The following publications also are based on Capital Jury Project Research. Some of these articles are available for you to download now, others will be available on this website soon.


  • Antonio, Michael E. (2003). "Arbitrariness and the Death Penalty: The Impact of Psychological Factors at Three Decision Points during the Capital Trial." (Law, Policy and Society, Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts).

  • Brewer, T. W. (2003). "Don't kill my friend: The attorney-client relationship in capital cases and its effect on jury receptivity to mitigation evidence." (Doctoral Dissertation, University at Albany, State University of New York, 2003) Dissertation Abstracts International, 64(2), 631.

  • Connell, Nadine M. (2006). "Does the Group Make a Difference? A Look at the Factors that Impact Perceptions of Group Deliberations and Sentencing Outcomes in Capital Trials." (University of Maryland, College Park).

  • Denver, Megan (2009). "Are Capital Jurors Willing To Serve Again? Investigating Race And Perceptions Of Procedural Fairness In The Deliberation Room." (Master's Thesis, Department of Sociology, University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware).

  • Edelman, Bryan (2003). "Misguided Discretion: A Dual Process Model of Juror and Jury Sentencing in Capital Trials." (School of Social Psychology, University of Nevada, Reno, Nevada).

  • Goetz, Julie (1995). "The Decision-Making of Capital Jurors in Florida: The Role of Extralegal Factors." (School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida).

  • King, Lisa (2002). "Juror Empathy for the Defendant." (Department of Psychology, University of Memphis, Memphis, Tennessee).

  • Lanier, Charles S. (2004). "The Role of Experts and Other Witnesses in Capital Penalty Hearings: The Views of Jurors Charged With Determining The Simple Sentence of Death" (School of Criminal Justice, State University of New York at Albany, Albany, New York).

  • Steiner, Benjamin D. (1999). "Race, Ideology, And Legal Action: The Case of Capital Sentencing." (Department of Sociology, Northeastern University, Boston Massachusetts).


  • Simmons V. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994). Justice Blackmun, opinion: "...prosecutors in South Carolina, like those in other States that impose the death penalty, frequently emphasize a defendant's future dangerousness in their evidence and argument at the sentencing phase; they urge the jury to sentence the defendant to death so that he will not be a danger to the public if released from prison. Eisenberg & Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 Cornell L.Rev. 1, 4 (1993)" (p. 163). See also Blackmun, opinion, fn 9.

  • O'dell V. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151 (1997). Justice Stevens, in Dissent, fn 7: "Eisenberg & Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 Cornell L.Rev. 1, 7-9 (1993) ("[J]urors who believe the alternative to death is a relatively short time in prison tend to sentence to death")"

  • Strickler V. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999). Justice Souter, concurring in part and dissenting in part: "What is more important, common experience, supported by at least one empirical study, see Bowers, Sandys, & Steiner, Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: Jurors' Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature Decision Making, 83 Cornell L.Rev. 1476, 1486-1496 (1998), tells us that the evidence and arguments presented during the guilt phase of a capital trial will often have a significant effect on the jurors' choice of sentence" (p. 305).

  • Ramdass V. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156 (2000). Justice Stevens, in Dissent, fn 26: "See Eisenberg & Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 Cornell L.Rev. 1, 7 (1993)."

  • United States V. Llera Plaza, 179 F.Supp.2d 444 (2001) (E.D. Pennsylvania). Pollak, District Judge, opinion, fn 5: "In arguing that the aggravating factor/mitigating factor calculus is not comprehensible, defendants have drawn the court's attention to certain empirical studies based on interviews with jurors or mock jurors. See Craig Haney et al., Deciding to Take a Life: Capital Juries Sentencing Instructions, 52 J. Soc. Issues 149 (1994); Craig Haney and Mona Lynch, Comprehending Life and Death Matters: A Preliminary Study of California's Capital Penalty Instruction, § 18 Law & Human Behavior 411 (1994); William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design and Review of Early Findings, 70 Ind. L.J. 1043 (1995). The defendants have cited findings of these studies which may be taken to suggest that some persons find the concepts of aggravating and mitigating factors neither immediately intuitive nor amenable to clarification through standard state jury instructions. However, the studies do not establish that the concepts of aggravating and mitigating factors as used in the FDPA bear such a degree of intrinsic "incomprehensibility" as to render them incapable of clarification through adequate jury instructions such as those to be crafted in the instant case, if a sentencing hearing is required. The studies are thus insufficient to support the defendants' argument" (p. 450).

  • State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458 (2002) (Tennessee). Adolpho A. Birch, Jr., J., concurring and dissenting, engages in a discussion of the Capital Jury Project findings regarding jurors’ "misperceptions about capital sentencing" in "II. Meaning of Life Sentence."

  • United States of America V. Mikos, 2003 WL 22110948 (2003) (N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division). Guzman, J., Memorandum Opinion and Order, fn 6: "Mikos discusses several statistical studies concerning the death penalty, including: William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043 (1995); William J. Bowers, Death by Default: An Empirical Demonstration of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 TEXAS L.REV. 605 (1999); C. Haney, L. Sontag, & S. Costanzo, Deciding to Take a Life: Capital Juries, Sentencing Instructions, and the Jurisprudence of Death, 50 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES 149 (1994); C. Haney & M. Lynch, Comprehending Life and Death Matters: A Preliminary Study of California's Capital Penalty Instructions, 18 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 411 (1994)."

  • Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082 (2003) (C.A.9; Ariz.). Rawlinson, Circuit Judge, in dissent: "The empirically established problems with jury sentencing deliberations calls into question the majority's facile conclusion that transfer of capital sentencing responsibility to a jury will enhance the accuracy of the process" (p. 1130). See pp. 1129-1131 for more on the Capital Jury Project.

  • Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S.Ct. 2519 (Decided June 24, 2004). Justice Scalia, opinion: "First, for every argument why juries are more accurate factfinders, there is another why they are less accurate" (p. 2525).

  • People V. LaValle, -- N.E.2d -- (June 24, 2004) (Court of Appeals of New York). G.B. Smith, J., opinion, under "III. PENALTY PHASE": "Studies have found that jurors tend to "grossly underestimate how long capital murderers not sentenced to death usually stay in prison" (Bowers & Steiner, Death by Default: An Empirical Demonstration of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 Tex L Rev 605, 648 [Feb 1999] ). Jurors' beliefs with respect to the actual number of years a defendant will serve in prison are compelling and can even be decisive. As the study concluded, the "sooner jurors think a defendant will be released from prison, the more likely they are to vote for death and the more likely they are to see the defendant as dangerous" (id. at 703). A study of South Carolina jurors who served in capital cases "confirm[ed] that jurors' deliberations emphasize dangerousness and that misguided fears of early release generate death sentences" (Eisenberg & Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 Cornell L Rev 1, 4 [Nov 1993]; see also Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What do Jurors Think?, 98 Colum L Rev 1538, 1560 [Oct 1998] [finding that "[f]uture dangerousness appears to be one of the primary determinants of capital-sentencing outcomes"] ). Thus, jurors might impose the death penalty on a defendant whom they believed did not deserve it simply because they fear that the defendant would not serve a life sentence. These studies provide the best available insight into jury behavior" (footnote omitted). See also Smith, opinion, fn 5.