Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918–88

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The literature on the democratic peace has emerged from two empirical claims: (1) Democracies are unlikely to conflict with one another, and (2) democracies are as prone to conflict with nondemocracies as nondemocracies are with one another. Together these assertions imply that the democratic peace is a dyadic phenomenon. There is strong support for the first observation, but much recent scholarship contravenes the second. This paper assesses whether the democratic peace is a purely dyadic, a monadic, or perhaps a mixed dyadic and monadic effect. Our analysis offers two important advances. First, our model directly compares the dyadic and monadic explanations by using the state as the unit of analysis rather than the potentially problematic dyad. Second, our model controls for an important but overlooked confounding variable: satisfaction with the status quo. Our results indicate that the initiation of violence within crises is predominantly a dyadic phenomenon, but we also find evidence suggesting a strong monadic effect regarding the emergence of crises.

The prevailing realist model of international conflict (Waltz 1979, Mearsheimer 1994/5) has come under increasingly severe attack by those who claim that domestic politics has an important influence even on issues which directly concern the "national interest," such as the outbreak of war. The relevance of domestic politics to understanding international conflict is forcefully presented in the rapidly developing body of scholarly work labeled the "democratic peace" literature (e.g., Ray 1995, Russett 1993). A common belief among scholars is that this literature posits two empirical observations about the conflict behavior of democracies: (1) They are unlikely to conflict with one another, and (2) they are as prone to conflict with nondemocracies as nondemocracies are with one another. Together, this is a vision of the democratic peace as a dyadic effect, which implies that democracies are only more peaceful with one another, and not a monadic effect, which would mean that democracies are more peaceful in their relations with all countries.

Although the empirical literature offers strong support for the first observation, the second has in recent years come under increasing attack (Ray 1995). Much of the most recent empirical scholarship contravenes the second point, indicating instead that democracies are unlikely to conflict with authoritarian as well as democratic states. Flaws in the research designs of these recent studies, however, casts doubt on their challenge of the second proposition.

This paper seeks to remedy those flaws and assess whether the democratic peace is a purely dyadic effect, a monadic effect, or perhaps a mixed dyadic and monadic effect (that is, democracies are more peaceful than nondemocracies toward all nations, but especially toward democracies). Our tests of the democratic peace offer two important advances over previous scholarship. First, our model permits a direct comparative test of the dyadic and monadic explanations by using the state as the unit of analysis rather than the potentially problematic dyad. Second, our model includes an important control: We identify whether a crisis participant is challenging the status quo. This is important, because if democratic participants in crises are less likely to have challenged the status quo, and if status quo challengers are in general more likely to resort to violence during a crisis, then the failure to include this control variable can distort our understanding of the causal processes behind the democratic peace by conflating the effect of democracy on the *emergence* of crises with its effect on the *escalation* of crises.[1]

The remainder of this paper consists of five parts. First, we review alternative theoretical arguments for the democratic peace. Second, we assess the existing empirical literature. Third, we present the hypotheses to be tested and their operationalizations. Fourth, we examine empirical results based on the behavior of states in international crises from 1918 to 1988. The results indicate that the initiation and escalation of violence within crises is predominately a dyadic phenomenon. Our findings also suggest, however, that there is potentially a strong monadic effect regarding the emergence of a crisis: Democracies are less likely than nondemocra-

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The authors thank Chris Achen, Bear Braumoeller, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James Fearon, Ted Hopf, Robert Keohane, Janet Newcity, Bruce Russett, Anne Sartori, Joe Underhill-Cady, Celeste Wallander, Suzanne Werner, the participants in the Alliances Workshop at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, and the participants in the IRISES workshop at the University of Michigan for their helpful comments. Any errors which remain are, of course, our responsibility.

[1] In this paper international *disputes* are defined as political conflicts between two independent states. If either state threatens to use or actually uses military force, the dispute becomes an international *crisis*. Our primary focus is on the influence of domestic political systems on decisions to use military force during international crises.

cies to initiate crises against all states. The final section summarizes the findings and offers directions for future research.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Theoretical scholarship on the democratic peace is characterized by two divisions: the source of the peace and the pattern of interaction. In terms of the source of the peace, most arguments fall into one of two schools: political norms or institutional structures. The normative explanation emphasizes the socialization of political leaders within their domestic political environment (Dixon 1993, 1994; Maoz and Russett 1993; Raymond 1994; Russett 1993). This argument posits that democratic political systems are characterized by compromise and nonviolent resolution of political conflicts. Democratic leaders are socialized into accepting these norms, and as a result the foreign policies of democracies are likely to be nonviolent and reflect the spirit of compromise. Nondemocratic political leaders, in contrast, are socialized in an environment in which coercion and violence are more widely accepted as legitimate means for resolving political disputes. Their foreign policies are assumed to reflect these norms, and hence nondemocracies are hypothesized to be more likely to initiate violence and less likely to compromise.[2]

In terms of the pattern of interaction, the institutional structure school focuses on the relationship between political structures and the domestic political costs of using force (Morgan and Schwebach 1992, Russett 1993). According to this school, decisions to use military force are based on domestic and international cost-benefit calculations. Foreign policy decisions can have costly domestic political repercussions. The expenditure of resources and loss of human life can mobilize opposition groups or fracture a ruling coalition. Relative to other political systems, democratic decision makers must be more sensitive to these potential domestic costs. This constrains their behavior in comparison with leaders of nondemocratic states (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992, Kant [1795] 1971, Russett 1993).

The assumptions that support these two explanations are worth laying out in greater detail. In the remainder of this section we present a series of propositions which reflect what we believe are the underlying assumptions of the theoretical writings on the democratic peace and specify how the ideas of different scholars converge and diverge.

The structural explanation posits four key assumptions.

STRUCTURAL ASSUMPTION ONE. *A central goal of state leaders is to retain their position of domestic political power.*

STRUCTURAL ASSUMPTION TWO. *In all political systems, domestic political opponents of a regime will attempt to mobilize political opposition when domestic and foreign policies pursued by the regime have failed to achieve stated policy goals.*

STRUCTURAL ASSUMPTION THREE. *In democratic political systems, however, counter-elites are better able to mobilize opposition in order to challenge incumbents for their policy failures.*

STRUCTURAL ASSUMPTION FOUR. *In all political systems, state leaders believe that a foreign policy setback for their country, stemming from a diplomatic retreat or military defeat, could pose a threat to their domestic political position.*[3]

In all countries, the ruling regime relies on a supporting constituency to remain in power. In addition, all state leaders must confront political opposition. While the scope and intensity of this opposition varies from regime to regime, political opposition eager to exploit policy failures exists in all states. The more democratic the regime, the higher is the probability that opposition groups will have the opportunity to mobilize opposition and/or splinter the ruling regime's supporting constituency. Democratic leaders, therefore, face a higher expected cost for failure because the probability that the costs are imposed is higher. Decisions to use military force are particularly risky since the likelihood of success and the costs to be incurred are often difficult to predict with high confidence. As a result, foreign policy leaders who face credible political opposition should be more concerned with protecting themselves from a political backlash by avoiding risky military confrontations.

The normative explanation posits two quite different assumptions.

NORMATIVE ASSUMPTION ONE. *Leaders socialized within democratic political systems are more likely to use compromise and nonviolent means to resolve disputes than are leaders socialized in authoritarian political systems.*

NORMATIVE ASSUMPTION TWO. *Norms and conflict resolution practices employed by political leaders when they are involved in domestic disputes are also used when these leaders seek to resolve international disputes and crises.*[4]

Domestic political systems induce political elites to resolve conflict in particular ways. Some political systems promote the use/threat of violence and the imposition of decisions to settle conflict, whereas other systems delegitimize violence and favor compromise to resolve disputes. Democratic systems, by prohibiting the use of threats and violence, socialize leaders in a system built on compromise and negotiation. In contrast, autocratic leaders are socialized in a system which tolerates or encourages the use of force against political opposi-

[2] Within the broad category of norms of compromise and nonviolence, we included an inclination for negotiated outcomes, a favorable attitude toward mediation by third parties, and a willingness to participate in binding arbitration.

[3] Empirical support for the relationship between failure in war and the loss of political power for wartime leaders is presented in Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995 and Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992. Also see Russett and Graham 1989.

[4] Several studies of foreign policy in the former Soviet Union have examined the link between internal patterns of political competition among elites and foreign policy behavior. See Goldgeier 1994, Ritcher 1994, and Roeder 1984.

tion; the vast majority of autocratic leaders either rise to power through the use of force or consolidate power by the systematic elimination of actual and potential opposition. Finally, normative explanations assume that regardless of the particular type of norms held by decision makers, they externalize these norms when facing international opponents.

The second theoretical division in this literature is over the causal pattern of the democratic peace; that is, whether democracies are more pacific in their actions toward all other states or only in their actions toward other democracies. We call the former claim the monadic proposition, as it assumes that the democratic peace emerges from the individual behavior of democratic states. The latter argument states that democracies are only more pacific toward one another, which we call the dyadic proposition, as it assumes that pacific policies are adopted in the context of democratic states interacting with one another.

In comparing the monadic and dyadic propositions, it is crucial to distinguish between the use of force in response to force (such as defending against an invasion) and the initiation of force (such as launching an invasion). Consider three kinds of foreign policies. First, a state could be a pure pacifist, unwilling to initiate or use force even in reply to the use of force. Such states are unlikely to remain independent in an anarchic system. Second, a state could be willing to respond with force but less likely to initiate the use of force. This strategy conforms with the assumptions laid out above for both the structural and normative explanations. The structural constraints on the use of force are likely to recede if force has already been used; public opinion may be averse to using force but recognizes the necessity of it when faced with an attack. The norms against the use of force also would not constrain force as a reply to force. For example, within a democracy, police force is sanctioned as a legitimate response to criminal force. A foreign policy informed by this norm then would permit the use of force in reply to the prior use of force. The third kind of foreign policy permits both the responsive use of force and the initiation of the use of force. This is not consistent with the monadic normative or structural explanations, as force is seen as a legitimate tool of foreign policy, not as a last resort. Note that while the second and third types of foreign policy exhibit very different patterns in the use of force, both may be expected to engage in violent behavior with any kind of state under certain circumstances. The critical distinction between these patterns lies in identifying which party initiates force. Thus, in testing arguments about the democratic peace, it is critical that one focus on the initiation of force, not simply the use of force or involvement in wars. Moreover, when examining the escalation of crises one needs to look at the level of military provocation each state faces.

The normative and structural arguments as laid out in the first six assumptions both point to the prediction that democracies are more pacific in their relations with all other states, not just other democracies. That is, these assumptions lead to the monadic prediction that democracies will reciprocate but not initiate force when dealing with all types of states. The structural assumptions imply that democratic leaders should expect a higher potential domestic cost of failure because the political opposition has a greater capacity to punish decision makers. Regardless of the regime type of the adversary, the higher cost of failure should make democratic states less likely to initiate and escalate. Similarly, the two normative assumptions imply that democratic decision makers should emphasize compromise and negotiation regardless of the regime type of the opponent. Reliance on such strategies should significantly lower the probability that democratic states are the first to resort to violence to resolve political disputes.

