Edward Renshaw
Professor of Economics
State University of New York at Albany
The most impressive aspect to the bull market of 1991-9? is its prolonged nature and resistance to downside corrections. In Table 6.1S it was noted that the two longest series of new high trading days for the S&P composite stock price index without a decline of three percent or more have occurred in this bull market. The data in Table 2.2S also show a very impressive new record with regard to a series of new high trading days without a larger correction of 9 percent or more.
In this essay we will up-date some tables from The Practical Forecasters' Almanac that provide some additional perspective of an historical nature on the uniqueness, duration and stability of the 1991-9? bull market.
On October 16, 1987--after a loss of more than nine percent in the preceding eight trading days--the S&P composite stock price index lost another five percent of its value and closed more than 16 percent below the historic high of 336.77 which was achieved on August 25, 1987. This was the fastest 16 percent decline in the S&P index from a new historic high since the index was first compiled on a daily basis in 1928. The speed of this decline may help to explain the panic of October 19 when the index plunged more than 20 percent in a single trading session.
While the crash of 1987 made headlines across the nation and around the world it was not the worst bear market in the post World War II period. If a crash is defined as a downward plunge in the average monthly values for the S&P composite stock price index amounting to ten percent or more, the stock market debacle of 1987 turns out to be only the third worst bear market since the end of World War II and the l5th most severe bear market since the S&P index was extended back to the 1870s using data compiled by the Cowles Commission. (See Table 9.1S.)
The data in this table would suggest that the stock market, if anything, has become more stable rather than less stable. In the 12 decades since the Civil War, only the 1950s, 1980s and 1990s stand out as having no stock market peak followed by a bear market with a decline greater than the 26.8 percent drop in the S&P index after the August 1987 peak.
The 61 month expansion in stock prices from July 1982 to August 1987 is exceeded only by the all time great bull market of the 1920s which persisted for 71 months without a contraction in monthly average stock prices of ten percent or more. The bull market which began in November 1990 already has the distinction of being the third longest and if it survives for another year it could tie the all time longevity record before the end of 1996.
During the great depression of the 1930s there were eight crashes of from 15 to 72.8 percent for the S&P index. In all of the other decades since the Civil War there have been from two to four peaks in the S&P index followed by declines of ten percent or more. Stock market instability, it would seem, is a well entrenched phenomenon that investors have always had to cope with.
Twenty-nine of the 42 crashes in Table 9.1S were associated with economic recessions. The other 14 bear markets, including the crash of 1987, occurred in the midst of prosperity and cannot be attributed to economic adversity. Crashes in the midst of prosperity tend to be of shorter duration than those associated with recessions. (See those declines identified with a # mark in column 4 of Table 9.1S.)
There have only been three economic recessions since 1873 that were not accompanied by stock market declines of ten percent or more. Two of these recessions occurred toward the end of World Wars I and II. The only other recession without a stock market crash was from October 1926 to November 1927 when the US was experiencing its greatest bull market.
Some of the most persuasive evidence in support of a longer run pattern to stock prices has been provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research. In a massive compendium which was published in 1961, Geoffrey Moore found that common stocks were excelled as a leading indicator of business cycles by only the net change in the number of operating businesses. Stock prices were classified as being a leading indicator 31 times, roughly coincident 14 times and a lagging indicator only five times.
The most publicized weakness of stock prices as an indicator of economic activity is a propensity for them to have predicted more economic recessions than have actually occurred. This point is illustrated in Table 9.2S where cumulative reversals amounting to 5.5 percent or more in the monthly average daily closing prices for the S&P composite 500 stock price index are used to define peaks and troughs in the index.
This reversal percentage is the smallest percentage that one can use and still eliminate all of the abortive stock market rallies which have occurred in the midst of recent economic recessions. Once the economy is in a recession and the stock market has recovered 5.5 percent on a monthly average basis the S&P index has consistently continued up for an additional gain of at least 25 percentage points before the index reversed itself on the downside by 5.5 percent. (See the gains in column 5 of Table 9.2S which are marked with a double asterisk.)
It will be noted that there have been 24 downside reversals since May 1946 and only nine recessions. Fifteen of these downside reversals occurred in the midst of a business expansion and were followed by an upside reversal of at least 5.5 percent before the economy became mired down in a recession. There are seven cases where a downside reversal of 5.5 percent was followed by a recession and two cases where a reversal of this magnitude did not occur until after the business peaks of January 1980 and July 199l.
