Identity, Power, and Threat Perception
A Cross-National Experimental Study

David L. Rousseau
Department of Political Science
University at Albany (SUNY), New York

Rocio Garcia-Retamero
Facultad de Psicología
Universidad de Granada, Spain

Realists in international relations and realistic conflict theorists in social psychology argue that the perception of threat in intergroup conflict is a function of power asymmetries between groups. In contrast, social constructivists and social identity theorists argue that a shared sense of identity can reduce perceptions of intergroup threat. In this article, we test these competing arguments using three laboratory experiments conducted in two different countries (Spain and the United States). Four findings emerge from the experiments: (1) a weak position in terms of military power increases threat perception, as realists predict; (2) shared identity decreases threat perception, as constructivists predict; (3) an interactive relationship between power and identity appears in two of the three studies; and (4) shared identity increases cooperation in economic policy areas.

Keywords: identity; power; threats; realism; constructivism; experiments

The perception of threat has long been a central topic in both the intergroup conflict and international relations literatures (Jervis 1976; Kemmelmeier and Winter 2000; Rouhana and Fiske 1995). In this article, we contribute to these literatures by presenting the results of three experiments that probe two competing explanations for the emergence of the perception of threat: relative power and shared identity. Proponents of realism in international relations (Grieco 1988; Waltz 1979) and realistic conflict theory in psychology (Campbell 1965; Levine and Campbell 1972; Sherif 1966; Sherif and Sherif 1953) predict that asymmetries in power will automatically trigger perceptions of threat and intergroup conflict. In contrast, social constructivists in international relations (Hopf 2002; Wendt 1999) and social identity theorists in psychology (Tajfel 1978; Tajfel and Turner 1979, 1986; see also Bar-Tal 1998; Hogg and Abrams 1999) argue that a shared sense of identity can reduce and in some cases eliminate perceptions of intergroup threat. Unfortunately, the international relations literature has been slow to
develop and experimentally test a model of identity construction. In this article, we fill this void by developing the “construction of threat model” at the individual level and testing its predictions using three laboratory experiments (one conducted in the United States and two conducted in Spain). Four key findings emerge from the experiments: (1) a weak position in terms of military power increases threat perception, as realists predict; (2) shared identity decreases threat perception, as constructivists predict; (3) an interactive relationship between power and identity appears in two of the three studies; and (4) shared identity increases cooperation in economic policy areas. In sum, the results strongly support the construction of threat model and demonstrate how both power and identity play a role in threat perception.

The remainder of this article is divided into eight sections. The next section examines the theoretical relationship between power asymmetries and threat perception. The second section explores the theoretical relationship between shared identity and threat perception. The third section introduces the causal logic of our construction of threat model. The results of the three laboratory experiments are presented in sections four, five, and six. The seventh section discusses the contribution of the experimental findings to our understanding of realism and liberalism. The final section provides a brief conclusion to the study.

Power and Threat Perception

In the international relations literature, a threat is defined as a situation in which one agent or group has either the capability or intention to inflict a negative consequence on another agent or group (Davis 2000, 10). Threats are probabilistic because they may or may not be carried out. From the broadest perspective, we can divide threats into two categories: threats against us as individuals and threats against collections of individuals (MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992). International relations focuses mostly but not exclusively on the second category of threats. Threats against collectives can be in the form of (1) military threats, (2) economic threats, or (3) cultural threats. In contrast, threats against an individual can be in the form of negative consequences for his or her (1) physical security, (2) personal wealth and income, or (3) personal values and beliefs. In some cases, a threat against a collective can also represent a personal threat against an individual. For example, an American worker in the textile industry may view the rise of China as a collective economic threat against the United States and a personal income threat against himself or herself.

Power can be used to threaten (or reward). Dahl (1957) defines power as the ability of actor A to get actor B to do what actor A wants (and that which actor B was not going to do anyway). Dahl’s definition focuses on observable conflict between two actors. Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963) supplement this vision of
power with behind the scenes power, such as agenda setting, that may lessen the observable conflict between actors. Finally, Lukes (1974) argues that power should be extended to include preference shaping activities. If an individual or group can alter another actor’s preferences to conform with its own through socialization or persuasion, then there will be no observable conflict and no need for the manipulation of agendas.

Power by definition is a relative concept; the power of actor A can only be assessed relative to the remaining actors in the environment (Grieco 1990, 40; Fiske 1993; Jones 1972). This relational aspect of power separates it from other variables central to the study of international relations. For example, the level of democracy is not a relational variable in that the rise in one state’s level of democracy does not by definition correspond to the loss by another state. The relative nature of power leads many realists in international relations to view power in particular and international relations in general in zero-sum terms (Waltz 1979, 70, 105).

In international relations, the balance of power among states is typically measured using some combination of “size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability, and competence” (Waltz 1979, 131). For realists in international relations, the immediate military balance provides the best measure of the ability of one actor (or alliance) to influence another actor (or alliance). The remaining elements of power are important because power is fungible; the other elements of power can be transformed into military power in the long run. Therefore, in the short run, realists worry about the immediate balance of military forces, and in the long run, realists worry about any economic or territorial gains by potential competitors.

Both classical (e.g., Gulick 1955) and structural realists (e.g., Waltz 1979) argue that threats are a function of power asymmetries (Doyle 1997, 168). If a neighboring state has more power than you, your state should feel at risk because nothing in the anarchical international system prevents that state from using force against you to resolve a conflict. In this “self-help” world, states are forced to rely on domestic military spending and temporary international alliances to balance against the power of other states. Even allies are suspect in this Hobbesian world because “today’s friend may be tomorrow’s enemy in war, and fear that achievements of joint gains that advantage a friend in the present might produce a more dangerous potential foe in the future” (Grieco 1988, 487).

