

**Women, Minorities and War:**  
**The Impact of Wartime Mobilization on Political Rights**  
**In Europe, 1900-1955**

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ABSTRACT

Tilly (1975) has convincingly argued that warfare in Europe contributed to the development of the powerful modern state. But just what form of strong state is likely to develop in the face of a persistent external threat? Hintze (1906) and Lasswell (1941) propose the "garrison state" hypothesis: states facing a severe security threat are likely to develop autocratic institutions. A competing argument proposed by the "extraction" school of thought argues that warfare can indirectly promote rather than inhibit the development of democratic institutions (Downing 1992). We examine these competing hypotheses by tracing the ebb and flow of political rights of majority males, females, and minority males using a cross-sectional time series of European states (1900-1955). We find that while wars lead to a reduction in rights in the short run, if large-scale mobilization occurs in response to the threat, then political rights tend to expand in the long run.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

How does the level of violence in the external environment influence the political development of a state? Tilly (1975) has convincingly argued that warfare in Europe contributed to the development of the modern state. In response to external conflict, state leaders consciously expanded the power of the state in order to raise armies and defend borders. The centralization of power, the development of bureaucracies, and the integration of economies were all initiated to maximize revenue-taking in order to enhance war-making (Tilly 1990). But just what form of strong state is likely to develop in the face of a persistent external threat? Hintze (1906) and Lasswell (1941) propose the "Garrison State" hypothesis: states facing a severe security threat are likely to develop autocratic institutions in order to minimize domestic opposition and maximize mobilization potential. A competing argument, which has been proposed by the "Extraction School" of thought, argues that warfare can indirectly promote rather than inhibit the development of democratic institutions (Downing 1992; Klinkner and Smith 1999). Execution of war, particularly large-scale war, requires the mobilization of populations and resources. State leaders must extract these resources from an ordinarily reluctant society (Stein 1980). In most cases, the extraction of resources requires state leaders to extend economic or political rights in exchange for cooperation in resolving the immediate crisis. Large-scale warfare can, therefore, have the unintended long run consequence of expanding political participation within a polity.

This paper examines these competing explanations by comparing and contrasting the experiences of three societal groups: males from the majority group, females, and minority males. How does wartime mobilization affect the political and economic positions of disenfranchised men, women, and minorities? Does the impact of direct participation in the war effort (e.g., conscription into the army) differ from that of indirect participation (e.g., work in munitions factories)? The findings support a synthesis of the garrison state and extraction school explanations. Involvement in war leads to curtailment of political liberties in the short run. However, as massive mobilization triggers domestic opposition and erodes the "rally around the flag" effect associated with the outbreak of conflict, leaders are forced to exchange rights for resources. In the long run, large-scale warfare is positively correlated with the expansion of

political and economic rights. Rather than the linear relationships proposed in the literature (i.e., the positive linear relationship proposed by the Extraction School and the negative linear relationship proposed by the Garrison State School), the relationship is best depicted as a "j-curve" in which rights fall in the short run and rise in the long run.

The remainder of the article is divided into eight sections. Section 2 explores the theoretical arguments proposed by the Garrison State and Extraction Schools. Section 3 uses a historical approach to probe the causal mechanisms proposed by the Extraction School with respect to majority males, minority males, women, and conscientious objectors. Section 4 examines one of the most important competing explanations for the expansion of political rights in the literature: domestic and international suffrage movements. Section 5 describes the coding rules used to construct the new political rights data set as well as the hypotheses to be tested in the statistical analysis. Section 6 presents the bivariate analysis and briefly explores the role of warfare in four cases in the data set (United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, and Italy). Section 7 presents the multivariate regressions and Section 8 provides concluding remarks.

## **2. GARRISON STATE VERSUS EXTRACTION**

Reflecting on the formation of national states in Western Europe, Tilly (1975) argues that war (and the tax systems created to pay for war) played a vital role in the development of strong states. "War made the state and the state made war" (Tilly 1975, 42). Beginning with almost 500 independent political entities in 1500, Europe gradually consolidated into approximately twenty sovereign states by the start of the 20th century. Many alternatives to the sovereign state, ranging from empires and city states to trading leagues and federations, fell by the wayside during the consolidation process (Spruyt 1994).

Tilly argues that the costs of war increased rapidly due to three revolutionary factors: technical innovations in weapons (e.g., cannons and firearms), tactical changes in warfare (e.g., the rise of infantry), and an expansion in the size of armies. Prior to these changes, rulers in the largely non-monetized feudal economic and military system had relatively few expenses and could typically manage affairs using the revenue produced from crown lands. In the feudal system, land was exchanged for military service and the vassals were responsible for equipping and supplying their own troops. After the

technical and tactical innovations, the larger mercenary armies and their advanced weapons became horrifically expensive. Desperate for additional revenue, rulers in Europe expanded the tax base and institutionalized the collection process. The first bureaucratic structures were created for revenue collection. The need for ever larger armies led to the extensive use of mercenaries from the 15th to the 18th century, and then to the use of conscripts during the Napoleonic Wars and the total wars of the 20th century. Tilly also argues that the mobilization of fiscal and human resources triggered resistance. He contends that states responded to this threat by increasing the coercive apparatus (e.g., police) to minimize disruptions. For the region as a whole, the process was autocatalytic. As rulers fielded even larger armies or equipped their artillery with even more accurate cannons, neighbors were forced to raise revenues in order to respond in kind. The upward spiral continued in Europe for at least 600 years.

If war did in fact contribute to the state building process, a second question emerges: just what sort of sovereign state emerged from this violent environment? Hintze (1906), like Tilly, argues that state development is inextricably linked to military development. While domestic factors such as the distribution of power between interest groups played an important role in state development, the level of external threat together with the state's position in the international political hierarchy could be decisive. "All state organization was military organization, organization for war" (1906, 181).

However, Hintze's argument goes beyond that proposed in Tilly's classic work *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* by hypothesizing that external threats determine the domestic political structures of states.<sup>1</sup>

England, with her insular security, was not directly exposed to the danger of these wars. She needed no standing army, at least not one of Continental proportions, but only a navy which served commercial interests as much as war aims. In consequence, she developed no absolutism. Absolutism and militarism go together on the Continent just as self government and militia in England. The main explanation for the difference in the way political and military organizations developed between England and the Continent -- one

which became more and more distinct after the middle of the seventeenth century -- lies in the difference in the foreign situations (Hinze 1906, 199).

England did not become democratic because it was either Protestant (Weber 1958), or industrialized (Smith 1965; Dahrendorf 1967), or agriculturally commercialized (Moore 1966). Rather, the lack of a persistent external threat allowed interest groups to maintain and expand political and economic privileges. For Hintze, this path was simply impossible for a state such as Prussia, which had to centralize power and eliminate domestic opposition in order to efficiently mobilize the resources required to maintain independence in an anarchic world.

Lasswell (1941), writing at a time in which the world (but not yet the United States) had plunged into the Second World War, takes a similar position. "The purpose of this article is to consider the possibility that we are moving toward a world of "garrison states" -- a world in which the specialists of violence are the most powerful group in society" (1941, 455). While not arguing the outcome was inevitable, Lasswell feared that mobilization for total war encouraged the authoritative allocation of resources at the expense of market allocation and the emphasis of the collective or the public at the expense of the individual or the private. During war "decisions will be more dictatorial than democratic, and institutional practices long connected with modern democracy will disappear (1941, 461)." Throughout his essay, Lasswell emphasizes the role of propaganda in mobilizing resources, increasing morale, repressing dissent, socializing the young, and ritualizing democracy. In sum, Lasswell echoes Hintze's contention that a hostile external environment leads to autocratic institutions but he focuses on the demise of existing modern democracies rather than the rise of embryonic autocratic states.

