
The Precursor to Deliberative Democracy

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Instead of vesting in the government alone all the administrative powers of which guilds and nobles have been provided, a portion of them may be entrusted to secondary bodies temporarily composed of private citizens: thus the liberty of private persons will be more secure, and their equality will not be diminished.¹

Alexis De Tocqueville

Introduction

Recently, democratic theory has been dominated by discussions of deliberative democracy. Many commentators² agree with the insight of Jurgen Habermas that what democracies today are lacking and need to develop is a critical public sphere where the people (participating relatively as equals) can formulate a coherent public opinion that both guides and reprimands the governmental apparatus of the nation. While this ideal of a deliberative approach to democracy is admirable and although the developments of this academic interest have resulted in promising ideas about how to make political institutions and procedures more democratic, I argue that deliberative democracy as it has developed has yielded a necessarily limited and subordinate approach to democratization.

To substantiate this claim, I rely on the original work of Jurgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*. In his original formulation of a deliberative democracy, I claim Habermas makes three pertinent contributions to democratic theory through his historical narrative of the development and demise of a bourgeois public sphere in Europe during the eighteenth century. As I relate each of these contributions, I will suggest that the direction the deliberative democratic debates have taken today is overly driven by a concern with Habermas's second point—that complex societies need to establish and institutionalize a critical public sphere by which the people are connected to and can better shape and guide their government democratically. As a

result, these arguments for deliberative democracy tend to become largely institutional and procedurally based. As a consequence, these arguments fail to balance this concern with Habermas's equally pertinent (if not more important) first point, that a democratic socialization of the people is what opens up society to new, large-scale democratic possibilities like a critical public sphere. In other words, arguments for deliberative democracy typically miss or believe they artificially create what precedes a critical public sphere in Habermas's original narrative—the widespread existence of a democratically cultured or socialized people, a people who through participation in the extra-political arenas of civil society underwent similar democratic experiences, developed similar democratic skills, and came to share a similar democratic mindset.

Likewise, this literature tends to lack an appreciation for Habermas's third point—that when the public sphere becomes institutionalized, i.e. when a primarily institutionalized and procedurally based public sphere becomes the principle feature of a democracy, it quickly tends to decompose and deteriorate as other political forces (the state, media, political parties and interest groups): a) tend to displace the role of the people in the public sphere and b) tend to usurp the powers of the critical public sphere, itself. As the deliberative democratic arguments were chosen to be largely institutional and rather procedurally based, I argue they have typically lacked in their ability to address either of these two equally important insights from Habermas's original exposition.

Feeling this flaw is inherent to the focus of arguments for deliberative democracy, the rest of this essay explores an alternative radical theory of democracy—associative democracy. “Associational” or “associative democracy” is based on an approach to democracy advanced primarily by the English sociologist, Paul Hirst. He defines

associational democracy as “a normative theory of society the central claim of which is that human welfare and liberty are both best served when as many of the affairs of society as possible are managed by voluntary and democratically self-governing associations.”³

While I will argue that this approach to democracy is more appealing and promising, this essay reflects my belief that Alexis de Tocqueville provides a more realistic understanding of associations and a more promising basis for developing associative theory of democracy.⁴

Thus, Section II is largely an attempt to sketch out the implicit associative model of democracy in Tocqueville’s work. From a comparison of his two classic works, *Democracy in America* and *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, it will become evident how civil and political associations are important as training grounds for a democratic society and, by extension, the likely building blocks for a critical public sphere(s). Likewise, it is argued that these secondary associations become the basis for the pursuit of a social democracy, which both: a) underlies and makes more institutionally based democratic approaches like deliberative democracy possible, as well as b) checks these more institutional forms of democracies tendencies towards decomposition and decline.

Therefore, the second section of this paper can be seen as an assessment of the ability of Tocquevillian version of associative democracy to better account for and balance all three of Habermas’s democratic insights. I argue that this model and approach to democracy, by shifting the focus, better addresses all of Habermas’s democratic insights while largely being compatible with and incorporating the deliberative democratic arguments. Through a synthesis of the democratic insights of Habermas in his original

historical narrative and the understanding of associations implicit in Tocqueville's writings, I argue that an associative democracy is more promising as a theory and approach to democratization. Because associative democracy emphasizes the people's participation in the (relatively democratic) secondary associations of civil society, it encourages the democratic socialization of the people, which both makes the possibility of a popularly based critical public sphere more likely, as well as creates a natural check against the tendency of democracy to become primarily institutional and susceptible to decay.

Section 1

Habermas's *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*

As Thomas Burger explains, "*The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* is a historical-sociological account of the emergence, transformation, and disintegration of the bourgeois public sphere."⁵ Corresponding with each of these stages of the historical account, Habermas provides a crucial observation for democratic theory. In the process of summarizing Habermas's work, it will be argued that the first contribution—that democracy needs extra-political arenas in civil society in which it develops and socializes a large portion of the people—is typically under appreciated; while the second—that a critical public sphere is needed to bridge the growing gap between civil society and (national) government—is arguably Habermas's most recognized contribution and the basis of his centrality in the deliberative democracy debate; and that the third—that democracy is increasingly undermined and decomposes as it is institutionalized—is generally recognized as a common problem for contemporary societies, but has yet to be solved in any adequate way.

Stage 1: Democratization Begins in Extra-political⁶ Arenas

In the first stage of his historical narrative—the story of the rise of a critical public sphere, Habermas focuses the reader’s attention on civil society or “the realm of commodity exchange and social labor governed by its own laws”⁷ and not the state. Civil society, the realm of private life separate from the public realm of government, is the start of his democratic story and acts as the soil in which the bourgeois public sphere grew. For, it was in civil society that a “bourgeois” stratum, “the real carrier of the public, which was from the outset a reading public”⁸ developed. As Habermas explains, unlike the previously feudal societies where this stratum of “merchants and officials” could be “integrated *in toto* into the noble culture”—into the court, the bourgeois with “Their commanding status in the new sphere of civil society led instead to a tension between ‘town’ and ‘court’”⁹. As a result of this division, “public concern regarding the private sphere of civil society was no longer confined to the authorities but was considered by the [bourgeois] subjects as one that was properly theirs.”¹⁰

From the private sphere, the bourgeois strata of society gained a critical distance from the state apparatuses and soon developed a public sphere—“a sphere of private people come together as a public”¹¹. It is the nature and origins of this sphere that seem to be largely unappreciated. As Habermas explains:

Even before the control over the public sphere by public authority was contested and finally wrested away by the critical reasoning of private persons on public issues, there evolved under its cover a public sphere in *apolitical* form—the literary *precursor* of the public sphere operative in the political domain.¹²

It is this “apolitical” public sphere that is “the training ground for a critical public reflection”¹³. I believe that implicit in this description is Habermas’s comprehension of the

fact that without this training ground, the bourgeois citizen would not likely have gained the democratic skills and experiences—i.e. the democratic socialization—necessary to prepare and energize them for a more substantive and active role in society.