Realistic conflict theory (Levine and Campbell 1972; Sherif 1966) is similar to realism in that power (or resource) asymmetries are the root cause of conflict among groups. The theory is realistic in that there is a “real” conflict over material resources. In a series of field studies at a boys’ summer camp, Sherif and Sherif (1953) demonstrated how intense competition could quickly spiral into open conflict. Twenty-two eleven-year-old boys were divided into two groups that were isolated from each other during phase 1 of the study and competed in sports and other activities in phase 2. The rapid emergence of prejudice and open conflict (e.g.,
taunting, burning of flags, ransacking cabins) forced the researchers to separate the boys. While attempts to lessen conflict by bringing the two groups into contact failed, the researchers were able to reduce prejudice and discrimination by getting both groups to solve a collective problem. In related work at the national level, Simpson and Yinger (1985) illustrated how political and economic competition among nationalities can lead to the perception of threat (e.g., competition among immigrants and nonimmigrants). When power among the groups is unevenly distributed, both parties in the asymmetric relationship may have cause for alarm. The weaker side may fear exploitation and/or resent their position of inferiority. Conversely, the stronger side may fear an inevitable shift in the balance of power in the long run and a challenge to the status quo.

**Identity and Threat Perception**

Social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel 1978; Tajfel and Turner 1979) and its offshoot self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner 1985; Turner et al. 1987) provide two nonmaterial explanations for identity construction and threat perception. Both theories were developed to explain prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory behavior toward members of the out-group. Given that prejudice is often (but not always) associated with a fear that the out-group has the capability or intention to inflict a negative consequence on the in-group, these theories can provide a competing explanation for the rise and fall of the perception of threat.

SIT (Tajfel 1978; Tajfel and Turner 1979) begins with the assumption that individuals automatically sort themselves into categories. This is a natural cognitive process that occurs in any social setting. Although the speed of the sorting and salience of the categorization can vary (e.g., high salience when you are a very distinct minority on a sorting dimension), the placement of objects into categories always occurs and the placement of the “self” in one category immediately creates an “other” (Brewer and Brown 1998). Given that groups naturally differ in power and prestige, Tajfel argues that the categorization automatically triggers a motivational need to view one’s own group positively. This motivation leads to behaviors in which the members of the in-group are favored over members of the out-group. Thus, SIT postulates a multistep process that encompasses both cognitive and motivational elements.

SCT (Turner et al. 1987) emphasizes the cognitive aspect of identity construction rather than the motivational aspect. The first step in the process is identical to SIT: individuals automatically sort themselves into categories and thus automatically create an “us” and a “them.” The second step involves the adoption of norms, beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviors associated with the in-group. If the individual desires to adopt these traits to fit with the in-group, SCT remains similar to SIT in that it combines cognitive and motivational aspects. However, Turner
et al. emphasize a purely cognitive process in the second step: individuals adopt the norms, beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviors associated with the in-group because they are part of a readily accessible schema (e.g., an individual categorizes himself or herself as “Catholic,” and this makes elements of the “Catholic schema” readily available). In this case, motivation or desire does not play a role. But regardless of the underlying causal mechanisms, SCT (just like SIT) predicts that the categorization process will lead to the emergence of prejudicial attitudes toward the out-group and discrimination against them. International relations scholars have adopted the logic of SIT to predict that “outsiders” in international affairs will be viewed as more threatening than “insiders” (Wendt 1999).

Construction of Threat Theory

We conceptualize collective identities as “bundles” of shared values, beliefs, attitudes, norms, and roles that are used to draw a boundary between the “in-group” and the “out-group” (Rousseau 2006, 12). Although proponents of SIT and SCT routinely discuss movement between identities based on the social context (e.g., shifting a personal identity from “father” to “professor” or shifting a collective identity from “Scottish” to “British”), there has been insufficient discussion of the process through which individuals construct identities for the collective in-group and the collective out-group. What building blocks are utilized? How are they aggregated? How can they be manipulated to alter a sense of identity? The construction of threat theory has been developed to answer these questions within the context of international relations (Rousseau 2006).

How do individuals in a country such as the United States construct a collective American identity, and how stable is this construction across time and space? Consider the process through which individuals construct opinions in response to survey questions. Sudman, Bradburn, and Schwarz (1996) present a four-step model of opinion formation. First, the respondent must interpret the question. Second, the respondent must generate an opinion. In some cases, the individual simply retrieves the opinion from memory. However, in many if not most instances, individuals do not hold readily accessible responses for survey questions (Sudman, Bradburn, and Schwarz 1996, 70). When faced with this situation, individuals compute a response using accessible information. How this is done is still a matter of great controversy. The traditional explanation proposes that individuals simply balance salient considerations for and against the proposition retrieved from memory (Dawes 1979; Keeney and Raiffa 1976; Zaller 1992). Third, the respondent must format the response for closed-ended questions. Finally, the respondent must decide whether to edit the response. For instance, individuals may feel reluctant to report to the interviewer that they watch twenty-seven hours of television a week.

We believe that a similar process takes place when constructing collective identities of the self and other. For example, when a survey research organization
telephones an American citizen and asks, “Should Japan become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council?” this individual must immediately construct some image of Japan. This image will be based on the categorization of Japan and the United States along a set of dimensions (e.g., beliefs, values, norms, attitudes). If the individual were asked this question repeatedly across time, we would find that he or she tended to rely on a handful of dimensions to categorize the other state. That is, while the individual would probably not construct the same image of Japan on every occasion, there would be a discernible pattern to his or her responses across time.

In Figure 1, we present the hypothetical case of “Jane Doe.” Jane tends to use eight different dimensions to evaluate Japan, ranging from wealth to great power status. However, these dimensions are “latent” in that they are in memory but not necessarily immediately available. On any given day, only a subset of the latent dimensions will be “salient” or readily accessible. Only dimensions that are salient influence the construction of the opinion (e.g., influence the aggregation process). In Figure 1, we see that on this particular day, three dimensions are salient: regime type, economic structure, and external orientation. Jane Doe evaluates both her own country and the other country using these salient dimensions. She concludes that both countries are democratic and capitalist but that the United States is more internationalist than Japan. Her net assessment is that the two states are pretty similar (but not identical).

The process is iterative in that the individual’s assessment of the self may make certain dimensions more salient for the construction of the other and vice versa (Hopf 2002). So when Jane Doe thinks of the United States, certain dimensions come to mind, and when she thinks of Japan, other dimensions come to mind. Ultimately, a comparison will be made on each dimension because both countries are salient. For example, if Jane Doe believes Japan is different because it is Buddhist, she is implicitly categorizing the United States as non-Buddhist. More important, the process is a subjective assessment. Although surveys indicate that more Japanese citizens profess adherence to the Shinto religion than to Buddhism, this “objective” fact is irrelevant to the subjective assessment of Jane Doe. If she believes Japan is a Buddhist country, her categorization scheme will reflect this belief. Moreover, the categorization will ultimately influence the degree of perceived shared identity and her perception of threat (Gries 2005, 237).

