

**Midterm Examination**

March 13, 2007

**Instructions.** Answer all the questions in your bluebook. There are two questions, and they are weighted equally. You have 90 minutes to complete the exam. Good luck!

1. (From an exam by Prof. Lars Ljungqvist) Let  $y_t$ ,  $w_t$ ,  $m_t$  and  $p_t$  be the logarithms of output, the wage level, the money stock and the price level, respectively. Consider the following ad hoc macroeconomic model:

$$y_t = m_t - p_t - \theta_t, \quad (\text{AD})$$

$$y_t = p_t - w_t + \eta_t, \quad (\text{AS})$$

$$w_t = E(p_t | I_{t-1}^p), \quad (\text{WS})$$

$$m_t = \alpha \eta_t. \quad (\text{MS})$$

where:  $\theta_t$  is an exogenous demand shock (the minus sign in front of  $\theta_t$  is intentional);  $\eta_t$  is an exogenous supply shock; and  $E(p_t | I_{t-1}^p)$  denotes mathematical expectations conditioned on the private sector's information set,  $I_{t-1}^p$ . This information set consists of all variables dated  $t-1$  and earlier:

$$I_{t-1}^p = \{y_{t-j}, p_{t-j}, m_{t-j}, w_{t-j}, \theta_{t-j}, \eta_{t-j}\}_{j=1}^{\infty}.$$

Equation (MS) implicitly assumes, however, that the monetary authority also observes the supply shock  $\eta_t$ :

$$I_{t-1}^g = \{I_{t-1}^p, \eta_t\}.$$

The random shocks  $\theta_t$  and  $\eta_t$  are both zero-mean and i.i.d., with

$$V(\theta_t) = \sigma_{\theta}^2; \quad V(\eta_t) = \sigma_{\eta}^2.$$

In addition,  $\theta_t$  and  $\eta_t$  are independent of each other at all leads and lags.

- (a) Find reduced-form expressions for output and prices as functions of  $m_t$ ,  $\theta_t$ ,  $\eta_t$  and  $E(p_t | I_{t-1}^p)$ . Then solve for  $E(p_t | I_{t-1}^p)$ .
- (b) Assume that the monetary authority sets  $\alpha$  to minimize the variance of output. Let  $y_t^U$  denote the expression for output that arises under this monetary rule. Find the optimizing value of  $\alpha$  and  $y_t^U$ .
- (c) Now suppose that the monetary authority still observes  $\eta_t$  while the private sector does not, but that the monetary authority announces its money supply decision before wages are set, so that

$$I_{t-1}^p = \left\{ \{y_{t-j}, p_{t-j}, m_{t-j}, w_{t-j}, \theta_{t-j}, \eta_{t-j}\}_{j=1}^{\infty}, m_t \right\}.$$

(Equation (MS) still holds.) Let  $y_t^A$  denote the expression for output that arises under this monetary regime. Solving again for  $E(p_t | I_{t-1}^p)$ , find  $y_t^A$ .

- (d) Now suppose that the monetary authority observes the demand shock  $\theta_t$  after it sets  $m_t$  but prior to making any announcements. Suppose further that the monetary authority selectively announces  $m_t$  as way to further reduce the variance of output. Assume for the moment that

$$y_t = \begin{cases} y_t^A, & \text{when } m_t \text{ is announced} \\ y_t^U, & \text{when } m_t \text{ is not announced} \end{cases} \quad (\text{ANN})$$

For what values of  $\theta_t$  and  $\eta_t$  should the monetary authority announce  $m_t$ ?

- (e) Is the combination of equation (ANN) and your answer to part (d) consistent with equation (WS)?

2. (Extended from a question by Prof. Lars Ljungqvist) Consider the following variant of the Lucas tree model. The preferences of the representative agent are

$$E_0 \left( \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{1}{1-\sigma} (c_t^{1-\sigma} - 1) \right), \quad 0 < \beta < 1, \quad \sigma > 0,$$

where  $c_t$  denotes consumption. Each tree provides a constant flow of  $d$  units of non-storable “fruit”, or dividends, per period. The economy starts off with each household owning one such tree. Let  $p_t$  be the price at time  $t$  of a title to all future dividends from a tree.

Each period, the government collects consumption taxes on the agent, so that the agent’s total expenditures on consumption are  $(1 + \tau_t)c_t$ . The tax rate  $\tau_t$  is an exogenous random variable, following a Markov process with the stationary one-step transition density  $f(\tau', \tau)$ . All revenues from the consumption tax are refunded to the agent as a lump sum transfer,  $T_t$ , which the agent treats a form of revenue. It follows that in equilibrium

$$T_t = \tau_t c_t.$$

However, the representative agent takes both  $T_t$  and  $\tau_t$  as given.

Let  $R_t^{-1} = R^{-1}(\tau_t)$  be the time- $t$  price of a risk-free discount bond that pays one unit of consumption at time  $t+1$ . Finally, let  $x_t$  denote the consumer’s *post-transfer* financial resources, which she allocates between risk-free bonds, stocks, consumption and consumption taxes.

- (a) Write down the consumer’s problem in recursive form and find the first order conditions.
- (b) Using a recursive approach, define an equilibrium in this economy. (**Hint:** make sure you account for the government.)
- (c) Derive the equilibrium pricing function for bonds,  $R_t^{-1} = R^{-1}(\tau_t)$  and the risk-free interest rate  $R_t = R(\tau_t)$ .

- (d) It is often argued that imposing a tax on consumption will increase the willingness of consumers to save, leading to lower interest rates. Suppose that the consumer faces a constant tax rate  $\tau$ . How does increasing  $\tau$  affect the risk-free rate  $R_t$ ? Briefly explain.
- (e) Define the return on stocks,  $R_t^S$ , by

$$R_t^S = \frac{p_{t+1} + d_{t+1}}{p_t},$$

and define the equity premium,  $e_t$ , by  $e_t = E_t(R_t^S) - R_t$ . Find  $e_t$ , and briefly explain what it means.