It is at this point that Habermas’s narrative describes how the private sphere—civil society—becomes the foundation of democracy; not the state (nor its institutions or procedures) or other political institutions (like political parties or the media). Instead, he claims “The ‘town’ was the life center of civil society, not only economically; in cultural-political contrast to the court, it designated especially an early public sphere in the world of letters whose institutions were the coffee houses, the *salons*, and the table societies.”¹⁴ In these arenas, “‘opinion’ became emancipated from the bonds of economic dependence”¹⁵, “social equality was possible at first only as an equality outside the state”¹⁶, “social intercourse... disregarded status altogether”, there was a “problematization of areas that until then had not been questioned”, and the public became “in principle inclusive”¹⁷.

From this description many of the vast democratic principles and experiences that an “apolitical”, but rather democratic public sphere could and did provide the bourgeois citizen surface. More importantly, this common democratic socialization resulted in a highly democratic stratum of citizens (although only a stratum). It is the development of such a politically educated and active citizenry who rationally debated public concerns and issues as equals that provided self-clarification and a coherent and empowered public opinion that could guide, even demand the state to follow its social dictates.

In all this, the point that needs to be appreciated—the point that seems too little noticed or emphasized—is this precursory step to a public sphere that guides and stands

over the state. It is the (democratically) educative process in the extra-political domains of civil society—the associative arenas of private life in civil society. In this example, democracy developed and thrived in coffee shops, *salons*, and table societies. Maybe it started over critical conversations on art or theater, but it grew to include social and political issues. With its growth, there was a corresponding growth in the democratic possibilities of bourgeois society.

To extrapolate on this point, one might conclude from Habermas’s narrative that the development of a democratically oriented people in civil society is the precursory, the foundational step in this narrative of the democratization process. While not all, probably not most coffee shops, *salons*, and table societies have such democratic outcomes, locating and encouraging ones that do should be a basic concern of political theorists and scientists, as well as common policy for democratic societies. These civil associations have tremendous transformative potential—they can open up society to heretofore-unfathomed democratic possibilities. Habermas, knowingly or not, highlights this fact although much scholarship on him today seems to miss it.

Stage 2: Critical Public Sphere as a Bridge Between Civil Society and Government

Instead, discussions of Habermas tend to center on the need of modern societies to bridge “the tension-charged field between state and society”, the very division from which “The bourgeois public sphere evolved.”¹⁸ Yes, the deliberative public sphere is an invaluable institution by which a body of citizens can be more democratically connected to and actively involved in overseeing their government apparatus. Holding the state accountable, as well as providing it with more guidance and directive is clearly the focus of most discussions of Habermas today.

To substantiate this claim, it is first necessary to understand Habermas's explanation of a deliberative public sphere and the service it does a democratic society. Habermas's argument seems to be a continuation of Kant's goal that "the public sphere... link politics and morality in a specific sense: it was the place where an intelligible unity of the empirical ends of everyone was to be brought about, where legality was to issue from morality."¹⁹ Drawing on Kant, Habermas believes that a reasoning public can develop or simply realize its preexisting moral consensus and use a critical public sphere—much as the bourgeois public sphere of the 18th century did—to bring the state in line with this consensus. Of particularly significance and popularity in this formulation is the way the public sphere becomes an institution that bridges the divide between the people in civil society (the private sphere) and the state authority (the public domain). Thus, a critical public sphere becomes a basic source of democratic legitimacy, as it reconnects the people to their public institutions and places them back at the helm.

In his historical narrative, Habermas suggests that the bourgeois class should be appreciated in their ability (however short-lived) to accomplish this feat. Admirably, they used their newfound private freedom and "claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations"²⁰. In addition, Habermas explains how a critical public sphere works. He argues that the bourgeois critical public sphere did not direct their complaints directly against the public authority. Instead, he argues what the public sphere really did was "undercut the principle on which existing rule was based."²¹ In other words, the bourgeois public sphere did not challenge the centralization of government, but rather criticized and demanded an alteration in the "claim to rule", in the "standards of 'reason' and the forms of the 'law' to

which the public wanted to subject domination and thereby change it in *substance*.”²² Ideally, “the rule of law” would dissolve “domination altogether”, but Habermas sarcastically points out how this “was a typically bourgeois idea insofar as not even the political safeguarding of the private sphere emancipating itself from political domination was to assume the form of domination.”²³ All of this resonates strongly with Kant’s ideal that the coercive powers of the state be minimized and used primarily “to exercise a positive influence upon it [“the universal end of the public” as manifested in the deliberative public sphere.]”²⁴

As he describes this high tide of the bourgeois critical public sphere, Habermas claims that “A political consciousness developed in the public sphere of civil society which, in opposition to the absolute sovereignty, articulated the concept of and demand for general and abstract laws and which ultimately came to assert itself (i.e., public opinion) as the only legitimate source of this law.”²⁵ It is this idealistic conception of the public sphere that has captured the majority of academic attention. Not surprisingly, much of today’s scholarly concern has been on how to artificially (re)create and preserve what developed rather naturally in the bourgeois society of the eighteenth century. This is in many ways the logical step. For, just as plurality of interests and positions make public opinion more difficult to grasp and encourage its replacement by a public voice derived artificially through modern technologies, radical democratic theorists attempt to replace the development of public opinion through active political strife and struggle by artificially produced opinion through institutions and procedures.