MONADIC HYPOTHESIS. *In a crisis, the more democratic a state, the less likely it is to initiate the use of force regardless of the political regime of the adversary.*

Some scholars have argued, however, that when democracies face nondemocracies they exhibit the third type of foreign policy, that is, democracies are willing both to reply with force and initiate the use of force against nondemocracies (for the structural explanation, see Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992, 158, and Russett 1993, 40; for the normative explanation, see Morgan and Schwebach 1992, 307). There are at least two reasons a democracy may initiate force when facing a nondemocratic adversary. First, if a democracy believes war is inevitable it may attack first to seize a military advantage (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992, 158). Second, other theorists have predicted that democracies may use force when they feel the negotiating process has broken down, as "democracies may initiate large-scale violence with nondemocracies rather than make the greater concessions demanded" (Russett 1993, 40). This reasoning predicts that a democracy is less likely to use force against another democracy in such a context, both because negotiations between democracies are more likely to yield a compromise solution and because a democracy is more likely to have faith in negotiations when facing a democracy (Dixon 1994).

The dyadic explanations, therefore, rest on the additional assumption that democratic decision makers fear exploitation. These leaders believe that their nondemocratic opponents view democratic political institutions as a source of weakness in the conduct of foreign policy. The public's aversion to paying the costs of war, the existence of political opposition within and outside the government, and a willingness to compromise all encourage autocratic leaders to challenge democratic polities. The fear of exploitation leads democratic leaders to alter their bargaining strategies (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992) and/or circumvent institutional constraints (Maoz and Russett 1993) when they are facing a nondemocratic adversary.

DYADIC ASSUMPTION. *The expectation that nondemocratic opponents will often resort to force and/or will refuse to negotiate in good faith leads democratic decision makers to adopt more coercive foreign policies, which include the first use of force in international crises.*

The additional assumption leads one to predict an alternative hypothesis.

DYADIC HYPOTHESIS. *In a crisis, the more democratic a state, the less likely it is to initiate the use of force against other democracies.*

Proponents of the monadic hypothesis reject this line of argument because they question the logical basis for assuming that democratic leaders believe they are exploitable. Democratic norms are compatible with a strategy of reciprocity in bargaining, and such a strategy does not encourage exploitation; it allows states to prepare adequately to defend their interests and to respond with force if attacked. While such a strategy may encourage the offering of contingent concessions, there is no reason to expect leaders following the strategy to make unilateral concessions. If democratic leaders do not believe they are exploitable, the rationale for becoming more coercive and intransigent when facing an autocratic opponent breaks down.

In summary, in contrast to some previous analyses, we have demonstrated that one can use both the normative and structural models to predict either a monadic or dyadic democratic peace.[5] The remainder of the paper addresses only the second of these two theoretical divisions. Our analysis is agnostic about whether the normative or structural model provides a better explanation of the democratic peace. Instead, we focus on the causal pattern, asking the question: Is the democratic peace monadic, meaning that democracies are unlikely to initiate violence against either democracies or nondemocracies, or is it dyadic, meaning that democracies are unlikely to initiate violence against democracies but willing to initiate against nondemocracies?

THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

The empirical literature on the democratic peace provides strong support for the proposition that democracies are pacific in their relations with one another, up to and including war, even controlling for alternative explanations such as geography and alliance ties (Bremer 1993; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992, 152; Doyle 1986; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Maoz and Russett 1993; Owen 1994; Russett 1993). The empirical support for the proposition that democracies are as belligerent in their relations with nondemocracies as are nondemocracies with one another is far more mixed. Small and Singer (1976) noted that democracies participated in war just as frequently as autocracies between 1816 and 1976. This was a useful preliminary finding, but just measuring frequency of participation is not a complete answer to the question of war-proneness, as one needs to place the frequency of participation within the context of a larger, systematic sample which includes nonparticipation.

A number of studies have moved beyond the Small and Singer approach by using the summed dyad as the unit of analysis.[6] In doing so they used improved sampling techniques by including cases of peace as well as war, enabling better assessments of frequency. It was hypothesized that if democracies are pacific toward one another but as equally war-prone toward nondemocracies as are nondemocracies toward one another, then we would expect democracy/democracy dyads to be less prone to conflict than all other kinds of dyads. Summed dyad studies offer empirical support for this proposition but also indicate that democracy/nondemocracy dyads are less prone to conflict than are nondemocracy/nondemocracy dyads. In wars since 1816, Bremer (1992) found that war was less likely in democracy/democracy dyads than in democracy/nondemocracy dyads and was less likely in the latter than in nondemocracy/nondemocracy dyads. Hewitt and Wilkenfeld (1995) uncovered similar results. Controlling for whether a crisis was ongoing, the gravity of the issues at stake in the crisis, and the level of violence in the trigger to the dispute, these authors found that as more democracies become involved in a crisis the likelihood that violence will be used in that crisis declines. Two other studies found that crises between nondemocracies were more likely to escalate to war than were crises between a democracy and a nondemocracy, which were in turn more likely to escalate to war than were crises between democracies (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992, 152–3; Morgan and Schwebach 1992). Maoz and Abdolali (1989) claimed to find that democracies are not generally more pacific, but they did find some limited evidence (p. 18) that democracies are more pacific toward all states. In contrast, one study that focused on a slightly different dependent variable—peaceful settlements—found that while such settlements are more likely when both disputants are democracies, the chances of peaceful settlement when only one of the disputants is democratic is about as likely as if both are not democratic (Dixon 1994; for a somewhat dissenting view, see Hewitt and Wilkenfeld 1995).

Measuring the conflict-proneness of dyads is an inefficient way to assess the pacifism of democracies, as a democracy can be peaceful and yet still belong to several war-prone dyads because it is attacked so often. A summed dyad unit of analysis obscures which state in the dispute is in fact forcing the crisis up the escalation ladder. In the twentieth century, the Belgium-Netherlands dyad has been peaceful, but the Belgium-Germany dyad has been war prone. This is not because democratic Belgium was more war prone in its relations with authoritarian Germany than was democratic Netherlands; Belgium did not initiate violence against either but was invaded twice by Germany (see Chan 1984, 636n). The summed dyad masks this kind of relationship.

The appropriate unit of analysis for assessing whether the democratic peace is monadic or dyadic is the nation-state. Such an approach enables us to discern which states initiate and escalate conflicts, and it thereby better permits the assessment of which states have a pacific

[5] A common misconception is the belief that structural explanations must yield monadic predictions and normative explanations must yield dyadic predictions.

[6] Most empirical tests of the democratic peace have relied on what Kegley and Skinner (1976) refer to as a summed dyad hypothesis. In order to test a summed dyad hypothesis, data are collected at the dyad level (e.g., "does the dyad escalate to war?"). Kegley and Skinner question the utility of summed dyad hypotheses.

foreign policy.[7] A few studies have tried to assess the pacifism of democracies using the nation-state as the unit of analysis. Using frequency counts, Small and Singer (1976, 64–6) found that democracies often have been on the initiating side of wars since 1816, but the study suffered from the previously mentioned sampling problem. Chan (1984, 636–9) conducted a somewhat more sophisticated statistical test and found that democracies were not statistically significantly less likely to be on the initiating side than were nondemocracies, although Domke (1988, 102) found democracies to be less likely to initiate wars of conquest. Leng (1993, 28–9) found that democracies were more likely than nondemocracies to use reciprocating bargaining strategies in international crises, reciprocation perhaps indicating a peaceful state willing to defend its interests. Two studies found that regimes with greater institutionalized constraints on state leadership (a common characteristic of democracies) were less prone to violent behavior than were less constrained regimes (Carment and James 1995; Geller 1985, 181). Schweller (1992) found that since 1665 no declining democratic great power has launched a preventive war against either a rising democratic or nondemocratic great power. Snyder and Mansfield (1995) used the nation as the unit of analysis in their study of democratization and war, but they looked at war participation rather than war initiation, thereby risking the same kinds of biases inherent in the summed dyad unit of analysis. Very few studies (exceptions include Leeds and Davis 1995 and Ray and Wang 1995) have combined all the necessary aspects of a proper test: a data set which includes cases of violence and nonviolence, identification of the state that initiates violence, and explicit comparison of the dyadic and monadic explanations.

Moreover, while a number of the later studies have expanded the domain from the set of very rare interstate wars to the set of relatively common militarized crises, a danger in generalizing the findings still exists. Examining the crisis behavior of democracies amounts to asking whether democracies are less likely to take violent actions in a crisis (or escalate it to war) than are nondemocracies. Yet, the theoretical foundations of the democratic peace should apply to precrisis behavior as well, since we would expect that democracies are less likely to become challengers in international disputes. We also might expect that challengers of the status quo would be more likely to use force first because altering the status quo would generally require action to force the defending state to change its behavior absent capitulation. Therefore, by failing to control for which state is challenging the status quo, one might falsely interpret a precrisis monadic effect of democracies being less likely to challenge the status quo as an intracrisis monadic effect of democracies being less likely to use force within crises. In other words, such analyses suffer the biases of an undetected selection effect (on selection effects in the deterrence debate, see Fearon 1994 and n.d.; see Achen 1986 on selection effects in general).

While the preceding discussion has focused on the debate over the pattern of interaction leading to the democratic peace, we should emphasize that adherents to the realist school reject the existence of either a monadic or dyadic peace. Realists have long argued that the distribution of military power among states and the degree of shared security interests between states are far more important determinants of state behavior than are domestic institutional structures. Realists assume that states resemble unitary rational actors in pursuit of a single overriding objective: survival and security in an anarchic system. The structural features of the international system lead all states to behave in a similar fashion regardless of their particular political institutions, economic structure, or ideological orientation (Waltz 1979).

The rapid growth of the democratic peace literature has, as should be expected, triggered a spirited realist counterattack. Spiro (1994) argues that the apparent peace among democracies is a statistical artifact resulting from the fact that both wars and democracies are rare. He concludes that a more full-bodied realist theory, which incorporates an element addressing the intersubjective understanding of state interests, could explain both alliance and conflict behavior. The inappropriate use of probability theory, however, severely undermines his conclusions (see Russett 1995). Layne (1994) examines four democracy-democracy crises and concludes that realist factors rather than institutional constraints or shared norms prevented the crises from escalating to war. While the use of case studies is an important step in the effort to understand fully the roots of the democratic peace, the examination of a very limited number of cases (the historical interpretations of which have been contested by Owen 1994) cannot decisively disprove a probabilistic argument.[8] Moreover, the fact that three of the four cases examined by Layne occurred during the 1800s raises uncertainty as to the generalizability of his results to the modern era, in which publics and legislatures have a much stronger influence on public policy. Finally, Farber and Gowa (1995; see also Cohen 1995) claim that the democratic peace is epiphenomenal and in reality is a manifestation of common security interests; the lack of conflict among democracies in the postwar period is simply due to the fact that they are much more likely to ally with one another, and alliance partners are unlikely to become engaged in conflict due to shared interests. We investigate this claim in the data analysis section.

This paper contributes to the existing empirical liter-

[7] A nation-state data set contains separate codings for the behavior of each actor in the crisis (e.g., does country A escalate the crisis? does country B escalate the crisis?). In order to test either a "directed dyad" or a "monadic" hypothesis, in the terminology of Kegley and Skinner (1976), requires the use of a nation-state data set. In this paper we test a directed dyadic hypothesis using nation-state data and an interactive term. For simplicity, however, we refer to our test as the "dyadic hypothesis."