From January to April of 1994 the monthly values for the S&P composite stock price index declined 5.446 percent and came very close to adding another contraction of 5.5 percent to the 24 downside reversals in Table 9.2S. The disqualification of this contraction enabled the S&P index to exceed the old record established in January 1966 of 43 months of sustained rise in stock prices (without a dip of 5.5 percent or more) when the monthly values for the S&P index recovered to a new historic high of 481.92 in February 1995.
Suppose one was able to identify business peaks at the end of the month in which they occurred. Would it then be too early to purchase common stock? The data which are presented in Table 9.3S show that the S&P index has then proceeded to lose from 3.8 to 35.1 percent of its value on a daily closing value basis before bottoming out during the nine recessions since 1947. Since the mild recession of 1960-61 the S&P index has consistently lost more of its value after the business peaks than before the business peaks.
While much attention has been paid to the unreliability of stock prices as a predictor of economic recessions it is less well appreciated that this market is a very superior predictor of economic recoveries. If we ignore the money supply, M-2 expressed in constant dollars, which is so trendy as to have not exhibited a distinct trough during some recessions, stock prices can claim the distinction of being the only component of the index of leading economic indicators that has consistently led economic recoveries in the post World War II period.
The unadjusted recovery lead times for the revised index of eleven leading economic indicators published in the October 1994 issue of the Survey of Current Business range from a low of one month for the 1973-75 and 1969-70 recessions to a high of 10 months for the 1981-82 recessions. The unadjusted lead times for stock prices, on the other hand, fall in the comparatively narrow range of from three to eight months. The lead times have been longer for those recessions associated with major wars. See Table 9.4S.
From 1929-92 there were only 14 years when the growth rate for real GDP in 1987 dollars was both positive and less than 3.0 percent. The financial return for the S&P index has (so far) always been positive during slow growth years unless there was a peak in business activity as was the case in five of these years (1957, 1960, 1969, 1981 and 1990). In four of the years containing a recessionary peak in economic activity the financial returns for the S&P index were negative and for 1960 the return was only .3 percent. See Table 9.5S.
The poor performance of the stock market during peak years and the more spectacular performance of the market during years containing a recessionary trough and some years of vigorous recovery from an economic recession is another illustration of the non linearity between changes in stock prices and economic activity.
In Table 9.6S we show major peaks and troughs in the value of the daily S&P index for the period 1946-90. All of the peaks and troughs since 1961 are identified on the basis of a 15 percent reversal of the index. A reversal percentage of this magnitude is needed to "filter out" an abortive rally in the midst of the more pronounced bear market from August 2, 1956 to October 22, 1957. The peaks and troughs associated with two smaller contractions are also included in this table to reflect the economic recessions which began in July 1953 and April 1960.
The most interesting point to note in connection with this table is that once the market has experienced a pronounced bear market and reversed itself on the upside by 15 percent it has usually risen at least another 15 percentage points before there was a downside reversal of this magnitude. The only exception to this conclusion in the post World War II period is the bear market of 1946-47 when the following recovery was only 24 percent.
If an investor had purchased the S&P index at the end of the day it first closed 15 percent above the preceding trough value, he or she would have always been able to have sold the index at a slight profit one year later. Holding the index for a second year would have sometimes resulted in a loss.
If the S&P index is able to weather October 1995 without a major crash and registers another new historic high in November, December or January, it will break the old record of 60 upward months without a correction of 15 percent or more which was established in August 1987.
Once the stock market has bottomed out and is in the process of recovering from a major bear market it has usually exploded upward at a very rapid rate during the first (or second) quarter of the recovery. See Table 9.7S. Price appreciation in the first quarter after a major bear market has been almost twice as much, on the average, as the price appreciation in each of the next three quarters. This is not something that one would expect on the basis of the random walk theory.
On September 7, 1929 the S&P index registered a new all time high and then proceeded to loose more than 86 percent of its value in a series of wild downward gyrations before bottoming out at an historic low for this century at 4.40 on June 1, 1932. In the next three months this index more than doubled in value to 9.31 on September 7, 1932. Since that spectacular rally an investor could have obtained average price appreciation amounting to 16.2 percent by simply buying a portfolio similar to the S&P index after a cumulative decline in the index of 19.4 percent or more and holding it for one year. (See Table 9.8S.) In the post 1948 period the average first year gain of 18.0 percent could have been supplemented with an additional gain of 16.3 percent by holding the portfolio for a second year.