For example, much of the discussion today is on the makeup of an ideal deliberative public sphere. Who does it include? What are the essential principles and

norms that govern this sphere? These are the basic questions being debated, a debate in which Habermas has plainly been an active participant²⁶. To show the lengths of the development of this debate, there is the work of Joshua Cohen. Probably no one has developed deliberative democracy as thoroughly as he has. In his article “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy”²⁷, Cohen lays out in-detail the internal requirements and principles for an ideal deliberative process. Similarly, Seyla Benhabib’s work argues it is “the radical proceduralism” of the discourse model as it has evolved in works of Habermas and others that is of value.²⁸ These scholars exemplify much of the work that has grown out of Habermas’s ideas. They share the goal of institutionalizing via law a public sphere, one governed by strict procedures and norms that ensures all citizens are brought together artificially to critically debate the core issues dividing society. Instead of focusing on the need to have and develop a democratic culture, this literature has chosen to artificially pursue democracy through institutions.

Stage 3: Decomposition of the Public Sphere

If this development in democratic theory is not problematic enough, consider the consequences of Habermas’s third point for the deliberative democratic literature. In this final stage, institutionalizing the critical public sphere to preserve the democratic bridge between the state and the people is seen as a promising solution in theory that quickly deteriorates in practice. Apparently, institutionalizing democracy necessarily encourages democratic laziness socially; as it opens the door for other institutions like bureaucratic state, political parties, the media and organized interests to step in a do what a socially active and democratically conditioned citizenry previously did for itself.

To explain this final stage, Habermas first establishes that the basis of the institutionalized public sphere is private law. Its preservation of the public/private distinction is the foundation of the bourgeois public sphere²⁹. Habermas argues that these laws, typically preserved in the state's constitution, gave rise to the series of basic rights that were the framework of a critical public sphere. He argues these "basic rights guaranteed: the *spheres* of the public realm and of the private (with the intimate sphere at its core); the *institutions* and *instruments* of the public sphere, on the one hand (press and parties), and the foundation of the private autonomy (family and property), on the other."³⁰ Through this description of the institutional foundations of a deliberative public sphere, the definite liberal underpinnings of the bourgeois public sphere surface. In Habermas's historical narrative, a liberal society with a constitutional state appears to be a necessary condition for the development and institutionalization of a critical public sphere. The irony is that this liberal foundation (which underlies the public sphere) is also the source of other structural transformations that quickly encourage its decline. Thus, he writes, "For about a century the social foundations of this sphere have been caught up in a process of decomposition... [as] Tendencies pointing to the collapse of the public sphere are unmistakable, for while its scope is expanding impressively, its function has become progressively insignificant."³¹

Here Habermas's third insight comes to the fore, as he contends that the "dialectic of a progressive 'societalization' of the state simultaneously with an increasing 'stateification' of society gradually destroyed the basis of the bourgeois public sphere—the separation of state and society."³² To help explain this point, Habermas turns to two liberal icons—John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville. He explains that:

Liberals like Mill and Tocqueville, therefore, who favored the process [of public opinion formation through the public sphere] for the sake of the same principle also devalued its consequences. This was because the unreconciled interests which, with the broadening of the public, flooded the public sphere were represented in a divided public opinion and turned public opinion (in the form of the currently dominant opinion) into a coercive force, whereas it had once been supposed to dissolve any kind of coercion into the compulsion of reason.³³

By bringing in this basic liberal fear—the fear of tyranny of the majority, Habermas demonstrates the irony of liberal society. While Mill and Tocqueville typically feared an irrational majority of citizens dominating and tyrannizing, what Habermas’s historical narrative suggests is that the reverse is true—a highly rational and self-interested group or set of interests is what dominated. The public sphere, which posits universal accessibility, tended not to be universally accessible and, when it does, this only creates further problems. The reality, as Habermas explains, is that the liberal model of society, which “had envisaged only horizontal exchange relationships among individual commodity owners”, had not foreseen the concentration of social power in a few private hands.³⁴ In eighteenth (and nineteenth) century Europe, these interests with a disproportionate share of social resources came to dominate the public sphere, thus the label “bourgeois” public sphere.

In response to this breakdown of the liberal model, there arose the modern welfare state. Habermas argues that, with this expansion of the state’s responsibilities, “the state also took over the provision of services that hitherto had been left to private hands”, i.e. to the public sphere.³⁵ Hence began the statefication of society. The artificiality of the principle of universal accessibility to the public sphere opened the door to increased dependence on the state. The state once involved tends to stay involved and even increase its role as Weber has so famously argued and Tocqueville illustrates in the next section. It

was not long before the state had grown and began providing services for society that previously the active bourgeois people had provided for themselves. But, this is only half the story. In conjunction with this development, the private sphere became fragmented as “the occupational sphere gained independence as a quasi-public realm”³⁶ and the family (which was the domain of leisure that gave rise to a society of letters) suffered a “refeudalization”—“Discussion as a form of sociability gave way to the fetishism of community involvement” not in critical debate, but in culture consumption³⁷. Thus, on one hand there was the “statefication” of society represented by the rise of the welfare state and on the other the shriveling and transformation of the critical private sphere, whereby the (democratic) energies of this private sphere were redirected into a “culture-consuming public.”

In the end, what once was a mechanism by which the bourgeois people rather democratically governed their society was now a political resource by which the state and those with disproportionate material resources manipulated and dominated society.

Habermas provides a glib explication of this, as he writes that:

In reality, however, the occupation of the political public sphere by the uprooted masses led to an interlocking of state and society which removed from the public sphere its former basis without supplying a new one. For the integration of the public and private realms entailed a corresponding disorganization of the public sphere that once was the go-between linking state and society. This mediating passed from the public to such institutions as have arisen out of the private sphere (e.g., special-interest associations) or out of the public sphere, e.g., parties... At the same time they endeavor, via mass media that themselves have become autonomous, to obtain the agreement of at least acquiescence of a mediatized public. Publicity is generated from above, so to speak, in order to create an aura of good will for certain positions.³⁸

At this point, liberal institutions—both public and private—that previously supported the critical public sphere have simply become tools by which public opinion can be

manufactured and used to control the people. As Habermas explains, “it [the public sphere] serves the manipulation *of* the public as much as legitimation *before* it. Critical publicity is supplanted by manipulative publicity.”³⁹

In the end, Habermas suggests that the public sphere is doubly undermined by the principle of universal accessibility. While an admirable democratic norm, universal accessibility led to a flooding of the public sphere that crippled it. It became a realm where either special interest groups dominated or the state (with all good intentions) became overly active and relieved the people of their democratic responsibilities. The problem is that universal accessibility, on the one hand, encourages domination of the public sphere by major (as opposed to majority) interests and, on the other, is conducive to state activism in order to correct these imbalances. The net result in practice is manufactured opinion and resurfacing of domination as both forces undermine a democratic public sphere.