[8] While there are exceptions (Rummel 1983), most researchers have proposed and tested probabilistic arguments (i.e., norms and structures reduce the probability of using military force) rather than deterministic laws (i.e., democracies will never use force against another democracy). While selecting on the dependent variable in order to refute a deterministically necessary condition (i.e., a law) is a useful approach, the method cannot be used to refute decisively a probabilistic argument.

ature on the democratic peace in two important ways. First, it directly compares monadic and directed dyadic hypotheses by using the state as the unit of analysis, initiation as the dependent variable, and a statistical model which permits the separation of dyadic and monadic effects. Second, it controls for which crisis participant challenged the status quo, avoiding the potential bias incurred by conflating precrisis and intracrisis behavior. We will address the important issue of selection effects in the concluding section.

HYPOTHESES, RESEARCH DESIGN, AND MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES

We now turn to the list of specific hypotheses that we will examine. The logic behind the first two hypotheses has already been discussed in detail.

HYPOTHESIS 1 (Monadic). *In a crisis, the more democratic a state, the less likely it is to initiate the use of force regardless of the political regime of the adversary.*

HYPOTHESIS 2 (Dyadic). *In a crisis, the more democratic a state, the less likely it is to initiate the use of force against other democracies.*

An important component of the dyadic explanation is expressed in the dyadic assumption: Democracies may preemptively initiate the use of force against authoritarian states because they fear exploitation. The argument posits that authoritarian leaders believe that democracies are more likely to capitulate; this belief leads the authoritarian leaders to attempt to exploit democracies by attacking first (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992, 155–60).[9] If this is true, then we would expect nondemocratic states to be more likely to initiate the use of force against democracies. While we are not claiming to test the dyadic assumption directly, we can probe the underlying logic of the argument with this auxiliary hypothesis.[10]

HYPOTHESIS 3. *In a crisis, nondemocracies are more likely to initiate the use of force against democracies than they are against nondemocracies.*

In addition to our analysis of the democratic peace, however, it is important that we include some controls in our analysis. One important control variable already discussed is whether the crisis actor in question is challenging the status quo. We would expect such actors to be more likely to initiate the use of force because it is often necessary in order to achieve their goals if their opponent does not capitulate. Status quo powers, in contrast, generally need not use force to achieve their goals unless their opponent does so first.

HYPOTHESIS 4. *In a crisis, if the actor is challenging the status quo, then the actor is more likely to initiate the use of force.*

Second, a prominent explanation for the use of force in international crises is the balance of military capabilities. Realists argue that the distribution of power among states should be the most powerful predictor of state behavior. States that enjoy a military advantage should be more likely to initiate force both because their military action is likely to be successful and because the cost is likely to be lower than when one faces a military disadvantage. Weaker states, however, will view the initiation of violence as a very risky strategy which is likely to result in substantial costs.

HYPOTHESIS 5. *In a crisis, the more the balance of military forces tends to favor the actor, the more likely is the actor to initiate the use of force.*

Finally, states that share substantial interests beyond the particular issue at stake in an international crisis may be deterred from escalating that crisis because they fear losing the other benefits they gain from the relationship with their opponent. Realists stress that shared security interests rather than domestic structures or shared norms should dictate decisions to use force. While nonmilitary factors such as trade or cultural ties may affect military action, realists claim that common security interests are the most likely candidates for influencing the escalation of international crises. Perhaps the best observable indicators of shared security interests are military alliance ties. Thus, we predict that allied states will be less likely to initiate force against one another in a crisis (Bremer 1992).

HYPOTHESIS 6. *In a crisis, if the actor has any military alliance ties with its adversary, then the actor is less likely to initiate the use of force.*

We test our hypotheses using the revised International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set. It contains the population of international crises from 1918 to 1988 in which one or both parties threatened to use, or actually used, military force to resolve a political conflict. The data set represents the most comprehensive attempt to identify the universe of international crises during the interwar and postwar periods. Moreover, the ICB provides much more extensive documentation than alternative data sets that identify the population of militarized disputes.[11]

Our data set is an adaptation of the revised ICB data set. From the ICB's 390 crises, we eliminated six categories. First, we removed 27 crises that occurred within the context of a full-scale war because conceptually we consider decisions to escalate the geographic scope or

[9] Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) have an existence proof which identifies the possibility of defensive preemption by democratic states in this situation. Reiter (1995), however, finds that preemptive strikes rarely happen.

[10] If democratic leaders can be shown to fear exploitation, even if no empirical evidence exists to support this belief, then the logic of the dyadic argument remains intact.

[11] A description of the ICB's structure as well as summaries of the international crises included in the original version can be found in Brecher, Wilkenfeld, and Moser (1988). The revised version, which uses the same coding rules but adds crises from 1918–29 and 1980–88, is available from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR 9286) at the University of Michigan. The well-documented data set has been used in a wide variety of international relations studies, including Maoz and Russett (1993) and Hewitt and Wilkenfeld (1995). Unfortunately, no broader data set comprising the universe of international disputes for the period under consideration currently exists. The authors are in the process of creating one. Therefore, the results presented here focus on the role of domestic institutions *within* crises; we cannot generalize to the broader set of international disputes at this time.

intensity of a major military conflict as fundamentally different from decisions to initiate an armed conflict or to escalate an existing dispute up to the large-scale use of force. For example, we removed the Stalingrad crisis of 1942 because the German decision to use force in the battle over Stalingrad is fundamentally different from the decision to launch the attack against the Soviet Union (Barbarossa Crisis) in 1941. Once large-scale armed conflict has occurred, we believe that the further use of force becomes largely a matter of military strategy and tactics, while domestic political considerations become much less important.

Second, we eliminated 39 crises in which, upon investigation, we failed to find evidence of either verbal threats or threats of force accompanied by military deployments by the challenger. Thus, in some cases we could not find evidence in the historical record indicating that the challenger was considering the use force even though the opponent in the crisis perceived a threat (e.g., the Bulgaria-Turkey Crisis of 1925); in other cases the challenger was intervening on the side of the internationally recognized government (e.g., Soviet actions during the East Berlin Uprising Crisis in 1953).

Third, we removed nine crises in which states capitulated to the demands of the challenger prior to the use of force by either side. Challengers in these crises never faced a discrete decision of whether to use force to resolve the political conflict. For example, in the Polish Ultimatum crisis of 1938, Lithuania capitulated to Polish demands for the normalization of relations and the opening of the border between the two countries; thus, Poland did not face a decision of whether to use force in an attempt to coerce a determined adversary.

Fourth, we aggregated 38 crises in which several conflicts erupted within the same basic dispute over a prolonged period. For example, the numerous cross-border raids involving South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas and South African Defense Forces from 1978 to 1987 were aggregated into a single case. After the initial crisis in 1978, all subsequent crises were treated as "intrawar" disputes because SWAPO guerrilla activity was almost continuous throughout this period.

Fifth, we removed five crises that involved a colonial power versus an indigenous independence movement. Our theoretical framework applies to the bargaining norms and political structures of independent state actors, and independence movements typically lack formal political institutional structures. In addition, it is unclear just what sort of conflict resolution norms are established under colonial rule. For these reasons, we removed colonial cases such as the Indonesia Independence crises of 1945, 1947, and 1948.

Finally, we removed three crises because one or both actors were not internationally recognized as sovereign states as defined by Small and Singer (1982).

We then added several crises by disaggregating conflicts with multiple conflictual dyads. For example, the single case identified by the ICB data set as the Invasion of Scandinavia was disaggregated into two cases: Germany versus Denmark and Germany versus Norway. After removing and disaggregating crises, we arrived at a final data set of 303 conflict dyads occurring within 272 international crises. For each crisis, we collect data on both the challenger and defender states because political leaders in both countries must decide when and to what extent military force should be used.[12] As a result, the data set to be tested consists of 606 observations (i.e., 303 decisions by the challenger whether to use force and 303 decisions by the defender whether to use force). The crises and conflict dyads included in the analysis are listed in Appendix A; a list of crises from the revised ICB data set that were deleted or merged can be found in Appendix B.

We turn now to a discussion of the specific measurements used to operationalize our hypotheses.

Initiation of Force

The first dependent variable measures the number of times a country was the first to use force at either minor or major levels of force during the crisis. The variable ranges from 0 to 2. If a state is the first to use a minor level of force (commit up to 1,000 troops to a combat zone) and the first to escalate the crisis to a major level of force (commit more than 1,000 troops to a combat zone), then it is coded 2. Alternatively, if one state is the first to escalate a crisis to a low level of force while the other state is the first to escalate to a high level of force, both states are coded 1. For example, in the 1969 Ussuri River confrontation between China and the former Soviet Union, both countries are coded 1. China was the first to escalate to a low level of force when it initiated a border clash at the beginning of March, but the Soviet Union was the first to escalate to a high level of force when it launched a large-scale counterattack in mid-March (Robinson 1981). In both instances, leaders made a conscious decision to resort to military force to resolve the political dispute. Finally, if neither side uses military force, the variable is coded 0 for both actors.[13]

Our measurement of the use of force includes the actions of state actors supporting nonstate actors, such as independence movements. For example, Algerian

[12] For each crisis, we have paired the primary challenger(s) and defender(s); the original ICB data set simply lists the actors involved in the conflict. The challenger is seeking to overturn the status quo. Although the challenger typically initiates the use of force, this need not be the case. In the 1967 Six Day War, we code Egypt as the challenger and Israel as the initiator of armed conflict.

[13] Since our data set is comprised of two decisions about the initiation of force, this creates the possibility that spatial autocorrelation will contaminate our results. Unfortunately, this problem cannot currently be accounted for in a probit model because the error terms do not conform to the usual assumptions of the ordinary-least-squares regression model. It is important to remember, however, that autocorrelation only affects the estimated standard errors of the coefficients (and thus their statistical significance), but it does not cause the coefficients to be biased (see Hanushek and Jackson 1977). In order to assess the potential for autocorrelation to exaggerate the statistical significance of our results, consider the worst case possibility: a perfect correlation between the error terms of the two states in a crisis. Under these circumstances, the proper statistical significance of our coefficients could be determined by multiplying their standard errors by the square-root of 2. The statistical results presented below remain significant even in this worst-case scenario. Moreover, the results are robust using the alternative dependent variable discussed below, which eliminates the potential dependency entirely.

support of the Polisario independence movement in the Spanish Sahara makes Algeria a crisis participant which used force against Morocco. The expanded definition addresses, in part, Cohen's (1995) concern that the failure to include the use of surrogate forces in previous empirical research has led to a systematic underestimation of the use of force by democracies.

Highest Level of Force

In order to test for the robustness of our results, we included a second measure for our dependent variable. This alternative coding measures the most severe level of force used by a state in the crisis. The variable, which varies from 0 to 2, was coded for both the challenger and the defender. If the actor used more than 1,000 troops at any point during the crisis, the variable was coded 2 (or as a high level of force). If the actor used up to 1,000 troops, the variable was coded 1 (or as a low level of force). If military forces were not used, the variable was coded 0 (or no use of force). For example, in the Mayaguez crisis in 1975, the United States was coded 1 because the rescue operation involved approximately 300 troops (Head, Short, and McFarlane 1978, 141).

We wish to make this a measure of the *disproportionate* use of force in crisis behavior, a concept similar to the initiation of the use of force. To accomplish this, we also measure the highest level of force initiated by the *opposing* side as a control. Our hypotheses about the disproportionate use of force mirror those concerning *Initiation of Force*.

Opponent's Initiation of Force

This variable is coded as the highest level of force *initiated* by the opposing state. Thus, the variable does not include uses of force by the opposing state in response to similar military actions of the state in question. If the opposing state initiated a major use of force, then this variable is coded 2. If the opponent initiated a minor use of force but did not initiate a major use, then this variable is coded 1. Finally, if the opposing state is not the first to use force at any level, then this variable is coded 0. For example, in the Six Day War in 1967, both Israel and Egypt used high levels of force, but Israel is coded 0 because its opponent did not initiate a minor or major use of force.

