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COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF COMMUNIST SUCCESSOR PARTIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
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What is to be done? Succession from the League of Communists of Croatia

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Abstract

Croatia’s complex and violent transition contributed to conditions under which ex-communists have exerted significant influence over multiple post-Communist parties. In the 1990s, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) led by President Franjo Tudjman employed war to impose a semi-authoritarian system that further weakened the electoral prospects of the most logical Communist successor party—the Social Democratic Party (SDP). The SDP-led coalition’s win in the 2000 elections ushered in conditions that enabled a deeper democratization in Croatia that brought it closer toward integration into the EU. HDZ’s loss in 2000 and EU leverage then helped compel HDZ to reform and to continue work toward meeting EU accession requirements.

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Keywords: Communist successor parties; Croatia; Nationalism; Democratization; Ethnic politics; EU integration

Introduction

Croatia’s transition away from Communist party rule involved moving away from a politically decentralized one-party Communist system, secession from a multiethnic Yugoslav federation, and Serb control of one-third of its territory,
which brought significant international intervention that began in 1991 and lasted until 1998. This complex process of transition helps explain why it is difficult to identify a single party as the Communist successor party, which Ishiyama (1999: 88) defines as the party that was formerly the governing party in the Communist regime and which inherited the preponderance of the former ruling party’s resources and personnel. While it is true that the League of Communists of Croatia—Party of Democratic Change (SKH-SDP), which became the Social Democratic Party (SDP) after losing the founding elections in 1990, most clearly evolved out of the former governing Communist regime, it is also the case that significant numbers of Communist party personnel fled to newly formed parties. Many ethnic Croats joined the nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). Many ethnic Serbs initially joined the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), which led the revolt against the elected Croatian Government from 1991–1995 and later joined the Independent Democratic Serbian Party (SDSS) in the late 1990s. It is important to place the influence of the former Communist regime against this complex background and within several different parties in the post-Communist period.

Regime type in the communist era

It was common for Yugoslav socialists from the 1960s and on to portray the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a physically and politically open regime, which split with the Soviet Union in 1948 and initiated a broader program of finding a third path of development. However, Western scholarship has long observed that Yugoslavia’s “breakthrough” after 1948 was less a principled project in which Yugoslav liberals rejected Stalin’s “bureaucratic socialism” and more a result of Tito’s success in holding onto power against the “predation” of Stalin and the Cominform (Ulam, 1952; Shoup, 1968; Johnson, 1972; Zimmerman, 1987). In the course of this struggle for power and beginning in the 1950s, Yugoslav theorists developed a more liberal approach to the organization of state power. Tito and his comrades managed to hold on to the reins of power, and only in the 1950s did they develop a more liberal socialist alternative that looked to non-Soviet socialist sources to provide a legitimizing basis for governance. This was an effort to find a third path to socialism (Rusinow, 1978; Baskin and Pickering, 2008).

Central were the efforts in the 1950s and 1960s at economic reform that led Yugoslavia a long way from economic practice in the Soviet Bloc. Most dramatically, the reforms in the mid-1960s were intended to include Yugoslavia more fully into the international economy, in part to exert pressure on Yugoslav firms to increase the efficiency of labor rather than the growth of employment. Such policies led to quickly growing unemployment in the late 1960s, the formal opening of borders and the dramatic outpouring of workers to employment abroad (Rusinow, 1978; Baskin, 1986; Zimmerman, 1987; Woodward, 1995). By 1973, more than 224,000 Croatian citizens, or 18.3 percent of active labor from Croatia, were employed abroad (Baskin, 1986: 30). In 1971, Croats constituted 39 percent of all Yugoslav migrants and were the single largest contingent of migrants from
Yugoslavia. This economic liberalization ultimately held dramatic consequences for Croatian politics, for it took a highly mobilized segment of the population outside the reach of Yugoslav state institutions for the purposes of their political socialization and symbolic identification. Many Croats from outside of Croatia have played prominent roles in domestic politics—as supporters of parties and as party functionaries in parties in post-Communist Croatia (Hockonos, 2003). The post-Communist party system helped to integrate this population, much of which was once considered persona non grata in Yugoslavia, into the mainstream of contemporary Croatian politics.

