

Although none of the 9/11 hijackers were immigrants to the US, Mohamed Atta and several other hijackers lived outside of their countries of birth or nationality for several years before launching the attacks and, therefore, were also part of the world’s migrant population. Atta moved from his native Egypt to Germany in 1992, where he studied urban planning and worked part-time, receiving his masters degree in 1999. Marwan al Shehi, a national of the United Arab Emirates, received a military scholarship to study in Germany and first entered the country in 1996. Lebanese national Ziad Jarrah enrolled in a German junior college in 1996. These men, who piloted three of the four aircraft hijacked on 9/11, were members of the so-called “Hamburg cell.” Although the three entered Germany on temporary residence permits and were not considered immigrants by the German government, they could possibly have gone on to further education and professional careers in Germany and become permanent residents. Indeed, US State Department consular officers in Berlin basically treated them for visa purposes as if they were permanent residents or German citizens because they resided in Germany for more than two years, learned the relatively difficult language of German, matriculated to a German University and, therefore, did not present a significant “risk” to immigrate to the US due to their strong ties to Germany (9/11 Commission 2004a, 118). As this case illustrates, immigrants in one state could become security risks as travelers to another state.
Inasmuch as Atta, Jarrah, and al Shehi were not members of al Qaeda or plotting any violent actions before spending several years in Germany, it may be that the fact of their migration and residence in another country enabled, if not, motivated their terrorist acts. That is, would each of these individuals have become suicidal terrorists had they remained in Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Lebanon? If even if they had become so motivated, to what extent would their range of action have been restricted by the governments and police in their home countries? It is clear that Islamic fundamentalist political activists had much greater freedom in Europe during the 1990s than they did in Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Lebanon.

Although we can never know if they would have been motivated to become suicidal terrorists in their home countries, we do know that their experience as migrants in Germany did so, at least in part. For example, Mohamed Atta appears to have been a very serious student in his first years in Germany but then became active in the Quds mosque, which featured speeches by Mohammed Haydar Zammar, who fought in Afghanistan and encouraged young men to join in jihad. It was in the Quds mosque that Atta initially met fellow members of what was to become the Hamburg cell. According to a college friend who saw Atta during a visit back home in Egypt in 1998, he had changed a great deal, grown a beard and “obviously adopted fundamentalism” (quoted in 9/11 Commission 2004).

Things might have been quite different had Atta stayed in Egypt or steered away from radical ideologues in Germany. During this time, the government led by Helmut Kohl of the Christian Democratic Union (1982-1998) repeatedly stated that Germany “is not an immigration country” and the Kohl government did not encourage migrants on
temporary visas to acquire permanent residence and nor those with unlimited residence permits to naturalize to Germany. Since the guestworkers, foreign students, refugees and all who arrived on temporary visas were expected to return home (even in the case of migrants who had resided in Germany for decades), migrants were not expected to integrate into German society nor did the government encourage German citizens to welcome the “foreigners” in their midst as future German citizens-in-the-making. Such social exclusion reduced the chances that even a well-educated migrant who spoke good German could envision a bright future in Germany.

It should, therefore, come as no surprise that during the 1990s, growing numbers of young Muslims in Germany, like Mohammed Atta, as well as those in other European countries with similar positions on immigrant integration, turned to fundamentalist ideologies that rejected the secular western societies of the countries in which they lived. In a sense, terrorism can be a function of the failure of immigrant integration into the economy, society and polity of the country in which they reside. In some cases, international terrorist attacks in one country can be partly the result of a failure of immigrant integration in another country.

Conclusion

Crime has been a factor of migration, whether in the form of criminals forced to move to overseas colonies or people moving from states with high crime rates to those with less crime. Political violence, including “terrorism,” has also induced people to move from one country to another but to a much smaller extent than crime.

Human smuggling is a crime that has increased international migration and migrants have been major perpetrators of this crime. Of course, if all states had “open
border” policies toward migration and no states had laws limiting the number of migrants and requiring them to enter though official ports of entry, there would be no such thing as “illegal” migration and no one would need to pay anyone for help to cross a border. While this may be a dream of anarchists and libertarians, it is not the reality of a world organized into states that exercise authority over pieces of the earth’s surface, mutually recognized as each other’s sovereign territory. Illegal migration is a function of the border controls inherent in this system of states and human smuggling is a function of increasingly effective border controls. As more immigration restrictions are enacted and border controls effectively tightened, more migrants and asylum seekers will turn to smugglers and the crime of human smuggling will increase.

Eliminating restrictions on immigration would not, however, eliminate border controls because they are not just for controlling migration. International migration is just a small subset of global mobility. Migration is dwarfed by international tourism and controlling international movements of people is only a part of border control, along with collecting duties (upon which many developing country governments rely on for a majority of their revenues), stopping the entry of contraband, like drugs, nuclear materials and products made from endangered species, as well as agricultural pests, invasive species and bacteria and viruses harmful to public health. International migration is not the “new security issue,” it is the growing cross-border movements of products, money, conveyances, people (and the micro-parasites they carry) that may be instruments of international terrorism. Nevertheless, international migration may play a role in enabling certain forms of political violence, failures of economic and social
integration of migrants may have contributed to their taking a violent path and some migrants have become prominent terrorists.

Some people think that the word “migrant” should never be uttered in the same breath as “crime” or “terrorism.” They fear that to do so would unjustly “securitize” migration and invite political backlash. Others cannot think of crime or terrorism in any other context than their opposition to immigration, thereby justifying the fears of those who oppose any linkage. If we step back from the anti and pro-immigration policy debates and attempt to consider the possible role of international migration in crime and terrorism and the influence of crime and terrorism on international migration, it becomes clear that there has been a long history of flows of migration that are at least partially shaped by the security issues of crime and terrorism; it is also clear that some migrants have become criminals and terrorists. Nevertheless, such history and contemporary realities must be understood in their broader political contexts and with the awareness that the migration-crime-terrorism linkage is used by certain political entrepreneurs who leverage bigotry and xenophobia for political gain and incite violence in the process.

References