External threats can undermine pluralist institutions and norms in a number of ways. First, the existence of a severe external threat can lead to the elimination of free and fair elections (e.g., the U.K. suspends national elections during both World Wars). Second, during war decision-making power constitutionally vested in the legislature is often shifted to the executive branch (e.g., Germany during the First World War). Third, the hostile external environment can lead to a suspension of the rule of law in the hope of efficiently mobilizing resources (e.g., Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus during the

American Civil War (Rehnquist 1998)). Fourth, threats often lead to the expansion of the power of the military over economic and political decision making (e.g., Ludendorff's military dominated government in Germany during the First World War). Fifth, threats often lead to the barring (or removal) of individuals of suspect loyalties from holding public office (e.g., the removal of Jews from the provincial government in Vichy France in 1940). Sixth, in the face of an intense threat, even short of war, states often restrict the right of its citizens to form political parties and compete in the political arena (e.g., Communists in the United States during the early Cold War era). Seventh, severe threats often lead to restriction in the right to vote in national and local elections (e.g., Japanese-Americans during internment in the Second World War (Daniels 1981)). Finally, in the hope of minimizing opposition to extraction policies, governments often repress free speech (e.g., Espionage Act of 1917 in the United States).

While threats and wars often result in a restriction of political rights, Downing (1992) argues that under certain conditions war may expand rather than contract political rights. Downing focuses on the medieval origins of constitutional government in Europe. Medieval customs and institutions (e.g., reciprocal rights between peasants and lords; the balance of power between the crown, the Catholic Church, nobles and burghers; prototype parliaments; and the rule of law) laid the foundation for participatory government. As with Tilly, the military revolution plays a decisive role in Downing's story. States that are forced to extract resources domestically are apt to develop autocratic structures capable of squeezing every last cent out of reluctant lords, merchants, and peasants. In contrast, states that are capable of raising capital in markets or fighting on the territory of other states (where they can extract resources from the victims of aggression) are less likely to develop autocratic institutions. In sum, the lack of a medieval legacy, the presence of severe security threats, and the reliance on domestic resources to finance military campaigns all increase the probability of an autocratic state.

Downing emphasizes that external threats and the need for wartime revenue often triggered an intense battle between the crown and its subjects. New taxes were not dictated by rulers from above; they were negotiated with interest groups from below. Feudal customs and institutions limited the crown's

ability to raise revenue. When the crown "asked" for extraordinary revenue, it was often forced to reward interest groups for compliance.

[E]states were essential to finance and consensus building: they debated matters of war, foreign policy, trade, and justice. ... [E]states often took advantage of any upper hand they might have had by enhancing their privileges and liberties, and by expanding their role in the machinery of government. In exchange for financial support, more often than not in time of war, estates assumed increasing control of law making (Downing 1992, 31).

Moreover, this expansion of rights related to the extraction of human resources as well. As the size of armies grew, the royal treasury simply could not afford to pay the mercenaries for their services. The solution was to enlist volunteers and conscripts. But why would a young peasant from Languedoc or Hanover volunteer for the hardship of military service or honor a conscription notice?<sup>2</sup> They complied because they were citizens -- members of a community that provided rights and demanded obligations. The Napoleonic Wars are considered a historical turning point because large "citizen" armies began to take the place of "mercenary" armies that had dominated in Europe since the end of the Middle Ages (Dupuy 1984, 156). Although Napoleon's *Grand Armée* assembled for the invasion of Russia in 1812 was dominated by foreign troops, it contained some 300,000 French conscripts and volunteers (Finer 1975, 146). "Citizen" armies would play a central role in the next global wars: World War I and World War II.

In sum, the Extraction School posits that raising revenues and armies requires political compromises and triggers social change.<sup>3</sup> Mobilization for large-scale war can, therefore, have the unintended consequence of expanding political rights in the long run.

### **3. MEN, WOMEN, AND MINORITIES**

In their most general forms, the Extraction and the Garrison State School hypotheses focus on society as a whole (e.g., threats directed against society as a whole, mobilization of the entire state, and the political rights of all citizens on average). This "society as a whole" approach seems appropriate for

the threat side of the equation because most wars are directed against societies as a whole. While the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 took place in Hawaii, it was perceived as an attack on the entire nation. However, the “society as a whole” approach may not be appropriate for the mobilization side of the equation because the impact of mobilization and the subsequent offering of rewards can vary greatly across society. The differentiation in mobilization raises an interesting question: could war have different consequences for majority males, females, and minority males?<sup>4</sup>

Participation can be divided into two categories: direct and indirect. Direct participation includes serving in combat units, combat service support, and military administration. Indirect participation includes working in defense industries and filling jobs abandoned by drafted soldiers.<sup>5</sup> During the Second World War, approximately 12 million men and 350,000 women participated directly in the American war effort. At the same time, approximately 6.2 million men and 6.0 million women participated indirectly in the war effort.<sup>6</sup> The only role American women did not fulfill in this war was service in combat units.<sup>7</sup> While some women participated as nurses (i.e., combat service support) and office workers in the Army (i.e., military administration), the vast majority of American women served indirectly.<sup>8</sup> However, such restrictions varied greatly from society to society because gender roles are social constructs. For example, women served in combat units, including tank operators and fighter pilots, in the Soviet Union during the Second World War (Campbell 1993, 319). British society took an intermediate position: women could serve in particular combat roles provided their behavior was strictly controlled. For example, while British women could serve in anti-aircraft units, they were prohibited from "pulling the trigger" (i.e., killing men (Campbell 1993, 308)).

Participation in war, both directly and indirectly, has influenced the political rights of minorities in many countries, including the United States. Klinkner and Smith (1999) argue that mobilization for war has led to an expansion in political and economic opportunities for African-Americans in the United States. During the American Revolution and Civil War many black slaves were explicitly granted their freedom in exchange for participation in combat units against the British and the Confederacy (1999, 18, 62). During World War II the federal government mandated the removal of many economic barriers to



black workers in order to maximize production and preempt planned protest marches by civil rights leaders (1999, 159). Finally, during the Cold War, the State Department forcefully argued that segregation undermined the ability of the United States to work with the newly independent states produced by decolonization (1999, 208; Duziak 2000). As their title *The Unsteady March* suggests, Klinkner and Smith emphasize that the march toward political freedom for African-Americans has been fitful at best. Although important progress was made during periods of intense threat in which African-Americans were seen as an essential element of national defense, the gains eroded during peacetime when opponents of political equality reasserted themselves. However, the long-run net effect was positive in that the post-war losses never completely wiped out the wartime gains.

Is there any historical evidence that the distinction between direct and indirect participation by majority males, females, and minority males was salient to the historical actors debating the expansion of suffrage? Clearly there is not a perfect correlation between large-scale conscription and extension of political rights; many autocratic states have conscripted large numbers of men and women without extending suffrage or granting free speech. However, the two ideas are explicitly linked in several cases. For example, at the second reading of the *Representation of the People Bill* in the middle of the First World War, Home Secretary Sir G. Cave stated his belief that there was a strong national feeling or consensus for expanding suffrage among male subjects.

At the present moment I think this feeling has been strengthened by recent events. The spirit manifested in this War by all classes of our countrymen has brought us nearer together, has opened men's eyes, and removed misunderstanding on all sides. It has made it, I think, impossible that ever again, at all events in the lifetime of the present generation, there should be a revival of the old class feeling which was responsible for so much, and, among other things, for the exclusion for a period of so many of our population from the class of electors. I think I need say no more to justify this extension of the franchise (Parliamentary Debates 1917, v93, 2135).