In essence, the problem seems to be that a universally accessible public sphere does not entail that all participants will have equal critical and deliberative abilities, i.e. equal democratic skills. Even worse, those who are not akin to the democratic game will not be involved or, if involved, not play with a democratic mindset. For example, when the public sphere is opened to the proletariat as well as the bourgeois, it does not mean the proletariat has the same critical and democratic abilities. Much of this depends of the training grounds, if any, available to this class. If this group lacks the social resources, the likelihood for advantaged interests dominating and for state intervention increases. Either way, when democracy becomes largely institutional, the participants (like the state, organized interests and the media) who are most knowledgeable and most active learn the

rules quicker and use them to secure the system to their own advantage. This is the underlying reason why largely institutional democratic practices tend to decompose. More importantly, this is a further reason why the largely institutional and procedurally based arguments for deliberative democracy are problematic. While artificially producing democracy is problematic enough, artificially producing a largely institutional and procedurally based democracy as the deliberative democratic arguments tend to simply ensure the demise of democracy in the face of other political powers.

Summary

From this analysis of Habermas, some important points have been established. The first is that the precursory step to any substantive democratization is the development, proliferation, and maintenance of democratic training grounds. The development and proliferation of democratic training grounds were readily evident in Habermas's historical narrative, but their role in deliberative democratic arguments today is rather weak and suspect. Also, while Habermas establishes the democratic usefulness of a deliberative public sphere as a bridge between the people and the state in modern societies, this does not mean that the focus of democratic theory should be on ways to institutionalize a critical public sphere. What such a conclusion must miss and downplay is the importance of the first point and the reality of Habermas's third—that with institutionalization there tends to set in stagnation and decomposition. In a way akin to Sheldon Wolin's argument that democracy is fugitive, Habermas suggests that attempts to institutionalize democracy inevitably leads to democratic deterioration and encourage its replacement by "politics as usual"⁴⁰ as the bureaucratic state and other political forces begin doing for the people what they previously did for themselves.

Section II

Through my analysis of Habermas, it becomes apparent how the deliberative democratic literature is problematic, as it does not appreciate all the insights into democracy he provides in his original work on the critical public sphere. As a result, this second section develops out of Alexis de Tocqueville an approach to democracy that seems to better account for Habermas's contributions. This section adopts a more social and associative approach to democracy that fully appreciates the need to have and develop social training grounds for democracy in civil society, so that democracy does not tend to become largely institutional. Interestingly, both of these goals are achieved while not precluding (but actually making more likely) the development of a deliberative public sphere.

To begin, it is first necessary to develop the implicit associational theory of democracy operating in the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville. Through comparing and contrasting the two classic works of Tocqueville, one begins to see how a more associative democracy like that operating in America in the early nineteenth century is the democratic approach that would better serve the needs of contemporary societies. More importantly, instead of simply offering another (some would say "equally idealistic") argument for associative democracy, this section will demonstrate that Tocqueville's treatment of "secondary" associations offers a more balanced understanding of how associations (and an associative society) can promote, as well as undermine the identity of the state and the people. For, while in *Democracy in America*, Tocqueville establishes that associations have the potential to be the means by which the state and the people develop some common democratic identity (which is the goal of a deliberative public

sphere⁴¹), his other work—*The Old Regime and the French Revolution*—makes it readily apparent that Tocqueville realizes associations can be self-serving and an obstacle to realizing democratic government. Thus, on the one hand, Tocqueville illustrates how groups can be democratically essential as a means by which the democratic foundation of society can be strengthened and can deliver a civically-educated citizenry prime for unification in a more cohesive (but not universalizing) national community. On the other hand, he realizes that associations are susceptible to the pursuit of purely selfish interests that reinforce selfish individualism and make democratic government so difficult.

Tocqueville: Social Democracy⁴² and the Democratic Potential of Associations

Writing in the early 1800s, Tocqueville provided an in-depth, two-volume analysis assessing the integrity of the young American democracy. In the mid-1800s he provided a similar analysis of the French Revolution. In both, Tocqueville explains how culture, ideology, environment, and political and economic institutions and practices all contribute to (as well as threaten the operation and maintenance of) democracy and democratic institutions. Comparing and contrasting these two works gives some important insight into the differences in the democratic foundations of both countries, as well as provides insight into the role associations and associative behavior play in facilitating democracy. Interestingly, Tocqueville himself suggests that it is these foundational differences which provide much of the explanation for why America had unprecedented success in its pursuit of democratic governance, while France suffered through years of instability until centralized government once again reasserted itself.⁴³

At the most basic level, a comparison of these two works suggests (in a rather Rousseauian manner) that social and cultural unity/coherency is very important to the

viability of democracy. For, a comparison of the two texts demonstrates that what often appear to be simple surface differences are actually derivative of important cultural variation. For example, when Tocqueville describes the town hall meetings of the U.S. and then France, one is struck by the difference in the inclusiveness of the two. His description of American town meetings as locally inclusive engagements where the populace publicly debate and develop public mandates, which they then give to their "selectmen" (administrators) to enact and enforce, is widely celebrated as democratic⁴⁴.

In contrast, he traces how town hall meetings in France—originally similar to those of America⁴⁵—gave way to meetings where the peasants erected barriers that prevented nobles and even wealthy commoners from participating. Thus, in France the meetings deteriorated as France's municipal assemblies became reflective of the class differentiation that plagued its society.⁴⁶ In the end, the result was that French town hall meetings were less inclusive and Intendants (state appointed officials) primarily developed and administered virtually all local law irrespective of the mandates developed by the people in their town hall meetings. Even worse, it became second nature for the people from all classes to depend on strong and centralized government (not themselves, members of their class, or the community) for their own care and the care of civil society. Thus, the town hall meetings of America (much like the coffee shops, table societies, and *salons* of the bourgeois in Europe) provided the widespread democratic socialization of the people, while such a socialization in France seems rather absent as there is a lack of such training grounds for democracy.