Efforts to liberalize and reform the Communist Party were rather modest, such that through the 1980s the authority of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) as the sole venue for legitimate political activity in Yugoslavia—renamed the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) in 1952 so as to make it appear more voluntarist and popular—was never too seriously threatened. Its deviation from the Soviet norm emerged from its unique geography and political space between the two blocs that enabled it to survive until the early 1990s as a somewhat apostate socialist order that gave birth to liberal trends in politics, economics, culture, management, foreign policy, and academia. But this less rigid Communism featured economic reforms that never became self-sustaining and political-administrative reforms that created dysfunctional bureaucracies. These included the 1974 constitution, the Delegate System and the 1976 Law on Associated Labor, all efforts made in the name of a more humanistic socialism. These Yugoslav reforms differed far more on paper than in how they actually organized political power or generated self-sustaining economic development. The reforms did create three genuine departures from the Soviet political norm: far more liberal censorship practices, far more open borders, and economic reform efforts that eliminated central planning but that never extended beyond the dominance of “social” ownership of property. These departures made available literature, models and methods of study and work that were common outside the socialist world.

Against this background, Croatian socialism in practice was not particularly liberal and reflects its uneven political and social integration, in which parts were administered directly from Vienna, parts administered from Budapest, and parts had been part of the military border of the Habsburg Monarchy with a significant population of ethnic Serbs. These traditions led the distinguished historian, Mirjana Gross, to characterize the “integration of the Croatian state” in the nineteenth century as a central force in modern Croatian history (Šidak et al., 1968; Gross, 1977, 1993). A second factor concerns conflicts between Serbs and Croats over the nature of Yugoslavia in which Croats have always favored a more decentralized (“federal” or “confederal” at different times) Yugoslavia. These differing concepts led to polemics throughout the nineteenth century, to political conflict in interwar Yugoslavia in which the popular leader of the Croatian Peasant Party was assassinated in the Sabor in 1928, to terrible violence during World War II and the subsequent victory of the Partisan movement under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito. The CPY “solved” the Croatian Question in 1944 by defeating Andreja Hebrang’s strategy of negotiating a genuine compromise between the Communist
Party and the Peasant Party within the anti-fascist Council for Peoples’ Liberation of Croatia in favor of the traditional, Leninist democratic centralism. This meant the end of a genuinely federal solution in socialist Yugoslavia and the establishment of the “leading party” as the main venue for addressing Serb–Croat political relationships in Croatia. Hebrang’s political error was to believe that power might be devolved to the regional party organizations (Irvine, 1993; Dubravica, 1996).

Until his death in 1983, Tito’s partisan comrade, Vladimir Bakarić, remained the dominant figure in Croatian politics and served as Chairman of the Croatian party from 1948 through 1969, when he handed off leadership to his chosen successors, Savka Dapčević-Kučar and Miko Tripalo. The waxing and waning of the liberal tradition in Croatian socialism turned more on questions of nationality, autonomy, and federalism than on questions of genuine political pluralism and the autonomy of the individual in social life.

Coinciding with the liberalizing economic reforms and departure of hundreds of thousands of Croats to employment abroad in the late 1960s, the Hrvatsko Proljeće (Croatian Spring) under the leadership of Savka Dapčević-Kučar, Miko Tripalo and Pero Pirker, made genuine efforts to broaden the regime’s social base and to increase Croatia’s autonomy within the Yugoslav Federation. “The basic orientation of that movement was democratic and socialist …[with] the real belief of the Croatian leadership that the activization of an ever-greater number individuals and pressure of the people would influence the bureaucratic logic and its structures in order to help move towards a more radical social reform” (Tripalo, 1989: 8). But the expansion of the social base in Croatian politics led to the emergence of large-scale social movement that included nationalist forces and that threatened the leading role of the party. One close observer pointed out that “…an analysis of their practical political activity and speeches…could only conclude that they began to feel themselves increasingly as leaders of a mass movement rather than as leaders of the League of Communists…..” (Bilandžić, 1985: 423). Tito ended this experiment at the famous meeting in Karadjordjevo in December 1971 as part of a much broader purge of liberals within Yugoslavia, a move that followed an earlier purge of hardliners (Rusinow, 1978; Ćuvalo, 1990: ch. 3; Kasapović, 1991). Tito’s purge led to the formal reassertion of the party’s leading role in each republic and autonomous province under a complex set of institutional and administrative arrangements that were codified in the 1974 Constitution. This order embodied a corporatist set of institutions that bound the republics together and that channeled mass participation through the Socialist Alliance of Working People, the Trade Unions, and other formal organizations and working groups (Rusinow, 1978; Bilandžić, 1985; Kasapović, 1996). The result was eight centralized, party-centered unreformed republic-level economic and political systems (Gagnon, 2004: 59). These purges ushered in a prolonged period of “Croatian Silence” (Hrvatska Šutnja), where illiberal figures, such as sociologist Stipe Šuvar, played leading roles in silencing “techno-managers,” “anarcho-liberals” and others who deviated from the norm of democratic centralism. The “ideological dictatorship” of the League of Communists over social, cultural, educational and scientific developments “was stronger in Croatia than in any other place in Yugoslavia.” (Kasapović, 1991: 29) For a time,
This “radical anti-liberalism of the [victorious] orthodox communist faction...de facto erased all traces of free political and cultural activity.” (Kasapović, 1991: 34)