With respect to the subject of women's suffrage, Cave also explicitly links the extension of the vote to the war effort. He asked his fellow members of parliament:

[W]hether it is possible for us, having called upon women for so large a contribution to the work of carrying on this War, and having received so splendid a response to that call, to refuse to women a voice in moulding the future of the country which their help and devoted self sacrifice have done so much to save (Parliamentary Debates 1917, v93, 2135)?

However, such views were not unanimous in the House of Commons debate. In fact, during the debate the distinction between direct and indirect participation became a major source of conflict. Mr. Blair, a member of parliament opposed to the bill, challenged his colleagues to measure relative sacrifice.

Personally, I think that to talk about giving the vote as a reward to women is an insulting proposal. If you are going to give it as a reward for their services, I should like to ask what reward you are going to give the 1,250,000 young men between the ages of fourteen and eighteen who, we are told by the Minister of Munitions, have been gallantly carrying on their own shoulders some of the burdens of this War, and I should like to know how you are going to appraise that reward? Are you going to give the same vote to a soldier as to the lady of thirty years of age who has worked very hard indeed in the munition factory or in a canteen kitchen (Parliamentary Debates 1917, v93, 2215)?<sup>9</sup>

The link between involvement in war and political rights becomes most vivid in discussions surrounding a particular interest group: conscientious objectors. Conscientious objectors, who refuse to serve in the military based on moral objections to war, have emerged in most, if not all, modern wars involving conscription (Levi 1997).<sup>10</sup> In June of 1917 the House of Commons amended *The Representation of the People Act* as follows:

A person shall not be entitled to be registered or to vote at a Parliamentary or local government election if he has been exempted on the ground of conscientious objection to

military service from any form of military service for which, but for such objection, he would be liable (Parliamentary Debates 1917, v95, 308).

The Right Honorable R. McNeil, proposed the amendment because he believed conscientious objectors threatened the liberties for which the rest of the country was fighting. By refusing to serve, they increased the burden upon others. By escaping the burdens of war, they benefited at the expense of others. If the number of conscientious objectors grew, it could threaten the entire war effort.

The question comes: Are they to be allowed to exercise the franchise after the War is over? In other words, are they, when this peril is over and when the Army returns and peace is restored, to enjoy all the rights and privileges of the State which they would not lift a hand to preserve? When the ship was in danger these men would not soil their hands by taking a turn at the pumps. Are these men to be allowed not only to have enjoyed immunity from the work we are engaged in, but also be allowed to share both the honours and the promotions with the men who have brought the ship into port (Parliamentary Debates 1917, v95, 313-4)?

Interestingly, the conscientious objectors debate in the House of Commons became linked to the extension of suffrage to women. *The Representation of the People Act* extended the right to vote to wives of men entitled to vote in Parliamentary or local elections. This raised the question: if the husband lost the right to vote based on his successful petition as a conscientious objector, would the wife lose the right to vote as well? Should we punish a woman because “she has the misfortune, as many of us think it, to be the wife of a conscientious objector” (Parliamentary Debates 1917, v100, 750)?

There are a great many women of valour and zeal for the country whose greatest humiliation it is that at the present time they have husbands of military age who are not in Khaki and serving at the front. I think it would be monstrous that these women, otherwise qualified for the vote, should lose it in these circumstances (Parliamentary Debates 1917, v100, 751).

On 19 June 1917 *The Representation of the People Act of 1917* was passed in the House of Commons by a vote of 385 to 55. On 10 January 1918 the House of Lords voted 134 to 71 in favor of the bill and on 6 February 1918 the crown assented to the bill. The law expanded suffrage from 28 percent to 78 percent of the adult population (including 5 million new male and 9 million new female voters). The first parliamentary election using the expanded electoral base is typically referred to by historians as the “Khaki” election of 1918.<sup>11</sup>

#### **4. WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE: COMPETING VIEWS**

Although numerous scholars such as Turner and Marwick find the reward argument persuasive, others remain unconvinced.<sup>12</sup> Hannam et al. (2000, xxiv) argue that the assumption that war led to the expansion of female suffrage in Europe does “not stand up to close scrutiny.” Similarly, DuBois (1991, 42) argues that “involvement in the war in no way correlates with the enfranchisement of women.” She supports this claim by pointing out that many combatants in the First World War failed to enfranchise women (e.g., Italy) and many non-combatants extended suffrage (e.g., the Netherlands). Moreover, she argues that even when the timing appears consistent with the argument, the relationship is often spurious (e.g., Denmark). Hause and Kenney (1984, 202) take an even stronger position; war actually undermined the female suffrage movement in France during and after the First World War.

Evans’ (1977) history of the woman’s suffrage movement in Europe, America, and Australasia provides an alternative explanation for the expansion of female suffrage. He contends that fear of revolution rather than experience in war led to the rapid expansion of suffrage after World War I. Evans argues that the women’s suffrage movement initially was framed as a demand for equality based on ideas from the Enlightenment. However, during the second half of the 19th century this frame was largely replaced by one emphasizing the innate differences between men and women. Reformers believed that extending the vote would enhance social control because women were naturally repelled by drunkenness, prostitution, and other vices. Evans argues that the early successes in the woman’s suffrage movement (e.g., Wyoming 1869 and New Zealand 1893) can be traced to a desire for social control. The large-scale suffrage movements that emerged in the United States and Britain became conservative organizations

directed by middle class women. Socialist women's organizations dedicated to equal rights for men and women increasingly clashed with these conservative suffragist organizations because they were often supportive of property and racial restrictions.<sup>13</sup> Evans argues that the conservative nature of the women's movement made it an increasingly attractive ally against the rise of the left in peacetime and the explosion of radical revolution in the aftermath of war. Fear of Bolshevism rather than reward for wartime support explains the rapid expansion after World War I (1977, 209).

Did warfare increase the political rights of women? Given the diversity of opinion, it is difficult to draw a firm conclusion. However, we believe the question requires further investigation for four reasons. First, most of the research to date has focused on historical case studies. While case studies are excellent tools for probing causal mechanisms and explaining particular events, they can limit our ability to discover general patterns.<sup>14</sup> Second, the large data sets measuring political rights (e.g., Gurr et al. 1989) employed in the international relations literature focus on collective political rights rather than the rights of women and minorities. Third, the search for a monocausal explanation is likely to be unproductive. Many factors have contributed to the expansion of political rights across time and space. While war is clearly not the only factor and may not even be the most important factor, it can still have played a vital role in the expansion of suffrage. Using a newly constructed data set to explore a large number of cases will allow us to assess the relative power of potentially complementary explanations.

Finally, previous research may have understated the impact of military conflict because warfare can have both direct and indirect effects on the expansion of rights. While we have emphasized two direct causal mechanisms (under the labels of the Extraction and Garrison State schools), a number of other indirect mechanisms are possible. For example, wars can trigger economic crises which, in turn, can lead to political crises. As Evans suggests, an economic crisis can lead to the rise of radicalism and a preemptory expansion of suffrage by coalitions hoping to forestall revolution. The case of Sweden fits this indirect pattern nicely (Andersson 1975). The key point is that in the absence of the war induced crisis it is not clear that parliament would have even addressed the suffrage issue in Sweden in 1918.