Not surprisingly, Tocqueville suggests there developed distinct differences in the driving motivations for people to participate in the public realm, in the operation of the

judicial system, and in the nature of group activities in both countries, as well. Obviously, these important substantive differences are a reflection of the socio-economic and cultural foundations of America and France, which are primarily differences in the class systems of these two countries. Thus, for Tocqueville France's entrenched class system and America's lack of one provide much of the explanation of this disparity. As a result, the focus on "equality of condition" drives Tocqueville's analysis throughout both volumes of *Democracy in America*. He even begins the first volume with the claim that "during my stay in the United States, nothing struck me more forcibly than the general equality of condition among the people."⁴⁷ This "equality of condition" theme rears its head throughout both volumes and repeatedly highlights the lack of classes in America.⁴⁸

In contrast, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* continually establishes that a highly differentiated class system and an entrenched and politically advantaged aristocracy is all that France has known. Tocqueville explains, "Each privilege, once granted [to the nobility], became hereditary and inalienable."⁴⁹ Thus, for years the commoners and people suffered the burdens of taxes, while those most capable of paying them (the aristocracy) were able to continuously gain exemption. It was this kind of difference in status, the lack of equality of condition, that became ingrained in France and led to town hall meetings where the peasantry and poor commoners wanted no involvement with the privileged wealthy. If the nobility was not going to pay taxes in support of the community, the nobility was not going to be allowed to participate in the local politics of the community. What this analysis is driven by and contributes an associative theory of democracy is how this equality of condition or lack thereof is driven by and a reflection of the nature of association in civil society.

For example, from this class differentiation in France there developed a culture devoid of unifying norms, while Americans had a strong collective sense of freedom and liberty. Tocqueville describes how, as a result of this situation, active citizen participation declined in France⁵⁰. He argues that participation in public office by men of the middle class was more for superficial (i.e. selfish) reasons—privilege, exemption from taxes, preservation of class distinctions—than from a sense of liberty.⁵¹ In stark contrast, there is Tocqueville's description of how America's unprecedented reliance on free (secondary) institutions—things like the press and civil and political associations—not only helps them appreciate and preserve their liberty and equality, but also promotes a surprisingly selfless participatory citizenry.

For example, Tocqueville (never one to sugar coat his observations) writes:

It is incontestable that the people frequently conduct public business *very badly*; but it is impossible that the lower orders should take a part in public business without extending the circle of their ideas... The humblest individual who co-operates in the government of society acquires a certain degree of self-respect; and as he possesses authority, he can command the services of minds more enlightened than his own... He takes part in political undertakings which he did not originate, but which give him a taste for undertakings of the kind. New improvements are daily pointed out to him in the common property, and this gives him the desire of improving that property which is his own. He is perhaps neither happier nor better than those who came before him, but he is better informed and more active. I have no doubt that the *democratic institutions* of the United States, joined to the *physical constitution of the country*, are the cause (not the direct, as is so often asserted, but the indirect cause) of the prodigious commercial activity of the inhabitants. It is not created by the laws, but the people learn how to promote it by the experience derived from legislation.⁵² (italics my emphasis)

Through an analysis and understanding of this quote, one arrives at the heart of the matter. In *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, Tocqueville argues that there exist certain "virtues so vital to a nation but now well nigh extinct [in France]- a spirit of healthy independence, high ambitions, faith in oneself and in a cause."⁵³ What should strike one

about the quote above is that it implies each of these (democratic) virtues now "nigh extinct in France" are readily produced in the everyday activities of many early Americans.

On the one hand, Tocqueville suggests Americans cannot help but have "a spirit of healthy independence" because even "The humblest individual who co-operates in the government of society acquires a certain degree of self-respect". With each successful undertaking in which the individual participates, he/she learns through cooperation with others how to (better) pursue his/her own (as well as the collective) interest. The individual's sense of independence rises out of his/her learning that some foreign⁵⁴ governmental institution is not always needed to protect and secure his/her rights, nor is it always needed to secure the common interests of society. He/she learns that collectively the association and/or the community can help provide many of these individual and common goods. The government becomes a secondary, and not a *primary*, consideration for the supply of these goods.

Equally important, Tocqueville suggests that as individuals learn to work together locally, they build a foundation upon which even greater, more regional and national collective actions can be pursued.⁵⁵ It is at this point that a national or many regional public spheres could be pursued. Tocqueville faults his own people (who never experienced much interpenetrating, non-class association) for not realizing this fact. This is probably an important part of why Habermas finds only a bourgeois public sphere and a rather limited, class-based democracy. As a result, Tocqueville claims "It never occurred to anyone [in France] that any large-scale enterprise could be put through successfully without the intervention of the State."⁵⁶ In the language of Putnam, Tocqueville felt early France had little social capital—a weak socio-cultural consensus and little base upon which to develop a stronger consensus, which when combined made the pursuit of democracy difficult, if not impossible.

Similarly, in the quotation above Tocqueville suggests that "high ambition" is a necessary virtue. To the extent that the collective activities of Americans extends "the

circle of his [the humblest member of society] ideas", Tocqueville suggests that some of the least ambitious in society learn what is accomplishable is much greater than what he/she heretofore thought. A good illustration of this ambition is captured in the writings of one Anti-Federalist using the pseudonym "John Dewitt". He argues that "Civil society is a blessing.—It is here universally known as such...--There is scarcely a citizen in America who does not wish to bring it, consistent with our situation and circumstances to its highest state of improvement."⁵⁷

This resonates with Tocqueville's own point that collective interaction in America leads to a rather positive adaptation of the Rousseauian idea that when an individual becomes aware of the improvements others have made in their lives and property, that individual will attempt to secure the same improvements in his/her own property.⁵⁸ As the individual becomes aware of the differences or inequalities manifest in society, he/she will become rather ambitious and work to undo these discrepancies.⁵⁹ It was this ability of American democracy to make people ambitious, open them up not only to the pursuit of public, but also their own private perfectibility, that so intrigued and impressed Tocqueville. This is why he concludes that, while the individual may not be happier or better than those before him/her, he/she is "in a thousand ways" being enlightened because he/she is more informed and active.⁶⁰

At this point, Tocqueville has clearly established that collective participation in both civil and political associations has, in the American case, facilitated democracy. It has provided a sense of empowerment and self-confidence—the civic education—of the individual through its reliance on (to borrow an idea from Mark Warren) a "democratic ecology of associations."⁶¹ Just as important, Tocqueville has suggested how associational behavior can make the people more likely to be self-governing—to rely on their own collective action to dominate the public sphere rather than expecting their government to lead the way, as happened in the more institutional stages of Habermas's narrative.