Actor's Democracy

We used the Polity II data set to code for the level of democracy within each state (Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore 1989). We constructed our index by subtracting the Polity II autocracy index from the democracy index to produce a variable which ranges from −10 to +10. In order to ease the interpretation of the statistical results, this variable was rescaled from 0 to 20. The Polity II democracy index is comprised of four components: openness of executive recruitment, competitiveness of executive recruitment, competitiveness of participation, and legislative constraints on the executive. The autocracy index contains all the elements in the democracy index plus a fifth component, the regulation of participation.

We revised the Polity II codings in three ways. First, some countries were originally coded 0 on the democracy and autocracy indexes even when there was missing data for *all* the components of the indexes (e.g., Italy 1922–27). Second, the democracy and autocracy indexes are often created even when one or more of the subcomponents are missing (e.g., Cuba 1959–86). This implies, for example, that for some countries the autocracy index varies from 0 to 10, while for other countries it only varies from 0 to 7. In order to correct for these first two problems, we used the Polity II coding rules to fill in the missing data at the subcomponent level. We then reconstructed the aggregate indexes using formulas identified in Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore (1989, 37–9).[14]

Finally, we examined the subcomponent level data to ensure that codings corresponded to conventional historical accounts. The only cases in which we found the codings to be very questionable involved Japan during the interwar period. According to the Polity II data set, the Japanese legislature had authority equal to or greater than the executive from 1885 to 1945. This places the Japanese legislature in the most constraining category, making it equivalent to the British House of Commons or the U.S. Congress. We believe that the historical record indicates that only slight to moderate limitations on executive authority existed after the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi and the demise of the party system in 1932 (Beasley 1990, 181; Berger 1988).[15] We believe all three types of revisions fit within both the letter and the spirit of the coding rules described in Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore (1989).

Opponent's Democracy

This variable was coded on the basis of the same data as the *Actor's Democracy* score and therefore ranges from 0 to 20 as well.

Interactive-Dyadic Democracy

In order to isolate the effect of level of democracy when facing a democratic opponent, we introduced an interactive term composed of the *Actor's Democracy* score multiplied by a dummy version of the *Opponent's Democracy* score. If the latter is 17 or greater on the

[14] The first problem is simply an error in the data set, probably introduced through the use of a formula which masks the difference between missing data and a value of zero. The second problem is not an error. For example, in the case of Cuba since 1959, the Polity II data set does contain values for "Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment" or "Openness of Executive Recruitment" because there has been no executive transition since Castro took over. Given that we must use an identical scale across all cases, we code the missing data based on the existing structure. In the absence of any evidence indicating that elections will be used to designate the next executive, we assume that the succession will be by selection from within the ruling elite. These first two problems affected the codings of approximately 20% of the cases.

[15] There are 11 disputes involving Japan after 1932. We have recoded the 7-point legislative constraints on the executive component of the Polity II indices from "Executive Parity or Subordination" (level 7) to "Slight to Moderate Limitations on Executive Authority" (level 3).

democracy scale, the dummy variable is coded 1. Otherwise, the variable is coded 0. Thus, when the opposing state is not democratic, this variable takes on a value of 0. When the opposing state is a democracy, however, this variable is equal to the *Actor's Democracy* score. Including this interaction as a separate variable in the analysis will allow us to identify the additional effect that the *Actor's Democracy* score has on a state's behavior *because* the opposing state is democratic.

The threshold of 17 identifies states as democratic if they share at least the following aspects of democratic government: (1) fully competitive political participation, which implies that "there are relatively stable and enduring political groups which regularly compete for political influence at the national level" (Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore 1989, 19); (2) a popularly elected chief executive; and (3) an executive branch with at least moderate constraints on its authority. The threshold of 17 is a salient empirical break in the data between one large group of states scoring 14 or 15 on the democracy scale and a second substantial group, which scored between 18 and 20. Moreover, sensitivity analysis demonstrated that varying the threshold from 17 to 19 did not change the patterns or statistical significance of the results.

In sum, three terms were used to test the democracy-initiation hypotheses: the *Actor's Democracy* score, the *Opponent's Democracy* score, and an interaction term. When the adversary is not democratic, the interaction term is coded 0, and so the *Actor's Democracy* score term measures the influence of the actor's political structure on the likelihood of initiation. When the adversary is democratic, all three variables will generally be positive, so in this case the measure of the effect of an actor's political structure on the likelihood of initiation is determined by all three terms. Finally, as the actor becomes increasingly undemocratic, the *Actor's Democracy* score and interaction terms converge to 0, meaning that the effect of political structure on the likelihood of initiation is determined by the *Opponent's Democracy* score.

Balance of Forces

This independent variable, which tests the realist argument that the distribution of power determines decisions to use force, measures each state's military capabilities relative to its opponent. A state's military capability is the average of three elements: number of troops, military expenditures, and military expenditures per soldier. The variable is created in four steps. First, the raw data were converted to a percentage relative to the global total of the element (e.g., actor A's troops in 1919/global total number of troops in 1919). Second, when necessary the totals were discounted to reflect the distance between the actor and the location of the conflict. The method used to discount power projection capability was developed by Bueno de Mesquita (1981, 103).[16] Third, for each element, the actor's capabilities were calculated as a percentage of the combined capabilities of both actors (e.g., actor A's troops/(actor A's troops + actor B's troops)). Finally, we averaged the three elements (troops, expenditures, expenditures per soldier). The final variable ranges from 0 to 1. A value more than 0.50 indicates that the state's military capability is superior to its opponent, and when the value approaches 1 a state then enjoys an overwhelming military advantage. The source of the troop and expenditure data was the Correlates of War Project data set, National Capabilities of States, 1816–1990.[17]

Shared Alliance Tie

This dummy variable is included to control for the realist argument that interests, indicated by a shared alliance, are an important determinate of state behavior in crises. The variable takes on a value of 1 when the two states in the crisis share a defense pact, neutrality pact, or an entente. Otherwise, the variable is coded 0. Sources for the alliance variable included, among others, Degenhardt (1986), Oren (1990), and Small and Singer (1990).

Satisfaction with the Status Quo

This control variable is coded 1 if a state is satisfied with the status quo with regard to the issue at stake in the crisis at the time that the crisis begins. It is coded 0 otherwise. We determined whether states were satisfied with the status quo by examining policy statements about the issue at stake immediately prior to initiation of the crisis. States which accepted the status quo as a settlement of the issue in the dispute were coded as satisfied. States which either viewed the current situation as unacceptable or were actively seeking an immediate change were coded as not satisfied. The vast majority of crises in the data set fall into two categories: territorial disputes (50%) and antiregime disputes (30%). In territorial crises, states were coded as satisfied with the status quo if they favored maintaining the current borders. In antiregime crises, states not actively seeking to overthrow another regime were coded as satisfied. States in which top foreign policy decision makers called for a revision of the territorial boundaries or the removal of opposing regimes were coded as dissatisfied. Other types of crises, such as conflicts over adherence to peace treaties and the treatment of nationals abroad, were coded in an analogous manner. In general, of course, challenging states were coded 0, while defenders were coded 1. There were a number of crises, however, such as the Indo-Chinese disputes over the North-East Frontier Agency, in which neither state was satisfied.

DATA ANALYSIS

The first set of results to be discussed are those for the *Initiation of Force* dependent variable. For this equation, the distribution of values on the trichotomous dependent variable was as follows: never escalates (0) in 56%

[16] Adjusted Capabilities = Composite Capabilities$^{\log(\text{miles/miles per day})+(10-e)}$.

[17] We would like to thank Professor J. David Singer for permitting us to work with the most updated version of this data set prior to its being deposited at the ICPSR.

TABLE 1. Probit Analysis Using *Initiation of Force* Dependent Variable

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	T-ratio
Actor's Democracy	−0.013	0.009	1.470
Actor's Democracy × Dummy Opponent's Democracy	−0.057	0.018***	3.146
Opponent's Democracy	0.027	0.009**	2.893
Balance of Forces	0.996	0.192***	5.187
Shared Alliance Ties	−0.072	0.142	0.505
Satisfaction with Status Quo	−1.892	0.183***	10.316
Second Threshold	0.912	0.084***	10.912
Constant	−0.283	0.167*	1.681

Number of observations = 606
Percent correctly predicted = 59%
Log likelihood at convergence = −472.6
All significance tests are one-tailed: *p > .05, **p > .01, ***p > .001.

of the cases, escalates once (1) in 24% of the cases, and escalates twice (2) in 20% of the cases (N = 606). This equation was estimated with an ordered probit model, and the results are presented in Table 1. On the one hand, hypothesis 1 (the monadic argument) predicts that the coefficient on the *Actor's Democracy* score will be negative and that the interaction term will be insignificant. Hypothesis 2 (the dyadic argument), on the other hand, predicts that the coefficient on the *Actor's Democracy* score will be insignificant, and the coefficient on the interaction term will be negative. Hypothesis 3, which tests a portion of the dyadic logic, predicts that the coefficient for the *Opponent's Democracy* score should be positive.

With regard to the control variables, the predictions of the hypotheses are fairly straightforward. Hypothesis 4 predicts that the coefficient on *Satisfaction with the Status Quo* will be negative. Hypothesis 5 predicts that the coefficient on the *Balance of Forces* will be positive. And hypothesis 6 predicts that the coefficient on *Shared Alliance Ties* will be negative.

The results strongly support the dyadic hypothesis and only weakly support the monadic hypothesis. The coefficient on the *Actor's Democracy* variable is slightly negative and falls just short of conventional thresholds of statistical significance. The coefficient on the interaction term, however, is sharply negative and statistically significant at the 0.001 level. These results indicate that democratic states are clearly less likely to initiate force against other democracies but only marginally less likely to initiate force against nondemocratic states. The results also provide support for hypothesis 3; the coefficient on the variable is solidly positive and statistically significant. This result implies that states are more likely to initiate force against democracies than against nondemocracies.[18]

In order to evaluate the substantive significance of these effects, we must consult the marginal impact analysis in Table 2. The table displays the probability of initiation for each level of the dependent variable and the change in probability (shown in boldface type) associated with a change in an independent variable while holding all other variables at their means or modes. The top portion of Table 2 illustrates the relative weakness of the monadic hypothesis. When the opposing state is not democratic, changing a state's domestic structure from absolutely authoritarian (0) to fully democratic (20) only decreases the probability that it will initiate twice by 8 percentage points. As the table shows, the predicted probability of initiating force twice only decreases from 32% to 24% as the *Actor's Democracy* score shifts from 0 to 20. This same change in government structure would cause a decrease of just one percentage point in the probability of initiating force once, and an increase of only 9 percentage points in the probability of never initiating force.

When the opposing state is a democracy, however, domestic structure has a powerful effect on a state's propensity to initiate the use of force. The second portion of Table 2 demonstrates that under these conditions changing a state's domestic structure from totally authoritarian (0) to a mixed system (10) decreases the probability that a state will initiate force twice by 24 percentage points. A further increase from a mixed system (10) to full democracy (20) decreases this probability by another 14 percentage points. This change in political structure from absolute autocracy to full democracy decreases the predicted probability that a state will initiate force twice against another democracy from 44% to 6% when holding other variables at their means or modes. At the same time, the change from autocracy to democracy also generates a reduction of 14 percentage points in the probability that a state will initiate force once and a very large increase of 52 percentage points in the probability that a state will never use force at all when facing a democracy.

