

War, Mobilization, and Democratization: The Experience of Minority Groups

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ABSTRACT

How does warfare influence the political development of a state? The *Garrison State* school of thought (Hintze 1906; Lasswell 1941; Anderson 1974) argues that states which face a constant threat of invasion will develop autocratic institutions in order to ensure the security of the state. In contrast, the *Resource Extraction* school (Downing 1992), argues that state leaders are often compelled to extend economic or political rights in exchange for the mobilization of human and financial resources to meet the immediate threat. This paper uses case studies of Imperial Russia (and the Soviet Union) and the Austrian Empire (and Dual Monarchy) to examine the relative strengths of these competing explanations. The paper describes the role of minority groups in the military, identifies the position of the minority groups in the political hierarchy, and traces the impact of warfare on minority groups.

1. INTRODUCTION

How does the level of violence in the external environment influence the political development of a state? Tilly (1975, 1990) has convincingly argued that warfare in Europe contributed to the development of the modern state.¹ In response to external conflict, state leaders consciously expanded the power of the state in order to raise armies and defend borders. The centralization of power, the development of bureaucracies, and the integration of economies were all initiated to maximize revenue taking in order to enhance war making.

But just what form of strong state is likely to develop in the face of a persistent external threat? Hintze (1906) has argued that continental powers, which face a constant threat of invasion, develop autocratic institutions in order to ensure the security of the state. Similarly, Lasswell (1941) argues that a hostile external environment will undermine existing democratic institutions as the military establishment expands control of policy until the regime is reduced to a “garrison state.” Finally, Anderson (1974) contends that a primary reason for the emergence of autocratic regimes in Eastern Europe and Russia was the ever present military threat posed by the early developing Western European states. All three works fall into the “garrison state” school of thought which contends that a hostile external environment compels the development of more centralized and autocratic institutions in order to mobilize forces to defend the state.

A competing argument has been proposed by the “extraction” school of thought which argues that warfare can indirectly *promote*, rather than inhibit, the development of democratic institutions. Execution of war, particularly large scale war, requires the mobilization of populations and resources. State leaders must extract these resources from an ordinarily reluctant society. In most cases, the extraction of resources requires state leaders to extend economic or political rights in exchange for cooperation in resolving the immediate crisis. Large scale warfare can, therefore, have the unintended long run consequence of expanding political participation within a polity.

Downing (1992), for example, contends that the rise of the infantry army and the revolution in military technology greatly increased the cost of warfare in the middle ages and early modern period. The scramble for new sources of revenue led to the development and empowerment of early parliamentary institutions which approved extraordinary war time taxes in exchange for the consolidation of political rights. Similarly, royal charters for cities were granted to expand the crown’s revenue base; the charters protected the political and economic liberties of the burghers and eventually led to the inclusion of the urban elite in the young parliamentary bodies. Marwick’s (1974, 1988) work on the social impacts of war also highlights important gains in political and economic rights for both working class males who are conscripted into the military and women drawn into the work force to fill the void left by conscription.² Finally, Andreski (1971) argues that high levels of military mobilization (i.e., the military participation ratio or MPR) can lead to a reduction in social stratification which can encourage democratization.³

This paper represents the first step in a larger research project intended to test the relative explanatory power of the garrison state and resource extraction arguments. We employ qualitative analysis to explore the impact of war on minority groups within two multi-ethnic empires: the Russian Empire (which officially became the Soviet Union in 1922-24) and the

¹ Also see Rasler and Thompson (1989) and Winter (1975).

² An opposing school of thought, exemplified by McMillan (1988), argues that the gains are only temporary and that warfare does not alter the long run path of social development. However, data and analysis presented by other authors in the volume edited by Marwick (1988) significantly undermine this opposing view.

³ Andreski emphasizes that this democratizing effect can be swamped by the greater government intervention and centralization of power associated with a severe and prolonged war effort.

Austrian Empire (which evolved into the Austria-Hungary Empire in 1867). Specifically, we will address three questions. First, what was the role of minority groups in the military and how did that role change over time? Second, what was the position of the minority groups in the political hierarchy? Third, was warfare associated with the mobilization of minority groups and what impact did the mobilization have on the minority groups' political and economic rights.

2. REGIME TYPE AND WAR

The importance in resolving the debate between the garrison state and extraction schools is directly tied to the burgeoning democratic peace literature which analyzes the relationship between warfare and regime type. This literature focuses on the propensity of regimes with different institutional structures to use military force to resolve international conflicts. The general consensus is that democratic political institutions and norms inhibit the use of force *only* when the democratic state is facing another democracy; in disputes with autocratic opponents, democracies are no less likely to use force than other types of regimes. This finding is labeled a “dyadic” peace because of the interactive nature of the relationship (i.e., both states must be democratic for a decline in the use of force to be observed).⁴




Figure 1. Causal relationship in the democratic peace literature.

The direction of the causal relationship in the democratic peace literature, almost without exception, is from regime type to propensity to use violence.⁵ Domestic characteristics are conceived of as the independent variables which are used to explain a state's behavior in the international system. However, the garrison state and extraction arguments outlined above call into question this traditional approach. If the amount of violence influences the regime type of a state, this prior relationship should be included in an analysis in order to fully understand the potential pacifying impact of domestic institutions. For example, if a peaceful environment leads to the development of democracies, then the finding that a democracy is less likely to use force against another democracy in this peaceful environment is much less interesting. In this situation, the real causal agent of interest is the external environment rather than domestic institutions as the democratic peace literature would lead us to believe. Figure 2 graphically depicts this more complex relationship.

⁴ Works which generally support this dyadic finding (i.e., democracies are only peaceful with each other) include Rousseau et al. (1996), Maoz and Russett (1993), Bremer (1992, 1993), Doyle (1986), Chan (1984). Dissenters include Rummel (1983), Owen (1994), Layne (1994), Spiro (1994), and Farber and Gowa (1995). For a critique of Rummel see Weede (1984); for a critique of Layne and Spiro see Russett et al. (1995). Rousseau (1996, 1997) finds evidence that this purely dyadic finding is due to a selection effect.

⁵ While Sorensen (1993) explores the external consequence of democratization (i.e., the democratic peace), his primary focus is the economic causes of democracy. Conversely, while Vanhanen (1990, 1992) examines how the international structure encourages or constrains the emergence of democracy, he does not focus on war and external threats. Others, such as Layne (1994), have indicated the importance of exploring the reciprocal relationship in future research.




Figure 2. Hypothesized relationship between war and regime type.

In order to examine the plausibility of this more complex framework and to generate hypotheses which could be tested using additional cases or a broader statistical study, we turn to our two case studies. The first examines the role of minorities in Imperial Russia and under communism in the Soviet Union. The second outlines the role of minorities in the Austrian Empire and the Dual Monarchy.

3. THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND THE SOVIET UNION

The Russian Empire emerged from the consolidation of the small duchy of Moscow with the surrounding principalities under Ivan the Great (III) in the 15th century. After the overthrow of its Mongol overlords during the reign of Ivan the Terrible (IV) and the conquest of the Khanates of Astrakhan and Kasan in the 16th century, the state gradually spread eastward toward Europe and westward through Siberia and toward the Pacific. Expansion into Europe continued until the early 19th century, when the Russian empire acquired the Ukraine, Finland and Poland over the course of the Napoleonic wars. The European powers, wary of further Russian expansion, propped up the Ottoman Empire as a buffer. This culminated in the Turkic-Russian conflict over the control of the Black Sea and the straits leading to the Mediterranean, which resulted in a humiliating Russian withdrawal following British and French intervention in the Crimea (1853-56). Expansion into the Transcaucasus was far more successful, as the principalities of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were incorporated by the mid-1850s. The peoples of the North Caucasus, by contrast, were subdued only after decades of bloody guerrilla warfare. The Turkistan regions (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) were incorporated by the end of the 1880s. Meanwhile, in the Far East Russian expansion was concluded by the end of the 19th century with the acquisition of the Khabarovsk and Vladivostok (Primorye) regions and the building of the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

Minorities in Russian and Soviet Culture

Both the Soviet Union and Tsarist Russia before it were in essence multi-national empires, encompassing hundreds of ethnic groups representing European, Islamic, and Asian heritages. Like many empires, however, the Soviet Union and Russia both had a single politically and culturally dominant people at its center: the “greater Russian” Slavs (Russians, Belorussians, Eastern Ukrainians). Despite the Marxist ideological predisposition of the founders of the Soviet Union to regard nationality as irrelevant and subordinate to class interests, the Soviet authorities found themselves wrestling with the same kinds of ethnicity-related dilemmas that vexed their Imperial Russian predecessors. The Soviets' response was to utilize the alternating strategies of the offering of concessions and forceful repression, while at the same time following the traditional practice of bifurcating their policy toward non-Russian minorities by dividing them into loyal and unreliable elements and dealing with them according to these two categories. Because of this policy of

bifurcation, the best way to study center-periphery relations is to deal with national minorities as a whole rather than examining or comparing one or two groups.

The Russian empire followed the common practice of 19th century multi-ethnic nations and left the social structures of conquered or annexed peoples and territories relatively intact. The Tsars were content to oversee these ethnic groups and extract their loyalty by co-opting part of the indigenous elites as a means to establish indirect rule, and to pursue the assimilation of these peoples by means of long term administrative adaptation and migration (Simon 1991).

