WORKING PAPERS

Monetary Policy Switching to Avoid a Liquidity Trap. co-authored with Siddhartha Chattopadhyay (January 2012)

We propose a monetary-policy-switching Taylor Rule, which would allow the economy to avoid a liquidity trap. In the event of a demand shock, large enough to send the nominal interest rate below zero under a Taylor Rule with a fixed long-run inflation target, the monetary authority switches to a higher short-run inflation target which decays toward the long-run target over time. If the short-run target is sufficiently persistent, then the increase in inflationary expectations is large enough to raise inflation and output even though the nominal interest rate does not fall below zero. The switching regime imparts an inflation bias to policy, but avoids indeterminacy created by the fixed nominal interest rate in a liquidity trap.

Asymmetries in Business Cycles: The Role of Oil Production. co-authored with Christian M. Hafner, Hans Manner, and Leopold Simar (slides) (September 2011)

Innovations to total factor productivity are thought to be an important determinant of business cycles. We investigate whether innovations to quarterly HP-filtered Solow residuals are symmetric over time for eleven OECD countries. Our model modifies classical stochastic frontier analysis to accommodate the strong serial correlation in macro data. The results have implications for whether business cycles are symmetric, with the economy responding in a linear way to normal iid shocks, or asymmetric with recessions fundamentally different from booms. Likelihood ratio

tests imply that nine of eleven countries have significant asymmetries. We also consider structural differences in economies with and without asymmetries and find that asymmetries tend to be stronger the less oil production per worker in the economy. Non-linear conditioning of the HP-filtered Solow residual on the relative price of oil removes or reduces asymmetries for most countries which otherwise exhibit them, implying that much asymmetry is due to the response of the economy to oil prices.

 

Exchange Rate Crises and Fiscal Solvency (slides) (Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking September, 2010)

This paper combines insights from generation-one currency crisis models and the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL) to create a dynamic FTPL model of currency crises. The initial fixed-exchange-rate policy entails risks due to an upper bound on government debt and stochastic surplus shocks. Agents refuse to lend into a position for which the value of debt exceeds the present-value of expected future surpluses. Policy switching, usually combined with currency depreciation, restores fiscal solvency and lending. This model can explain a wide variety of crises, including those involving sovereign default. We illustrate by explaining the crisis in Argentina (2001).

Private-Sector Risk and Financial Crises in Emerging Markets  (slides) (revised February 2011, forthcoming Economic Journal)

Investment necessary for growth is risky and often requires external financing. We present a model in which capital market imperfections separate countries into a safe credit club of industrial countries, with low interest rates and steady credit access, and a risky club of emerging markets, with high interest rates and volatile access. In an emerging market, a large negative productivity shock interacts with credit market imperfections to trigger a severe contraction in external lending. Domestic agents react with widespread default. We calibrate to South Korean parameters and argue that the 1998 financial crisis could have been the downside of risky investment financed in imperfect capital markets.

Pushing the Limit? Fiscal Policy in the European Monetary Union  co-authored with Christos Shiamptanis (revised October 2011)

Governments are facing increasing scrutiny over debt and deficits following the worldwide recession and financial crisis which ended in 2009. Additionally, policy makers are confronted with the growing realization that they face fiscal limits on the size of debt and deficits relative to GDP. These fiscal limits invalidate Bohn's criterion for fiscal sustainability since it allows explosive debt relative to GDP, eventually violating any fiscal limit. The purpose of this paper is to derive restrictions on fiscal policy, necessary for the government to be expected to satisfy fiscal limits in the long-run. We show that the restrictions require that the primary surplus respond large enough to debt. Additionally, since fiscal limits rule out explosive behavior, they imply cointegration between debt and the primary surplus and between the primary surplus and output. We test these two equivalent empirical implications for a panel of ten EMU countries, and find that in the years preceding the financial crisis, fiscal policy was responsible, in the sense that governments did not expect to violate fiscal limits in the long run..

Fiscal Risk in a Monetary Union (slides) co-authored with Christos Shiamptanis (revised January 2012)

Diverse fiscal policies, which are subject to fiscal limits and stochastic shocks, can threaten a monetary union. The fiscal limits arise due to distortionary taxation and political will. Stochastic shocks are random and could push a fiscally sound policy towards its limit. In equilibrium agents refuse to lend along a path which violates the fiscal limits, creating a crisis. The crisis requires a policy response to restore lending. We focus on two responses, default and policy switching, both of which must be designed to restore fiscal solvency. Under the assumption that agents know the policy response, we show that a monetary union can avoid price instability if it is willing to tolerate member country default. Alternatively, policy switching creates price instability. We simulate the model to quantify fiscal risk in the European Monetary Union with fiscal variables at end of 2009 values. Our model predicts the Greek crisis which occurred and warns of an Italian one.

The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level and Initial Government Debt (April, 2007), Review of Economic Dynamics

It is widely believed that the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL) does not work in an environment in which initial government debt is zero. This paper demonstrates that this view is incorrect when asset markets are incomplete and fiscal policy is stochastic. In particular, it is possible to define a stochastic non-Ricardian fiscal policy for which the set of equilibrium stochastic price processes under non-Ricardian fiscal policy is a subset of the set of equilibrium stochastic price processes under Ricardian fiscal policy.

Financial Liberalization and Banking Crises in Emerging Economies co-authored with John Jones (May, 2007), Journal of International Economics.

Financial liberalization often leads to financial crises. This link has usually been attributed to poorly designed banking systems, an explanation that is largely static. In this paper we develop a dynamic explanation, by modeling the evolution of a newly-liberalized bank's opportunities and incentives to take on risk over time. The model reveals that even if a banking system is well-designed, in the sense of having good long-run properties, many countries will enjoy an initial period of rapid, low-risk growth and then enter a period with an elevated risk of banking crisis. This transition emerges because of the way in which the degree of foreign competition, the marginal product of capital, and the bank's own net worth simultaneously evolve.

Public Default Dynamics  (revised –August 2006)

This paper provides a dynamic model of a public debt crisis in which fiscal insolvency is the cause. The insolvency is created by a combination of a passive fiscal policy with an upper bound on the long-run budget surplus, yielding risky government debt, and a string of bad luck. As debt rises and a crisis approaches, the interest rate rises, due to a risk premium on debt in anticipation of possible default. A position, in which the contractual value of debt under passive fiscal policy exceeds the maximum expected present-value surplus, is infeasible. Should passive fiscal policy require such a point, a crisis occurs. Crisis resolution includes a promise of fiscal reform, with a switch to active fiscal policy as in the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL). The switch creates larger near-term surpluses, which serve to raise the expected present-value surplus, and greater exchange rate flexibility, which eliminates the default premium on debt. If the present-value surplus is still too low relative to debt after the policy switch, default is necessary. 

 Monetary Policy in a Fiscal Theory Regime (June 2004)

This paper considers the behavior of monetary policy in a regime in which the "Fiscal Theory of the Price Level" (FTPL) applies and in which the government issues long-term debt. Cochrane (2001) shows that the fiscal authority can use a commitment to maintain a fixed maturity structure of government debt to fully determine the impact and dynamic effects of present-value-surplus shocks on inflation in a cashless economy. We show that in a monetary economy, in which Cochrane’s fiscal commitment to maturity structure is replaced with a monetary commitment to a state-contingent interest rate rule, the monetary authority becomes responsible for the timing of inflation. We derive interest rate rules, which minimize the variance of inflation around a target, and show that the interest rate will respond positively to shocks raising inflation and to shocks raising output above trend, as with a Taylor Rule.