How does this conceptualization of identity creation relate to threat perception? The construction of threat model claims that the perception of threat is a function of the line drawn between the in-group and the out-group. The model predicts that power influences people’s threat perceptions only after identity between the self and the other has been established. If the other is completely unlike the self (i.e., if no shared identity exists), the material balance of power between the self and the other will be a good predictor of threat perception. However, the higher the level of shared identity between the self and the other, the less threatening the other will
appear. In the extreme case in which the other and the self are members of the same in-group, the other will not be seen as a threat regardless of the particular balance of power. In sum, the construction of threat model predicts that both a shared sense of identity and power interact with each other when influencing people’s threat perceptions.

The perception of a highly similar or shared identity will also have important consequences in terms of affect, beliefs, and behaviors (Crisp and Hewstone 2006). The greater the sense of shared identity, the stronger the affective attachment the individual will have toward the other (see Figure 2). In addition, a shared sense of identity will lead individuals to categorize themselves as closer to the other. Thus, shared identity will manifest itself in both “hot” emotional and “cold” cognitive terms. More important, a shared sense of identity will decrease the belief that the other has the intention to inflict negative consequences on the individual. Therefore, a shared sense of identity will alter behavior by increasing the willingness of the individual to cooperate with the other. Returning to our example of Jane Doe, if she believes that the United States and Japan share a common identity, she should believe that Japan is less threatening than other states, and she should be more willing to take a chance on cooperating with Japan because the risks of exploitation are lower. Therefore, by making specific attitudes and beliefs salient, shared identity increases the probability of cooperation.

**Experiment #1: Abstract Scenario in the United States**

Experiment #1 tests whether a perception of threat posed by another country is influenced by the material balance of power and/or a shared sense of identity. The
experiment employed an abstract scenario involving two unnamed countries engaged in a territorial dispute (Geva and Hanson 1999). Specifically, participants were asked to play the role of a foreign policy advisor in an unnamed country. They were informed that a simmering international dispute had erupted into conflict, and they were asked to advise their boss on the best possible course of action. The scenario was intentionally vague with respect to the party responsible for the outbreak of fighting. After completing the short scenario, participants answered a series of questions about the source of conflict and the utility of using military force.

The experimental survey varied along two dichotomous dimensions: the balance of military forces between the countries (strong vs. weak power) and the degree of shared identity between the countries (shared vs. nonshared identity). Our main experimental hypotheses then focused on the relationship between power, identity, and threat perception. The causal process linking these elements is illustrated in Figure 2. Specifically, we hypothesized the following:

**Hypothesis 1: Power.** If the foreign country is framed as a strong military power, then the participant’s perception of threat will increase. This hypothesis is derived from the realist school of thought in international relations (Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 1979) and the realistic conflict theory of social psychology (Levine and Campbell 1972; Sherif 1966).

**Hypothesis 2: Identity.** If the foreign country is framed as similar to the home country (e.g., similar language, religions, and culture), then the perception of threat will decrease. This hypothesis is derived from the social constructivism school of thought in international relations (Wendt 1999) and the SIT in psychology (Tafjel 1978).
Hypothesis 3: Interaction between power and identity. While most explanations treat power and identity as completely independent dimensions, the construction of threat model predicts an interactive effect. At one theoretical extreme, in which identity is completely shared, power asymmetries should have no impact on threat perception. At the other theoretical extreme, in which no shared identity exists at all, power will determine threat perception. Between these theoretical extremes (in which most real-world cases will fall), we should observe that the degree of shared identity modulates the impact of power asymmetries on threat perception. Therefore, if a foreign country is framed as both a strong military power and diverging from democratic institutions and a market economy, then the perception of threat should increase beyond what one should expect from a simple linear additive model.

Hypothesis 4: Similarity. If the foreign country is framed as having an identity similar to the home country, then the perceived similarity between the countries will increase. This manipulation check probes the cold cognitive causal mechanism behind the shared identity claim. If the identity manipulation does not produce a recategorization of the other with respect to the self, we cannot claim to have a strong understanding of the causal mechanisms supporting the theoretical predictions.

Hypothesis 5: Affect. If the foreign country is framed as having an identity similar to the home country, then the positive affect toward the foreign country will increase (Furia and Lucas 2006). In addition to providing a robustness check for the identity manipulation, this hypothesis explores whether the shared sense of identity is, in part, the function of a hot affective process. While it is possible for the identity manipulation to only increase the perceived similarity between countries, it could also trigger positive affect toward the other.

To probe the robustness of the analysis, the survey included several questions that allow us to control for competing explanations that fall outside the central focus of our study. Although the results reported below are statistically significant with or without these controls, the controls have been reported to reassure the reader that competing arguments have been explored systematically. Hypothesis 6 predicts that individuals with realist belief systems are more likely to view the other as threatening than individuals with liberal belief systems. Rousseau (2002) has shown that participants scoring high on a realist-liberal index are more likely to view other states as threatening and more likely to support the use of military force to resolve conflicts. The realist-liberal variable has a theoretic range of –20 (extreme liberal views) to +20 (extreme realist views). The exact wording of the questions used to create the realist-liberal variable appears in Appendix 1. Hypothesis 7 predicts that male participants are more likely to view the other as threatening (Heskin and Power 1994). Hypothesis 8 predicts that American participants are more likely to take a militarist view of international politics and therefore perceive
the other as threatening (Hurwitz, Peffley, and Seligson 1993). Finally, hypothesis 9 predicts that self-described “conservative” participants are more likely to view outsiders as threatening than nonconservative participants (i.e., self-described middle of the road or liberal; Heskin and Power 1994). Conservatism was self-reported using a question virtually identical to that used in the American National Election Study.