The third portion of Table 2 examines the behavior of nondemocratic states when facing a democratic opponent. As predicted by the Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) argument presented as hypothesis 3, we find that completely autocratic states are more likely to initiate against democratic opponents. Changing the *Opponent's Democracy* score from completely authoritarian (0) to fully democratic (20) increases the predicted probability of initiating twice from 24% to 44%, or a change of 20 percentage points. In contrast, the probability of never initiating force falls by 19 percentage points. While the results cannot tell us if democratic decision makers are aware of the tendency and respond by altering their strategies, the results do support one key element of the dyadic argument: Autocracies appear to view democracies as exploitable.

The precise nature of the interactive relationship between regime type and a state's propensity to initiate force is illustrated in Figure 1. The dashed line represents the effect of a state's democracy when its opponent is not democratic, while the solid line represents the effect of democracy when facing a democratic state. The exclusively monadic argument would predict that these

[18] The marginal analysis indicates that this result is the product of nondemocratic states initiating against democracies.

TABLE 2. Marginal Effects on *Initiation of Force*

	Probability (initiate twice)	Percentage Point Change from Value Above	Probability (initiate once)	Percentage Point Change from Value Above	Probability (never initiate)	Percentage Point Change from Value Above
Actor's Democracy with Nondemocratic Opponent						
0	32		35		33	
10	28	**−4**	35	**0**	37	**4**
20	24	**−4**	34	**−1**	42	**5**
Total Change		**−8**		**−1**	9	
Actor's Democracy with Democratic Opponent						
0	44		34		22	
10	20	**−24**	33	**−1**	48	**26**
20	6	**−14**	20	**−13**	74	**26**
Total Change		**−38**		**−14**		**52**
Opponent's Democracy for Fully Autocratic State						
0	24		34		41	
10	34	**10**	35	**1**	31	**−10**
20	44	**10**	34	**−1**	22	**−9**
Total Change		**20**		**0**		**−19**
Balance of Forces						
1:9	17		31		52	
1:3	21	**4**	33	**2**	46	**−6**
1:1	28	**7**	35	**2**	37	**−9**
3:1	37	**9**	35	**0**	28	**−9**
9:1	43	**6**	34	**−1**	23	**−5**
Total Change		**26**		**3**		**−29**
Shared Alliance Ties						
No	28		35		37	
Yes	26	**−2**	35	**0**	39	**2**
Satisfaction with Status Quo						
No	28		35		37	
Yes	1	**−27**	5	**−30**	94	**57**

Note: Predicted probabilities and percentage point change may not sum to 100% due to rounding. Marginal effects were calculated by generating predicted values from the probit model while changing the values of selected independent variables and holding the others at their means or modes. The predicted values were transformed into probabilities that the outcome would fall into each category by summing the area underneath the cumulative normal distribution between the predicted value and each of the category thresholds.

two lines should be identical. A mixed monadic-dyadic argument could account for different effects of democracy when facing differing opponents, but both of the lines should have a negative slope. The relatively flat slope of the dashed line, however, clearly demonstrates that a state's level of democracy has a limited effect on its initiation of conflict when facing a nondemocratic state. The downward sloping solid line shows that democracy does matter when opposing a democracy. Moreover, the fact that the solid line is higher than the dashed line at the left-hand side of Figure 1 is consistent with Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's claim (1992) that authoritarian leaders view democracies as weak, which leads them to initiate the use of force more often. Notice that the solid line remains above the dashed line until the *Actor's Democracy* score reaches 5. Thus, states with an *Actor's Democracy* score of less than 5 are more likely to initiate force against a democratic opponent. Any state with an *Actor's Democracy* score greater than 5 is less likely to initiate force against a democratic state. Finally, the fact that the solid line reaches much lower than the dashed line captures one of the empirical findings that has driven research on the democratic peace. That is, when two states in a crisis are democratic, they are very unlikely to initiate force against each other.

In addition to levels of democracy, a number of other variables in our analysis also have a significant effect on *Initiation of Force*. First, as shown in Table 1, the coefficient for the *Balance of Forces* used to test the realist argument is strongly positive and statistically significant at the 0.001 level. The more powerful the state relative to its opponent, the more likely it is to initiate the use of force. In Table 2, the marginal analysis indicates that increasing the balance of power from a very unfavorable 1:9 ratio to a very favorable 9:1 ratio increases the probability of initiating force twice by 26 percentage points. While power considerations clearly play an important role, the important finding is the fact that the marginal effect of the domestic political institution variables are just as large as the realist variable. The results imply that realists who deny the importance of domestic political institutions are as incorrect as those who claim domestic factors dominate foreign policy decisions.[19] The second realist argument, which states

[19] A log-likelihood ratio test demonstrates that the full model is

FIGURE 1. The Effect of *Actor's Democracy* on *Initiation of Force*



that shared alliances indicate shared interests and therefore should decrease the likelihood of conflict, is not supported by the data. The *Shared Alliance Ties* variable is neither statistically nor substantively significant. Table 1 reveals that its t-ratio is only 0.505, and Table 2 demonstrates that an alliance has virtually no effect on *Initiation of Force* in international crises. This result may seem counterintuitive, but it is consistent with some other empirical findings (Bueno de Mesquita 1981). We shall discuss some potential reasons for this findings when we turn to the issue of selection effects below.[20] Finally, being satisfied with the status quo has a very large influence on a state's propensity to initiate the use of force. Table 2 shows that changing a state from dissatisfied to satisfied decreases the probability of initiating force twice by 27 percentage points and increases the probability of never initiating force by 57 percentage points.

In order to test the robustness of these findings, we now turn to our analysis of the *Highest Level of Force* used in a crisis.[21] Once again the results clearly provide much stronger support for the dyadic hypothesis compared to the monadic hypothesis. The trichotomous dependent variable was distributed as follows: no escalation (0) in 30% of the cases, low level of escalation (1) in 32% of the cases, and high level of escalation (2) in 38% of the cases ($N = 606$). We used an ordered probit model to test our hypotheses, and the results are shown in Table 3. The coefficients for the various interactive effects of democracy should be interpreted in the same manner as discussed above.

Our results concerning the highest level of escalation virtually mirror those concerning *Initiation of Force*. Thus, the effects we document are robust across differing measures of the use of force in international crises. The coefficient on the *Actor's Democracy* variable remains slightly negative but again fails to achieve statistical significance. The interaction between *Actor's Democracy*

significantly superior to those that restrict the model by excluding either the domestic institutional variables ($v = 16.04$, $df = 3, p < .01$) or the realist variables ($v = 24.32$, $df = 2, p < .001$). The formula used to determine significance levels is: $v = -2$[log-likelihood function value x_1 − log-likelihood function value x_2] with $x_2 - x_1$ degrees of freedom and where x_1 represents the restricted model and x_2 represents the full model. The significance level is calculated using a chi-square distribution (see Greene 1990, 356). Calculations based on the second dependent variable are even stronger ($v = 22.82$, $df = 3$, $p < .001$) and ($v = 21.12$, $df = 2, p < .001$) for the institutional and realist variables, respectively.

[20] Auxiliary regressions performed for all equations presented in this paper revealed that none of the variables which failed to achieve statistical significance had auxiliary R^2 of more than 0.46. Thus, multicolinearity cannot explain the insignificant results in any of our analyses. There is no evidence to support the Farber and Gowa (1995) claim that shared alliance ties among democracies are the real cause of the democratic peace. Moreover, in contrast to the predictions of Farber and Gowa, the coefficients are stable across both the interwar and postwar periods.

[21] In addition to using multiple dependent variables, we also conducted sensitivity analysis on various coding methods for the measures of monadic and dyadic hypotheses about the democratic peace. The statistical and substantive results remained stable when using a dummy *Opponent's Democracy* variable, incorporating dummy variables for all three institutional variables, altering the threshold for the interactive term, and incorporating a power concentration index from Polity II into the democracy variables (see Maoz and Russett 1993). The only exception was lowering the value of the threshold used in the interactive term to 16 when using the *Initiation of Force* dependent variable; the results remained robust using the *Highest Level of Force* dependent variable.

TABLE 3. Probit Analysis Using *Highest Level of Force* Dependent Variable

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	T-ratio
Actor's Democracy	−0.010	0.007	1.298
Actor's Democracy × Dummy Opponent's Democracy	−0.070	0.018***	3.819
Opponent's Democracy	0.025	0.009**	2.856
Balance of Forces	0.785	0.177***	4.426
Shared Alliance Ties	−0.240	0.130*	1.840
Satisfaction with Status Quo	−1.196	0.129***	9.294
Opponent's Initiation of Force	0.867	0.085***	10.177
Second Threshold	1.031	0.093***	11.084
Constant	0.080	0.162	0.496

Number of observations = 606
Percent correctly predicted = 51%
Log likelihood at convergence = −561.4
All significance tests are one-tailed; *p > .05, **p > .01, ***p > .001.

and the dummy variable marking democratic opponents, however, is strongly negative and statistically significant at the 0.001 level. Finally, the coefficient on the opponent's democratic status remains strongly positive and statistically significant.

The substantive effects of the variables in this model are documented in Table 4. In generating these marginal effects the opponent's *Initiation of Force* variable was held constant at zero. Thus, these marginal effects may be interpreted as predicting the level of force used by a state given that its opponent does not initiate the use of force. That is, these effects capture the predicted probabilities of the disproportionate use of force. The top portion of Table 4 demonstrates that when the opposing state is not democratic, changes in a state's domestic structure have a limited effect on its propensity to escalate crises. The transformation from total autocracy to full democracy reduces the likelihood of using major force by only 7 percentage points. Similarly, such a change in domestic structure has no effect at all on the minor use of force and increases the probability of not using force by only 7 percentage points.

Just as was the case with *Initiation of Force*, however, when the opposing state is a democracy these results change dramatically. Table 4 shows that in this context changing a state's *Actor's Democracy* score from 0 to 20 decreases the probability of using major force by 43 percentage points. Specifically, the predicted probability that a state will use major levels of force if its opponent does not initiate falls from 48% to 5%. Moreover, the third portion of Table 4 shows that fully authoritarian states are 19 percentage points more likely to use major force against a democratic opponent than they are against an authoritarian one, even if the opposing state takes no provocative military action.

Figure 2 illustrates this interactive relationship. As with the previous analysis, the dashed line represents the effect of democracy when facing a nondemocratic state, and the solid line represents the same effect when the opponent is democratic. As one would expect, this figure matches the findings in Figure 1 in nearly every respect. The downward sloping solid line in combination with a relatively flat dashed line indicates strong support for the dyadic argument.

Once again, a number of the control variables also have a significant effect on the level of force used in a crisis. The coefficient for *Balance of Forces* is strongly positive and significant at the 0.001 level. As with *Initiation of Force*, Table 4 shows that the substantive effect of this variable is significant, but it does not overwhelm the importance of domestic structure. The most significant difference between this model and the previous equation is that *Shared Alliance Ties* have a significant effect on the disproportionate use of force. The coefficient for this variable is negative and significant at the 0.05 level. Substantively, the fact that two states in a crisis share an alliance has only a modest influence on their conflict behavior. Once again, Table 4 shows that allied states are only about 9 percentage points less likely to use major force against each other. The probability that they will make a minor disproportionate use of force does not change, while the probability that they will not use any force if their opponent does not initiate only increases by 9 percentage points. *Satisfaction with the Status Quo*, however, continues to have an extremely powerful effect on crisis behavior. The coefficient for this variable is strongly negative and significant at the 0.001 level. Table 4 illustrates that a change in status from dissatisfied to satisfied decreases the predicted probability of using major force from 34% to 5% and increases the predicted probability of never using force from 27% to 72%.