War could also trigger an expansion of political rights by changing expectations and developing social networks. Mobilization for war, whether through conscription or migration to defense jobs, exposes individuals to new environments and new social circles. The experience can change how they view themselves and the world around them. Many black Senegalese males serving in the African *Tirailleur* units in Europe during the World Wars found it difficult to return to the pre-war life of colonial rule (Echenberg 1990). The social networks created during war also allowed many of these veterans to play an important role in the decolonization movement. Similarly, many British women serving during World War II interviewed by Penny Summerfield (1998) as part of an oral history project found the independence associated with working and living outside the home transformative. While war was neither a positive experience nor a life changing event for every participant, it often had a profound impact on individuals, particularly those oppressed under the peacetime regime.

Finally, war can contribute to the expansion of rights through the diffusion of ideas. Ramirez et al. (1977) argue that the early success of the women's suffrage movement in places such as the United States and Britain was driven by the mobilization of large domestic interest groups. In contrast, the later successes were largely driven by the diffusion of new international norms with the assistance of non-governmental organizations.<sup>15</sup> While Ramirez et al. place the critical domestic/international transition point at 1930 in their statistical analysis, the diffusion undoubtedly played a role after the First World War. The successful expansion of suffrage in Britain during the war provided a powerful example to other countries, including both long independent states (e.g., the United States and Canada) and newly independent states (e.g., Czechoslovakia and Poland).

The complex relationship between war and political liberalization implies that if we focus our attention too narrowly, for example on a single causal mechanism, we are likely to miss the interaction between agents and environments. For instance, Evans (1977, 222) calls the claim that British women obtained the vote based on reward for service a "myth." However, the war set in motion a chain of events that ended with both calls for rewards in parliamentary speeches and the extension of suffrage. The destruction of the British Army and the decline in volunteers forced the British to debate conscription.

The conscription debate raised the issue of male suffrage for disenfranchised recruits. Given the militancy of the suffrage movement before the war and the support of women in the war effort, male suffrage could not be addressed without a simultaneous discussion of female suffrage. In the context of this discussion, the coalition supporting the expansion of women's suffrage was joined by a number of individuals believing war service justified a reward. Was war service the only reason for the extension of franchise? Clearly not. Was the war sufficient for the extension? Probably not. Did war play a central role in the timing of the extension of suffrage? Definitely. The combination of a powerful suffragist movement with the extraordinary demands of war significantly increased the probability of the expansion of British suffrage in 1918.

## **5. DEPENDENT VARIABLES, HYPOTHESES, AND THE DATA SET**

The dependent variables in our study measure the level of political rights on a yearly basis. While existing data sets often provide measures of collective political rights (such as the Polity data sets developed by Gurr and his colleagues and the Freedom House measures), to our knowledge no large data set measures the individual rights of majority males, females or minority males. For example, the Polity IV data set codes Switzerland as fully democratic (10 on the 0-10 scale) during our period of analysis despite the fact that women do not get the vote until 1971. Thus, we created a unique data set measuring eight "political rights" variables that are divided into two categories: individual rights and collective rights. Individual rights refer to liberties granted to specific individuals or groups. The broader the distribution of individual rights the more "inclusive" the political system (Dahl 1971). We code individual rights for three groups: majority males, females, and minority males.

Collective rights refer to political rights granted to all those *included* in the political system; they are directly analogous to "public contestation" or political competition as presented by Dahl (1971). While political system may include all citizens in the political process, institutional rules may severely curtail political competition (e.g., the Soviet Union). Conversely, political systems may allow for lively competition despite the fact that the political system only includes a small percentage of the adult

population (e.g., Britain during the 1800s). Thus, it is essential to measuring collective rights, which are coded for the entire polity rather than individual groups, in addition to individual rights.

The individual rights variables include 1) Right to Hold Office; 2) Right to Form Political Parties; 3) Right to Vote in National Elections; and 4) Freedom of Expression. Each of these variables is coded on a 0-3 scale for each sub-population – i.e., majority males, females, and minority males. While space considerations prevent us from illustrating the rules for each of the variables, the structure of the rules is similar for all four variables. For example, the Right to Hold Office variable is coded as follows:

3) Unrestricted: All adults in the sub-population have the right to hold any public office in the executive, judiciary, or the legislature.

2) Slightly Restricted: Some restrictions exist on the right to hold public office. However, the total number of positions withheld is minimal AND the percentage of the adult sub-population restricted from holding the office is limited to less than 20%.

1) Substantially Restricted: Widespread restrictions on the right to hold public office exist. The total number of positions withheld is extensive AND the percentage of the adult sub-population restricted from holding the office falls between 20% and 80%.

0) Extremely Restricted: Over 80% of the adult sub-population is formally or de facto excluded from holding political office.

The collective rights variables include 1) Free and Fair Elections; 2) Legislative Power Over the Executive; 3) Rule of Law; and 4) Military Intervention in Society. Each of these variables is also coded on a 0-3 scale for each country. Again, while space considerations limit our ability to describe each variable, the Free and Fair Elections variable example provides an example of our collective rules.

3) Free and Fair Elections: Those individuals included in the political system can select their leaders using free and fair voting procedures. Votes are equally weighted and the aggregation process is transparent.

2) Substantially Free and Fair Elections: While some voting rules may be violated and the system may lack transparency and rigor, the overall process appears to produce results which match the



distribution of preferences among those included in the political system. Votes may not be equally weighted, but this does not play a decisive or even central role in the outcome of the process.

1) Partially Free and Fair Elections: The voting process heavily favors one interest group within society. This group uses its power to largely determine the outcome of elections (buying voters, stuffing ballot boxes, or simply fabricating results). Votes may be very unequally weighted, resulting in disproportionate power by one group or coalition.

0) No Free or Fair Elections: This category includes states which do not hold elections and those states which hold elections in which the outcome is for all practical purposes determined by the executive or ruling party.

In the multivariate analysis described below, we aggregate the four individual components to create three indices that vary from 0-12 (i.e., a unique index for women, minority males, and majority males). Similarly, we aggregate the four collective components to create a single index for collective rights for each country.<sup>16</sup> The complete set of coding rules for the new individual and collective rights variables as well as the sources used to code the variables are available from the authors at [www.xxx.edu](http://www.xxx.edu).

The Garrison State hypothesis predicts that the security threat triggered by the outbreak of war will lead to a decrease in political rights. The level of threat is measured using a Cumulative Battle Deaths variable which provides a running sum of a country's battle deaths in thousands by year. The definition of war and list of interstate wars is derived from the Correlates of War (COW) project (Small and Singer 1982); the battle deaths data was supplemented using Clodfelter (2002). For the purposes of sensitivity analysis, a Dispute Involvement variable was created using the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set (Gochman and Maoz 1984). This variable simply sums the number of militarized disputes a country is involved in during a given year. The results are robust using either measure.

The Extraction hypothesis predicts that high levels of military mobilization during a war will lead to the expansion of political rights after the war. The Lagged Wartime Mobilization variable is created in three steps. First, we calculate the percentage of the population mobilized by year by dividing the number

of regular military troops by the country's total population using the COW National Capabilities data set. Second, we identify the year of maximum mobilization during the war. Third, this percentage is lagged from the moment the war ends until four years after the war. For example, during World War I (1914-1918), the maximum level of mobilization for Britain was 9.6% (in 1917). Thus, the Lagged Wartime Mobilization for Britain is 9.6 for the years 1918-1922. The mobilization variable ranges from 0 to 18%. Although the vast majority of German males between the ages of 18 and 45 were mobilized during the First World War, the number of soldiers in service as a percentage of the total population (including women and children) in any given year only peaked at 13.7 percent in 1918. Sensitivity analysis indicates that models are robust with lags ranging from two to four years.