From 1929 to 1990 the longest period between buying opportunities of this sort in Table 9.8S was a little over eight years from June 13, 1949 to October 21, 1957. If the stock market is more stable now than it used to be, however, investors may have to wait even longer to again be confronted with such a great buying opportunity.
In a world where stocks have outperformed bonds over long periods of time and where the inflation adjusted risk premiums in Table 5.3S have been positive it would seem irrational for representative stock price indexes to decline by 19.4 percent or more--given the mildness of post World War II recessions and the speed with which the S&P index has recovered from crashes of this magnitude.
The S&P composite stock price index has outperformed the DJIA over long periods of time. There have been numerous years when this was not the case, however. During the 1980s the DJIA increased 228.3 percent while the S&P was increasing 227.4 percent--a difference of only .9 percentage points. See Table 9.9S.
Date of Cycle Index Value Months Duration Percentage Change
------------------ ------------- --------------- -----------------
Peak Trough Peak Trough Rise Decline Rise Decline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Apr 1872 Nov 1873 5.18 4.01 15 19 16.7 22.0
Feb 1874 Jun 1877 4.80 2.73 3 40 18.8 43.1*
Mar 1980 May 1980 5.30 4.77 33 2# 94.1 10.0
Jun 1881 Jan 1885 6.58 4.24 13 43 37.9 35.6*
May 1887 Jun 1888 5.90 5.01 28 13 39.2 15.1
May 1890 Dec 1890 5.62 4.60 23 7 12.2 18.1
Aug 1892 Aug 1893 5.62 4.08 20 12 22.2 27.4*
Sep 1895 Aug 1896 4.82 3.81 25 11 18.1 21.0
Apr 1899 Sep 1900 6.48 5.80 32 17 70.1 10.5
Sep 1902 Oct 1903 8.85 6.26 24 13 52.6 29.3*
Sep 1906 Nov 1907 10.03 6.25 35 14 60.2 37.7*
Dec 1909 Jul 1910 10.30 8.64 25 7 64.8 16.1
Jun 1911 Sep 1911 9.67 8.67 11 3 11.9 10.3
Sep 1912 Dec 1914 9.86 7.35 12 27 13.7 25.5
Nov 1916 Dec 1917 10.21 6.80 23 13# 38.9 33.4*
Jul 1919 Aug 1921 9.51 6.45 19 25 39.9 32.2*
Mar 1923 Oct 1923 9.43 8.03 19 7 46.2 14.8
Sep 1929 Nov 1929 31.30 20.58 71 2 289.8 34.2*
Apr 1930 Dec 1930 25.46 15.51 5 8 23.7 39.1*
Mar 1931 Jun 1932 17.53 4.77 3 15 13.0 72.8*
Sep 1932 Mar 1933 8.26 6.23 3 6 73.2 24.6
Jul 1933 Oct 1933 11.23 9.55 4 3# 80.3 15.0
Feb 1934 Mar 1935 11.32 8.41 4 13# 18.5 25.7
Feb 1937 Apr 1938 18.11 9.89 23 14 115.3 45.4*
Nov 1938 Apr 1939 13.07 10.83 7 5# 32.2 17.1
Oct 1939 Jun 1940 12.90 9.67 6 8# 19.1 25.0
Nov 1940 Apr 1942 10.98 7.84 5 17# 13.5 28.6*
May 1946 May 1947 18.70 14.34 49 12# 138.5 23.3
Jul 1947 Feb 1948 15.77 14.10 2 7# 10.0 10.6
Jun 1948 Jun 1949 16.82 13.97 4 12 19.3 16.9
Jan 1953 Sep 1953 26.18 23.27 42 8 87.4 11.1
Jul 1956 Feb 1957 48.78 43.47 34 7# 109.6 10.9
Jul 1957 Dec 1957 48.51 40.33 5 5 11.6 16.9
Jul 1959 Oct 1960 59.74 53.73 19 15 48.1 10.1
Date of Cycle Index Value Months Duration Percentage Change
------------------ ------------- --------------- -----------------
Peak Trough Peak Trough Rise Decline Rise Decline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dec 1961 Jun 1962 71.74 55.63 14 6# 33.5 22.5
Jan 1966 Oct 1966 93.32 77.13 43 9# 67.8 17.3
Dec 1968 Jun 1970 106.48 75.59 26 18 38.1 29.0*
Jan 1973 Dec 1974 118.42 67.07 31 23 56.7 43.4*
Sep 1976 Mar 1978 105.45 88.82 21 18# 57.2 15.8
Feb 1980 Apr 1980 115.34 102.97 23 2 29.9 10.7
Nov 1980 Jul 1982 135.65 109.38 7 20 31.7 19.4
Aug 1987 Dec 1987 329.36 240.96 61 4# 201.1 26.8
Jun 1990 Oct 1990 360.39 307.12 30 4 49.6 14.8
#Stock market declines in the midst of prosperity that were not associated with economic recessions.