Finally, as one would expect, the opposing state's initiation of violence has a very powerful influence on a state's level of escalation in a crisis. Table 4 shows that as the opposing state shifts from not initiating force to initiating minor force, the probability that a state will use major force increases by 33 percentage points. The probability that a state will use minor force or will use no force in response, however, declines by 13 and 20 percentage points, respectively. In this context, a major use of force is still disproportionate because the opposing state has only made a small-scale use of violence. Thus, it would appear that the small-scale use of force in a crisis is not a good strategy for conveying resolve. Instead of deterring the opposition, or even eliciting a reciprocal minor use of force, this tactic appears to generate a spiraling escalation toward the major use of force. The initiation of major force by the opposition, of course, increases the probability that a state will use major force itself by 24 percentage points. Once again, the probability that a state will use minor force or will use no force declines. This time the decreases are 17 percentage points and 6 percentage points, respectively. When the opposing state initiates a major use of force, the predicted probability that a state will also use major force is 91%.

TABLE 4. Marginal Effects on *Highest Level of Force*

	Probability (major force)	Percentage Point Change from Value Above	Probability (minor force)	Percentage Point Change from Value Above	Probability (no force)	Percentage Point Change from Value Above
Actor's Democracy with Nondemocratic Opponent						
0	37		39		24	
10	33	**−4**	39	**0**	28	**4**
20	30	**−3**	39	**0**	31	**3**
Total Change		**−7**		**0**		**7**
Actor's Democracy with Democratic Opponent						
0	48		36		16	
10	20	**−28**	37	**1**	43	**27**
20	5	**−15**	22	**−15**	73	**30**
Total Change		**−43**		**−14**		**57**
Opponent's Democracy for Fully Autocratic State						
0	29		39		32	
10	38	**9**	39	**0**	23	**−9**
20	48	**10**	36	**−3**	16	**−7**
Total Change		**19**		**−3**		**−16**
Balance of Forces						
1:9	23		39		38	
1.3	27	**4**	39	**0**	34	**−4**
1:1	34	**7**	39	**0**	27	**−7**
3:1	41	**7**	38	**−1**	21	**−6**
9:1	46	**5**	36	**−2**	18	**−3**
Total Change		**23**		**−3**		**−20**
Shared Alliance Ties						
No	34		39		27	
Yes	25	**−9**	39	**0**	36	**9**
Satisfaction with Status Quo						
No	34		39		27	
Yes	5	**−29**	23	**−16**	72	**45**
Opponent's Initiation of Force						
None	34		39		27	
Minor	67	**33**	26	**−13**	7	**−20**
Major	91	**24**	9	**−17**	1	**−6**
Total Change		**57**		**−30**		**−26**

Note: Predicted probabilities and percentage point change may not sum to 100% due to rounding. Marginal effects were calculated in the same manner as described in Table 2.

CONSIDERATION OF SELECTION EFFECTS

Before we conclude that the monadic claims supporting the democratic peace are without merit, however, we must consider the process that leads states to become involved in international crises in the first place. Just as with the initiation of violence, a strong monadic argument can be made that democracies should be less likely to take the militarized actions that initiate international crises. If this is so, then we would expect that democratic states would systematically not select themselves into international crises as the challenger. To the extent that democracies are involved in crises, we would expect them to be disproportionately designated as defenders of the status quo. In reviewing our data set, precisely this pattern emerges. States with an *Actor's Democracy* score of 17 or greater, our threshold for qualifying as a democracy, constitute 33% of the states defending the status quo in our data set. This same group represents only 16% of the challenging states. This observation alone, however, does not demonstrate a monadic effect of democracy in selecting states into crises. It is possible, for example, that democracies' underrepresentation as challengers stems merely from their failure to challenge other democratic states.

One way to investigate the nature of this selection effect is to remove the control variable for *Satisfaction with the Status Quo* from our analysis of international crises. This variable captures the selection effect with which we are concerned, and by removing it our analysis would conflate the effect of democracy on the emergence of crises with its effect on the escalation of crises. We reestimated both probit models without the *Satisfaction with the Status Quo* variable, and the results are presented in Table 5.

In both of these equations, democracy appears to have a much stronger monadic effect. The coefficients on the *Actor's Democracy* score alone are strongly negative and statistically significant in both equations, describing an

FIGURE 2. The Effect of *Actor's Democracy* on Disproportionate *Use of Force*



apparently monadic source for the democratic peace. Using the *Initiation of Force* dependent variable, a shift from fully autocratic to fully democratic results in a decline of 23 percentage points in the probability of using force twice. These results suggest that the failure to control for the process by which states select themselves into crises has clouded the analysis of the democratic peace by conflating the effects of *monadic selection processes* with the effects of largely *dyadic bargaining processes*. Our results concerning the selection of states into international crises must be considered preliminary, however. Future studies should use data sets that include both crisis and noncrisis behavior in order to model this process explicitly.[22]

Selection effects are not only a concern in the analysis of our democracy variables. Other variables, such as the *Balance of Forces* and *Shared Alliance Ties*, may also be influenced by selection effects. If allies are less likely to become involved in a crisis in the first place, then only the most severe alliance conflicts will appear in the crisis data set. Once a crisis in which one or both parties have threatened to use or have used military force has begun, the future value of any alliance bond may already have been discounted. This implies that the alliance variable, while strong at the dispute phase (Huth 1996), may appear very weak within crises. It is important to note, however, that the presence of selection effects does not imply that our results are biased. The coefficients we estimate are accurate assessments of the influence of the variables we consider *in international crises*. The error of selection bias occurs not in analyzing nonrandomly selected samples but in generalizing one's results to nonselected sections of the population. We have tried to avoid this error by discussing the selection process underlying our data and the effects of democracy both within crises and before crises occur.

CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

We began by noting that the conventional wisdom on the democratic peace is based on two central empirical generalizations: (1) democratic states very rarely use military force against one another, and (2) democratic states are just as likely as other states to use force against nondemocracies. While this first observation has been well documented, the evidence in support of the latter claim is actually quite thin. Some recent empirical studies have produced evidence that a democracy is less likely to use force regardless of the nature of its opponent, but they have all suffered from various problems of research design.

In general, our findings give powerful support to the argument that the democratic peace is primarily a dyadic process when addressing the escalation of international crises. Our use of the nation-state as the unit of analysis rather than the summed dyad and our focus on the initiation of violence and the disproportionate use of force allow us to distinguish more carefully between these causal processes, and in doing so our findings only weakly support those of Benoit (1994), Bremer (1992), Hewitt and Wilkenfeld (1995), and Morgan and Schwebach (1992), who all conclude that democracies are less

[22] See Achen (1986) for a discussion of the nature of selection effects and the use of structural equations to account for the nature of this process.

TABLE 5. Probit Analysis after Removing *Satisfaction with the Status Quo* Variable

	First Dependent Variable: *Initiation of Force*			Second Dependent Variable: *Highest Level of Force*		
Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Errors	T-ratio	Coefficient	Standard Errors	T-ratio
Actor's Democracy	−0.029	0.008***	3.742	−0.020	0.007**	2.659
Actor's Democracy × Dummy Opponent's Democracy	−0.045	0.018**	2.483	−0.058	0.016***	3.571
Opponent's Democracy	0.042	0.009***	4.649	0.036	0.009***	4.007
Balance of Forces	1.342	0.180***	7.459	1.036	0.179***	5.782
Shared Alliance Ties	−0.042	0.137	0.306	−0.237	0.128*	1.845
Opponent's Initiation of Force	—	—	—	0.585	0.069***	8.428
Second Threshold	0.774	0.068***	11.451	0.937	0.080***	11.766
Constant	−0.880*	0.144***	6.103	−0.311	0.157*	1.982

Number of observations = 606
Percent correctly predicted = 60%
Log likelihood at convergence = −552.3

Number of observations = 606
Percent correctly predicted = 46%
Log likelihood at convergence = −607.2

All significance tests are one-tailed; *p > .05, **p > .01, ***p > .001

likely to escalate conflict to war in general. Once a democracy is involved in an international crisis, it carefully distinguishes the type of state with which it is bargaining and adjusts its bargaining behavior accordingly. When faced with a democratic opponent, a democracy believes that its opponent shares its desire to avoid the use of force. Without reassurances, however, democracies will be less restrained concerning the use of force.

While our analysis points to a strong dyadic effect within international crises, our examination of the *Satisfaction with the Status Quo* variable indicates that there may be substantial monadic effects for the initiation of crises. Although this finding requires more detailed analysis, our results suggest that democracies are unlikely to initiate crises with all other types of states, but once in a crisis, democracies are clearly less likely to initiate violence only against other democracies. Future work should be directed at modeling and empirically analyzing the selection process by which a much larger population of potential international disputes is reduced to a smaller number of disputes which escalate to crises and then wars. Based on our findings, such studies should document the monadic nature of this selection process, complementing the predominately dyadic effect of democracy within crises.

In addition to more sophisticated empirical analyses, better theory is needed. The dyadic argument assumes that democratic decision makers, fearing possible exploitation by their autocratic opponents, abandon their traditional norms and/or circumvent constraining institutions. The logic implies, among other things, that democracies should be prone to preemption when facing a hostile autocracy. A brief review of the 46 cases in which democracies initiated force, however, reveals that only one can be explained as an instance of democratic preemption (the Israeli attack on Egypt during the Six Day War). The assertion that democracies use force as negotiations break down seems to account for only about ten more cases, leaving a large number of initiations unexplained.[23] Moreover, the narrowness of these arguments casts them as scenarios for the use of force rather than fully developed theories. Significantly, a common theme among the examples of democratic initiation of force was that such uses seemed to be relatively popular domestically. Many of the cases, such as Israeli raids on PLO bases, involved enduring disputes in which a history of violence convinced the democratic public that force was necessary.

In consideration of these new empirical results, we offer here a preliminary theoretical framework that avoids some of the shortcomings of previous models. The new framework consists of three assumptions.

ASSUMPTION A. *Democracies conduct their foreign policies according to nonviolent norms of conflict resolution.*

ASSUMPTION B. *In a crisis, states are less likely to believe that their goals can be achieved by relying only on diplomacy and negotiation and more likely to believe that credible threats of force are important in supporting their bargaining position. In deciding whether continued negotiation is warranted, democracies assess the nature of their adversary and history of relations. If their opponent is a democracy, they infer that it shares their norms of nonviolent compromise and so believe that a negotiated settlement is still possible.*[24] *If their opponent is nondemocratic, they infer that it is not likely to share these norms. They lose confidence that negotiations and diplomatic means by themselves can be relied upon to deal with a nondemocratic adversary, particularly one*

[23] A third dyadic argument, which has not been addressed in this paper, focuses on a crusading impulse found within democratic polities; democracies initiate conflict with nondemocracies in an effort to transform the latter into democratic states (Owen 1994; Schweller 1992). Given that at most ten cases fall within this realm, the majority of democratic initiations remain unaccounted for by existing dyadic explanations.

[24] Dixon 1994 found this expectation accurate, as democracy-democracy disputes are more likely than other disputes to end in peaceful settlement.

which has used violence previously or has refused to compromise in prior negotiations.