Yet in its policies toward ethnic minorities, as in many areas of its administration, the Tsarist system displayed a rigidity and an inability to adapt to the profound changes that were taking place domestically and internationally in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Indeed, the collapse of that system was intimately connected with the growth of nationalist movements in the non-Russian parts of the Empire. The fact that Russia essentially became an empire before it was ever a nation led Russia to an inherent definition of herself in terms of a nation encompassing subjects - which made it difficult or impossible for both liberals and conservatives in the Russian government and intelligentsia to conceptualize nationalism on the part of the Empire's subject peoples. Only the socialists, in the radical left of the Russian intelligentsia, embraced the ideas of national autonomy and independence. National movements for liberation, albeit in an abstract conception, formed a central part of the revolutionary movement as a whole. Conversely, as ethnic conflict in the Russian Empire tended to run along social lines, there was a strong socialist aspect to the budding nationalist movements in many parts of the Empire. For these movements, nationalism was a means of human liberation from oppression and foreign domination - from what Lenin often described as the "prison of the peoples." (Figs 1996).

That being said, prior to the First World War, there was little conception of nationality in general, except among intellectuals. Localized forms of identity were more prevalent, especially in the Muslim regions of the Caucasus and in Central Asia, where tribal fiefdoms remained dominant despite the superimposition of Tsarist administrative structures. National consciousness was an intellectual conception that was imported from the West, and its supporters championed such westernizing factors as secular mass education, urbanization, the development of trade and industry, civic society, and the extension of language rights. (Figs 1996)

Cultural nationalism in its intellectual form did not necessarily imply national independence. But the rigidity of Tsarism did not allow it to tolerate cultural autonomy. By the nature of Tsarist self-definition, non-Russian peoples must be subordinated to Russia's cultural domination. The Empire's reaction to the development of these nationalist movements, a policy of Russification, in turn politicized the nationalist movements and made them into enemies of the regime. The goal of this Russification policy was to assimilate the non-Russian peoples into the Russian cultural and political system in a system of ethnic hierarchy that paralleled the existing social hierarchy. Nationalities were ranked in accordance with their loyalty to the Tsar, and each was given a different set of legal rights and privileges. The Russians and Baltic Germans occupied the top positions in the civil and military services, followed in order of rank by Poles, Ukrainians, Georgians, and Armenians, with the Jews at bottom of this hierarchy. Caucasian Muslims and Central Asians did not even make the scale.

In most of these regions, particularly in the Muslim territories, nationalist movements were still in the early stages by the time the First World War erupted, and had not yet become mass movements. Nevertheless, as in the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, crises tend to transform diffuse national aspirations into successful political programs that can threaten the existence of empires.

Minorities and the Russian military.

The Tsarist regime traditionally approached the recruitment of national minorities into the military in a bifurcated fashion. As far back the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, those

nationalities that were considered loyal to the regime were conscripted while the unreliable elements were excluded from service in the regular army. The Caucasians, North Caucasians, Western Ukrainians, and Central Asians, in particular, were generally considered inherently disloyal to the regime and were excluded from military service. Some national units were created from these groups under the Tsars, as well as later under the Bolsheviks, but their loyalty was always highly suspect. Meanwhile, Christian Armenians, Georgians, and Ossetians enjoyed distinguished careers in the Tsarist army. For the most part, non-Russians continued to serve in auxiliary units, or "troops of different nationalities" (*inorodicheskie voiska*), (Alexiev and Wimbush 1988; Beskrovnyi 1973). Because of concerns that Muslims, who were over-represented in these auxiliary units, might side with the local population during the Russian drive into Central Asia, the national troops were dramatically reduced in number throughout the second half of the 19th century (Alexiev and Wimbush 1988).

Thus the Kremlin has traditionally drawn on the support of minority troops to defend the country, conduct foreign campaigns, and to perform internal police functions. The authorities were consistently forced to deal with the continuous struggle to balance the inherent advantages and disadvantages of a multinational military. Segregating minorities into ethnically distinct units solved the language problem and allowed the deployment of ethnically antagonistic units to suppress rebellions in any given area of the state. This segregation, however, complicated the issues of reliability and control.

World War I, Revolution, and Civil War.

The First World War severely tested the Tsarist social and military systems and required the commitment of all available personnel and resources. Because of the desperate need for manpower, the regime was forced to accept the political risks associated with the formation of clearly identifiable national military units,

Revolutionary fervor among the minority soldiers of the Imperial Army, stirred up by the radical left, significantly contributed to the military's disintegration and to the loss of its combat effectiveness at the front (Rakowska-Harmstone 1990). Universal conscription of Central Asians and Caucasian Muslims began for the first time in 1916, and Central Asians were to service in the rear as support troops, thus freeing up Slavs for combat roles in the front. The scope of the army's demands, the fact that they were made at the height of the cotton season, along with the Muslim's reluctance to serve in the Russian Army, where they believed they would be forced to eat pork and become contaminated by association with non-believers, were the motivating factors behind the great Central Asian rebellion of 1916. The regime was only able to put down this revolt with the help of the Cossacks and they were forced to accept a much lower number of recruits than what was expected when conscription was finally put into effect (Alexiev and Wimbush 1988). Many of the Tatars conscripted into the Russian Army deserted, and the existing tension in that region was heightened by the efforts of émigré Tatar leaders in Turkey, which led to an attempt at local autonomy and the creation of a federation of Ural-Volga states in 1917 (Akiner 1983). Strong nationalist and separatist trends also began to emerge among Crimean Tatars in 1917, which also led to attempts to set up an independent state.

The civil war that followed the October Revolution and the withdrawal from the World War was a chaotic and fluid period that provided a brief opportunity for the diverse ethnic groups of the former empire to assert demands for and struggle to realize their individual national aspirations. Both the Reds and the Whites in the civil war sought the support of the nationalities, which viewed their participation in the war as a means to fulfill their own national goals. The Reds, with their ideologically propounded claims to national self-determination were moderately more successful at winning over the ethnic groups than the Whites, who were hampered by their overt Russian chauvinism and *status quo ante* intentions.

Thus the Bolsheviks won the civil war, in part, because they were willing to concede a great deal to the nationalities apart from outright secession. The Whites were uncompromising in their ideal of a "one and undivided Russia," which made a permanent coalition with the non-Russian national movements impossible (Simon, 1991). Despite recruiting large contingents of minorities into the Red Army, however, the Bolsheviks were faced with a series of uprisings, especially in the Transcaucasus and the Islamic guerrillas (*Basmachi*) rebellion in Central Asia (Alexiev and Wimbush, 1988; Figes, 1996). The Bolsheviks allowed the use of the *Sharia* law code in Dagestan to counteract the anti-Soviet uprising under Uzan Haji, a leader of the Sufi brotherhoods of the North Caucasus from 1919 to 1921. In 1919 *Sharia* courts were re-instituted and mosques and religious schools were returned to the Islamic clergy throughout Central Asia. The Reds concluded that without these concessions, they could not win the fight against the *Basmachi*, which nevertheless lasted until 1926 (Simon 1991).

The Bolshevik leadership during the civil war clarified its position in the two important issues of the role of the party and the role of the military in the nation building process: nation building was limited to recruiting non-Russians into the party and the army. Any attempt at separation from the central organization or at raising national armed forces in addition to those in the Red Army, or at founding autonomous or even independent national parties from the Bolsheviks was clearly going too far. Lenin and Stalin were very much aware of the disintegration of the Social Democratic Party of the Austro-Hungarian Empire along ethnic lines shortly before the First World War and were determined not to let the same thing happen to their party (Figes 1996; Simon 1991).

In all national territories that the Red Army conquered during the Civil War, the Soviets forced all the socialist parties that had emerged locally to dissolve. Similarly, national armed forces were either incorporated into the Red Army or demobilized. The Bolsheviks, however, did think it necessary to make concessions on the issue of the self-administration of state organs and the economy - concessions that were clearly made to counteract national ambitions.

Following the inception of the Red Army in January of 1918, national units were formed in the newly established western borderlands of Ukraine, Belorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. In Tatarstan and Bashkira pro-Soviet Moslem military units were formed in Kazan in 1918 under the command of Russian officers. These armies were willing to cooperate with the Red Army, but they were unwilling to give up their national autonomy for the sake of this cooperation. Later Soviet sources admitted that separatism was rampant in these armies (Kliatskin 1965), and the Bolsheviks had to move quickly to subordinate them to Red Army command. All military units were placed under the command of the RSFSR Revolutionary Military Council in May of 1919, and a unified command system was established the following June (Mints 1982, 161-3). It took much longer for some of the Western Ukrainian units to be actually incorporated into the Red Army. After the Red Army reconquered the Transcaucasus in 1920-21, the pro-Soviet Moslem national units, which contributed significantly to the Reds' victory in the civil war, were dissolved as separate entities (Rakowska-Harmstone 1990).

Soviet Nationalities Policy in the Inter-war Period.

a. State institutional structure and majority/minority relations.

Thus Lenin and the Bolshevik leadership well understood the potential of the national minorities and used it to advantage in facilitating the breakup of the Empire through the advocacy of the right of the rebellious minorities to national self-determination. As the Bolsheviks evolved from political radicals to acting party of power following the Reds' victory in the civil war and began building their new Soviet state, they were forced to develop new strategies to limit the influence of the national movements. The existence of national minorities was always a political and ideological nuisance for the Soviet Union's Bolshevik leadership. According to Marxist theory,

nationalism is a bourgeois condition that presents an obstacle to revolutionary consciousness. In the words of Lenin, "Workers know no fatherland." In order to counter nationalist sentiment, both Lenin and Stalin modified the principle of national self-determination by subordinating it to the principle of class unity, arguing that "the interests of socialism are higher than the interests of the right of nations to self-definition." (Lenin 1960, 449).