*Bear markets of greater magnitude than the 26.8 percent decline experienced during the crash of 1987.
Source of basic data: BCI series 19 and Standard & Poor's Trade and Securities Statistics, Security Price Index Record.
Date of Cycle S&P Stock Index Months Duration % Change in Index
-------------------- --------------- --------------- -----------------
Peak Trough Peak Trough Rise Decline Rise Decline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
May 1946 Nov. 1946 18.70 14.69 30 6 65.0 21.4
Feb. 1947 May 1947 15.80 14.34 3 3 7.6 9.2
July 1947 Feb. 1948 15.77 14.10 2 7 10.0 10.6
June 1948 June 1949 16.82 13.97 4 12 19.3 16.9*
June 1950 July 1950 18.74 17.38 12 1 34.1** 7.3
Jan. 1953 Sep. 1953 26.18 23.27 30 8 50.6 11.1*
July 1956 Feb. 1957 48.78 43.47 34 7 109.6** 10.9
July 1957 Dec. 1957 48.51 40.33 5 5 11.6 16.9*
July 1959 Oct. 1960 59.74 53.73 19 15 48.1** 10.1*
Dec. 1961 June 1962 71.74 55.63 14 6 33.5** 22.5
Jan. 1966 Oct. 1966 93.32 77.13 43 9 67.8 17.3
Sep. 1967 Mar. 1968 95.81 89.09 11 6 24.2 7.0
Dec. 1968 June 1970 106.48 75.59 9 18 19.5 29.0*
Apr. 1971 Nov. 1971 103.04 92.78 10 7 36.3** 10.0
Jan. 1973 Aug. 1973 118.42 103.80 14 7 27.6 12.3
Oct. 1973 Dec. 1974 109.84 67.07 2 14 5.8 38.9*
July 1975 Sep. 1975 92.49 84.67 7 2 37.9** 8.5
Sep. 1976 Mar. 1978 105.45 88.82 12 18 24.5 15.8
Aug. 1978 Nov. 1978 103.92 94.71 5 3 17.0 8.9
Feb. 1980 Apr. 1980 115.34 102.97 15 2 21.8 10.7*
Nov. 1980 July 1982 135.65 109.38 7 20 31.7** 19.4*
Oct. 1983 July 1984 167.65 151.08 15 9 53.5** 9.9
Aug. 1987 Dec. 1987 329.36 240.96 37 4 118.0 26.8
Jun. 1990 Oct. 1990 360.39 307.12 30 4 49.6 14.8*
*Stock market declines that were associated with economic recessions.
**Rises following economic recessions.
Source of Basic Data: BCI series 19.
Date of Closing Values S&P Index % Decline
---------------------------- ------------------------ -----------------
Market Business Market Market Business Market M. Peak B. Peak
Peak Peak Low Peak Peak Low B. Peak M. Low
6/15/48 11/30/48 6/13/49 17.06 14.75 13.55 13.5 8.1
1/05/53 7/31/53 9/14/53 26.66 24.75 22.71 7.2 8.2
8/02/56 8/30/57 10/22/57 49.74 45.22 38.98 9.1 13.8
8/03/59 4/29/60 10/25/60 60.71 54.37 52.30 10.4 3.8
11/29/68 12/31/69 5/26/70 108.37 92.06 69.29 15.1 24.7
1/11/73 11/30/73 10/03/74 120.24 95.96 62.28 20.2 35.1
2/13/80* 1/31/80 3/27/80 118.44* 114.16 98.22 3.6 14.0
11/28/80 7/31/81 8/12/82 140.52 130.92 102.42 6.8 21.8
07/16/90 7/31/90 10/11/90 368.95 356.15 295.46 3.5 17.0
*Only case where the stock market peak occurred after the business peak.
Source of Basic Data: Standard and Poor's Security Price Index Record.