Participants and Procedure

The experiment was conducted in the United States during the fall semester of 2004 at the University of Pennsylvania with a sample of 169 undergraduates enrolled in introductory political science classes. The sample included 102 men and 67 women. All participants were between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five. The ethnicity survey question indicated that the sample was 65 percent white, 20 percent Asian, 3 percent black, 3 percent Hispanic, and 9 percent “other” (or refused to answer). The participants were offered extra credit for participating in a one-hour experiment exploring the role of news coverage in international affairs. After completing an initial survey and “distracting” sorting exercise, the participants were randomly assigned to one of four scenarios based on the balance of military power and the degree of shared identity between the countries. The wording of all versions of the scenarios appears in Appendix 2.

The power and identity hypotheses were tested using a $2 \times 2$ between-subjects experimental research design. The scenarios varied along two dichotomous dimensions: (1) the balance of military forces (strong vs. weak); and (2) the degree of shared identity in terms of ancestry, language, and religion (shared identity vs. no shared identity). In the “strong opponent” scenario, the army and navy of the southern neighbor were described as double the size of the “home” state. In the “weak opponent” scenario, the situation was reversed. In the shared identity scenario, the southern neighbor was described as sharing a common language, culture, and religion. In the “different identity” scenario, the two hypothetical states did not share any similar dimensions. After reading the scenario, participants answered a short twelve-question survey. The manipulation checks in this survey indicated that only 2 of the 169 participants could not correctly identify either the balance of power between the two states or the degree of cultural similarity. While the findings reported below include these 2 participants, the results are virtually identical if the 2 participants are deleted from the sample.

Dependent Variables

The experiment explores three dependent variables: threat perceptions, feelings of warmth, and perceptions of similarity.
1. **Threat perceptions.** On a 10-point scale, participants evaluated how much of a military threat the neighboring country in the scenario represents. A score of 0 meant no threat at all, and a score of 10 meant extremely threatening.

2. **Perceptions of similarity.** On a 5-point Likert scale, participants estimated the extent to which they view the neighboring country as similar or dissimilar to the home country, ranging from very similar to very dissimilar.

3. **Feelings of warmth.** On a scale ranging from 0 to 100, participants estimated their feelings toward the neighboring country. Ratings between 50 and 100 meant that they felt favorable and warm toward the neighbor. Ratings between 0 and 50 meant that they did not feel favorable toward the neighbor. A rating of exactly 50 meant that they did not feel particularly warm or cold. For many years, the American National Election Study has used this type of “feeling thermometer” to measure how much respondents like particular candidates and political parties.

### Results from Experiment #1

The hypotheses are tested using regression analysis with robust standard errors. Table 1, which displays models 1, 2, and 3, presents results using the “threat perception” dependent variable, which ranges from 0 (no threat) to 10 (extremely threatening) and has a mean of 6.6 in our sample. Model 1 presents the results with the two variables manipulated in the experiment; model 2 adds an interactive variable to the equation. Finally, model 3 includes all the control variables controlling for competing explanations. Given that the coefficients and standard errors are stable across the three models, we will restrict our discussion to model 3.

Hypothesis 1 predicts that if the other state is powerful, then the perception of threat should increase. The results in model 3 strongly support this realist claim; the coefficient is positive ($\beta = 2.15$; $SE = 0.34$) and statistically significant at the better than the 0.001 level of significance. Hypothesis 2, which predicts that a shared identity will decrease threat perception, is also supported by the data. The coefficient is negative as expected ($\beta = -0.59$; $SE = 0.28$) and statistically significant at the better than the 0.05 level of significance. The much larger size of the power coefficient indicates that the marginal impact of the power manipulation was about four times the marginal impact of the identity manipulation. But despite this asymmetry, the analysis clearly demonstrates that both power and identity matter; realists focusing only on the material balance of power and constructivists focusing only on ideational factors miss half the story. Finally, model 3 indicates that there is no interactive impact of these variables; the interactive term is not statistically different from zero in Table 1.

None of the remaining control variables in model 3 are statistically significant. Realists are no more likely to view the “southern neighbor” as more threatening than liberals. Threat assessments by males and Americans are no different from
their female and non-American counterparts. Nor are conservatives more likely to view the other as threatening compared with liberals.

Models 4 and 5, which are displayed in Table 2, probe the causal mechanisms behind the identity argument. In model 4, the dependent variable is the perception of similarity. After the scenario, participants were asked, “Do you view your southern neighbor as similar or dissimilar to your country?” For coding purposes, the response categories were collapsed into similar (very or somewhat) and dissimilar (very or somewhat). The probit analysis using this dichotomous variable indicates that the shared identity scenario significantly increases the categorization of states as similar ($\beta = 2.33; SE = 0.37$). The marginal impact of the variable is quite large. Using Clarify software to calculate the marginal impacts, we find that a shift from no shared identity to shared identity increases the predicted probability of perceiving

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Experiment #1, Regression with Threat Dependent Variable</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Variables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable balance of power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction: Strong power* different identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realist-liberal index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-described conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability &gt; F (6, 162)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R$-squared</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Model estimated with Stata 8.0 using robust standard errors. Standard errors appear below the estimated coefficients. All significance tests are one-tailed.

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
the states as similar by approximately 74 percentage points when holding all other variables at their means or modes (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003). In contrast, neither the favorable balance of power nor any of the control variables have a statistically significant impact on the categorization of the other.

In model 5, the dependent variable is the level of positive affect felt toward the other. The warmth variable has a mean of 36 degrees, a standard deviation of 17 degrees, and a range of 5 to 100 degrees in our sample. The results in model 5 strongly support hypothesis 5: the shared identity scenario produces much warmer feelings toward the other. The estimated coefficient ($\beta = 12.35; SE = 3.54$) is statistically significant at the better than the 0.001 level of significance. A shift from a dissimilar to similar identity increases the warmth felt toward the other by over 12 degrees. Thus, the identity manipulation influenced both the participant’s cold cognitive categorization process and a hot affective process. As with the previous

### Table 2

Experiment #1, Regression with Warmth and Similarity Dependent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Similarity Perception</td>
<td>Warmth Perception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(range: 0/1) Probit</td>
<td>(range: 0-100) OLS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable balance of power</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>3.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared identity</td>
<td>2.33***</td>
<td>12.35***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>3.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction: Strong</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>3.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>power* different identity</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>4.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realist-liberal index</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-5.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>4.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-described conservative</td>
<td>-0.74</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>34.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>4.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability &lt; F (6, 162)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.57 (pseudo)</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-50.8</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Model estimated with Stata 8.0 using robust standard errors. Standard errors appear below the estimated coefficients. All significance tests are one-tailed.