In the aftermath of the civil war, the Bolsheviks realized that some concessions were necessary to fulfill the promises that had been made to the pro-Soviet minorities and to win over the rest of the minority peoples to the revolution. After 1921, Soviet power was only tentatively established in many non-Russian territories, and barely existed in central Asia. The figurehead policy of this concessionary approach was the policy of *Korenizatsiia*, or "rooting-in", which involved bringing indigenous elites into the mechanism of local government and party organizations while at the same time encouraging local languages and intellectual cultures.

The 10th Party Congress in March 1921 resolved to help non-Russian peoples to develop and consolidate their Soviet statehood in forms appropriate to their national characteristics and way of life; to develop and consolidate judicial administrative, economic and governmental bodies operating in the native language and composed of local people who know the way of life and psychology of the local population; to develop the press, schools, theaters, clubs, and cultural institutions in general in the native language; and to establish and develop a wide network of general and technical-professional courses and schools in the native language (*KPRS v rezoliutsiakh* 1970, 252).

Lenin, always an astute political pragmatist, saw temporary political concessions to the language and nationality issue as a means of coping with the complex and difficult nationalities problem inherited from the Tsarist Empire. Faced with the problem of creating a sense of loyalty among these widely varied peoples to the revolutionary ideas that had triumphed in the more urbanized and industrialized central Russian areas, Lenin undertook a rethinking of the Bolshevik attitude toward federalism and also to the creation of an extensive system of organization and representation of the various nationalities, the Commissariat of Nationality Affairs (*Narkomnats*) and the Council of Nationalities. This approach proved to be a convenient method of political control, and also demonstrated the tremendous idealism of the Bolsheviks about the triumph of the revolution and its imminent spread throughout the world and about the task of making the equality of peoples and languages into a living practical reality.

Lenin, because of his ideological convictions, was quite wary of the legacy and potential danger of greater Russian chauvinism. Nevertheless, for reasons of pragmatism, Lenin insisted upon a Russian centered - though less Russian dominated - arrangement for the Soviet-inherited Russian empire in order to overcome the strong resistance to Bolshevism among the Ukrainians, Central Asians, and Transcaucasians, who had already demonstrated powerful separatist tendencies. With the Communist Party as the instrument of integration, Lenin opted for a union of separate republics reflecting national differences as a compromise stage prior to the attainment of general Sovietization (Huttenback 1990). The Soviet Union, as it officially emerged in 1923, was in essence a compromise between ideology and reality. It was an attempt to reconcile the Bolshevik strivings for unity and centralization of power with the recognition that nationalism did survive the collapse of the old order (Pipes 1990). Nevertheless, massive bureaucratic institutions were created, emanating from the center with symmetrical vertical lines of authority reaching down to the local level.

Thus Lenin's shift from a policy of regional autonomy to one of assimilation foreshadowed more ominous developments after his death. The accession to power of Stalin led to a deterioration of national rights in the Soviet Union. By the mid 1930s, the national egalitarianism of Lenin had become national regimentation and hierarchy.

b. Minorities and the Red Army in the Inter-war Period.

Following the Civil War, the Soviet leadership needed to demobilize the military. The national units who had backed the Reds, however, wanted their promises fulfilled. Although the minorities were denied the right to form national armies, the center compromised by agreeing to the maintaining and raising of national units that would be strictly subordinated to the Moscow-based chain of command.

Most of the national units had originated during the civil war, and during the 1920s they existed in all of the union republics and in many autonomous republics in the RFSFR. Most of the non-commissioned officers, middle ranks, and nearly all the political officers were indigenous. At no time, however, did all or even the majority of non-Russian soldiers serve in the national units, which probably never numbered significantly more than ten percent of the Red Army's effective strength. The national units made it possible to draft non-Russian speaking recruits from Central Asia, where compulsive service was only introduced in 1931, and also allowed the growth of a class of non-Russian career officers and NCOS. With this in mind, the Red Army created several special training facilities in the military and political sector for these officers (Simon 1991). The military was thus incorporated into the policy of *korenizatsiia* which was designed to bring minority cadres into the state and party apparati in the minority areas. This resulted in the coexistence - under a unified command - of a cadre army within territorial national minority formations (Rakowska-Harmstone 1990). There was a clear understanding that the national units existed primarily as a political and cultural concession to minorities and for the purpose of spreading revolutionary ideals among them - rather than the strengthening of the Soviet armed forces as such (Fedotoff White 1944). The Chief of Staff of the Red Army Frunze admitted that from a purely military viewpoint, it would have been better to maintain ten divisions of well trained and disciplined Russians than five good divisions and five lower quality divisions recruited on a national basis. However, he conceded that "the importance of the revolutionary movement of the colonial peoples in their struggle for national independence" could not be overlooked (Frunze 1957).

These goals were clearly at the center of the military reforms worked out in the plenary session of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR in November 1924, which were then approved by the Third Congress of Soviets in 1925. The reorganization established national military divisions recruited in the union republics and larger autonomous republics and ethnic units (regiments and smaller) recruited from among smaller ethnic groups as parts of the regular standing army, side by side with the core of small regular cadres made up of Slavs. Also provided for were territorial militia divisions as a form of reserve (Rakowska-Harmstone 1990).

These national divisions and units and reserve militias continued to be formed in all the republics and major autonomous entities throughout the next decade, but these concessions to the national principle proved to be illusory. Except in name and the ethnic origins of their soldiers, the units did not differ from regular (cadre) forces in any other respect. Most were small infantry or cavalry units and all were part of larger regular formations, commanded by Russian officers, although an effort was made in the mid-1920s to train non-Russian officers. By the late 1920s and early 1930s the national formations began to become de-emphasized in view of the centralization policies pursued by Stalin, the purges of "bourgeois nationalists" among the leading communist cadres of the republics, and a revival of the Russian national ethos (Rakowska-Harmstone 1990).

The national military formations policy had long been troubled by shortages of native command personnel and intractable nationalism, and the national units were never considered entirely loyal. The policy was thus terminated in 1938. At that time, the territorial militia was replaced in Soviet military doctrine with standing formations, and the national units were integrated into the regular army. Part of the Stalinist purges of this period were aimed directly at the native elites in many minority regions, which were accused of deviations of one kind or another. The abolition of the national units, which might have supported these local elites, was a logical element

of Stalin's consolidation of ever-greater centralized control over the union republics and various ethnic groups. Additionally, the national units were tied to their own areas, and because the Moscow leadership feared attack in the more Western areas, there was a fear that the national units would not defend areas other than their own.⁶

The Great Patriotic War.

a. Conscription of minorities.

Soviet military and political preparation for war prior to the German attack on the Soviet Union in June of 1941 was abysmal. The Red Army's command structure had been decimated in the purges of the late 1930s and Soviet defenses were seriously unprepared for an attack from the West. Nevertheless, Soviet patriotism and the fact that it had gradually been pumped up with Russian national values throughout the previous decade opened up the opportunity to fall back on Russian patriotism, which dominated propaganda during the war. Stalin wanted to be seen as perpetuating the line of great Russian autocrats such as Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. The Soviet leadership therefore called on the heroic epochs of Russian history and its heroes to mobilize the armed forces and the home front, whereas appeals to the history of the other peoples remained very abstract.

Demonstrations were organized in minority regions between November 1941 and September 1942 that were described as "anti-fascist demonstrations of the peoples' representatives." There was no real mention anywhere, however, of the living traditions of freedom fighting among the minorities - mainly because these traditions had often developed in defensive struggles against Russian conquerors. Since minorities' patriotic symbols had fought for freedom from Russia, rather than for Russia's freedom, minority patriotism acquired a life of its own that was contrary to the general line of Stalin's nationalities policy. Only the fact that the Soviets needed to mobilize all energies during the war years can explain its resurrection. Nevertheless, even before the end of the war, as we shall see, counter-measures began against this indigenous patriotism.

Thus, even though the first war years did not end the political terror or produce domestic liberalization, the Soviet leadership felt threatened in its very existence. Concessions were therefore granted in these early years of the war to specific social groups and vague rumors were spread of a real domestic new beginning and a thaw after the war. One of the most important of these concessions granted to the nations was the reintroduction of national military units. In August of 1941 the first national unit, a Latvian infantry division, was activated.

At the start of the German invasion, the Soviet Army was officially composed of ethnically integrated units, although some de-facto national formations existed as a result of the Soviet conquest of the Baltic states and because the army's reserve system tended to group native servicemen together. Despite its reservations about the reliability of national units, the regime once again quickly resorted to creating them to mobilize more of the union's resources in the war effort. During the early part of the war, when much of the Slavic manpower was under German occupation, the regime needed to gain access to the one manpower pool that was still available: the minority regions, and especially Central Asia and the Caucasus, which were still largely unassimilated and where few people spoke Russian.. The Soviets were able to mount a successful campaign to raise these national units, although many non-Russians defected to the German side.

Official recognition of units' specific ethnic character enhanced morale, facilitated command and socialization tasks, and mobilized the support of the soldiers' home communities. The

⁶ This policy was exactly the opposite of the Austrian Empire (and Dual Monarchy) which stationed troops outside its home territory due the fear that the local troops would become infected with nationalism and refuse to put down domestic unrest.

campaign was launched in union and autonomous republics to mobilize the non-Russians for the defense of the "motherland."