This period of orthodox reaction ended only in the late 1980s as part of a broader change in Yugoslav politics: “Liberalization did not....begin as an expression of a political program of one faction within the bloc in power, but as a consequence of the inability of any faction to completely control politics in the whole country, that is, in all republics of the Federation. (Kasapović, 1996: 87)” The Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia began opening up significantly to consider a range of previously taboo subjects: conformism, the role of social science in party activity, and the leading role of the party in society. The pages of the party journal, Naše Teme, (Our Issues) were full of roundtable discussions on religion, the character of the state, the character of pre-Communist Croatian history, and so on (Počeci Moderne Hrvatske 1985, Reforma ili Obnova 1989, Kriza i Avangarda 1987, and Socijalna Struktura 1988). As its genuine legitimate authority in Croatian society continued to slide, party intellectuals and leaders continued to search for answers to the key questions of Yugoslav politics: the federal question, the economy, the pluralization of political life, and the breakdown of the Yugoslav Communist system (Ramet, 2002: 44–45).

Ivica Račan’s narrow victory as President at the 11th Congress of the League of Communists of Croatia in December 1989 formally ended the “Croatian Silence” by giving the leadership’s official support for a genuinely liberal and reformist approach to governance (Ramet, 2002). With the defeat of a series of reform proposals at the 14th Extraordinary Congress of the LCY in January 1990, Račan led the Croatian delegation out of the Congress just after the Slovene delegation departed. Under Račan, the SKH sponsored multiparty elections in April 1990, changed its name to the SKH-SDP (the League of Communists of Croatia—Party of Democratic Change, or Savez Komunista Hrvatske—Stranka Demokratske Promjene, to later become the Social Democratic Party), and graciously accepted its defeat to the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica or HDZ) at the polls (Baskin, 1990; Loza, 2007). The defeat led to the departure of more traditionally-oriented communists from the SDP, especially Croatian Serbs, under Borislav Mikelić, and marked the beginning of the social and political implosion in the summer of 1990 that led to war in 1991. It also led to an explosion of multi-party activity in the period from 1989 until the war in Croatia in 1991, including the appearance of Serbian parties, a set of national Croatian parties, and social democratic parties, most of which were led by former members of the LCY.

Opposition strength during the Communist period

There were two types of opposition during the period of Communism that could have led to the authentic liberalization of Croatian politics. The first was a sophisticated, cosmopolitan, neo-Marxist and all-Yugoslav group that emerged from the Praxis School (Sher, 1977; Gruenwald, 1992). It began at a symposium in Bled, Slovenia that rejected dogmatic conceptions of dialectical materialism and led to the creation of the Korcula Summer School from 1963 to 1974 and to a Yugoslav and
international edition of the journal, *Praxis*, that brought together social scientists from throughout Yugoslavia. Among the leading lights of this “movement” were internationally respected academics from the Zagreb University, including Rudi Supek and Ivan Kuvačić (sociology), Danko Grlić, Gajo Petrović and Milan Kangrga (philosophy), and many others. It represented less a coherent program of opposition than a neo-Marxist critique of Stalinism and the “dictatorship of the proletariat” that featured a bloated, controlling state apparatus (Gruenwald, 1992: 178–9). The Praxis School’s very autonomy represented a threat to the regime since it threatened to broaden the basis of political legitimacy in Croatia, and contributed to a proto-pluralism within Yugoslav official discourse. Although the Praxis group never developed a mass movement or comprehensive programmatic political alternative to the LCY, it helped create the political space in which very different kinds of opposition could emerge: a new-left student opposition in 1968 and a more tradition-bound national opposition in Croatia that achieved significant institutional strength—first in 1971 and again in 1990.