Assumption C. *When initiating force becomes an option, democratic leaders will evaluate the domestic political costs and benefits of such a strategy. When using force promises domestic political benefits, democratic leaderships will be especially likely to initiate force.*

We believe that this framework has at least three important characteristics that other approaches lack. First, it integrates structural and normative explanations of the democratic peace into a single framework, recognizing that these two explanations are complementary rather than competitive. This framework postulates that each explanation provides a necessary condition for the democratic initiation of force; a democratic government must abandon its norms of nonviolent behavior *and* feel unconstrained by domestic political pressures to initiate the use of force. Second, it accounts for the rather surprising empirical pattern of monadic behavior in the precrisis phase and dyadic behavior in the crisis phase. Most structural arguments, for example, explain why democracies initiate force when it is domestically popular, but they cannot account for why democracies initiate force almost exclusively against nondemocracies. Third, unlike some structural models that predict a dyadic pattern in crises (such as Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992), our framework does not argue that democratic initiation takes the form of preemption, a scenario which very rarely occurs. But while we believe that this synthetic approach represents an improvement on previous efforts to understand the democratic peace, the true evaluation of its merits must await future research.

APPENDIX A: 303 CONFLICT DYADS IN 272 INTERNATIONAL CRISES

(Challenger v. Defender)

Year			
1918	United Kingdom v. Soviet Union *Russian Civil War I*	Nicaragua v. Costa Rica *Costa Rica Coup*	Japan v. Soviet Union *Russian Civil War II*
1919	Poland v. Czechoslovakia *Teshen*	Czechoslovakia v. Hungary *Hungarian War*	Soviet Union v. Finland *Russo-Finnish War*
	Afghanistan v. United Kingdom *Third Afghan War*	Soviet Union v. Romania *Bessarabia*	
1920	Poland v. Soviet Union *Russo-Polish War*	Soviet Union v. Iran *Persian Border*	Greece v. Turkey *Greece-Turkey War I*
	Poland v. Lithuania *Vilna I*		
1921	Panama v. Costa Rica *Costa Rica-Panama Border*	France v. Germany *German Reparations*	Czechoslovakia v. Hungary *Karl's Return to Hungary I*
	Yugoslavia v. Albania *Albanian Border*	Hungary v. Austria *Burgenland Dispute*	Czechoslovakia v. Hungary *Karl's Return to Hungary II*
	Greece v. Turkey *Greece-Turkey War II*		
1923	France v. Germany *Ruhr I*	Italy v. Greece *Corfu Incident*	
1924	Turkey v. United Kingdom *Mosul Land Dispute*		
1925	Greece v. Bulgaria *Greece-Bulgaria Front*		
1926	Mexico v. Nicaragua *Nicaragua Civil War I*	Yugoslavia v. Albania *Albania*	
1927	Japan v. China *Shantung I*		
1928	Japan v. China *Shantung II*	Paraguay v. Bolivia *Chaco I*	
1929	China v. Soviet Union *Chinese E. Railway*		
1931	Japan v. China *Mukden Incident*		
1932	Bolivia v. Paraguay *Chaco II*	Ecuador v. Colombia *Leticia*	
1933	Yemen v. Saudi Arabia *Saudi-Yemen War*		
1934	Germany v. Austria *Austria Putsch*		
1935	Germany v. Lithuania *Kaunas Trials*	Ethiopia v. Italy *Ethiopian War*	Ecuador v. Peru *Maranon I*
1936	Germany v. France *Remilitarization of Rhineland*	Germany v. Spain; Italy v. Spain *Spanish Civil War*	Turkey v. France *Alexandretta I*
	Turkey v. France *Alexandretta II*	Turkey v. France *Alexandretta III*	
1937	Soviet Union v. Japan *Amur River Incident*	China v. Japan *Marco Polo Bridge*	Honduras v. Nicaragua *Postage Stamp Crisis*
	Dominican Republic v. Haiti *Haiti-Dominican Republic*		

APPENDIX A: 303 CONFLICT DYADS IN 272 INTERNATIONAL CRISES continued

1938

Soviet Union v. Japan
Changkufeng

Germany v. Czechoslovakia
Munich

Italy v. France
Italy Threatens France

1939

Germany v. Czechoslovakia
Czech Annexation

Germany v. Lithuania
Memel

Italy v. Albania
Invasion of Albania

Japan v. Mongolia
Nomonhan

Japan v. United Kingdom
Tientsin

Germany v. Poland; Soviet Union v. Poland; Germany v. France; Germany v. United Kingdom
Entry World War II

Soviet Union v. Lithuania; Soviet Union v. Latvia; Soviet Union v. Estonia
Soviet Occupation of Baltics

Soviet Union v. Finland
Finnish War

Turkey v. France
Alexandretta IV

1940

Germany v. Denmark; Germany v. Norway
Invasion of Scandinavia

Germany v. Belgium; Germany v. Netherlands; Germany v. Luxembourg
Fall West Europe

Japan v. United Kingdom
Closure of Burma Road

Soviet Union v. Romania; Hungary v. Romania; Bulgaria v. Romania
Rumanian Territory

Italy v. Greece; Germany v. Yugoslavia
Balkan Invasions

1941

United Kingdom v. Iraq
Middle-East Campaign

Germany v. Soviet Union
Barbarossa

Peru v. Ecuador
Maranon II

United Kingdom v. Iran; Soviet Union v. Iran
Occupation of Iran

Japan v. United States; Japan v. Netherlands; Japan v. United Kingdom; Japan v. Thailand
Pearl Harbor

1944

Germany v. Hungary
Occupation of Hungary

Soviet Union v. Iran
Iran

Yugoslavia v. United Kingdom
Trieste I

France v. Syria
Syria-French Forces

Soviet Union v. Turkey
Kars Ardahan

Soviet Union v. Japan
End of World War II

Soviet Union v. Iran
Azerbaijan

1946

Soviet Union v. Turkey
Turkish Straits

Yugoslavia v. Greece
Greek Civil War II

1947

Cuba v. Dominican Republic
Dominican Republic-Cuba

India v. Pakistan
Junagadh

Pakistan v. India
Kashmir I

1948

Jordan v. Israel; Syria v. Israel; Egypt v. Israel; Iraq v. Israel; Lebanon v. Israel
Israel Independence

Soviet Union v. United States
Berlin Blockade

Nicaragua v. Costa Rica
Costa Rica-Nicaragua I

1949

Afghanistan v. Pakistan
Pushtunistan I

Guatemala v. Dominican Republic
Luperon

Soviet Union v. Yugoslavia
Soviet Bloc-Yugoslavia

1950

North Korea v. South Korea
Korean War I

1951

Syria v. Israel
Tel Mutilah

Pakistan v. India
Punjab War

Egypt v. United Kingdom
Suez Canal

1952

Soviet Union v. Sweden
Catalina Affair

1953

Taiwan v. Burma
Burma

Yugoslavia v. Italy
Trieste II

Jordan v. Israel
Quibya

United States v. Guatemala
Guatemala

1954

China v. Taiwan
Taiwan Straits I

1955

Nicaragua v. Costa Rica
Costa Rica-Nicaragua II

Egypt v. Israel
Gaza Raid

Afghanistan v. Pakistan
Pushtunistan II

1956

United Kingdom v. Egypt; France v. Egypt; Israel v. Egypt
Suez Nationalization

Soviet Union v. Hungary
Hungarian Uprising

Soviet Union v. Poland
Poland Liberalization

1957

Nicaragua v. Honduras
Nicaragua-Honduras

Tunisia v. France
Tunisia-France I

Turkey v. Syria
Syria-Turkey Border

Morocco v. Spain
Ifni

Soviet Union v. United States
Berlin Deadline

1958

Tunisia v. France
Tunisia-France II

Egypt v. Sudan
Sudan-Egypt Border

China v. Taiwan
Taiwan Straits II

Thailand v. Cambodia
Cambodia-Thailand

Guatemala v. Mexico
Mexico Fishing Rights

1959

Cuba v. Haiti; Cuba v. Dominican Republic; Cuba v. Nicaragua; Cuba v. Panama
Cuba-Central America I

China v. India
India-China Border I

Iran v. Iraq
Shatt Al Arab I

1960

United Araba Republic v. Israel
Rottem

Togo v. Ghana
Ghana-Togo Border

Dominican Republic v. Venezuela
Assassination Attempt-Venezuela

Zaire v. Belgium
Congo I-Katanga

Cuba v. Guatemala; Cuba v. Nicaragua
Cuba-Central America II

Somalia v. Ethiopia
Ethiopia-Somalia

APPENDIX A: 303 CONFLICT DYADS IN 272 INTERNATIONAL CRISES continued

1961	North Vietnam v. Laos *Pathet Lao Offensive I*	United States v. Cuba *Bay of Pigs*	Afghanistan v. Pakistan *Pushtunistan III*
	Soviet Union v. United States *Berlin Wall*	Iraq v. Kuwait *Kuwait Independence*	Tunisia v. France *Bizerta*
	Indonesia v. Netherlands *West Irian II*	Egypt v. Syria *Breakup of UAR*	India v. Portugal *Goa II*
	N. Vietnam v. S. Vietnam *Vietcong Attack*		
1962	Mali v. Mauritania *Mauritania-Mali*	Taiwan v. China *Taiwan Straits III*	North Vietnam v. Laos *Pathet Lao Offensive II*
	India v. China *India-China Border II*	Saudi Arabia v. North Yemen *Yemen War-Cluster I*	United States v. Soviet Union *Cuban Missile Crisis*
1963	Indonesia v. Malaysia *Malaysia Federation*	Haiti v. Dominican Republic *Haiti-Dominican Republic*	Morocco v. Algeria *Morocco-Algeria Border*
	Somalia v. Kenya *Kenya-Somalia*	Greece v. Turkey *Cyprus I*	Jordan v. Israel *Jordan Waters*
	Dahomey v. Niger *Niger-Dahomey*	Burundi v. Rwanda *Rwanda-Burundi*	
1964	Somalia v. Ethiopia *Ogaden I*	North Vietnam v. United States *Gulf of Tonkin*	Saudi Arabia v. North Yemen *Yemen War-Cluster III*
1965	N. Vietnam v. S. Vietnam *Pleiku*	Pakistan v. India *Rann of Kutch*	Pakistan v. India *Kashmir II*
	Rhodesia v. Zambia *Rhodesia's UDI*		
1966	North Yemen v. Saudi Arabia *Yemen War-Cluster IV*	Jordan v. Israel *El Samu*	
1967	Cuba v. Bolivia *Che Guevara/Bolivia*	Egypt v. Israel; Syria v. Israel; Jordan v. Israel *Six Day War*	Greece v. Turkey *Cyprus II*
1968	North Korea v. United States *Pueblo*	Jordan v. Israel *Karameh*	Soviet Union v. Czechoslovakia *Prague Spring*
	Venezuela v. Guyana *Essequibo Territory*	Egypt v. Israel *Pre-War of Attrition*	Israel v. Lebanon *Beirut Airport*
1969	China v. Soviet Union *Ussuri River*	Egypt v. Israel *War of Attrition I*	North Korea v. United States *EC-121 Spy Plane*
	Iraq v. Iran *Shatt Al Arab II*	El Salvador v. Honduras *Football War*	Syria v. Leganon *Cairo Agreement-PLO*
1970	North Vietnam v. Cambodia *Invasion of Cambodia*	Syria v. Jordan *Black September*	Guinea v. Portugal *Portuguese Invasion of Guinea*
1971	India v. Pakistan *Bangladesh*	Libya v. Chad *Chad-Libya*	Zambia v. South Africa *Caprivi Strip*
	Tanzania v. Uganda *Uganda/Tanzania I*		
1972	Tanzania v. Uganda *Uganda/Tanzania II*	North Yemen v. South Yemen *North-South Yemen I*	
1973	Zambia v. Rhodesia *Zambia*	Iraq v. Kuwait *Iraq Invasion of Kuwait*	Egypt v. Israel *Israel Mobilization*
	Iceland v. United Kingdom *Cod War I*	Egypt v. Israel; Syria v. Israel *Yom Kippur War*	South Yemen v. Oman *South Yemen-Oman*
1974	Greece v. Cyprus; Turkey v. Cyprus *Cyprus III*		
1975	Cambodia v. United States *Mayaguez*	Zaire v. Angola *War in Angola*	Morocco v. Spain *Moroccan March*
	Guatemala v. United Kingdom *Belize I*	Algeria v. Morocco; Algeria v. Mauritania *Sahara*	Iceland v. United Kingdom *Cod War II*
	Indonesia v. Portugal *East Timor*		
1976	Syria v. Lebanon *Lebanon Civil War I*	Uganda v. Kenya *Uganda Claims*	Mozambique v. Rhodesia *Operation Thrasher*
	Iraq v. Syria *Iraqi Threat*	Israel v. Uganda *Entebbe Raid*	Libya v. Sudan *Sudan Coup Attempt*
	Turkey v. Greece *Aegean Sea*	Syria v. Israel *Syria Mobilization*	Botswana v. Rhodesia *Operation Tangent*
1977	Angola v. Zaire *Shaba I*	Guatemala v. United Kingdom *Belize II*	Egypt v. Libya *Egypt-Libya Border*
	Somalia v. Ethiopia *Ogaden II*	Zambia v. Rhodesia *Rhodesia Raids*	Vietnam v. Cambodia *Vietnam Invasion of Cambodia*
	Algeria v. France *French Hostages*	Argentina v. Chile *Beagle Channel I*	