Soviet data from the period is somewhat contradictory on the numbers of national divisions, regiments, and smaller units (Simon 1991), but it appears that from the union republics there were at minimum two Latvian, two Estonian, three Azerbaijani, four Armenian and four Georgian infantry divisions, and five Uzbek, one Tadjik, three Kirgiz, two Turkmen, and three Kazakh cavalry divisions (Simon 1991; although this contradicts the table given in Gurvich 1976). From the autonomous republics there were at least two Bashkir, one Kalmyk, one Chechen-Ingush, and one Kabardino-Balkarian divisions. In addition, there were a considerable number of smaller military units, reserve and support troops (Simon 1991). Table 1 identifies the major units by republic and type.

Table 1: National Military Units

Republic:	Rifle Divisions	Separate Rifle Brigades	Cavalry Divisions
Azerbaijan SSR	2	0	0
Armenia SSR	3	0	0
Georgia SSR	4	0	0
Kazakhstan SSR	0	2	2
Kirgiz SSR	0	0	3
Latvia SSR	1	0	0
Lithuania SSR	1	0	0
Tadjikistan SSR	0	2	1
Turkmenistan SSR	0	2	2
Uzbekistan SSR	0	9	5
Estonia SSR	2	0	0
Bashkir ASSR	0	0	1
Kabardino-Balkar ASSR	0	0	1
Kalmyk ASSR	0	0	2
Chechen-Ingush ASSR	0	0	1

(Table translated from Gurvich 1976).

The new national units were different from the pre-1938 formations in that they were made up mostly of non-Russian speakers. Regular Slav officers remained the crucial element of the command structure, but they were assisted by Russian speaking ethnic personnel (Rakowska-Harmstone 1990). Most non-commissioned officers were minority personnel. These units were drafted as an addition to the Red Army's regular plan of mobilization, and the national territories financed their mobilization and basic training (Gurevich 1976, 43f). This opportunity to raise additional funds for the war effort may have made it easier for the State Defense Committee to agree to the activation of the ethnic units.

The actual numbers of local nationals among the enlisted personnel varied considerably among the national formations, These numbers decreased dramatically in the course of the units' front-line deployment. Most losses were replaced with regular troops. As an example of this, 40 to 70 percent of the eight Transcaucasian divisions were local in 1941, but by 1943-44 that number had declined to 1 to 15 percent (Simon 1991). On the other hand, men were readily conscripted from reoccupied Belorussian and Ukrainian regions. In March and April 1944, the 6th army in Ukraine had mobilized every man in the reoccupied area with the objective of raising the strength of its rifle division to 6,000 men. From March 1944 to May 1944 the 2nd Ukrainian Front took in 265,000 men from the formerly occupied territory. In the same period the 3rd Ukrainian Front took in 79,000 men. In some units more than half the men were 'booty' troops.

The newly acquired soldiers received ten days' training before assignment to combat units (Dunn, 1944, 98).

Thus this pattern, intensifying particularly after the war had turned in the Soviets' favor after the battle of Kurtsk in 1943 which brought many Slavic areas back under Soviet control, was part of a larger policy in which the regime moved to reduce non-Slavic participation once the Soviets took the offensive in war. At the same time, it became less necessary or practical to transport recruits from the Caucasus and Central Asia. These patterns are shown in Table 2 which outlines the evolution of military units over the course of the Second World War.

Table 2: Evolution of Military Units During the Second World War.

Nationality	% in infantry units	% in infantry units	# of losses	% of general	Nationality as
	January 1943 to 1 January 1944	1 July 1944	(in thousands)	losses	% of 1939 census
Russians	62.95	51.78	5747.1	66.3	58.41
Ukrainians	14.52	33.93	1376.5	15.9	16.56
Belorussians	1.9	2.04	251.4	2.9	3.11
Uzbeks	2.88	1.25	121.4	1.4	2.86
Tatars	2.38	1.7	188.3	2.2	2.54
Kazakhs	2.4	1.12	130	1.5	1.83
Jews	1.42	1.14	138.7	1.6	1.78
Azerbaijanis	1.55	0.81	58.1	0.67	1.34
Georgians	1.5	0.5	79.7	0.92	1.33
Armenians	1.51	0.81	83.2	0.96	1.27
Mordvinians	0.79	0.56	63.3	0.73	0.86
Chuvash	0.75	0.52	63.1	0.73	0.81
Tadzhiks	0.48	0.32	22.5	0.26	0.72
Kirghiz	0.57	0.22	26.9	0.31	0.52
Bashkirs	0.5	0.31	32.1	0.37	0.5
Peoples of Dagestan	0.18	0.15*	11.3	0.13	0.5
Turkmen	0.47	0.23	21.7	0.25	0.48
Udmurts	0.26	0.2*	23.4	0.27	0.36
Chechen-Ingush	0.004	0.03*	na	na	0.29
Mari	0.26	0.19*	20.8	0.24	0.28
Komi	0.16	0.13*	16.5	0.19	0.24
Osetins	0.16	0.14*	10.4	0.12	0.21
Karelians	0.09	0.06*	na	na	0.15
Kabardino-Balkars	0.06	0.05*	na	na	0.13
Kalmyks	0.08	0.06*	na	na	0.08
Moldovans	0.04	0.04*	53.7	0.62	na
Baltics (Latvian, Estonian, Lithuanian)	0.5	0.48	44.2	0.51	na

(Compiled from information in Artem'ev 1975, and Krivosheeva 1995).

b. Minority conduct in the war.

Thus, a substantial number of national formations and regular divisions containing significant percentages of non-Russians were raised in the various regions of the Soviet Union. The magnitude of the non-Slavic contribution to the war effort, in terms of numbers of men raised, represents marked progress in the ability to involve all nationalities of the union in its defense. Most importantly, the Soviet government was able to mobilize the minorities at a time when much of its Slavic population was under German control and not available to the Red Army. Another important measure of the minority contribution was the extent of participation in the most critical battles and campaigns. National units participated in such critical battles as Moscow, Stalingrad,

and Kursk, as well as in campaigns to regain control over the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Baltics (Artem'ev 1975).

Nevertheless, native participation in divisions raised in the minority regions varied greatly, and the involvement of such units in major battles does not necessarily prove that substantial numbers of minorities participated. The question of how effectively minorities participated in the war is difficult to answer. Some Western scholars argue that the minorities fought neither efficiently nor effectively and were of questionable loyalty (Alexiev and Wimbush 1988). The following table demonstrates the numbers and percentages of recipients of “Hero of the Soviet Union” awards broken down by ethnicity. The relatively high percentage of Slavs as compared to other nationalities suggests that minorities participated rather less in the front line combat units overall.

Table 3: Hero of the Soviet Union Awards.

Nationality	Number of "Hero of the Soviet Union" Awarded	% of total "Hero of the Soviet Union" Awards	# of losses (in thousands)	% of general losses	Nationality as % of 1939 census
Russians	8190	71.27	5747	66.3	58.41
Ukrainians	2069	18.07	1377	15.9	16.56
Belorussians	309	2.70	251	2.9	3.11
Uzbeks	69	0.60	121	1.4	2.86
Tatars	161	1.41	188	2.2	2.54
Kazakhs	96	0.84	130	1.5	1.83
Jews	108	0.94	138	1.6	1.78
Azerbaidzanis	43	0.38	58	0.67	1.34
Georgians	90	0.79	80	0.92	1.33
Armenians	90	0.79	83	0.96	1.27
Mordvinians	61	0.53	63	0.73	0.86
Chuvash	44	0.38	63	0.73	0.81
Tadzhiks	14	0.12	23	0.26	0.72
Kirghiz	12	0.08	27	0.31	0.52
Bashkirs	39	0.34	32	0.37	0.5
Peoples of Dagestan	na	na	11	0.13	0.5
Turkmen	18	0.16	22	0.25	0.48
Udmurts	10	0.08	23	0.27	0.36
Chechen-Ingush	na	na	na	na	0.29
Mari	16	0.14	21	0.24	0.28
Komi	na	na	17	0.19	0.24
Osetins	32	0.28	10	0.12	0.21
Karelians	9	0.08	na	na	0.15
Kabardino-Balkars	7	0.06	na	na	0.13
Kalmyks	8	0.07	na	na	0.08
Moldovans	2	0.02	54	0.62	na
Baltics (Latvian, Estonian, Lithuanian)	24	0.21	44	0.51	na

(Compiled from information in Artem'ev 1975, Koloskov and Gevurkova 1995, and Krivosheeva 1995).

The Soviet experience of non-Russian recruitment of non-Russian personnel is thus mixed, and cannot have strengthened the Soviets' confidence in the loyalty or reliability of the national minorities. It seems therefore that the revival of national formation was nothing more than a temporary expedient that provided for the most effective use manpower (Rakowska-Harmstone 1990), a temporary concession born of necessity and not a return in any form to the *korenizatsiia* (Simon 1991).

c. Political and economic changes.

The Soviet regime at the start of the war clearly suffered from a political vulnerability that derived from the nature of its multi-national state, in which peoples of vastly diverse cultural, political, and historical traditions were forcibly integrated into a highly centralized and coercive empire. When strained by war, the artificial bonds tying many of the subject nations to the empire frayed and broke. The military disaster that befell the Red Army in the summer of 1941 was due as much to the disunity, defeatism, and hostility toward the system among its peoples and soldiers as it was to the technical superiority and acumen of the enemy (Dunn 1994; Alexiev and Wimbush 1988).