In the end, the national opposition proved to be much more robust than one rooted in a Marxist discourse that was critical of Yugoslavia’s (and Croatia’s) socialist regime. Praxis’ social basis was far thinner than that of an opposition that was rooted in national and cultural concerns. The economic reforms of the 1960s that led over 5 per cent of the population to seek work abroad were bound to create socio-cultural uncertainty concerning the nature of the regime that forced them to travel abroad for work. And the majority of Croats did not mediate this uncertainty through a sophisticated ideological framework, but through a religious one that was more familiar in the small towns and villages of their origin. Official campaigns against the Catholic Church in Croatia in 1971 and 1981 were clearly linked to concern with Croatian nationalism, a purge of liberals within the party, the shutting down of the nationalist cultural society *Matica Hrvatska* in 1971, and with the imprisonment of several leading Croatian nationalists, including future Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Liberal Party Leader Vlado Gotovac. (Šagi-Bunic, 1983, Ramet, 1985). *Matica Hrvatska* amounted to an organized opposition to the League of Communists. Gotovac had been editor of its weekly, *Hrvatski Tjednik* (*Croatian Weekly*), whose readership grew dramatically and quickly as a genuinely popular paper that gave voice to broad cultural and national concerns in Croatia in a way that was unmediated by the official Marxism of the regime (Baletic, 1990).

This helped to stoke a mass movement among students at the university that quickly went outside of a framework that could be politically acceptable in Croatia. In sum, the “Croatian Spring” leadership’s effort to create a mass social basis for the regime raised the issue of whether Yugoslavia’s socialist government was sufficiently authoritative to weather these political challenges by co-opting the nationalist leader ships and integrating these national movements into the regime. The socialist regime might have played on the very real divisions within the national movements and within the Church in order to navigate a genuinely reformist and reconciliatory path. However, because both the Church and the national movement remained outside the bounds of mainstream Croatian political life in the 1970s and 1980s, an
orthodox Leninist regime’s refusal to engage these popular movements constructively sowed seeds of the regime’s own destruction. The capacity of the nation-church nexus to win moral and material support from without made it a significant source of opposition to self-management socialism as led by the League of Communists. This capacity was strengthened still further by economic reforms that would increase unemployment and temporary migration abroad in a manner that enhanced the insecurity of workers and peasants of all nationalities throughout Croatia.

With the closing of the Korčula summer school and the shutting down of the journal, Praxis, in the mid-70s, individuals from the Praxis movement soon found other forums in which to meet. In the early 1980s, a research group called Ćovijek i Sistem (Man and the System) brought in former Praxis contributors from throughout Yugoslavia and a range of younger students for monthly meetings at the Philosophy Faculty in Zagreb under the joint chairmanship of academics Rudi Supek and Eugen Pusić. The group would also meet for several weeks each spring at the Dubrovnik Post-Graduate School. These forums provided the younger generation with the opportunity to cut their teeth politically outside of the official organizations—and many individuals from these meetings emerged to political prominence after 1990.

The growing political character of these activities was realized much more fully in 1989. Then, the Association for a Yugoslav Social Initiative (Udrženje Jugoslovenske Demokratske Inicijative, UJDI) provided a forum that explicitly brought together liberal Communists and non-communist civil society in an effort to support the emergence of genuine political pluralism and reform. It began regular meetings in Zagreb and throughout Yugoslavia that would include political pariahs—for example, political prisoners, proponents of the 1960s Croatian Spring—to reintroduce themselves to official reformers and to find a place in Croatian politics. It could have initiated a long-term process of reconciliation, as when the economist Branko Horvat and poet and editor Vlado Gotovac publicly apologized to each other in Zagreb for their polemics in 1971 at a meeting attended by one of the authors. There were also a host of social and political initiatives, from the emergence of a “Green” movement to the establishment of the Croatian Social Liberal Party and the first large congress of the nationalist HDZ, for which many émigrés returned for the first time in decades. These developments demonstrated that in advance of the elections in April 1990, Croatia was the venue to a market for a wide variety of political ideas and organizations (Pusić 1991).