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
model, neither the prevailing balance of power nor the control variables had an impact on the assessment of warmth.

**Experiment #2: Abstract Scenario in Spain**

In experiment #2, we replicate the central findings of the prior experiment with one important difference: to demonstrate the cross-national applicability of the construction of threat model, we test the hypotheses using Spanish participants rather than American participants. Although countries may differ with respect to the most common dimensions used to separate the self from the other, we expect the process of identity construction at the individual level to be similar across countries. The hypothetical territorial dispute scenario was translated into Spanish, and the experiment was administered at a Spanish university. As in the last experiment, the scenarios varied along two dimensions: the balance of military forces between the countries (strong vs. weak power) and the degree of shared identity between them (shared vs. nonshared identity). Given the absence of significant results for the control variables in the prior study, this experiment focused solely on the five hypotheses tested in the first study: the power hypothesis, the identity hypothesis, the interaction hypothesis, the similarity hypothesis, and the affect hypothesis.

**Participants and Procedure**

The participants in experiment #2 were 112 undergraduates enrolled in a psychology course from the University of Granada (Spain) in the spring of 2005. The participants included 46 men and 66 women. They had a median age of twenty years (range seventeen to fifty-five), and all were Caucasian. They were randomly assigned to one of four groups based on the power and identity of the framed country. The participants received course credit for their participation in the experiment. The hypothetical scenario, survey questions, and dependent variables were virtually identical to experiment #1 (see Appendix 2 for minor changes made to frame identity in the Spanish context).

**Results from Experiment #2**

The results of experiment #2 appear in Table 3. As predicted by realist theories, an unfavorable balance of power increased the perception of threat (see model 1). The coefficient is positive ($\beta = 2.71; SE = 0.52$) and statistically significant at the better than the 0.001 level of significance. Similarly, the data strongly support the identity hypothesis proposed by constructivists. Describing the two states as having a similar culture, religion, and language significantly decreased the perception of a military threat. The estimated coefficient is negative ($\beta = -1.07; SE = 0.44$) and statistically significant at the better than the 0.01 level of significance. As was the
case in the first experiment, the balance of power has a more powerful impact than the shared identity variable. Unlike the first experiment, the interaction term, which isolates the situation in which the opposing state is strong and culturally different, produces a positive ($\beta = 1.73$; $SE = 0.65$) and statistically significant coefficient. Although the addition of this interactive term slightly weakens the power and identity coefficients, it does not alter the conclusions we draw from the results of the regression. Thus, both power and identity influence threat perception, and the most feared states of all have both the power to injure and a different identity.

As predicted by the similarity hypothesis, the identity manipulation increased the closeness of the categorization of the self and the other (see model 2). The shared identity coefficient was positive, as predicted ($\beta = 2.37$; $SE = 0.51$), and statistically significant at the better than the 0.001 level of significance. The marginal analysis indicates that a shift from no shared identity to shared identity increases the predicted probability of perceiving the states as similar by approximately 60 percentage points when holding all other variables at their means or modes (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003). Neither the power manipulation nor the interaction term produced significant changes in the assessment of similarity.

Finally, Table 3 also shows that as predicted by the affect hypothesis, the identity manipulation increased a sense of warmth toward the southern neighbor (see model 3). The warmth dependent variable has a mean of 50 degrees, a standard deviation of 17 degrees, and a range from 10 to 99 degrees. Describing the other state as religiously, linguistically, and culturally similar led to a statistically significant increase in warmth ($\beta = 11.29$; $SE = 4.31$; $p < 0.05$). A shift from different identity to similar identity increases the sense of warmth by just over 11 degrees. In contrast, neither the power manipulation nor the interaction term had an impact on the perception of warmth.

**Experiment #3: Concrete Situation in Spain**

The purpose of experiment #3 was threefold. First, we wanted to alter the power and identity manipulations to demonstrate that a very minor difference in a framing could produce the types of dependent variable changes seen in the previous two studies. Therefore, the manipulation in experiment #3 begins with a very short introduction (approximately eighty-five words) in which shared identity and power are framed for the participants (Hiscox 2006). This new manipulation is suitable for both a paper and pencil study (employed in the current study) and a telephone survey with a nationally representative sample (which we hope to employ in future research to demonstrate the generalizability of our findings). Moreover, we employed a real-world situation rather than a hypothetical scenario to probe the robustness of previous findings. Critics of laboratory experiments often claim the studies lack external validity because the manipulations are abstract and devoid of real-world content (e.g., studying responses to alpha or beta state). Thus, in this experiment, we tackle
the much more difficult task of manipulating perceptions of power and perceptions of identity of a real-world great power: Russia.

Second, we investigate the interaction between identity and power in the decision process. Although most versions of realism and constructivism predict that only power or only identity matters, the empirical findings in the previous studies indicate both factors play a central role in threat perception. But how do these two variables interact in the decision process? Participants could simply average over two independent variables (Meyer 1981). However, the significance of the interactive term in the second experiment hints at a more interesting relationship. For example, participants might use a simple heuristic that privileges one dimension over the other. This type of decision-making heuristic is referred to as a “fast and frugal decision tree” (see Martignon et al. 2003). Figure 3, which is adapted from the work of Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group (1999, 4), displays a fast and frugal decision tree heuristic that privileges identity (Rousseau 2006, 217).

In this heuristic, power and identity are treated as dichotomous variables. The individual begins the decision process by asking: is the other state a member of the out-group? If the answer is yes, the individual asks a second question: does the other state have more power than my state? If the answer to this second question is also a yes, then the other state is classified as a threat. While the simple fast and

---

### Table 3

**Experiment #2, Regression with Threat, Warmth, and Similarity Dependent Variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 1: Dependent Variable: Threat Perception (range: 0-10) OLS</th>
<th>Model 2: Dependent Variable: Similarity Perception (range: 0-10) OLS</th>
<th>Model 3: Dependent Variable: Warmth Perception (range: 0-10) Probit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable balance of power</td>
<td>2.71*** 0.52</td>
<td>-0.34 0.57</td>
<td>3.32 5.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared identity</td>
<td>-1.07*** 0.44</td>
<td>2.37*** 0.51</td>
<td>11.29** 4.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction: Strong power* different identity</td>
<td>1.73*** 0.65</td>
<td>-0.16 0.69</td>
<td>-0.15 0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.25*** 0.29</td>
<td>0.57** 0.25</td>
<td>33.98 4.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of observations: 112

Probability > F (6, 162): .000

R-squared: 0.60 (pseudo) 0.019

Log likelihood: — 39.8

Note: Model estimated with Stata 8.0 using robust standard errors. Standard errors appear below the estimated coefficients. All significance tests are one-tailed.