Hostility toward the regime took particularly extreme forms among the national minorities, which was significant, as the war was largely fought on non-Russian territory. In many areas, the Germans were regarded as liberators. The German invasion not only failed to arouse the Soviet peoples' unity and will to resist, it unleashed powerful centrifugal forces that threatened to undermine the regime. Many nationalities used the German attack as an opportunity to break away from Russian control.

The Baltic peoples, Western Ukrainians, North Caucasians, large parts of the Georgian and Armenian populations, and substantial numbers of Central Asians and Volga Tatars were prepared to support the invading Germans. Rather than enhancing the internal cohesion and unity of the Soviet Union, the formidable external threat caused significant ethnic fragmentation. For many of these peoples the Germans, despite their brutality and dismal record of occupation policies, were the lesser of two evils. The Soviet policies toward these nationalities as the war shifted in Moscow's favor, characterized by vicious purges and mass deportations, which in some cases assumed genocidal proportions, indicate that the regime was clearly aware of the ethnic issue as a key systemic vulnerability (Alexiev and Wimbush 1988).

The Second World War showed the precariousness of the multinational structure. In order to deal with this problem, Stalin observed the weak response to appeals for international solidarity and decided that it was necessary to replace them with an appeal to another kind of solidarity: history, nation, and religion. The Soviet leadership thus completely renounced the pre-war emphasis on egalitarianism and established levels of priority for local nationalistic sentiments. The war provided an excellent pretext for the elevation of the Russian nation to the top rank and for the exultation of its traditions and culture. As soon as the Germans retreated from the national territories in which autonomous tendencies had appeared, Stalin moved in ruthlessly. Whole nations were accused of collective crimes and physically devastated through deportation. The German advance deep into the Caucasus furnished Stalin with an opportunity to neutralize the Chechens, the Karachai, Ingush, and Balkar peoples on the grounds that they were a security threat. More than 400,000 people are believed to have been deported by railway boxcar to Kazakhstan and Kirgizia between November 1943 and March 1944 (Conquest 1960; Goldenberg 1994).

By attacking whole nations, Stalin was making examples of them and trying to assign different levels to national responsibilities in Soviet life: bad nations versus exemplary ones, with Russia as the most exemplary. These inequalities, justified in Stalinist doctrine by ancient and modern history, were set up as a basic principle for relations among nations following the war. The federation, like the empire before it, grouped many peoples around one guiding people. National cultures were suddenly denounced, as they represented symbols of a reactionary past, and all expression of national culture was attacked and suppressed. Languages were not to be used to convey traditions, at the same time that Russian culture and language were flourishing. Thus,

Stalin responded to the outburst of nationalism in the war years by imposing a brutal solution on the nations: rapid Russification (d'Encausse 1978).

Despite its harshness, this policy accomplished its aim. Stalinism and Russification were powerful unifying tools. In the process of working with Russian troops in the military, hundreds of thousands of minority members improved their Russian language skills, which reinforced the politico-economic unity of the Soviet Union (Hiro 1995). The losses of men during the war caused a skewing of the male-female ratio, which led to a great deal of inter-ethnic marriages, thereby enhancing the linguistic and ethnic Russification of non-Russians (Anderson and Silver, 1985). The industrialization of these areas, particularly Central Asia, also received a boost due to the wartime policy of transferring factories from the front-line zones to the peripheral regions. The victory in the war, especially, provided a great boost and seeming moral vindication of the Soviet system that was also a powerful unifying force.

The Aftermath of the War.

a. Demobilization.

Most of the national units were demobilized during the latter stage of the war as more Slavic manpower became available. Although some national units survived until the mid-1950s, existing national units and sub-units were disbanded and the personnel were integrated into regular formations of the Red Army. There was hereafter no regional or ethnic affiliation in units, and an effort was made to achieve a distribution of ethnic groups in each unit. However, technical jobs attract a preponderance of Slavs, and Asians were heavily represented in construction units. Reserve divisions would take on an ethnic character on mobilization, as whenever possible they would draw reservists from the areas in which they were stationed to bring them up to strength (Isby 1982).

b. The Persistence of change

Following his assumption of power, Khrushchev reinstated the policy of *korenizatsiia* and urged nations to resume cultural rights and traditions. Rapid economic development and cultural sovietization began in earnest as two vital preconditions had now been satisfied- the masses had been exposed to political education, and the party cadres had been properly trained ideologically as a means of creating organic unity between the Russian core and the non-Slavic periphery, as well as professionally to perform managerial and executive jobs. A new generation of Soviet-educated, war hardened party cadres, totally loyal to the regime, began rising in the hierarchies of the minority republics.

The Khrushchev government reinstated the Balkars, Chechens and other deported nationalities approximately in their former positions, and the era in general appeared less perilous for the minorities. However, dogmatism among ideologists threatened to erase internal borders and dismantle the structures that nationalities had come to regard as shields against ethnic annihilation. New pressure to generalize the use of the Russian language frightened the large and small nationalities alike. The Khrushchev era was exceptionally volatile, and in spite of the steps taken toward removing some excesses of the Stalin era, ideological vigor and renewed Russian chauvinism unexpectedly made the period a time of apprehension for the survival of the nationalities.

During the subsequent Brezhnev era, those fears subsided. No important structural changes in the forms of ethnic administrative units were made during the long incumbency of Brezhnev, and in 1972 he formally and publicly acknowledged the permanent nature of the nationalities problem.

Conclusions to the Russian/Soviet case study

This search for new personnel to build up local political structures was crucial to the preservation and renewal of national consciousness in the regions - the so-called policy of

korenizatsiia. This process was unevenly applied, yet it nevertheless contributed to one of the most important - and least understood - legacies of Soviet rule in the republics: it helped to instill a separate ethnic consciousness. The structure of the Soviet Union, which for the first time linked ethnicity, territory and administration, inherently strengthened national identity (Goldenberg 1994). Not having prior identities as nations, many ethnic groups gained status as republics or autonomous regions, which was one step towards consolidating an ethnic identity. This, in turn, undercut tribal, clan, and village allegiances. *Korenizatsiia* became the keystone of policy in the republics during the Khrushchev era, and it encouraged the development of local languages and culture. Cultural renewal was coupled with attempts to increase the proportion of nationals in the republican parties, governments and militaries by setting targets for recruitment and initiating training programs. This led to high levels of education in some republics, especially Georgia and Armenia, and to higher than average levels of membership in the party.

This led to a hidden disadvantage, however, as it created entrenched local party elites that consolidated their power through family networks - which in turn led to ethnic chauvinism and corruption. Despite the largess shown toward the majority cultures of the republics, there were few facilities for minorities within these republics. This was a central contributing factor, for example, to the Armenian sense of grievance in the under-developed Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. Rigid systems of quotas, intended to ensure a balanced representation from all ethnic groups, backfired. Instead of obliterating national grievances, the quota system heightened them by focusing attention on the ethnicity of every official. Nor did the attempts at co-optation, particularly in the military, during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras entirely satisfy the aspirations of the major nationalities. These unfulfilled aspirations were to become an important cause of ethnic tension. When Gorbachev began to initiate his reforms in the mid-1980s, the Caucasus, in particular, proved to be the most volatile region in the USSR. The first agitation to lead to territorial and ethnic conflict was the demand of the Armenian majority of Nagorno-Karabakh to secede from Azerbaijan, which resulted in anti-Armenian pogroms in the industrial city of Samgait (February 1988), and Baku (January, 1990). In Georgia, the anxieties aroused by the Abkhazian minority's demands for more power were behind the watershed April 1989 demonstration in which nineteen people were killed by Soviet troops, and the outbreak of war in South Ossetia.

4. THE AUSTRIAN EMPIRE AND THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE

The Habsburg family and Austria became linked in the end of the Thirteenth Century when Rudolph of Habsburg, a German King and head of the Holy Roman Empire, gained control of the Duchy of Austria. Over the centuries the family acquired possessions from Hungary, Bohemia, the Netherlands, Spain, Mexico, Peru and the Philippines. The split between the Spanish and Austrian lines of the family was followed by a slow geographic consolidation of the empire which resulted in the geographically contiguous realm which emerged following the Napoleonic Wars.

Despite the geographic consolidation, the Habsburg Empire remained extremely heterogeneous. Table 4 provides a breakdown by nationality just before the First World War for the country as a whole and for each half of the Dual Monarchy. While the highest percentages belong to Germans (23.36) and Hungarians (19.57), no one ethnic group dominated the Empire. Moreover, even within the Austrian and Hungarian portions of the country, neither ethnic group formed a clear majority. By any standard, the Dual Monarchy was an extremely heterogeneous state.

The ethnic structure of the empire reflected the gradual piecemeal fashion of its evolution. Territory was added to the Empire through a variety of means --- force of arms, marriages, territorial exchanges, inheritance, etc. For the most part, centralization and assimilation were kept to a minimum. Local diets, local nobles, and local bureaucracies were incorporated into the administrative structure of the Empire. In 1804, Francis declared himself emperor of Austria,

which included the lands displayed in Table 5; the geographical location of the political unit can be seen in Figure 3. While some political units were relatively homogeneous (e.g., Germans in Upper Austria), most lands in the empire were composed of multiple ethnic groups.