In addition to the Garrison State and Extraction hypotheses, we test three arguments related to size, scope, and success of woman's suffrage movement. First, we hypothesize that the presence of a strong domestic suffrage movement should increase the probability of the expansion of political rights. While wars and industrialization create structural circumstances conducive to change, the agents exploiting these opportunities are political actors and interest groups within the state. States without a powerful pre-war suffrage movement are likely to lack the organizational capacity necessary to successfully push for political change during the crisis. Although we originally hoped to collect annual data on membership in leading domestic suffrage organizations, obtaining this data across twenty-four countries and fifty-five years proved impossible. For many countries, we could not find *any* reliable membership data across time. As an alternative measure, we create a dichotomous Strong Domestic Movement variable using the historical research of Evans (1977). Evans and Hannam et al. claim that only seven European countries had powerful domestic movements at the start of the 20th century (United Kingdom, Iceland, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Finland and Sweden).<sup>17</sup>

Second, we examine the role of international suffrage organizations. During the 1900-55 period, three organizations played a dominant role in the international suffrage movement: the International Council of Women (ICW) founded in 1888; the International Alliance of Women (IAW) established as the International Woman Suffrage Alliance in 1904; and the Women's International League for Peace and

Freedom (WILPF) established by the International Congress of Women in 1915 (Rupp 1997, 4, 15). All three organizations had broad political, economic, and social aims. The ICW, which was the oldest and most conservative organization, was led by upper middle class women who regarded radical feminists, such as suffragettes, as “destructive” (Rupp 1997, 20). The refusal of the ICW to take a pro-women's suffrage position led to the splintering of the organization and the establishment of a pro-suffrage IAW (Rupp 1997, 21-3). Dissatisfaction with the suspension of the ICW and IAW congresses at the beginning of the First World War led to a pacifist and pro-suffrage meeting in the Hague in 1915. The left-leaning WILPF, which emerged out of this congress, became the most radical of the three organizations (Rupp 1997, 26-33).

A dummy variable was created for membership in each organization. The ICW and WILPF were coded using Rupp (1997, 16-19). The IAW was coded using Whittick (1979), Bosch (1990), and Rupp (1997, 16-19). A state-year was coded 1 if a national women's organization from the respective state sent a delegation, rather than just an observer, to the organization's congress in that year (or to the most recent congress). Otherwise the variable was coded 0. If a state's national women's organization missed sending a delegation to a congress, that state was coded 0 until the next congress attended. The absence usually reflected changes in domestic politics. Turkey was not represented at the 1939 and 1946 IAW congresses because the Turkish government disbanded the national women's movement (Whittick 1979, 166). Italy and Germany were not represented at the 1935 and 1939 IAW congresses by order of the Fascist governments (Whittick 1979, 121, 137). Hungary was absent between 1949 and 1952 congresses by order of the new communist government (Whittick 1979, 170). Finally, political instability was also a factor. Germany was not represented after the Second World War until the 1952 IAW congress (Whittick 1979, 170). Although there is a correlation between the strength of domestic suffrage movements and attendance at international congresses, Rupp (1997, 63-69) reveals that many states with strong domestic movements such as Denmark were not represented at early IAW congresses and many states with weak domestic movements such as Germany were present. Given the high correlation between the variables

and the fact that the IAW was the most powerful suffrage proponent in the era, we employ the IAW variable in the central analysis and the remaining variables in sensitivity analysis.

Third, we hypothesize that the spread of female suffrage in the region will lead to the diffusion of the idea across borders. Geographic proximity facilitates communication and provides very salient demonstration effects. For each state, we coded the percentage of contiguous states (or states within 50 nautical miles) that had granted full suffrage to women using data provided by Hannam et al. (2000, 339-340) and Daley and Nolan (1994, 349-352). This variable is labeled Neighborhood Diffusion. Although we created a systemic diffusion variable recording the number of states world wide granting full suffrage to women, the variable was never strongly significant in the models. Therefore, we focus on “neighborhood” diffusion.

In addition to the central hypotheses, we control for a number of competing explanations for the expansion of political rights. The “long durée” school argues that slow, long run forces are behind the expansion and contraction of political rights; wars, which are typically of very limited duration, have little if any impact on these long run processes (McMillan 1988).<sup>18</sup> One of the most important long run processes is industrialization. Scholars have long argued that industrialization, by expanding the middle class and educational opportunities, has contributed to the expansion of democracy (Lipset 1960). Proponents of the long durée might argue that failing to control for this long run process could lead to an erroneous interpretation of the impact of war. For this reason, we have included two variables that tap different dimensions of a state’s economic development. First, we predict that iron and steel production is positively associated with industrialization and, therefore, the expansion of rights.<sup>19</sup> Second, we predict that the percentage of the population living in urban areas is positively associated with industrialization and the expansion of political rights. Data for the two variables was derived from the COW National Capabilities data set.<sup>20</sup>

Religion is the third control variable in the multivariate analysis. Weber (1958) argues that the Protestant work ethic was a driving force behind the early industrialization of Europe. Catholic countries such as Spain and France lagged behind Protestant states such as England and the Netherlands (Rostow

1978; North and Thomas 1973). Moreover, Catholicism may discourage democratization more directly by emphasizing hierarchy and the collective at the expense of the individual. Case studies by Evans (1977, 30, 124) and regression analysis by Bollen (1979) indicate that Catholic countries were slower to expand political rights. The Catholic dummy variable is coded as "1" if a majority of citizens in the state are Roman Catholic.

Nationalist struggle is our fourth control variable. Evans (1977, 217-218) argues that nationalist movements against third parties facilitated the mobilization of woman and a perception of greater equality between the sexes. In both the Norwegian struggle against Sweden and the Finnish struggle against Russia, the widespread mobilization against the imperial power facilitated the creation of a new constitutional order and the granting of full female suffrage. All states seeking independence from a foreign power in the 20th century are coded as a "1" on the dichotomous Nationalists Struggle variable (i.e., Norway, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Albania, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia).

Progressive Social Programs is a fifth control variable. DuBois (1991) argues that the left played an important role in the promotion of suffrage at both the domestic and international levels. Although the socialist woman's suffrage movement clashed with the mainstream bourgeois suffrage organizations at times, the simultaneous pressure from the left and the middle contributed to more rapid social change. Given the rise of socialist parties in European parliaments in the pre-World War I period, it seems plausible that the success of the left could explain the expansion of suffrage to both working class males and females. Following the approach taken by Ramirez et al. (1997), we create an index counting the number of welfare programs established by the state. We identified the first law establishing welfare programs in four areas using data collected by the U.S. Social Security Administration: 1) old age pension programs; 2) sickness benefits; 3) injury compensation, and 3) unemployment insurance. For example, Britain is coded as a "4" in 1911 because it had established all four welfare programs (old age 1908; sickness 1911; worker injury 1897; and unemployment 1911).<sup>21</sup>

Finally, the multivariate analysis also contains two control variables associated with military conflict. The *Occupied by a Democracy* dummy variable identifies states that have been occupied by

democracies at the conclusion of a conflict (e.g., Germany after World War II). We predict that states occupied by a democracy at the end of the war are more likely to experience an expansion of political rights. Similarly, the *Occupied During War* dummy variable controls for the fact that in some instances restrictions in political rights were determined by the occupying power (e.g., in Belgium during the German occupation during World War II). The purpose of these control variables is to isolate alternative explanations which may correlate the central hypotheses albeit for very different reasons. The central hypotheses focus on internal decisions to expand (or contract) democracy in the face of an external threat rather than external forces imposing changes on a state.<sup>22</sup>

The hypotheses are tested using a cross-sectional time-series consisting of European states from 1900-1955.<sup>23</sup> Due to the scope of the data collection effort, we randomly selected a portion of this group for analysis (Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Ottoman/Turkey, Romania, Serbia/Yugoslavia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). The analysis includes all years in which the particular country was an independent state in the international system for a total of 1165 country year observations. By spanning just over a half century, our data set should allow us to disentangle short term influences from long term trends. Moreover, the period includes two wars of total mobilization which gives us great variation on the threat and mobilization variables. Finally, the focus on European history is an explicit recognition of the limited scope of the claims. The expansion of political rights in other locations and time periods, such as the extension of suffrage following decolonization, is probably driven by a different process.