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
frugal decision tree is valuable because it does not involve any computationally difficult averaging for individuals, it does privilege one variable by placing it first in the series of questions. More important, the heuristic implies that power asymmetries and dissimilar identities are necessary conditions for the perception of threat: only if a foreign country is framed as both a strong military power and diverging from democratic institutions and a market economy will the perception of threat increase.

Finally, the third experiment examines the public policy implications of the manipulations of power and identity. Although the prior two laboratory studies established the fact that shared identity decreases threat perception and military weakness increases threat perception, the experiments did not demonstrate that public policy positions (e.g., trade and investment with the other) would be impacted by the assessment. Therefore, we hypothesize that if the foreign country is framed as becoming more like the home country, then individuals will be more willing to support cooperation (e.g., a trade treaty, an arms control agreement, and trade in general) with the foreign country.

Thus, we test four hypotheses in this third experiment: the power hypothesis, the identity hypothesis, the revised interaction hypothesis, and the new public policy hypothesis.

**Participants and Procedure**

The participants were 112 undergraduates enrolled in psychology from the University of Granada (Spain) in the spring of 2005. The participants included
50 men and 62 women; all participants were Caucasian. Participants had a median age of twenty years (range eighteen to fifty-one). The participants, who received course credit for participating in the experiment, were randomly assigned to one of four groups based on the balance of military power and the degree of shared identity between the countries.

Participants completed a twenty-minute questionnaire that began with a very short paragraph (approximately eighty-five words) framing the power and collective identity of Russia relative to Spain and the European Union. The four introductory descriptions delivered at the start of the experiment are located in Appendix 3. For illustrative purposes, the condition “strong power” and “similar identity” is presented here:

We would like to ask you a few questions about relations with Russia. Many people focus on the fact that the Russians have increased defense spending by over 10% a year for the last several years. Many others believe that Russia is becoming more like the countries of the European Union due to the expanding role of markets in the economy and recent increases in freedom of expression and assembly for many groups in society. We are interested in your opinions.

The assignment of the order of the statements about the balance of military power and identity in the scenario was counterbalanced across participants. Given that we did not find significant differences between assignments, the results reported below are based on an analysis across assignments. Following the introductory scenario, participants were asked a series of questions that directly tested our hypotheses. The resulting factorial design of experiment #3 was a 2 (balance of military power: strong vs. weak power) \( \times \) 2 (degree of shared identity: shared vs. nonshared identity) between-subjects design.

**Dependent Variables**

In the third experiment, we employ two dependent variables: threat perception and willingness to cooperate.

1. **Threat perceptions.** On a 10-point scale, participants evaluated how much of a military threat Russia is to the countries of the European Union. A score of 0 in both questions meant no threat at all and a score of 10 meant extremely threatening.

2. **Policy cooperation assessments.** On a 5-point scale, participants evaluated whether they would favor or oppose: (a) an international trade agreement that results in small economic gains by the countries of the European Union but major economic gains by Russia, (b) cutting troop totals by 50,000 for both Spain and Russia, and (c) increasing trade with Russia. For the statistical analysis presented below, we created a dichotomous “favors cooperation” by combining the “strongly favors” and the “somewhat favors” categories.
Results from Experiment #3

The results from the regression analysis with the threat dependent variable are presented in Table 4. Given that the central findings are similar with or without the interaction term, we will restrict our discussion to model 2 in Table 4. As with the first two experiments, we once again find that an unfavorable military balance increases the perception of threat. The estimated coefficient is positive ($\beta = 1.46; \text{SE} = 0.56$) and statistically significant at the better than the 0.01 level of significance. Conversely, emphasizing a shared identity between Spain and Russia decreased threat perception. The shared identity coefficient is negative ($\beta = -1.82; \text{SE} = 0.55$) and statistically significant at the better than the 0.001 level of significance. Unlike the prior two experiments, the identity variable has a larger marginal impact than the power variable in the real-world situation. Finally, model 2 indicates that the interaction between identity and power is positive ($\beta = 1.64; \text{SE} = 0.79$) and statistically significant at the 0.05 level. When the other state is described as both more powerful and possessing a different identity, the perception of threat grows above and beyond simply summing the impact of the two independent variables.

But how are participants using the interaction? The Interaction Hypothesis predicted a simple necessary condition heuristic: states would only be viewed as threatening if they possessed both a different identity and greater military power. The

### Table 4

**Experiment #3, Regression with Threat and Dependent Variable**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dependent Variable:</td>
<td>Dependent Variable:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Threat Perception</td>
<td>Threat Perception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(range: 0-10) OLS</td>
<td>(range: 0-10) OLS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable balance of power</td>
<td>2.29***</td>
<td>1.46**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared identity</td>
<td>-2.64***</td>
<td>-1.82***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction: Strong power* different identity</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1.64*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.23***</td>
<td>3.54***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability &gt; F (3, 108)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Model estimated with Stata 8.0 using robust standard errors. Standard errors appear below the estimated coefficients. All significance tests are one-tailed.

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
results in Table 5 do not support this type of heuristic. The interaction hypothesis correctly predicts that the highest level of military threat perception occurs when Russia was described a strong power with a nonshared identity (mean threat equals 6.64). However, the necessary condition hypothesis also predicts that the values in all the remaining cells should be low and indistinguishable from each other. This is not the case. Moreover, a purely realist explanation has trouble explaining the results because it would predict both strong power conditions would trigger a similar level in threat regardless of identity (i.e., realists expect the 3.18 mean would be expected to be closer to the 6.64 mean). Similarly, a purely constructivist explanation has trouble explaining the results because it would predict both shared identity conditions would trigger a similar level of threat (i.e., constructivists expect the 1.71 mean would be expected to be close to the 3.18 mean). Thus, while the necessary condition hypothesis (or fast and frugal decision tree hypothesis) failed with respect to military threat, the findings strongly support a positive interaction between the power variable and the identity variable.