This loosely integrated multiethnic regime emerged from the Napoleonic Wars as a pivotal state in great power politics. However, the French Revolution and subsequent wars forever changed the shape of debate in the heterogeneous state as the seeds of nationalism began to bear fruit. The spread and growth of nationalism was reinforced by the slow industrialization process which spread throughout the Empire in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Gellner 1983). While the Empire had always confronted widely divergent preferences due to its diverse cultures, broad geographic reach, and economic heterogeneity, the introduction of nationalism made identifying a compromise position increasingly difficult.

Table 4: Nationalities of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1910

Nationality	Absolute Number	Overall Percentage	Austria Percentage	Hungary Percentage
Germans	12,006,521	23.36	35.6	9.8
Czechs	6,442,133	12.54	23.0	--
Slovaks	1,967,970	3.83	17.8	9.4
Poles	4,976,804	9.68	17.8	--
Ruthenes (Ukrainians)	3,997,831	7.78	12.6	2.3
Slovenes	1,255,620	2.44	4.5	--
Serbs and Croats	4,380,891	8.52	2.8	14.1
Italians	768,422	1.50	2.7	--
Romanians	3,224,147	6.27	1.0	14.1
Hungarians (Magyars)	10,056,315	19.57	---	48.1
Others	2,313,569	4.51	---	--
Total	51,390,223	100.00	100	100

Sources: Deak (1990, 13) for columns 1 and 2; Kann (1964, 303-305) for columns 3 and 4. Fiume, Transylvania, and Croatia-Slovenia included in the Hungarian figures. Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is not included in the totals, was composed of 21% Croat, 42% Serb, and 34% Muslim. Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

Table 5: Austrian Lands in 1804 (Deak 1990, 10)

1 Hereditary Provinces

- a. Lower Austria
- b. Upper Austria
- c. Princely County of Tyrol
- d. Land of Vorarlberg
- e. Duchy of Salzburg
- f. Duchy of Styria
- g. Duchy of Carinthia
- h. Duchy of Carniola

2. Czech Crown Lands

- a. Kingdom of Bohemia
- b. Margravate of Moravia
- c. Duchy of Silesia

3. Adriatic Holdings

- a. Adriatic Littoral (including Trieste)
- b. Kingdom of Dalmatia

4. Italian Holdings

- a. Kingdom of Lombardy
- b. Venetian Republic

5. Western Holdings

- a. Kingdom of Galicia
- b. Kingdom of Lodomeria
- c. Duchy of Bukovina

6. Hungary Holy Crown Lands

- a. Kingdom of Hungary
- b. Grand Duchy of Transylvania

Figure 3: Habsburg Lands in 1848.



Source: Deak 1990, 42.

Hungarian nationalism erupted in the Revolution of 1848 when the Imperial Army was forced to crush a revolutionary Hungarian Army which included numerous defectors from the Imperial Army itself. Relative stability ensued until the military defeat at the hands of the Prussians in 1866 which led to a virtual partition of the Austrian Empire through the Compromise of 1867. The Dual Monarchy consisted of Austria and Hungary -- each with its own parliament, its own bureaucracy, and its own national guard. The only remaining Imperial or joint agencies were the ministries of War, Finance, and Foreign Affairs. Francis Joseph became a “dual” monarch by simultaneously holding the titles of King of Hungary and Emperor of Austria. However, aside from the Emperor himself, the only truly important “imperial” agency which glued the heterogeneous state together was the Army.⁸

As with most great power armies, the Hapsburg army first emerged in the 13th century as a feudal institution in which nobles provided heavy cavalry and foot soldiers to the crown for limited time periods (e.g., 40 days) in exchange for grants of land. However, the rise of the infantry in the 14th Century (e.g., Courtrai in 1302, Morgarten in 1315, Laupen in 1339, and Crecy in 1346)

⁷ As will be discussed below, the map highlights the fact that the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia was divided into a civilian area and a “military border district.”

⁸ Although the empire had a Navy based in the Adriatic Sea, it played a relatively minor role in the processes described below and was much less heterogeneous than the Army (mostly Croat and Italian).

followed by the introduction of fire-arms in the 15th Century made the feudal military system increasingly obsolete. The crowns of Europe required larger, better equipped armies with disciplined infantry which could take to the field for extended periods of time. Gradually, the “feudal armies” gave way to the “mercenary armies” of the early modern period (Downing 1992; Parker 1988). Soldiers in the Austrian armies raised by Wallenstein during the Thirty Years’ War (1618-48) were paid for their services in cash and booty. These mercenaries were drawn from a wide range of ethnic groups residing both within and outside the lands of the Empire. The units were raised on an ad hoc basis to deal with military crises; they were led by nobles from crown lands and were not under the direct control of the Habsburg Monarch.

As with all monarchies of the day, the Habsburgs slowly attempted to consolidate power by developing a monopoly of the means of violence (Tilly 1990; Thomson 1994). In 1627, during the height of the Thirty Years’ War, the “Revised Land Ordinance” deprived the regional estates of raising armies. However, the estates still controlled the purse strings and therefore exercised considerable power on the center’s war making capacity. The decisive step in the growth of Imperial control occurred in 1649 when Ferdinand III decided to retain in permanent service nine infantry regiments, ten cavalry regiments, and some artillery units. A permanent and professional Habsburg Army was born.⁹

From the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 to the outbreak of French Revolutionary Wars in 1792, the Imperial Army fought in 14 major great power wars (Levy 1983, Table 3.1). Although successful in the field during the early part of this period, stunning defeats in the War of Polish Succession (1733-1735) and the Austro-Turkish War (1737-1739) highlighted weakness in the Army and led to the military and financial reforms of Maria Theresa.

Between 1770 and 1777, the “selective conscription system” was introduced by Maria Theresa’s son Joseph II (Rothenberg 1976, 6). As the size of armies and scale of conflict had grown in Europe, some monarchs began to experiment with universal conscription during war time. Habsburg monarchs consistently resisted this urge because they believed that it would escalate the level of violence and increase the risk that demobilized soldiers would threaten the political system.¹⁰ Even after the success of the massive French citizen armies mobilized during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the Habsburg family and the Imperial Army resisted the introduction of large scale conscripted armies. Although the *Landwehr*, a citizens militia drawn from Austrian crown lands and Bohemia, was reluctantly created at the height of the Napoleonic Wars, it was largely demobilized after the war and completely eliminated by 1831 (Rothenberg 1976, 31).

The core of the Imperial Army was the officer corps. The officers were responsible for melding young conscripts into professional soldiers and leading them in battle. The task was particularly difficult given the diverse language and cultural backgrounds of the conscripts. The officers corps was devoted to the Habsburg dynasty; they swore loyalty to the Emperor and consciously placed themselves above nationalities and political parties. On the whole, the officers were professional and efficient. The main avenues for entry into the corps were through the prestigious military academies or the more common cadet schools; children between the ages of 10 and 17 were sent to military schools as the first step toward a life long career in the military. A

⁹ Rothenburg (1976) objects to dating the Army from 1649 because many institutions from earlier eras were integrated with this permanent Army. He dates the founding of the Army to 1522.

¹⁰ Both fears proved to be entirely justified. Universal conscription coupled with the industrial revolution allowed the First World War to be fought on a scale heretofore unimaginable. Moreover, soldiers demobilized after the war were drawn into militia groups supporting causes on both the left and right hand side of the political spectrum. Ultimately, the clashing of these private militias destabilized the political systems of virtually all Eastern European states during the Interwar Period.

very large number of the inductees were from military families and over time a “military caste” developed within the Empire. However, the officer corps was not aristocratic in the way the Russian and French officers corps were the exclusive domain of noble families.¹¹ Moreover, the corps was decidedly multi-national for within its ranks, particularly before 1867, one could find significant numbers of Irish, Scottish, German, Spanish, Dutch, Walloon, English, and French officers.

Table 6 compares the ethnic background of the career officers with that of the rank and file soldiers and the population as a whole just before World War I. The percentages for the rank and file closely parallel the population as a whole. Unlike the Russian/Soviet case, all the ethnic groups in the empire contributed to the Army. However, the table, which was constructed with official statistics, indicated that almost four out of every five officers were German.

Deak (1990, 183) argues that the official statistics overstate the German influence of the officer corps. Many officers with mixed backgrounds simply categorized themselves as German. Others, the sons of officers who had been moved from post to post throughout their youth, had no clear national affiliation and categorized themselves with ethnic group which was historically linked to the officer corps. Moreover, the Army as an institution consciously sought to “de-nationalize” both enlisted soldiers and career officers. Officers spoke to one and other in German in the officers’ mess; they gave all their orders in German. They often came to see themselves as part of the dynasty and distinct from its ethnic components. Deak’s random sample of 516 officers lead him to estimate only 55 percent of the career officers were German. While it was certainly true that all ethnic groups (including Jews) could enter and be promoted up the chain of command, Germans disproportionately choose to be career officers.