## **6. BIVARIATE ANALYSIS AND EXPLORATION OF CASES**

What is the relationship between war involvement and changes in collective political rights? Tables 1 through 4 display the results for the four collective variables. The tables compare changes during peacetime (68% of the cases), during wartime (12% of the cases), and five years following the war (20% of the cases).<sup>24</sup> The table focuses on the direction of change (i.e., increase or decrease) rather than the magnitude of the change (i.e., a one point change versus a three point change on the 0-3 scale).

Although for the vast majority of country-years no changes take place, we find political rights tend to be restricted during wartime and expanded following wartime. In Table 1, we see that during peacetime in only 1% of the cases do states *increase* the fairness of the electoral system and in only 2% of the cases do states *decrease* the fairness of the current system. During wartime, the balance shifts toward decreasing political rights – that is, the number of instances of rights reductions (8%) exceeds the number of instances of rights expansion (3%). After the war, we see a reversal of the trend – expansion becomes more common (8%) than contraction (4%). A similar pattern of results is found when examining the power of the legislature relative to the executive (Table 2), the degree to which the rule of law is enforced (Table 3), and the level of military intervention in civil society (Table 4). In each case, wartime is associated with restriction relative to peacetime, the post-war period is associated with expansion relative to peacetime.<sup>25</sup> During war the executive expands its power over the legislature, laws are increasing suspended or ignored, and the military increases its control of executive, legislative, and judicial power. The results in all four tables are statistically significant at better than the .001 level.

How did wartime mobilizations impact the individual political rights of women? Figure 1 compares the rights of women to those enjoyed by majority males for four countries in the data set (United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Sweden). The left-axis measures the individual right to vote in national elections on the 0-3 scale. The x-axis measures time and the right-axis measures the level of mobilization (i.e., troops/total population). In all four cases, we see that the rights of women lagged behind their male counterparts in 1900. The Figure also indicates a convergence between the majority male and female lines over time. In all four cases, war had an important direct or indirect impact on this convergence.

In the United Kingdom (upper left hand quadrant), the period begins with male suffrage partially restricted despite the series of major electoral reforms in the 19th century (1832, 1867, and 1884). In contrast, females have no right to vote in national elections. Both lines jump upward during the high mobilization of World War I (about .10 of the population as shown on the right hand axis). While males in Britain achieved universal suffrage with the passage of *The Representation of the People Act* in 1918,

female suffrage was restricted to married women and women over thirty years of age who paid taxes.

War did not play a role in the final removal of all major gender-based restrictions in 1928. While large-scale warfare may increase the probability of an expansion of rights, it is neither necessary nor sufficient.

In Germany (upper right hand quadrant), males had already achieved universal male suffrage under Bismarck as part of an effort to promote national unification and check the power of liberals. In contrast, women did not have the right to vote in Imperial Germany. As in the case of Britain, World War I would serve as a transition point. The German government's desperate attempt to mobilize human and financial resources led to severe restrictions on economic and political liberties. Four years of war-induced deprivation led to the popular uprisings which defeated the Germany military in a way the French, British, Russian, and American armies could not. The post-war Weimar constitution removed most key barriers to political participation for both men and women. Unfortunately, the expansion was limited in duration due to the rise of Hitler. Restrictions, which were rationalized by pointing to external and internal threats, were not permanently lifted until the destruction of the Third Reich.

In Italy (lower left hand quadrant), a similar pattern emerges: women start out the period with a lower level of rights than men and war leads to an expansion of rights for both men and women. Although the mobilization line records only a minor upward blip during the 1911-12 Italian-Turkish War, the war directly contributed to the expansion of suffrage for males in that year. The Italian Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti believed that by pushing through the suffrage expansion bill he could increase public support for his administration and the war effort (Therborn 1977; Giolitti 1973). The second major jump for Italian males occurs just after the end of World War I when suffrage was extended to all males over 21 as well as veterans failing to meet the age requirement. However, conservative political and religious groups blocked attempts to expand suffrage for women. Unlike their German and British counterparts, Italian women did not benefit politically from the First World War. The right to vote was not extended to women until Mussolini and the fascists took over the political system in the 1920s. Yet, the "right to vote" was meaningless in absence of the right to form and participate in political parties. Genuine



political freedom for both men and women only emerges after the autocratic Italian regime was defeated by a democratic coalition in the Second World War.

Finally, the Swedish figure (lower right hand quadrant) indicates that direct participation in warfare is not a necessary condition for the expansion of political rights for men and women. Political rights for males were extended slightly (but not enough to shift categories in our coding scheme) in 1906 following the secession of Norway in 1905. Although Sweden was neutral during the First World War, war played an important role in broad expansion of suffrage for men and women in 1918. Suffrage movements existed in Sweden prior to the war but were radicalized by the wartime gains by the left in the legislature as well as the privations of wartime (Andersson 1975, 424). The intellectual basis for the wealth-test of political competence had been discredited by a number of revelations about wartime profiteering (Andersson 1975, 425). However, the still conservative Riksdag refused to consider suffrage expansion when it began its fall 1918 session. When news of the November 4th revolution in Germany reached Sweden, the Riksdag began to debate suffrage. This was intensified when worker demonstrations began in Stockholm on November 11<sup>th</sup> (the very day the First World War ended). The demonstrations, food riots, and looting led many to believe that Sweden was on the brink of social revolution (Therborn 1977, 16). The government proposed suffrage reform November 14, and the decision to reform was made November 17 (Scott, 1977, 477). Andersson concludes that both the international example set by the German revolution and the threat of domestic revolution, itself an outcome of wartime privations, caused the suffrage reform (1975, 425-6).

## **7. MULTIVARIATE RESULTS**

Is the relationship between war and political change highlighted for these four countries generalizable across the continent? Table 5 displays regression results for the twenty-four country data set. The dependent variables for the first three models are the 0-12 individual rights indices (created with the Right to Hold Office, Right to Form Political Parties, Right to Vote in National Elections, and Freedom of Expression variables) for females (Model 1), minority males (Model 2), and majority males (Model 3). The dependent variable for Model 4 measures collective political rights for society as a whole

(created with the Free and Fair Elections, Legislative Power, Rule of Law, and Military Intervention variables).