Date of NBER Business Unadjusted Lead Times Adjusted Lead Times at
--------------------- --------------------- ----------------------
Peak Trough Months to Months to Business Business
Peak Trough Peak Trough
(1) (2) (3)n (4)n
Nov. 48 Oct. 49 30 4 27 3
July 53 May 54 6 8* 3 5
Aug. 57 Apr. 58 13 4 0 -1
Apr. 60 Feb. 61 9 4 2 2
Dec. 69 Nov. 70 12 5* 6 2
Nov. 73 Mar. 75 10 3 8 2
Jan. 80 July 80 - 1 3 -2 1
July 81 Nov. 82 8 4 -2 2
July 90 Mar. 91 1 5* -1 3
(3)n. Months to the business peak after the monthly average value for the S&P composite stock price index has declined five percent or more from its preceding cyclical high and maintained that degree of downness until after the next cyclical trough in the S&P index.
(4)n. Months to business trough after the monthly average value for the S&P index has increased the 5.5 percent needed to offset abortive rallies in the midst of an economic recession.
*Lead times that may have been influenced by major military operations.
Source of Basic Data: BCI series 19.
Year GDP Growth Rate Financial Return
S&P Index
(1) (2)
1949 .4 17.8
1956 2.0 6.4
1957 1.9 -10.4P
1960 2.2 .3P
1961 2.7 26.6
1967 2.6 23.7
1969 2.7 - 8.3P
1971 2.9 14.1
1979 2.5 18.4
1981 1.8 - 4.8P
1986 2.9 18.5
1989 2.5 31.2
1990 1.2 - 3.1P
1992 2.3 7.4
P signifies a year containing a recessionary peak in business activity.
Source of basic data: BCI series 55 and Standard and Poor's Security Price Index Record.
Duration Following
Date of Value S&P Index in Months % Change Index Appreciation
----------------- --------------- ------------- -------------- -------------
Peak Trough Peak Trough Rise Decline Rise Decline 1st yr 2nd yr
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)n
5/29/46 5/17/47 19.25 l3.71* -- 12 -- 28.8 6.6 -14.2
6/15/48 6/13/49 17.06 13.55 13 12 24.4 20.6 21.3 24.2
1/05/53 9/14/53 26.66 22.71 43 8 96.8 14.8 41.1 21.2
8/02/56 10/22/57 49.74 38.98 35 15 119.0 21.6 27.0 .6
8/03/59 10/25/60 60.71 52.30 21 15 55.7 13.9 13.3 - 3.9
12/12/61 6/26/62 72.64 52.32* 14 7 38.9 28.0 20.0 18.9
2/09/66 10/07/66 94.06 73.20* 43 8 79.8 22.2 14.4 3.8
11/29/68 5/26/70 108.37 69.29 26 18 48.0 36.1 24.0 10.6
1/11/73 10/03/74 120.24 62.28 31 21 73.5 48.2 22.7 13.0
9/21/76 3/06/78 107.83 86.90* 24 18 73.1 19.4 .7 12.1
2/13/80 3/27/80 118.44 98.22 23 2 36.3 17.1 16.8 -16.9
11/28/80 8/12/82 140.52 102.42 8 21 43.1 27.1 36.8 3.3
8/25/87 12/04/87 336.77 223.92* 60 3 228.8 33.5 8.3 25.8
7/16/90 10/11/90 368.95 295.46 31 3 64.8 19.9 29.1 5.6
(8)n. Price appreciation in percent following a 15 percent recovery from the trough value in column (2).
*Large declines in stock prices that were not associated with economic recessions.
Source of Basic Data: Standard and Poor's Security Price Index Record.
Quarterly % Changes Annual % Changes
Date of Percent Following Trough Following Trough
Trough Decline -------------------------- -----------------
1st Q 2nd Q 3rd Q 4th Q 1st yr. 2nd yr.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Recessionary Bear Markets
6/13/49 -20.6 16.2 5.7 2.9 12.4 42.1 11.9
9/14/53 -14.8 8.7 8.1 7.2 9.3 37.1 43.8
10/22/57 -21.6 5.7 3.9 8.4 10.0 31.0 9.7
10/25/60 -13.6 15.7 7.9 - .1 4.8 30.7 -20.0
5/26/70 -36.1 17.2 4.8 13.7 2.9 43.7 11.1
10/03/74 -48.2 13.5 15.3 15.8 - 8.9 38.0 21.2
3/27/80 -17.1 18.1 8.9 8.1 - 1.4 37.1 -16.9
8/12/82 -27.1 36.2 5.8 11.3 - 1.3 58.3 2.0
10/11/90 -19.9 6.7 19.8 - .2 1.2 29.1 5.6
Averages -24.3 15.3 8.9 7.5 3.5 39.8 7.6
Bear Markets in the Midst of Prosperity
5/17/47 -28.8 13.6 - 2.5 - 7.6 18.3 21.2 -10.1
6/26/62 -28.0 7.3 12.2 5.4 4.5 32.7 17.4
10/07/66 -22.2 12.3 8.7 2.6 6.1 32.9 6.6
3/06/78 -19.4 15.4 5.0 - 7.5 .4 12.6 11.0
7/24/84 -14.4 13.1 5.7 3.1 5.1 29.6 24.2
12/04/87 -33.5 19.4 - .3 - .3 2.6 21.4 29.3
Averages -24.4 13.5 4.8 - .7 6.2 25.1 13.1
Source of Basic Data: Standard and Poor's Security Price Index Record.