As Tocqueville explains, democracy in America did not throw every man "back forever upon himself alone" nor threaten "in the end to confine him entirely within the solitude of his own heart."⁶² There was no withdraw deeper and deeper into the private sphere (as in Habermas's narrative), with no way to get back to the public. Instead, early American democracy, largely through its unparalleled use of the right to freely associate in (an ecology of) secondary associations, was able to breed a unity and public-spiritedness that checked and counter-balanced the liberal and individualistic leanings of society. America seems to have achieved the same ends as Europe's bourgeois public sphere, either without it at all or through multiple competing, yet overlapping public spheres.

In other words, America's associative nature helped bridge the public/private split. In an ironic observation about the classless Americans, Tocqueville suggests that the success of America in its democratic pursuits has to do with its rather aristocratic practice of individualism. He claims that Americans practiced every day what aristocrats (rarely practiced, but) argued to be a basic virtue. He explains how Americans daily demonstrate "with complacency how an enlightened regard for themselves constantly prompts them to assist one another and inclines them willingly to sacrifice a portion of their time and property to the welfare of the state."⁶³ Tocqueville terms this the "principle of self-interest rightly understood", but a more accurate label would be "enlightened self-interest", for only an enlightened democrat has learned Tocqueville's golden rule: to know when to sacrifice some of one's private interests to save the rest.⁶⁴

Thus, Tocqueville suggests that democracy demands public participation and some sacrifice by the individual to the collective. An associational life that produces this affect represents a positive harnessing of the democratic potential of associations. As, for Tocqueville this self-sacrifice not only promotes the integrity of the democratic community; it also helps individuals protect and pursue their private interests better. Through such an ethic, individuals are inclined to be active publicly, to be open to the common good and, more importantly, to develop essential democratic virtues like

independence, ambition, and self-confidence that make them better suited to pursue life publicly and privately. In other words, Tocqueville makes one more aware of the important side effects of public participation, as well as make the participation more desirable to the individual making the self-sacrifice.

Still, Tocqueville is skeptical of how long enlightened self-interest will manifest itself in American society, i.e. he is aware of how few people realize the personally beneficial aspects of self-sacrifice through public participation. Thus, later in *Democracy in America* he writes:

the members of a community, as they become more equal, become more ignorant and coarse, it is difficult to foresee to what pitch of stupid excesses their *selfishness* may lead them; and no one can foretell into what disgrace and wretchedness they would plunge themselves lest they should have to sacrifice something of their own well-being to the prosperity of their fellow creatures.⁶⁵ (my emphasis)

When equality is not counter-balanced by a tendency towards enlightened self-interest, a public-orientedness, selfish individualism (purely self-interested action) becomes the norm, the democratic foundation weakens, and everyone begins to turn inward and away from society. Here, the more negative side of associational life begins to surface.

At this point, when associations do more to divide people and encourage their withdraw from public life, one can enact whatever institutional forms of democracy desired—there can exist a highly institutionalized deliberative public sphere, but the outcome is not likely to be very democratic in practice. This seems to be Tocqueville's understanding of the democratic problems of France, as this is how he characterizes the associative interaction that exists in France. What is worse, Tocqueville argues that as "the ties of family, of caste, of class, and craft fraternities no longer exist", as the aristocracy of France is broken, their dysfunctional associative past led to a propensity "to become self-seekers practicing a narrow individualism and caring nothing for the public

good". He adds that the various despotic governments of France (as do "representative" governments today) seized on this differentiation, promoted it—"it [government] estranged them [the people] still more" from each other, as "despotism freezes them" in their non-associative differentiation to maintain their position of power.⁶⁶ Tocqueville concludes that it was the French's lack of a sense of freedom that allowed "equality and tyranny to coexist" and to steadily deteriorate "the mental and moral standards of a nation."⁶⁷

Without the democratically positive experience of strong secondary institutions that arise out of free, classless association, the French people could not actively develop the basic virtues of independence, self-confidence, etc. that are the foundation for democratic endeavors, nor could they provide a counter-balance to other monopolistic elite powers. Thus, as the French gained an increasing sense of equality, instead of developing a common democratic culture Tocqueville suggests their class-oriented society turned them in upon themselves or made them "fly at each other's throats."⁶⁸ The net result is that contact between classes often did more to dredge up past differences than build horizontal interactions between them.

As one might expect, these differences between France and the United States are never so apparent as in the polar opposite group dynamics that developed in each country. In describing French group activities, Tocqueville writes:

Nevertheless, each of the thousands of small groups of which the French nation was then composed took thought for itself alone; in fact, there was, so to speak, a group individualism which prepared men's minds for the thorough-paced individualism with which nowadays we are familiar.⁶⁹

He adds, "Thus each of these small groups lived only for itself and, quite literally, minded its own business."⁷⁰ In stark contrast Tocqueville argues that in America, where the

people were able to partake in multiple and diverse political and civil associations, "they learn to surrender their own will to that of all the rest and to make their own exertions subordinate to the common impulse, things which it is not less necessary to know in civil than in political associations."⁷¹ Incidentally, it is this last description of civil and political association in America that better captures the ideal of deliberative democracy. It is this active political deliberation of associational life and not the artificial deliberation ensured by the norms and procedures of an institution that deliberative arguments should be pursuing.