Table 5 indicates that the Cumulative Battle Deaths coefficient is negative and statistically significant in all models. As predicted by the Garrison State hypothesis, states that become involved in intense international conflicts tend to decrease the political rights of all parties. Model 4 indicates that even collective rights are restricted during warfare. Sensitivity analysis indicates that the finding is robust using a number of alternative operationalizations for military threat, including cumulative duration of wars, total wars, total military disputes, maximum hostility of disputes, and cumulative duration of disputes.<sup>26</sup>

The Table also provides support for the Extraction hypothesis, which predicts that political rights will rise after a war involving a large scale mobilization. Model 2 indicates that minority males benefit most from large scale mobilization. However, the coefficients on the Lagged Mobilization variable are positive for both females and majority males and the statistical significance of the coefficients is at approximately the 0.06 level. Thus, although the findings for females and majority males are slightly weaker, it does appear that mobilization triggers post war political gains for all parties. Sensitivity analysis also indicates that the size of the mobilization is important. A simply dummy lagged variable indicating mere involvement in a war is much weaker than the Lagged Mobilization variable used in the four models in the Table.

The Strong Domestic Movement variable is positive and statistically significant in all models. Societies with large scale domestic female suffrage organizations are more likely to expand political rights for all groups. Thus, the mass organizations contributed to a “spill over effect” in which demands for female suffrage appears to raise the broader question of dealing with the disenfranchised. In contrast, the IAW Attendance variable is insignificant in all four models. While this finding does not shed light on the role of the IAW more broadly (e.g., diffusion outside Europe), it appears that participation in IAW conferences is not a powerful predictor of the success.<sup>27</sup> In contrast, the Neighborhood Diffusion variable is positive as predicted and strongly significant in the model of women’s political rights (Model 1). As

the number of neighboring countries granting female suffrage grows, a state is much more likely to expand the female suffrage at home. However, the diffusion does not seem to influence the rights of minority males or collective rights more generally. And although the coefficient is statistically significant for majority males, it has a much smaller substantive impact than in the case of woman's rights.

The Progressive Social Programs coefficient is statistically indistinguishable from zero in all models. The success of the left's agenda in government does not seem to translate into greater political rights for excluded males, females, and minority males. The estimated Catholic coefficient is only statistically significant in the woman's rights model. However, contrary to expectations, Roman Catholic states are more, rather than less, likely to expand the vote. An examination of the data set reveals several predominately Catholic countries that expanded female suffrage immediately after achieving independence (e.g., Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Lithuania). Thus, while Evans may be correct about Catholic barriers in long independent states such as Spain, France, and Italy, Catholicism does not appear to have a negative impact in general. Finally, the Nationalist Struggle, Iron and Steel Production, and Urban Population variables are generally statistically insignificant. Although Iron and Steel Production is positive in two of the four models, the coefficient is just marginally significant. The economic variables appear to be undermined by the slow expansion of female suffrage in heavily industrialized states such as France and Belgium.

The final two war-related independent variables receive partial support. Occupation by a foreign power during war tends to lead to a large reduction in collective political rights and the rights of majority males. In contrast, the post-war occupation of a state by a democracy increases political rights for females and collective rights for all. As described above, these variables were explicitly included to ensure that the variables of primary interests, Cumulative Battle Deaths and Lagged Mobilization, were not picking the impact of different causal mechanism. Indeed, sensitivity analysis reveals that removing these control variables tends to strengthen the battle deaths and mobilization variables.<sup>28</sup>

## 8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

War is an extremely costly and wasteful human activity that should only be employed as a last resort. However, as with many large scale social processes, war has unintended consequences far from the battlefield. Using a newly created data set of individual and collective political rights, this paper has identified four important consequences. First, large-scale warfare has a tremendous impact on both political rights in general and female suffrage in particular. The Garrison State hypothesis is strongly supported by the data: during intense international struggles states tend to suppress political rights in the short run. Similarly, the Extraction School argument is also supported by the empirical analysis: large (but not small) scale mobilizations lead to an expansion of rights in the long run. Together, the two coefficients point to a J-curve shaped relationship between war and political rights. These findings were statistically significant even after controlling for several competing explanations such as the mobilization of domestic interest groups, non-governmental organizations, and economic development.

Second, the model predicts that military threats without large scale mobilization are likely to be least conducive to the maintenance or expansion of political rights. Although we should be cautious about generalizing from our 20th century European data set, the model suggests that the post-September 11th world is likely to be fraught with dangers. The ever present threat of terrorism coupled with the limited need to mobilize large-scale forces to meet the non-state threat, creates a perfect environment for the restriction of political rights. Clearly, further investigation is warranted.

Third, the expansion of political rights occurs for both direct and indirect participants in warfare. Although mobilization for warfare had a bigger impact on minority males than other groups, the model still indicated an expansion in rights for females. Females, who historically tended to participate in the mass mobilization indirectly through service in defense industries and combat support, also experienced important political gains following large-scale war.

Finally, the results strongly support the conclusion that the expansion of political rights is triggered by a variety of variables interacting in complex ways. Domestic mobilization is clearly important. Diffusion across borders plays an important role. And warfare seems to interact with these

processes in interesting ways. Thus, attempts to advocate monocausal explanations (either from the perspective of agents or situational contexts) should be viewed with skepticism.

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
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Figure 1: Voting Rights, Gender, and Mobilization



**Table 1: Impact of War on the Free and Fair Elections**

	Free and Fair Elections		
	Decreased	No	Increased
	Rights	Change	Rights
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Peacetime	2%	97%	1%
Wartime	8%	89%	3%
Just After War	4%	88%	8%

N=1141; Chi Square (4)=47.0; Probability = .000

Numbers may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

**Table 2: Impact of War on the Power of the Legislature**

	Legislative Power		
	Decreased	No Change	Increased
Peacetime	2%	97%	2%
Wartime	8%	90%	2%
Just After War	4%	88%	8%

N=1135; Chi Square (4)=41.2; Probability = .000

Numbers may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

**Table 3: Impact of War on the Rule of Law**

	Rule of Law		
	Decreased	No Change	Increased
Peacetime	2%	96%	1%
Wartime	8%	91%	1%
Just After War	4%	87%	8%

N=1135; Chi Square (4)=43.1; Probability = .000

Numbers may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

**Table 4: Impact of War on Military Intervention in Society**

	Military Intervention		
	Decreased	No Change	Increased
Peacetime	4%	93%	4%
Wartime	1%	91%	8%
Just After War	9%	84%	6%

N=1141; Chi Square (4)=27.0; Probability = .000

Numbers may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

**Table 5: Regression Results**

Dependent Variables:	<b>Model 1</b>		<b>Model 2</b>		<b>Model 3</b>		<b>Model 4</b>	
	Females		Minority Males		Majority Males		Collective Rights	
<i>Cumulative Battle Deaths.</i>	-0.002 ***		-0.002 ***		-0.001 **		-0.003 ***	
	0.001		0.001		0.001		0.001	
<i>Lagged Mobilization</i>	8.801 *		21.587 ***		10.339 *		3.358	
	5.533		6.974		6.363		8.489	
<i>Strong Domestic Movement</i>	3.648 ***		3.764 ***		2.426 **		4.212 ***	
	0.680		0.942		1.044		1.147	
<i>IAW Attendance</i>	-0.377		0.987		0.619		0.529	
	0.558		0.889		0.712		0.698	
<i>Neighborhood Diffusion</i>	4.361 ***		0.709		1.493 **		-0.107	
	0.804		0.823		0.811		0.948	
<i>Progressive Social Programs</i>	0.327		-0.018		-0.250		-0.064	
	0.273		0.365		0.392		0.417	
<i>Catholic</i>	1.521 **		1.293		0.819		1.154	
	0.845		1.291		0.948		1.197	
<i>Nationalist Struggle</i>	0.363		-0.506		-1.873 **		-0.333	
	0.665		0.991		1.034		1.037	
<i>Iron and Steel Production</i>	0.0002		0.0004 *		0.0003		0.0004 *	
	0.0002		0.0003		0.0002		0.0003	
<i>Urban Population</i>	-0.0001		-0.0002		-0.0002		-0.0003	
	0.0002		0.0002		0.0002		0.0002	
<i>Occupied During War</i>	-0.905		-1.080		-1.522 **		-2.241 ***	
	0.778		0.889		0.737		0.916	
<i>Occupied by Democracy</i>	3.426 **		2.464		1.771		3.111 ***	
	1.546		1.625		1.648		1.295	
<i>Constant</i>	1.472 ***		5.646 ***		8.007 ***		7.240 ***	
	0.397		0.934		0.888		1.299	
Number of obs	1079		1079		1079		1078	
F( 12, 23)	42.5		9		9		40	
Prob > F	0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Adjusted R-squared	0.51		0.25		0.17		0.26	
Number of clusters	24		24		24		24	

Notes: The standard errors appear directly under the regression coefficients. Model estimated with STATA 8.0 using robust standard errors and clustering on the national cross sections. \*p<.10, \*\* p<.05, \*(p<.01. All tests of significance are one-tailed.



## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> Tilly's later works, such as *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992*, probe this second issue in greater detail.

<sup>2</sup> Levi (1997) points out that many men did not honor their conscription notices. Fleeing to the cities was always a possibility for those without property. For the wealthy, substitution and commutation were often possible. During the American Civil War men could purchase their way out of the draft at a fixed rate of \$300 (Levi 1997, 99). Resistance to the draft was often so great, men maimed themselves to make themselves unfit for combat (Levi 1997, 47).

<sup>3</sup> For a discussion of mobilization for war in the United States and the emergence of opposition, see Stein (1980).

<sup>4</sup> See Kerber (1990) on this point.

<sup>5</sup> In theory, indirect participation could include buying war bonds, dealing with ration coupons, participating in recycling drives, raising children without the support of drafted fathers, and even simply contributing to the gross product of the country during wartime. While these are important contributions, we will focus on the more narrow idea of filling jobs related to war industries and job shortages.

<sup>6</sup> These figures are from Zabecki (1999, 202), Sherrow (1996, 94), and Dear (1995, 1181). The indirect number for women includes women working in defense industries (about 2.0-2.6 million) and women filling conscription-induced labor shortfalls.

<sup>7</sup> From December 1942 to April 1943, the U.S. Army established a secret experimental anti-aircraft unit with about 400 women drawn from the Women's Auxiliary Army Corps (WAAC). Although the mixed-gender units were a success, the Army feared that the American public was not ready for women in combat roles (Campbell 1993, 304).

<sup>8</sup> American women would be barred from combat service until 1991. After 40,000 American women served in the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, the U.S. Congress removed the ban on female combat pilots

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(Titunik 2000). For a discussion of Army and Marine studies investigating the integration women into ground combat units, see Kier (1998) and Titunik (2000).

<sup>9</sup> Many in the women's suffrage movement viewed the vote as a right; they found the "reward" argument deeply disturbing.

<sup>10</sup> Some conscientious objectors have been willing to serve in non-combat positions (e.g., medics) in the military. Approximately one quarter of the 4,000 American conscientious objectors in World War I chose to serve in non-combat roles in the military. Others served in non-military service organizations such as the American Friends Service Committee founded by the Quakers during World War I (Jones 1971). For a discussion of how conscientious objectors seek to define themselves as "good citizens" despite their unwillingness to serve in the military, see Burk (1995).

<sup>11</sup> Figures and votes are found in Gullace (2002, 7, 168).

<sup>12</sup> Turner (1986, 70, 95) argues that warfare can increase political rights for women through rewards for participation in the war effort and disruptions in traditional patterns of the sexual division of labor. Similarly, in his analysis of women and war in Britain during the First World War, Marwick (1977, 157) states "to say that war brought votes for women is to make a very crude generalization, yet one which contains essential truth." While not discounting the importance of suffragist movements and the impact of economic changes, Marwick believes that war had decisive impact on social change, including political change (1974, 76-77).

<sup>13</sup> Although Evans (1977) emphasizes the split between bourgeois and social suffragists, DuBois (1991) emphasizes that some cooperation took place, particularly below the national level.

<sup>14</sup> Although Ramirez et al. (1997) is an interesting exception, the study does not examine the impact of war.

<sup>15</sup> While Rupp emphasizes the importance of organizations such as the *International Woman Suffrage Alliance*, she also argues that the racist, elitist views of many suffragists from Europe and the United States inhibited the diffusion process at times (1997, 69-81).

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<sup>16</sup> The correlation between our collective rights index and the democracy index in the Polity IV data base is 0.74. The correlation was calculated using the Polity2 variable (which is created using the Democracy Index minus the Autocracy Index). No parallel data set exists for comparing the individual rights variables.

<sup>17</sup> The list of states with over 2,500 members in the *International Woman Suffrage Alliance* in 1911 was identified using Hannam et al. (2000) and Evans (1977).

<sup>18</sup> For a critique of McMillan's position see Marwick (1988, 1974) and Summerfield (1988).

<sup>19</sup> Although earlier versions of the paper used "energy consumption," the low quality of the data for our time period has led us to prefer iron and steel production. However, neither variable is a strong predictor of political rights in the models.

<sup>20</sup> Earlier versions of the paper contained additional economic variables such as the percentage of the labor force employed in agriculture, gross national product per capita, and the percentage of males receiving a primary school education. These variables have been omitted here because their inclusion leads to a massive amount of missing data (e.g., the loss of 50% of the observations). The systematic nature of the missing data (i.e., less developed countries were less likely to have reliable estimates of labor force participation) biases the estimated coefficients. See Ramirez et al. for a similar problem (1997, 741).

<sup>21</sup> United States Social Security Administration (1997, 368-372).

<sup>22</sup> If democracies are more likely to win wars and losers in wars are more likely to change their regime type, it is conceivable that external processes may be more important than internal processes. However, while the empirical evidence supports the claim that democracies are more likely to win wars due to their ability extract resources (Lake 1992) and/or their propensity to pick easy fights (Rieter and Stam 1998), our data indicate that defeated states are no more likely to undergo regime change than victorious states. The numerous electoral victories by opposition parties (or minority members of wartime coalitions) following military victory shed light on this pattern of outcomes (e.g., British Prime Minister Churchill's

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defeat following World War II and Japanese Prime Minister Katsura's resignation in 1906 following the Russo-Japanese War).

<sup>23</sup> Turkey, which has historically controlled a significant portion of territory in Europe (during the lifetime of the Ottoman Empire) and continues to this day to be intimately tied to European foreign affairs, is also included in the analysis. The importance of the "European" dimension of Turkish identity will be left to others to debate.

<sup>24</sup> The results are statistically significant in the expected direction using either a five-year or a three-year lag period.

<sup>25</sup> Although the four measures are highly correlated, they are by no means perfectly correlated. The correlations range from a low of 0.38 to a high of 0.80.

<sup>26</sup> However, a simple dichotomous "war" dependent variable does not produce similar results because, unlike these other measures, it fails to distinguish between relatively short and costless wars and major conflicts.

<sup>27</sup> Alternative operationalizations produced similar results (e.g., a dummy ICW variable, a dummy WILPF variable, and a dummy variable indicating membership in any of the three organizations).

<sup>28</sup> Sensitivity analysis indicates that the primary variables of interest, Cumulative Battle Deaths and Lagged Mobilization, remain statistically significant in the expected direction in a variety of models (e.g., fixed-effects model, an AR(1) autocorrelation model, and a probit model with a dichotomous dependent variable).