The final set of analyses, which is displayed in Table 6, explores the policy implications of the framing experiment. The survey question examined in model 1 asked, “Would you support or oppose an international trade agreement that results in small economic gains by Spain, but major economic gains by Russia?” Fifty-two percent of the participants supported such an agreement either somewhat or strongly. The survey question is important because wording explicitly states that Russia will achieve relative gains from the agreement. Realists such as Waltz (1979) and Grieco (1988) expect leaders to be wary of relative gains by other states. The results in model 1 of Table 6 indicate that framing Russia as a member of the in-group increases support for the trade agreement despite the disproportionate gains by Russia ($\beta = 0.45$; SE = 0.24, $p < 0.05$). In contrast, the framing of power had no impact. A second survey question probed support for defense cuts that were equal in absolute terms but relatively larger for Spain because of its smaller military. Model 2 in Table 6 indicates that when the issue area is military affairs, participants are less willing to support such an agreement when in a position of military weakness ($\beta = -0.51$; SE = 0.25, $p < 0.05$). In this case, shared

### Table 5

**Military Threat Assessments by Treatment in Experiment #3.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Shared Identity</th>
<th>Nonshared Identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weak Power</td>
<td>Strong Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military threat</td>
<td>1.71$_{a}$ (1.98)</td>
<td>3.18$_{b}$ (2.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.54$_{b}$ (2.15)</td>
<td>6.64$_{c}$ (2.04)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The means and deviations (in parentheses) about identity and power. Military threat was measured using a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The means that do not share a common subscript differ at the .05 level or lower by Tukey’s HSD test.
Finally, a third survey question explored support for increasing trade with Russia in general. Overall, 81 percent of the participants supported increasing trade either somewhat or strongly. However, while the military balance did not influence support for increasing trade, when Russia was described as becoming more like Spain, support for increasing trade grew significantly ($b = 0.79$; $SE = 0.30$, $p < 0.01$). In sum, the framing of the other in terms of power and identity had a powerful impact on public policies regulating interaction between the two societies.

### General Discussion

Realists tend to emphasize material factors because power is viewed as the best predictor of threat (Waltz 1986, 329), and it is relatively easy to measure (Waltz 1979, 98, 131). In contrast, many constructivists tend to focus exclusively on ideational factors. The three experiments discussed here suggest both these exclusive viewpoints are misguided; both power and identity influence threat perception. In all three experiments, a position of military weakness increased the perception of threat, and a different identity increased the perception of threat. This was true for both American participants and Spanish participants. This was also true in both hypothetical and real-world situations. Furthermore, this was true even after controlling for several alternative explanations for threat perception in experiment #1.

### Table 6

**Experiment #3, Impact of Identity and Power on Policy Positions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable balance</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>–0.51*</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of power</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared identity</td>
<td>0.45*</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.79**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>–0.32</td>
<td>0.38*</td>
<td>0.40*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald chi²(2)</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td>–7.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability &gt; chi²²</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>–75.1</td>
<td>–67.5</td>
<td>–49.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Model estimated with Stata 8.0 using robust standard errors. Standard errors appear below the estimated coefficients. All significance tests are one-tailed.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$. 

identity did not influence the policy preference.
In addition, there is a strong interaction between power and identity. In experiments #2 and #3, the interactive term was positive and statistically significant. In other words, specific combinations of power and identity (e.g., both military strength and a different identity) produced an increase in threat perception more than the simply additive impact of each independent variable. This raises a very interesting question: how are power and identity combined in the calculation of threat? Unfortunately, constructivist theories of international relations developed to date provide little guidance on this issue. Solving this empirical puzzle will require us to turn to the decision analysis literature. Although the “necessary condition” interaction hypothesis (or fast and frugal decision tree hypothesis) drawn from this literature was not confirmed in experiment #3, scratching this explanation off the long list of plausible explanations is an important first step toward solving this critical question.1

It is important to note that not all constructivist scholars neglect material factors. Wendt (1999), for example, is one of the few authors that explicitly links identity and power in a model of systemic conflict and cooperation. While power tends to dominate considerations in a Hobbesian world and identity dominates calculations in a Kantian world, Wendt claims that both power and identity influence state assessments and international patterns in the intermediate Lockean world. Unfortunately, Wendt’s desire to create a systemic social theory of international politics (to directly challenge Waltz’s systemic realist theory of international politics) leads him to explicitly “black box” the state and implicitly drop individuals from the analysis. In his review of Wendt’s book, Smith (2000) asks, “Where in Wendt’s model are the only moving forces in the social world: human beings?” (p. 161). The answer is nowhere. As with Smith, we contend that it is impossible to develop a complete social theory of international politics without explaining the role of people in the process.

The construction of threat model proposed in this article provides an individual level mechanism that explains the interaction of power and identity. It articulates the causal mechanisms at the individual level that can explain how humans can create the Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian worlds that Wendt discusses at the systemic level. Although the purpose of this article has been to provide empirical support for the model at the individual level, it provides a foundation for discussion diffusion at the state and international levels (Rousseau and van der Veen 2005; Rousseau 2006).

Finally, the construction of threat model provides a precise and fully specified way to synthesize realism and liberalism into a single framework. International relations scholars have long sought to integrate the two models in a systemic fashion. For example, in *Power and Interdependence*, Keohane and Nye (1977) proposed a continuum from “pure realism” to “complex interdependence.” As one moved toward the realist pole, the authors expected realist theories to have greater explanatory power. Similarly, Grieco (1988) proposed a “k” factor that measured
the salience of relative gains. As $k$ became closer to 1.0, we moved toward a zero-sum realist world of pure competition. The construction of threat model contends that identity is an important explanation for placement on Keohane and Nye’s (1977) continuum and for the level of Grieco’s $k$. The experimental evidence demonstrates that identity moderates the subject’s interpretation of the material balance of power. When shared identity is high, threat perception and the salience of relative gains are lower. This increases the probability of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral cooperation. Conversely, when shared identity is low, threat perception and the salience of relative gains are higher. In this Hobbesian world, cooperation is more difficult. Thus, shared identity is a crucial variable that determines whether individuals behave according to the predictions of realism or liberalism.