Summary

From this comparison, it is apparent that Tocqueville has a lot to offer on democracy and associational life. All in all, this comparison of Tocqueville's two classic works demonstrates how integral associations can be to a healthy democracy. Foremost, it is apparent how difficult it is to pursue democracy in cultures (like France in the 1800s) that are highly differentiated along class lines. In such societies, associative behavior is rather absent or, at best, confined internally to things like class. Thus, the cultural foundation matters. Where there is a lack of coherence and not much of a chance of producing a stronger cultural consensus, the implementation and maintenance of a democracy is difficult, if not impossible. When the people are largely selfish, the reliance on a balance in associations and a rather foreign state apparatus may be the best democracy achievable. However, without a move to develop a proliferate associative society, the likely result is a politics typically dominated by a few interests with disproportionate resources coupled with an authoritarian government that likes to hide behind a democratic facade. Thus, from this analysis one can see how Tocqueville

appreciates many of the fears people have of associations. He knows groups can be very selfish and self-serving. Yet, he also realizes and appreciates that it is through participation in associations, particularly ones of a political nature⁷², that people learn important lessons like the "principle of association"—that "The greater the multiplicity of small affairs, the more do men, even without knowing it, acquire facility in prosecuting great undertakings in common."⁷³ Can there be any greater undertaking for a group of people than a democracy?

Thus, this analysis of Tocqueville's works encourages the conclusion that it was the ability of American institutions to promote a more associative society—a society of more horizontal interaction and cultural coherence—that helped it overcome internal differentiation and the inherent selfish tendencies of its people in order to develop a stable and substantive democracy. The lack of this stable associative foundation in France seems to be why it continually moved towards more institutional and procedural democracy and often reverted back to authoritative forms of government. For, Tocqueville suggests it was France's lack of this associative dynamic that led the French to "always [be] readier to put up with the arbitrary rule, however harsh, of an autocrat than with a free, well-ordered government by his fellow citizens."⁷⁴

Conclusion

Essentially, what Tocqueville offers the associative literature is that associations, which are a potential evil, are instrumental to people's liberties and to the development of the horizontal interactions and relationships that facilitate collective undertakings like a deliberative public sphere or, more generally, democracy. Also, Tocqueville suggests how, in the spectrum of associative behavior, one must fluctuate between the antithetical

poles of class-based association and cross-cultural, overlapping associations. Fluctuation in a middle range between these two poles is probably the most reasonable and the most practical expectation. Yet, it may be that the desired location at any point in time is rather dependent on the strength of the associative base in society at that time.

More importantly, what Tocqueville spells out is how, through associations, people become aware of the value of leading a public, as well as a private life. In other words, the “quasi-civic”⁷⁵ nature of associations, i.e. their ability to straddle the public and private spheres, help individuals to realize how their collective public participation can facilitate and show them ways to better pursue their private interests, as well as counter the individualistic and disempowering impulse to withdraw into the private sphere that is characteristic of modern, highly differentiated societies.

To connect this to Habermas’s work, I suggest that both Habermas and Tocqueville share a belief that associations and a more associative civil society are likely the best means by which the common people can develop the type of social interaction and ethic that makes greater democratic undertakings possible. Thus, while the emphasis of deliberative democratic arguments is admirable and promising in terms of democratizing procedures and institutions, the claim in this work is that many (at times even Habermas himself) seem to miss that deliberative democracy is necessarily a secondary and subordinate approach to democratization. It is secondary in that it is predicated on the people already having experienced a substantial democratic socialization. Likewise, the arguments for deliberative democracy are subordinate in that their institutional and procedural focus tend to limit its potential for democratization. It largely encourages changing the procedures and norms of existing institutions and practices, whereas

associative democracy seems more likely to look for and open up society to the development of new democratic institutions and practices.

Likewise, in response to Habermas's third observation, the more associative Tocquevillian approach suggests a society that encourages a "democratic ecology of associations" is better positioned to combat the tendency of democratic institutions to decline and decompose. For one, an associative democracy encourages wide levels of democratic participation in diverse ways, i.e. beyond purely institutional forms of democracy. Thus, it balances institutional democracy with a more social one. Likewise, it encourages the collective action and empowerment of the people, which is there only force against other political media like the state, organized interests and the media.

In conclusion, associational democracy realizes that the precursory step to democracy. It predicates democracy on developing arenas where democracy is first cultivated socially, where a democratic education and democratic experiences are achieved outside the avenues of electoral and government politics. Also, a more associative democracy (while it may not be able to absolutely prevent the decomposition of democracy as special interests and the government are powerful modern forces that do increasingly try to usurp the responsibilities of a democratic people) does encourage the development, proliferation, and maintenance of democracy in civil society and outside governmental institutions that creates a tension to help counter democracy's tendency of decomposition. It addresses both these, while also accommodating, even enabling the development of a deliberative public sphere. Therefore, while deliberative democracy is a worthwhile strategy for small-scale democratization (i.e. democratizing procedures and government institutions), it seems necessarily a secondary and auxiliary approach to

democracy. Associative (and not deliberative) democracy in a Tocquevillian manner fully appreciates Habermas's important insights into democracy and democratization and offers a more promising approach to breeding in modern societies new, large-scale, and unfathomed democratic possibilities as it encourages the common people to realize a more substantive democracy.

¹ Tocqueville, Alexis de. *Democracy in America*. Volume 2, p. 323.

² Look at the number of collective works and conferences recently organized around the ideas and works of Jurgen Habermas. For example, there is: *The Communicative Ethics Controversy*. Edited by Benhabib, Seyla & Fred Dallmayr. MIT Press, 1995(1990); or *Habermas and the Public Sphere*. Edited by Calhoun, Craig. MIT Press, 1997(1992). Also, one could include *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*. Edited by Benhabib, Seyla. Princeton University Press, 1996.

³ See "Associational Democracy", *Prospects for Democracy*. Edited by David Held, Stanford University Press, 1993, pp. 112-135 (quote p. 112). For more on associative democracy, see also Hirst, Paul. *Associative Democracy*. The University of Massachusetts Press (Amherst), 1994; Cohen, Joshua & Joel Rogers. "Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance", *Politics & Society*, vol. 20, no. 4, December 1992, pp. 393-472.

⁴ Whereas Hirst finds the basis for his argument in the works of English pluralist theorists (for example, see *The Pluralist Theory of the State: Selected Writings of G.D.H. Cole, J.N. Figgis, and H.J. Laski*. Edited by Paul Hirst, Routledge, 1989(1993).), I advocate (especially in the American context) Tocqueville as a more realistic and richer basis for an associative theory of democracy.