Table 6: Nationalities of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1910

Nationality	Empire	Career Officers	Rank and File
-----	----	----	----
Germans	23.36	78.7	25.2
Czechs	12.54	4.8	12.9
Slovaks	3.83	---	3.6
Poles	9.68	2.5	7.9
Ruthenes (Ukrainians)	7.78	0.2	7.6
Slovenes	2.44	0.5	2.4
Serbs and Croats	8.52	2.4	9.0
Italians	1.50	0.7	1.3
Romanians	6.27	0.9	7.0
Hungarians (Magyars)	19.57	9.3	23.1
Others	4.51	---	--
-----	----	----	----
Total	100	100	100

Sources: Deak (1990, 183, 13). Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

The “selective conscription system” established in the late 18th century meant that different political units had different rights and responsibilities. In some areas, such as Tyrol no conscription took place. Tyrol was required to supply 20,000 *Jager* (light infantry) to the imperial army during times of war. In areas where conscription took place, inductees were chose by lot or by the community. The later method allowed local jurisdictions to get rid of criminal and misfits. The

¹¹ While many of the career military officers were granted noble titles, they were not linked to a landed noble class as were the officer corps of other great powers.

new military service law introduced in 1827 set the term of service at 14 years in most areas (except Hungary, Tyrol, Lombardy, and Venetia). The 1852 service law extended conscription to previously exempted areas (again Hungary, Tyrol, Lombardy, and Venetia) and set the term of service to 8 years in active forces and 2 years in the reserve (Rothenberg 1976). The Imperial Army believed that socialization and indoctrination were only possible with long term conscripts; the Imperial Army, therefore, resisted the Prussian model which emphasized the role of reserves in the mobilized army.

Life in the military for the rank and file was brutal. Poor living conditions, miserable pay, and physical brutality lead to surprisingly high mortality rates for soldiers relative to their peers and unsurprisingly high desertion rates (Rothenberg 1976, 42). The military dealt with the problem of ethnic cleavages and horrible conditions by distributing troops outside their native territories and rotating the troops every year or two. Italian troops stationed in Galacia were less likely to revolt and less likely to fraternize with the Polish civilians.

The diversity of ethnic groups in the Army created a number of problems. If only 23 percent of the population was German, could you force all conscripts to learn German? If an integrated army using the German language is not a viable alternative, then ethnic based units are required. Moreover, should the Army organize active and reserve troops territorially or non-territorially? In a country with geographically concentrated minorities, a territorial unit structure implies ethnic based units. While the use of ethnic based units is administratively easier, the obvious draw back is that the state is arming collections of oppressed and disgruntled minorities.

The Habsburg solution to the ethnicity problem was to define three “languages” in the Army (Stone 1966, 100). The “language of command” was German. All officers were required to speak, read, and write German; therefore any Croat or Hungarian had to be bilingual to enter the officer corps. All rank and file soldiers were required to memorize 80 German commands. The “language of service” was also German; recruits were forced to learn about 1000 technical terms for dealing with equipment (e.g., the parts of a field gun). Finally, the “language of instruction” or the “regimental language” varied from unit to unit. A few regiments, such as those composed of German speaking Austrians, had a single regimental language -- German. However, most regiments had two or more regimental languages. For example, a regiment composed of Czechs, Germans, and Hungarians would have linguistically homogeneous units at the company level. The officers were required to speak the language of their men within three years or be dismissed. General Conrad, the Chief of the General Staff during World War I, could speak eight languages. Bilingual officers and the use of German as the common denominator were the linchpins holding the ethnically and linguistically heterogeneous army together.

The system was not without its faults. During the early part of World War I the professional bilingual officer corps was decimated; the newly recruited officers and reserve officers often could not speak the language of their troops. Moreover, as nationalism spread throughout society and began to make serious inroads into the Army, units became increasingly polarized. Having said this, the fact that the Army did not disintegrate until after the country itself broke up after four years of horrendous warfare attests to the unity of the Army in face of tremendous obstacles.

One key element of the Imperial Army which we have neglected to this point was the Military Border Districts along the Ottoman frontier which had existed for centuries prior to their dissolution in 1871 (Rothenberg 1960).¹² The soldiers were originally military colonists. They were given tracks of land and freedom from serfdom and taxes in exchange for guarding the frontier and launching raids into the Ottoman Empire; the program was a clear example of

¹² As Rothenberg points out, although the dissolution order was signed in 1871 it took a decade for the institution to be completely eliminated.

extending political and economic rights for the extraction of resources. During the era of mercenary armies, it was simply too expensive to station a permanent defensive force on the frontier. The border troops gradually came under the jurisdiction of the Imperial Army; military law and courts ruled the territory. Croatia-Slovenia, was therefore, divided into a civilian area dominated by nobles and the military area controlled by the crown. The border troops were eventually viewed as a cheap source of conscripts and during times of crisis the troops were sent around the empire. Not surprisingly, given their environment and socialization, these troops were regarded as brutal and efficient but difficult to control.

The most significant change in the structure of the military during the course of the 19th century came as the result of the Compromise of 1867. Francis Joseph and the Imperial Army refused to allow the creation of a completely independent Hungarian Army. The memory of the Hungarian revolt and the image of Imperial troops firing upon their former Hungarian comrades was too fresh in the minds of the Imperial officers. The compromise was to maintain the Imperial Army (also referred to as the Common Army or the Joint Army) with German as the language of command and service. An Austrian National Guard (*Landwehr*) and the Hungarian National Guard (*Honved*) were also created. In 1910, the Imperial Army was composed of 183,000 infantry, 57,000 cavalry, and 79,000 artillery soldiers. The *Landwehr* had 62,000 infantry and the *Honved* had 42,000 infantry soldiers. The Imperial Army had envisioned the national guards as second class reserve forces; the decision to concentrate most cavalry and all artillery in the Imperial forces was clearly designed to ensure that the Hungarian *Honved* could not challenge the Imperial forces should another civil war erupt. However, the Hungarians always saw the *Honved* as the first step toward an independent Hungarian Army. The Hungarian parliament devoted considerable resources to the *Honved* and the unit added significant amounts of cavalry and artillery over the years.

The military reorganization also introduced universal conscription for the first time. Rather than select a small number of conscripts for long term service as was the tradition, Austria Hungary moved to a broader conscription with short active duty (3 years) and longer reserve duty (7 years in reserves and 2 years in either national guard). 95,000 new recruits were to be inducted each year; 55,000 from the Austrian side of the Monarchy and 45,000 from the Hungarian side. During peacetime the active army was approximately 255,000 while during wartime mobilization it grew to 800,000. Despite the changes the Dual Monarchy still lagged other great powers in terms of mobilization capacity: France 1,350,00; Germany 1,028,946; and Russia 1,476,000 (Rothenberg 1976, 81). While the short term active and long term reserve format was required to keep up with its neighbors, the plan severely undermined the Army's ability to socialize and denationalize new recruits.

The deployment of the Imperial Army reflected its dual mission: domestic control and external defense. A majority of troops were stationed in fortresses within the country to ensure the state could quickly repress any popular uprisings or full scale revolts. Even during the 1859 war with France and Sardinia and the 1866 war with Prussia, tens of thousands of troops remained in Hungary to ensure Imperial control was not challenged. Deak (1990) argues that Francis Joseph and the Imperial Army clung to the pomp and circumstance because it served the goal of domestic pacification through the glorification of the army. Unfortunately, clinging to many traditions (e.g., the cavalry with decorative uniforms and sabers) also undermined the development of an effective army capable of external defense.

World War I

The outbreak of war in August of 1914 transformed the economic and political structure of Europe forever. Figures 4 through 9 present mobilization rates for all the European great powers during the 19th and 20th centuries. The military participation ratios (mpr) are simply the total

number of active troops divided by the total population.¹³ The figures highlight the unprecedented mobilization rates during the first “total” war in human history. While minor peaks due to war time mobilization occurred during the 19th century (e.g., Russia during the Crimean War (1853-56), Prussia during the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), and Italy during the Wars of Unification (1859-61)), the peaks associated with the world wars are historically unprecedented. Each great power mobilized between seven and fourteen percent of their total populations for World War I. These figures appear low at first glance because women and children are included in the totals; in France and Germany approximately 80% of all males between the ages of 18-50 served in the military during the war.

Figure 4: Russia/Soviet Union Mobilization Rates (total troops/total population).




Figure 5: Austria-Hungary Mobilization Rates (total troops/total population).

¹³ The data are from the “National Capabilities Data Set” compiled by the Correlates of War project.




Figure 6: France Mobilization Rates (total troops/total population).




Figure 7: United Kingdom Mobilization Rates (total troops/total population).




Figure 8: Sardinia/Italy Mobilization Rates (total troops/total population).





Figure 9: Prussia/Germany Mobilization Rates (total troops/total population).



The consequence of the total mobilization of countries couple with the new destructive power of war due to the industrial revolution is shown the Table 7. Although the exact numbers differ slightly from previous graphs due to the use of an alternative source, the basic patterns are the same. During the course of the First World War, out of a population of 53 million, the Dual Monarchy was able to put 7.8 million in uniform. 1.2 million of these soldiers perished; another 3.6 million were wounded.

Military leaders in Austria-Hungary, like those in every other European state, believed that the war would last a matter of weeks. They believed that the forces on the offense were virtually unstoppable and that the outcome would be determined by a handful of decisive battles. The “cult of the offensive” dominated civilian and military thought in the Dual Monarchy; Francis Joseph’s conviction that the infantry bayonet and cavalry saber charge would decide any military outcome encouraged the anti-intellectualism in the Imperial Army. In general, the Officer Corps expected a war similar in manner (but hopefully different in outcome) to the Austria-Prussia “Seven Weeks War” of 1866 which Austrian military had lost a mere 20,000 souls. In sharp contrast, during the first month of World War I in Galicia the Dual Monarchy lost 250,000 killed or wounded and 100,000 captured. The September-December Serbian Campaign of the same year cost another 227,000 dead, wounded, or missing.¹⁴

The initial mobilization in Austria-Hungary progressed surprisingly well. Conscripts reported to their train transport and assembly points generally without incident; a considerable feat given that millions of people were moving simultaneously and mobilization poster had to be printed in 15 languages. Even the Czechs, whose hatred of anything German had reached a boiling point, reported for duty. Political parties in the Austrian Reichsrat all supported the mobilization. Ethnic Germans in the Empire viewed the coming war as a great Slavic-German battle. The Social Democrats (as with those in Germany) supported a conflict against an autocratic and backward Russia. The Italians and Romanians were not being called on to fight their ethnic compatriots

¹⁴ Figures from Clodfelter (1992, 741, 747).