**Conclusion**

In this article, we have proposed a model for identity construction at the individual level, and we have demonstrated that a sense of shared identity decreases threat perception and increases the probability of support for interstate cooperation. Our empirical analysis was a “hard test” for the ideational model because the laboratory experiments demonstrate that ideas matter even after controlling for the material factors such as the balance of military power. More important, the experiments demonstrate that ideas and power both influence threat perception in a systematic manner. As a sense of shared identity decreases, the material balance of power becomes a more powerful predictor of threat perception. Although other authors have suggested that both factors matter, to our knowledge, no other study in international relations has developed and experimentally tested a fully articulated model linking power, identity, and threat perception.

**Appendix A**

**Realism-Liberalism Index in Experiment #1**

Note: Response categories for all questions included strongly agree, somewhat agree, neutral, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree, not sure.

1. Military force should only be used for defensive purposes. States should not use military force to intervene in the affairs of others states, including on-going military conflicts.
2. In order for a state to achieve its economic and security goals, it must cooperate with other countries around the globe.
3. States are inherently aggressive. They will naturally expand their economic and military power until they meet an opponent capable of checking their expansion.
4. Conflict is rare in the international system because states typically have compatible goals. What is best for one state is usually best for other states in the system.
5. In general, international organizations and trans-national interest groups are ineffective because they lack the power necessary to change the behavior of strong states and powerful corporations.

6. States are generally untrustworthy. Unless they are constantly watched, states will attempt to exploit their neighbors and to break international accords if it suits their needs.

7. Moral considerations such as the promotion of human rights and justice should play an important role in the formation of foreign policy.

8. The best way to solve international problems is to identify a fair solution in which both states benefit equally. Often this implies that stronger states forgo disproportionate gains they could have obtained through the use of threats and/or rewards.

9. In general, the use of military force against other states only makes problems worse.

10. You must always be wary of the economic success of other countries because they can easily transform the economic gains into military power and use it to threaten your country.

Appendix B
Abstract Scenario Used in Experiments #1 (English) and #2 (Spanish)

Note: The wording in [brackets] varies according to language used in the study.

(Common to all conditions) You are the chief political advisor for the president of your country. Your job is to advise your boss on domestic and foreign policy matters. Your boss was first elected to office 1 year ago. He has asked you to assess the threat posed by your country’s southern neighbor. Your country and your southern neighbor dispute the ownership of a 136-km² stretch of land. This territory includes a very fertile agricultural region and a mountainous region with large mining operations. Although at one time few people lived in the region, it is now home to almost 10% of each country’s population. In 1913, both countries agreed to have the International Court of Arbitration in The Hague resolve the dispute. When the Court ruled in favor of your country, your southern neighbor rejected the decision and refused to give up its portion of the territory. In response, your country’s army occupied the remaining half of the disputed territory. Although negotiations have been attempted on several occasions, no settlement has been reached.

(Similar identity condition) You and your southern neighbor share a common language, culture, and religion. Both countries are former colonies of [Spain/Great Britain]. Approximately 90% of both populations are of European ancestry. The official language of both countries is [Spanish/English]. The vast majority of citizens in both states belong to the [Roman Catholic faith/Christian faith].

(Dissimilar identity condition) You and your southern neighbor do not share a common language, culture, or religion. Your southern neighbor is a former
colony of the Sultanate of Oman. Ninety percent of its population is of Arabic ancestry. The official language is Arabic. The vast majority of citizens belong to the Muslim faith. In contrast, your country, which is a former colony of [Spain/Great Britain], is populated almost entirely by citizens of European ancestry. The official language of your country is [Spanish/English] and the vast majority of citizens belong to the [Roman Catholic faith/Christian faith].

(Facing weak power condition) At the time of the 1913 decision, both countries had armed forces of approximately 30,000 troops, the majority of which were stationed along the disputed territory. Since that time, the population of your country and the size of your military have grown a lot. Currently, your army has about 300,000 troops and your air force has about 300 combat aircraft. Your southern neighbor has approximately 150,000 troops and 150 combat aircraft.

(Facing strong power condition) At the time of the 1913 decision, both countries had armed forces of approximately 30,000 troops, the majority of which were stationed along the disputed territory. Since that time, the population of your southern neighbor and the size of its military have grown a lot. Currently, your army has about 150,000 troops and your air force has about 150 combat aircraft. Your southern neighbor has approximately 300,000 troops and 300 combat aircraft.

(Common to all conditions) When you arrived at the office this morning, you learned that a large-scale military clash involving hundreds of troops occurred during the previous night. Regional military authorities on both sides claim that the other country fired the first shot. Please begin the survey to explain how you will respond to this crisis.

Appendix C

Introductory Paragraph from Experiment #3

(Common to all conditions) “We would like to ask you a few questions about relations with Russia. Please read the following:”

(Similar identity condition) “Many people believe that Russia is becoming more like the European Union due to the expanding role of markets in the economy and recent increases in freedom of expression and assembly for many groups in society.”

(Dissimilar identity condition) “Many people believe that Russia is becoming less like the European Union due to the control of the economy by government bureaucrats and the tightening grip of the President over society.”

(Facing strong power condition) “Many people focus on the fact that the Russians have increased defense spending by over 10% a year for the last several years.”
(Facing weak power condition) “Many people focus on the fact that total Russian defense spending remains only about 10% of the defense spending of Spain and it NATO allies.”

(Common to all conditions) “We are interested in your opinions.”

Note

1. We do not believe that readers should draw any important conclusions concerning the positive findings of an interaction in the Spanish experiments and the negative finding in the American experiment. At this point in our research program, we see no reason to conclude that the process of the construction of threat differs across countries. In the three studies reported in the article, the power variable is the most robust across all operationalizations. Sensitivity analysis using both dichotomous and trichotomous versions of the threat dependent variables produced identical results for the power variable. While the identity variable was similarly robust in experiments #2 and #3, it fell just short of statistical significance at the 0.05 level in experiment #1 in the sensitivity analysis. In contrast, the interaction variable was the weakest variable in the three experiments, and it was not as robust as the identity and power variables in sensitivity analysis. Therefore, we believe more cross-national analysis is required before we can make any firm conclusions about how the process of threat construction varies across countries.

References