APPENDIX A: 303 CONFLICT DYADS IN 272 INTERNATIONAL CRISES continued

1978	Libya v. Chad *Chad-Libya II*	Syria v. Lebanon *Lebanon Civil War II*	Cambodia v. Thailand; China v. Vietnam *Sino-Vietnam War*
	Lebanon v. Israel *Litani Operation*	Angola v. South Africa *Cassinga Incident*	Angola v. Zaire *Shaba II*
	Costa Rica v. Nicaragua *Nicaraguan Civil War*	Argentina v. Chile *Beagle Channel II*	Uganda v. Tanzania *Fall of Amin*
1979	South Yemen v. North Yemen *North-South Yemen II*	Soviet Union v. Afghanistan *Afghanistan Invasion*	Iran v. United States *U.S. Hostages-Iran*
1980	Libya v. Tunisia *Raid on Gafsa*	Soviet Union v. Poland *Solidarity*	Libya v. Malta *Malta-Libya Oil Dispute*
	Iraq v. Iran *Iran-Iraq War*	Libya v. Gambia *Libya Intervention in Gambia*	Syria v. Jordan *Jordan-Syria Confrontation*
	Somalia v. Ethiopia *East Africa Confrontation*		
1981	Libya v. Chad *Chad-Libya Merger*	Ecuador v. Peru *Peru-Ecuador*	Mozambique v. South Africa *Mozambique Raid*
	Venezuela v. Guyana *Essequibo II*	Israel v. Syria *Al-Biqua Missiles*	Cameroon v. Nigeria *Nigeria-Cameroon Border*
	Israel v. Iraq *Iraq Nuclear Reactor*	Libya v. United States *Gulf of Syrte I*	Iran v. Bahrain *Coup Attempt-Bahrain*
1982	Argentina v. United Kingdom *Falklands-Malvinas*	Israel v. Lebanon *Lebanon War*	Ethiopia v. Somalia *Ogaden III*
	Lesotho v. South Africa *Lesotho Raid*		
1983	Libya v. Sudan *Libya Threat-Sudan*	Chad v. Nigeria *Chad-Nigeria Clashes*	Libya v. Chad *Chad-Libya VI*
	United States v. Grenada *Invasion of Grenada*	Botswana v. Zimbabwe *Botswana-Zimbabwe Border*	Ethiopia v. Sudan *Sudan-Ethiopia Border*
1984	Thailand v. Vietnam *Thai Border Incident*	Libya v. Sudan *Omduran Bombing*	China v. Vietnam *Sino-Vietnam Clashes*
	Laos v. Thailand *Village Border Crisis I*	United States v. Nicaragua *Nicaragua Mig-21's*	
1985	Botswana v. South Africa *Botswana Raid*	Libya v. Tunisia *Expulsion of Tunisians*	Burkina Faso v. Mali *Burkina Faso-Mali Border*
1986	Libya v. United States *Gulf of Syrte II*	Qatar v. Bahrain *Bahrain-Qatar Dispute*	Zimbabwe v. South Africa *South Africa Cross-Border Raid*
	Sudan v. Uganda *Rebel Attack-Uganda*	Malawi v. Mozambique *Mozambique Ultimatum*	Ghana v. Togo *Attempted Coup-Togo*
	Honduras v. Nicaragua *Honduras-Nicaragua Border*		
1987	China v. Vietnam *China-Vietnam Border*	India v. Pakistan *Punjab War Scare II*	Ethiopia v. Somalia *Somalia-Ethiopia Border*
	Turkey v. Greece *Aegean Sea II*	Cameroon v. Nigeria *Nigeria-Cameroon Border*	India v. Sri Lanka *India Intervention in Sri Lanka*
	Iran v. Saudi Arabia *Mecca Pilgrimage*	Laos v. Thailand *Village Border Crisis II*	Kenya v. Uganda *Kenya-Uganda Border*
1988	China v. Vietnam *Spratly Islands*		

APPENDIX B: 121 DELETED OR MERGED ICB CRISES

Intrawar Crises (27)

Smyrna 1919
Cilician War 1920
Battle of Britain 1940
East African Campaign 1940
El Alamein 1942
Stalingrad 1942
Fall of Italy 1943
Soviets in Eastern Europe 1944
D-Day 1944
Fall of Saipan 1944
Leyte and Luzan 1944
Final Soviet Offensive 1945
Iwo Jima 1945
Okinawa 1945
Sinai Incursion 1948
Korean War II 1950
Korean War III 1953
Tet Offensive 1968
Vietnam Spring Offensive 1969
War of Attrition II 1970
Invasion of Laos II 1971
Vietnam Ports Mining 1972
Christmas Bombing 1972
Final Vietnam Offensive 1974
Khorramshahr 1982
Basra-Kharg Island 1984
Iraq Recapture-Fao 1988

No Threat A—No Strong Evidence that the Challenger Considered Using Force (26)

Aaland Islands 1919
Rhenish Rebellions 1920
Austrian Separatists 1921
Ruhr II 1924
Haiti Unrest 1929
Bulgaria-Turkey I 1935
Bulgaria-Turkey II 1935
Panay Incident 1937
Czech May Crisis 1938
Baghdad Pact 1955
West Irian I 1957
Jordan Regime 1957
Aborted Coup-Indonesia 1958
Formation of UAR 1958
Mali Federation 1960
Cuba-Venezuela 1963
Guinea Regime 1965
Cienfuegos Sub Base 1970
Libyan Plane 1973
Soviet Threat-Pakistan 1979
Nicaragua-Colombia 1979
Libyan Threat-Sadat 1980
Coup Attempt-Gambia 1981
Aegean Naval Crisis 1984
Al Biqua Missiles 1985
Egypt-Libya Tensions 1985

No Threat B—No Government-to-Government Threat (13)

Assassination of King Alexander 1934
Greek Civil War I 1944
Truman Doctrine 1947
China Civil War 1948
East Berlin Uprising 1953
Goa I 1955
Lebanon-Iraq Upheaval 1958
Jordan Internal Challenge 1963
Panama Canal 1964
East Africa Rebellions 1964
Congo II 1964
Dominican Republic 1965
Syria in Lebanon 1987

Capitulation Crises (9)

Anschluess 1938
Polish Ultimatum 1938
Communism in Rumania 1945
Communism in Poland 1946
Communism in Hungary 1947
Marshall Plan 1947
Communism in Czechoslovakia 1948
Soviet Note to Finland I 1948
Soviet Note to Finland II 1961

Merged Crises (38)

Transcaucasia 1917
  w/ *Russian Civil War I* 1918
Vilna II 1920
  w/ *Vilna I* 1920
Greece-Turkey War III 1922
  w/ *Greece-Turkey War II* 1921
Chanak 1922
  w/ *Greece-Turkey II* 1921
Shanghai 1932
  w/ *Mukden* 1931
Jehol Campaign 1933
  w/ *Mukden* 1931
Walwal 1934
  w/ *Ethiopian War* 1935
Danzig 1939
  w/ *Entry WWII* 1939
Palestine Partition 1947
  w/ *Israel Independence* 1948
Qalqilya 1956
  w/ *Quibya* 1953
Suez-Sinai Campaign 1956
  w/ *Suez Nationalization* 1956
Yemen War-Cluster II 1964
  w/ *Yemen War I* 1962
Nouakchott I 1976
  w/ *Sahara* 1975
Nagomia Raid 1976
  w/ *Operation Thrasher* 1976
Chimolo Tembue Raids 1977
  w/ *Operation Thrasher* 1976
Mapai Seizure 1977
  w/ *Operation Thrasher* 1976
Nouakchott II 1977
  w/ *Sahara* 1975
Chad-Libya III 1978
  w/ *Chad-Libya II* 1978
Air Rhodesia Incident 1978
  w/ *Rhodesia Raids* 1977
Angola-Invasion Scare 1978
  w/ *Cassinga* 1978
Tan Tan 1979
  w/ *Sahara* 1976
Raids on Zipra 1979
  w/ *Rhodesia Raids* 1977
Raids on Swapo 1979
  w/ *Cassinga* 1978
Chad-Libya IV 1979
  w/ *Chad-Libya II* 1978
Goulimime Tarfaya Road 1979
  w/ *Sahara* 1975
Rhodesia Settlement 1979
  w/ *Operation Tangent* 1976, *Operation Thrasher* 1976, and *Rhodesia Raids* 1977
Raid on Angola 1979
  w/ *Cassinga* 1978
Operation Iman 1980
  w/ *Sahara* 1975
Operation Smokeshell 1980
  w/ *Cassinga* 1978
Operation Protea-Angola 1981
  w/ *Cassinga* 1978
Polisario Attack 1981
  w/ *Sahara* 1975
Operation Askari 1983
  w/ *Cassinga* 1978
South Africa Raid on Lesotho 1985
  w/ *Lesotho Raid* 1982
Chad-Libya VII 1986
  w/ *Chad-Libya VI* 1979
Chad-Libya VIII 1986
  w/ *Chad-Libya VI* 1979
Western Sahara 1987
  w/ *Sahara* 1975
S. Africa Intervention Angola 1987
  w/ *Cassinga* 1978
Sandanista Border Crossing 1988
  w/ *Honduras-Nicaragua* 1986

Colonial Crises (5)

Indonesia Independence I 1945
Indonesia Independence II 1947
Indonesia Independence II 1948
Invasion of Laos I 1953
Dien Bien Phu 1954

One or Both Parties Are Not Recognized Members of the International System (3)

Baltic Independence 1918
Nejd-Hijaz War 1924
Hyderabad 1948

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