⁵ Burger, Thomas. "Introduction", *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*. MIT press, 1996(1991), p. xi.

⁶ Habermas will often use "apolitical" when talking about these training grounds in civil society, but I prefer "extra-political" as it implies these groups—although not part of the traditional political structures—often have political significance and impact, especially on the citizens who participate in them.

⁷ Habermas, Jurgen. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*. Translated by Thomas Burger. MIT press, 1996(1991), p. 3.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 29. (my emphasis)

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 115. (author's original italics)

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 28. (my emphasis)

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 54.

²⁶ Many of Habermas's works have discussed the basic norms of an "ideal speech act" or an ideal deliberative process. See, for example, Habermas. *The Theory of Communicative Action*. Volumes I & II. Translated by Thomas McCarthy, Beacon Press, 1984(Vol. 1) and 1987 (Vol. 2); as well as, Habermas. "Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification", *The Communicative Ethics Controversy*. Edited by Seyla Benhabib & Fred Dallmayr. MIT Press, 1995(1990), pp. 60-110.

²⁷ Cohen, Joshua. "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy", *The Good Polity*. Edited by Alan Hamlin & Phillip Petit. Oxford, 1989, pp. 17-34.

²⁸ Benhabib, Seyla. "3 Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition, and Jurgen Habermas", *Habermas and the Public Sphere*. Edited by Craig Calhoun. MIT Press, 1997(1992), pp. 73-98 (quote p. 95).

²⁹ Habermas. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*. p. 74-75.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 83.

³¹ Ibid., p. 4.

³² Ibid., p. 142.

³³ Ibid., p. 133.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 144.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 147.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 154.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 158.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 177.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 178.

⁴⁰ Wolin, Sheldon. "Fugitive Democracy", *Democracy and Difference*. Edited by Seyla Benhabib. Princeton University Press, 1996, pp. 31-45. There seems to be a semblance of this logic, although not nearly as radical, in Habermas's argument.

⁴¹ I would argue that Robert Putnam makes a similar argument in his classic work, *Making Democracy Work*. Princeton Univ. Press, 1993.

⁴² I borrow the term "social democracy" from Jack Lively, who distinguishes between the social and political democracy of Tocqueville. Social democracy is the more spontaneous democracy between people in civil society, while political democracy is the institutions and procedures of representative democracy. See Lively, Jack. *The Social and Political Thought of Alexis de Tocqueville*. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962.

⁴³ Tocqueville, Alexis de. *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*. Translated by Stuart Gilbert, Doubleday Press, 1955, pp. 208-209.

⁴⁴ Tocqueville, Alexis de. *Democracy in America*. Volume I, Vintage Books, 1990, pp. 64-68.

⁴⁵ Tocqueville writes "In short, the French and American systems resembled each other- in so far as a dead creature can be said to resemble one that is very much alive". *The Old Regime & the French Revolution*. p. 48.

⁴⁶ Tocqueville. *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*. p. 201.

⁴⁷ Tocqueville. *Democracy in America*. Vol. I, p. 3.

⁴⁸ For example, in the first volume he dedicates a chapter describing how the American "aristocrat", by which he really only means wealthy, hide their wealth in private and simply act like a common citizen in public, see *Democracy in America*. Vol. 1, Chapter X. In the second volume, he dedicates a chapter to describing and contrasting the precarious relationship of the master and servant in the U.S. with that of an aristocratic society. At these points (among numerous others) it becomes clear how the idea of equality at work in the U.S. has prevented and subverted the differentiation of society necessary for the development of an aristocracy.

⁴⁹ Tocqueville. *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*. p. 86.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 45.

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 91-92.

⁵² Ibid., pp. 91-92.

⁵³ Ibid., p. xii.

⁵⁴ The term “foreign” here is does not mean a the government of a foreign country. It is used to emphasize the separation between the people and their own government as the government becomes more and more distant to their everyday lives. Tocqueville’s point is that individuals learn first to rely on themselves and their community or association for obtaining their collective interests before the resort to their government.

⁵⁵ This is clearly the way Robert Putnam reads Tocqueville, as he builds his own social capital argument off this point. For example, Putnam explains that collective participation, whether in a civil or political associations, in local or national government, creates social capital- "norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement", which make the accomplishment of (greater) future collective endeavors even easier. See Robert Putnam’s *Making Democracy Work*. pp. 169-171.

⁵⁶ Tocqueville. *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*. p. 69.

⁵⁷ *The Antifederalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention*. Ed. by Ralph Ketcham, Penguin Books, 1961, pp. 190-191.

⁵⁸ Here I am referring to an argument Rousseauian makes in another of his works, *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* in *Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Basic Political Writings*. Translated by Donald Cress, Hackett Publishing Company, 1987, pp.25-82. It seems that Tocqueville puts a positive spin on Rousseau's idea that man has "the faculty of self-perfection".

⁵⁹ I would argue that this idea- that by public participation one can better learn how to pursue his/her private interests- is one of the much neglected justifications for democratic governance.

⁶⁰ Tocqueville. *Democracy in America*. Volume I, p. 251.

⁶¹ Warren, Mark. *Democracy and Association*. Princeton University Press, 2001, pp. 207-216.

Similarly, Habermas’s description of the participatory social life of Europe in civil society as a “democratic ecology of associations”, as well.

⁶² Tocqueville. *Democracy in America*. Volume II, p. 99.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 122.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 123.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 124.

⁶⁶ Tocqueville. *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*. p. xiii.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. xiv.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 107.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 96.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 96.

⁷¹ Tocqueville. *Democracy in America*. Volume II, p. 116.

⁷² Tocqueville describes political associations as "large free schools, where all members of the community can go to learn the general theory of association". Ibid., p. 116.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 115.

⁷⁴ Tocqueville. *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*. pp. 210-211.

⁷⁵ I borrow this term from Nancy Rosenblum's essay, "Compelled Association: Public Standing, Self-respect, and the Dynamic of Exclusion", as it seems to capture Tocqueville's point and imply the power of associations to bridge between the public and private. Her essay can be found in the collective work, *Freedom of Association*, edited by Amy Gutman, Princeton Univ. Press, 1998, pp. 75-108.

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