Burak Dindaroglu
Ph.D. Candidate in Economics
SUNY Albany, Department of Economics

CV

Major Fields:
Industrial Organization, Labor Economics, Applied Microeconometrics

Research Interests:
Economics of Innovation, R&D Competition and Policy, Labor Mobility, Markets with Network Externalities

Education:
Ph.D (Economics), SUNY Albany (2009)
MA (Economics), SUNY Albany (2005)
B.Sc. (Electrical and Electronics Engineering), Bilkent University (2002)

Experience:
2008-Present, Lecturer, Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy, SUNY Albany
Taught Public Economics and Finance (Master’s level)

2004-Present, Lecturer, Department of Economics, SUNY Albany
Taught Public Finance, Economics of Labor, Principles of Microeconomics, Principles of Macroeconomics

Intra-Industry Knowledge Spillovers and Scientific Labor Mobility (Job Market Paper)
Abstract: I exploit the ability of citations to proxy the value of patents, and their implied use as measures of R&D output, to address the role of scientific labor mobility in facilitating knowledge spillovers among firms in the same industry. Using a variant of the standard Tobin's Q equation, I show that knowledge that is externally created in the firm's industrial neighborhood and scientific labor mobility jointly have a positive and significant impact on the firm's market value. Specifically, a one percentage point increase in the mobility rate (one additional job change for each 100 scientists) increases market value by 8.5% through spillovers for a firm that has access to the median spillover pool. This effect is largely offset by the standalone negative impact of labor mobility on market value, thus the firm breaks even in terms of the net private value of increased labor turnover. Firms that have access to large pools of externally created knowledge enjoy additional market value as a result of higher scientific mobility, while they suffer from it whenever external knowledge is limited. The firm facing the spillover pool at the fourth quartile enjoys a 1.8% net increase in market value from the aforementioned increase labor turnover. These results are consistent with previous findings and anecdotal evidence on high-tech firms, and provides further insight into why innovative firms cluster in high-tech districts.

The Broadcasting Market and Competitive Advertising
Abstract: I study a two-sided model of the broadcasting market whereby advertising is considered a nuisance, but may have value by informing viewers of additional products. Depending on how information is disseminated among consumers, advertisements that carry information benefits intensify price competition among producers. The models for the case of a monopoly broadcaster and the case of competing broadcasters admit symmetric and asymmetric equilibria. Exclusive dealings emerge endogenously as part of both types of equilibria. For the case of a broadcasting duopoly I identify two classes of equilibria. In one, both broadcasters deal exclusively with a single producer in each industry, and ads do not carry informational benefits. Another class of equilibria involves the coexistence of two different equilibrium strategies: one broadcaster carries ads exclusively and hosts a low advertisement volume, while the other hosts a high ad volume along with additional information surplus for its viewers.

Multiplicity of equilibria stems from producers' tendency to "escape" close competitors by placing ads in different channels. This tendency leads to complete exclusivity and zero information surplus. On the other hand, some broadcasters might alleviate this effect by luring rival producers through lower ad prices, and keeping their audience through the additional information surplus offered. Surprisingly, in equilibria with higher information surplus, where the exchange prices of advertised goods are lower, total consumer surplus is necessarily lower and producer surplus is higher. Although total number of ads in this case is higher, total consumption of goods and media are reduced, which leads to the aforementioned reallocation of welfare. All equilibria are welfare ranked.