Following Price Appreciation
Downside Closing ----------------------------
Purchase Value First Second
Date S & P Year Year
(in percent)
(1) (2) (3)
10/28/29 22.74 -21.5 -43.6*
6/16/30 20.56 -33.6 -62.5*
4/29/31 14.37 -59.4 42.7*
9/12/31 12.37 -34.1 35.7*
11/28/31 9.17 -25.8 42.6*
4/01/32 7.18 -18.1 82.8*
9/14/32 7.35 51.1 -23.9
2/18/33 6.19 87.2 -19.4
7/21/33 9.65 - 2.2 12.4*
5/12/34 9.42 4.0 41.4*
9/07/37 14.69 -15.5 .7*
3/31/39 10.98 11.6 -18.7
5/14/40 10.28 - 7.7 -17.9*
11/28/41 9.12 2.4 19.1*
9/04/46 15.46 - 2.1 7.4*
6/13/49 13.55 42.1 11.9
10/21/57 39.15 31.0 10.3
5/28/62 55.50 26.1 14.8
8/29/66 74.53 24.6 6.3
1/28/70 86.79 9.7 9.4*
11/26/73 96.58 -28.1 30.9*
3/06/78 86.90 12.6 11.0
9/25/81 112.77 9.4 37.5*
10/19/87 224.84 23.2 25.3
10/11/90 295.46 29.1 5.6
*Price appreciation following first year gains under ten percent.
Source of Basic Data: Standard and Poor's Security Price Index Record.
Year Year-End Closing Values Percentage Changes
----------------------- ------------------
S&P DJIA S&P DJIA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1959 59.89 679.36 8.5 16.4*
1960 58.11 615.89 - 3.0 - 9.3
1961 71.55 731.14 23.1 18.7
1962 63.10 652.10 -11.8 -10.8*
1963 75.02 762.95 18.9 17.0
1964 84.75 874.13 13.0 14.6*
1965 92.43 969.26 9.1 10.9*
1966 80.33 785.69 -13.1 -18.9
1967 96.47 905.11 20.1 15.2
1968 103.86 943.75 7.7 4.3
1969 92.06 800.36 -11.4 -15.2
1970 92.15 838.92 .1 4.8*
1971 102.09 890.20 10.8 6.1
1972 118.05 1020.02 15.6 14.6
1973 97.55 850.86 -17.4 -16.6*
1974 68.56 616.24 -29.7 -27.6*
1975 90.19 852.41 31.5 38.3*
1976 107.46 1004.65 19.1 17.9
1977 95.10 831.17 -11.5 -17.3
1978 96.11 805.01 1.1 - 3.1
1979 107.94 838.74 12.3 4.2
1980 135.76 963.99 25.8 14.9
1981 122.55 875.00 - 9.7 - 9.2*
1982 140.64 1046.54 14.8 19.6*
1983 164.93 1258.64 17.3 20.3*
1984 167.24 1211.57 1.4 - 3.7
1985 211.28 1546.67 26.3 27.7*
1986 242.17 1895.95 14.6 22.6*
1987 247.06 1983.83 2.0 4.6*
1988 277.72 2168.57 12.4 9.3
1989 353.40 2753.20 27.3 27.0
1990 330.22 2633.66 - 6.6 - 4.3*
1991 417.09 3168.83 26.3 20.3
1992 435.71 3301.11 4.5 4.2
1993 466.45 3754.09 7.1 13.7*
1994 459.27 3834.44 - 1.5 2.1*
*Years when the DJIA outperformed the S&P composite stock price index.
Source of Basic Data: The Wall Street Journal.
Go on to Essay 10S:
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