(although they would as the war expanded in subsequent years). Overall, mobilization in the multi-ethnic Dual Monarchy was very similar to the rest of Europe; the public on the left and right rallied behind the government in the time of crisis (Macartney 1968, 811).

As the battle field casualties began to mount up, virtually every government was forced scrambled for fresh recruits. Countries such as Britain and Canada, which had long resisted conscription, were forced to begin drafting men as the pool of volunteers dried up by 1917. In Austria-Hungary, the universal conscription system had led to the registration of all males. The heavy loses in November 1914 forced the government to call up the 21-32 age classes immediately; the following year the 32-42 age cohort was called up. Eventually, all able bodies were recruited including those declared physically unfit during peace time and the early stages of the war.

In the short run, as with most wars, the government restricted political rights. The Austrian Prime Minister had suspended the Austrian Reichstat in March of 1914 before the July crisis even emerged; the Monarchy refused to call the parliament back into session fearing it would hamper the war effort. The military also took direct control of all administration (civil and military) in areas involved in military operations. The military administration extended deep into the interior and covered all defense production efforts. While Austria-Hungary never became a military state as did Germany, political rights were systematically restricted throughout the realm. Political dissidents, such as most of the Czech leaders who were accused of undermining the war effort, were jailed. Censorship prevented any open criticism of the Monarchy, military or the war effort.

Table 7: Mobilization Rates and Casualties During the First World War

	Total Population	Mobilized	Killed & Died	Wounded	Prisoners & Missing	Total Casualties	Killed/ Pop	Killed/ Mobilized	Casualties/ Pop.	Casualties/ Mobilized	Mobilized/ Pop
Central Powers											
1 Germany	66,000,000	11,000,000	1,773,700	4,216,058	1,152,800	7,142,558	2.7%	16.1%	10.8%	64.9%	16.7%
2 Austria-Hungary	53,000,000	7,800,000	1,200,000	3,620,000	2,200,000	7,020,000	2.3%	15.4%	13.2%	90.0%	14.7%
3 Ottoman Empire	19,000,000	2,850,000	325,000	400,000	250,000	975,000	1.7%	11.4%	5.1%	34.2%	15.0%
4 Bulgaria	5,000,000	1,200,000	87,500	152,390	27,029	266,919	1.8%	7.3%	5.3%	22.2%	24.0%
Totals	143,000,000	22,850,000	3,386,200	8,388,448	3,629,829	15,404,477	2.4%	14.8%	10.8%	67.4%	16.0%
Allied Powers											
1 Russia	169,000,000	12,000,000	1,700,000	4,950,000	2,500,000	9,150,000	1.0%	14.2%	5.4%	76.3%	7.1%
2 British Empire	46,000,000	8,410,000	1,357,800	4,226,000	537,000	6,160,800	3.0%	16.1%	13.4%	73.3%	18.3%
3 France	40,000,000	8,904,467	908,371	2,090,212	191,652	3,190,235	2.3%	10.2%	8.0%	35.8%	22.3%
4 Italy	36,000,000	5,615,000	650,000	947,000	600,000	2,197,000	1.8%	11.6%	6.1%	39.1%	15.6%
5 United States	99,000,000	4,355,000	126,000	234,300	4,500	350,300	0.1%	2.9%	0.4%	8.0%	4.4%
6 Japan	52,000,000	800,000	300	907	3	1,210	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	1.5%
7 Romania	8,000,000	750,000	335,706	120,000	80,000	535,706	4.2%	44.8%	6.7%	71.4%	9.4%
8 Serbia	5,000,000	707,343	45,000	133,148	152,958	331,106	0.9%	6.4%	6.6%	46.8%	14.1%
9 Belgium	7,000,000	267,000	13,716	44,686	34,659	93,061	0.2%	5.1%	1.3%	34.9%	3.8%
10 Greece	4,000,000	230,000	5,000	21,000	1,000	27,000	0.1%	2.2%	0.7%	11.7%	5.8%
11 Portugal	6,000,000	100,000	7,222	13,751	12,318	33,291	0.1%	7.2%	0.6%	33.3%	1.7%
12 Montenegro	500,000	50,000	3,000	10,000	7,000	20,000	0.6%	6.0%	4.0%	40.0%	10.0%
Totals	472,500,000	42,188,810	5,152,115	12,791,004	4,121,090	22,089,709	1.1%	12.2%	4.7%	52.4%	8.9%
GRAND TOTAL	615,500,000	65,038,810	8,538,315	21,179,452	7,750,919	37,494,186	1.4%	13.1%	6.1%	57.6%	10.6%

Source: Cowper 1990.

Ironically, the situation in Hungary was not as severe. Since the establishment of the Dual Monarchy in 1867, the Austrian half of the realm had always been more democratic and more tolerant of minorities. However, Tisza, the Hungarian prime minister, rejected calls by the Army for the closing of the Hungarian and Croatian parliaments. Tisza believed that the centralization tendency which often manifests itself during war time would undermine years of effort to create a separate and equal Hungarian state. Throughout the war, the relative autonomy of Hungary limited the efficient allocation of resources. For example, Hungarian authorities made sure its constituents were fed before shipping grain to the Austrian lands or the Imperial Army.

Did the massive extraction of resources lead to the expansion of political rights to minority groups? The answer appears to be a qualified yes. First, as early as 1915 the Hungarian government once again began clamoring for a truly independent army. Emperor Charles, who succeeded his uncle in 1916, supported the move but the leading generals believed that it would have to wait for the conclusion of the war.

Second, Emperor Charles called the Reichsrat back into secession in order to appease minority groups and solidify support behind the Monarchy as it desperately sought to find a way to end the war in honorable way.

Third, the imperial government succeeded in pressuring the Hungarian government to expand suffrage. Suffrage was extremely limited in Hungary and political parties based on ethnic affiliation were banned. The effort, which was very unpopular with Hungarians, was seen as a way to increase support with Romanian and Slovak minorities who had long been repressed by the Hungarian majority.

Fourth, political prisoners were released in July 1917. Although the Emperor believed this would increase the probability of a negotiated compromise, many of the newly released dissidents believe that a line had already been crossed and began to actively work for the dissolution of the empire.

Fifth, ethnic groups such as the Poles of Galicia and the Czechs of Bohemia and Moravia were offered autonomy within a loose federal system. Prior to the war this was exactly what Polish and Czech leaders had sought; there was little if any talk of an independent Czech or Polish state. However, during the course of the war minority discontent rose as did the perception that the Monarchy was a fragile political entity. By 1917 Russia was openly calling for an independent Polish state and was creating Czech legions from its massive collection of prisoners of war to fight against the Dual Monarchy (Becvar 1932). The war time experience raised minority expectations to such an extent, that "compromises" put forward by the Dual Monarchy during the last half of the war seemed inadequate.

During war time political leaders often make concessions to societal groups to raise money and manpower for the war effort. The British government granted the right to vote to the working class *unless they were conscientious objectors*. The Belgian government extended suffrage to the mothers and wives of fallen soldiers after World War I. Even the military controlled German government offered an expansion of post-war political rights in exchange for war time contributions.

Making promises is one thing; keeping them is another. The German government did not have an opportunity to fulfill its promises because the government fell at the close of the war. Other governments, who were coerced into making concession when their resources were stretched to the breaking point, systematically retract rights after the situation stabilized and the government harnesses its defense and police forces. For example, the Russian Tsar, who was forced to make concessions to the Duma following the military defeat at the hands of the Japanese during the 1904-5 Russo-Japanese war, retracted the privileges within a couple of years. Just what would have transpired had the Dual Monarchy survived the war remains unclear.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Three conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, the mobilization problems for the Russia Empire (and Soviet Union) were very different from that of Austria Empire (and Dual Monarchy). The Hapsburg empire was much more heterogeneous than its Russian/Soviet counterpart; the “greater Russian Slavs” dominated the country in a way the Germans and Hungarians never could. As a result, the Romanov dynasty and their Communist successors were less dependent on minorities to conduct military operations. This in turn limited the ability of minority groups to extract concessions from the center and freed the center to repress minority groups with “questionable” loyalties.

Second, both the mobilization and extraction schools are supported by the cases. During the early phases of war, political rights were severely restricted with the expansion of censorship and military administration. However, the scope of the war forced the mobilization of a much broader segment of the population. This necessitated concession to minority groups such as the reemergence of national units in the Soviet Union during the Second World War and the offers of autonomy to Poles and Czechs in the Dual Monarchy during the First World War. The relative weakness of the minority groups position in the Soviet Union allowed the government to restrict this right when the military crisis subsided; the relative strength of the minority groups positions in the Dual Monarchy led to the fragmentation of the empire.

Third, the policies of Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union under Stalin appear to resemble those of Hungary much more than those of Austria. After the Compromise of 1867, the Hungarian government systematically attempted to repress minority rights and embarked on an extensive Magyarization program. This coercive assimilation program closely parallels the Russification program followed by Stalin after his consolidation of power.¹⁵

¹⁵ However, Himka (1992, 90) argues that the level of violence in the Soviet campaign was qualitatively different than that used by the Hungarian government.

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