Type of transition from Communism

As noted above, in late 1989, the Croatian Communist leadership endorsed the legalization of multi-party elections by “bowing to internal pressures, the example of Slovenia, and news of collapse of Communist regimes in other East European states” (Cohen, 1997: 77). In 1985, only 28 percent of members of the Croatian Communist party looked positively on a multiparty system, while several months before the March 1990 founding election, 65.3 percent of Croatian Communist party members looked favorably on political pluralism, and non-Communists were
even more enthusiastic about political competition (Cohen, 1997: 79). The SKH party members made political choices to “exit” from the party in late 1989 and 1990 (Hirschman, 1970). Between the end of 1989 to June 1990 membership in SKH-SDP fell from 298,000 to 46,000, with an estimated 27,000 defecting to the HDZ between late 1989 and March 1990, and another 70,000 defecting to the HDZ in 1990 (Cohen, 1997: 115, in Goati, 1991). More significantly, a considerable number of prominent former Communists, many of whom were purged following the Croatian Spring (including the former General and future President Franjo Tudjman) established the nationalist HDZ between February and June 1989 with significant assistance from the Croatian diaspora. Former party leaders Tripalo and Dabičević-Kućar associated themselves with the moderate non-communist self-styled sophisticated “Coalition of National Accord,” whose supporters were noticeably more secular than those in HDZ (Šiber, 1991: 113). In short, the twilight of the era of a formally organized vanguard guiding Croatia’s politics led many Communists to seek alternatives in non-socialist parties that would win popular affirmation (Djurić et al., 1990).

These party membership numbers suggest that the HDZ, which Croatian voters swept into power in the April 1990 multiparty elections, could be considered a Communist successor party. A total of 97,000 deserted from the SKH to HDZ, while only 46,000 decided to stay in what became the SDP. The numbers of Communist defectors to the HDZ might suggest that the transformation from one-party Communist rule could in some sense be described largely as “highjacked by the ex-Communists.” This is despite the fact that the HDZ’s message was ardently anti-Communist. During the 1990s, the HDZ was a movement party that united different factions around the goal of Croatian sovereignty. Gagnon (2004: 137) points out that HDZ’s rhetoric in the 1990 elections revolved around the threat posed by Belgrade, the need to change the governing party after four and one-half decades of Communist Party rule, and democracy. The HDZ campaign featured moderate candidates who had been mid and lower-level Communist Party officials during the Croatian Spring, even though some within HDZ grouped local Serbs with Milosevic (Gagnon, 2004: 137). People voted for HDZ largely in rejection of the often arbitrary rule and corruption of the Communist Party during the past 45 years and as an affirmation of Croatian national and religious identity (Baskin, 1990). In short, the HDZ appeared as the most authoritative anti-Communist choice to Croatian voters.

Gagnon (2004: 141) described the HDZ candidates standing for election in 1990 as a mix of moderate democratic and economic reformers who had been purged from the Croatian Communist party during the Croatian Spring; technocrats and managers of socially owned firms who were interested in maintaining control and economic growth of their firms; ardent nationalists who were authoritarian and ethnically chauvinistic; and those, particularly in western Herzegovina, with links to...

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1 As Chip Gagnon suggests, further research should investigate the number of SKH cadres who defected to HDZ.
Ustaša émigrés. The resources brought by the nationalist diaspora played an important role in bolstering the HDZ’s organizational capacity.

In 1990, the SKH-SDP initially retained its multiethnic character. Its membership at the time of the founding elections was 52 percent Croat, 28 percent Serb, 3 percent Yugoslav, and 3 percent “others” (Šiber, 1992: 143). Several characteristics and preferences distinguished party supporters of SKH-SDP from supporters of HDZ. In comparison with supporters of HDZ, supporters of SKH-SDP were more likely to be concerned with the economic situation rather than with Croatia’s position in Yugoslavia. On the issue of reform of Yugoslavia’s territorial system, SKH-SDP supporters preferred a confederation of autonomous states or the existing Yugoslav federation, as opposed to HDZ supporters who preferred either a confederation or secession (Šiber, 1992: 144–164). Finally, SKH-SDP supporters were also less religious and more likely to place themselves in the center of the ideological spectrum than were HDZ supporters (Šiber, 1992: 150, 165).

A survey conducted at the end of the 1990 election campaign showed that twice as many Serbs voted for the SKH-SDP (46 percent) than for the nationalist Serb Democratic Party (23 percent). The same survey revealed that Croats and Serbs held vividly different views of national equality and discrimination in Croatia (Zakošek, 1991: 152, 171). Such dramatic ethnic polarization, even within the SKH-SDP in 1990, points to the difficulty of the emergence of only a single “successor party” in the case of Croatia.

The fact that HDZ’s most powerful leaders were ex-Communists who had been purged from the Communist Party in the early 1970s and/or nationalists—including diaspora—who had long rejected Communism, while the SDP arose out of what was left of the Croatian Communist Party suggested that SDP was a more appropriate Communist successor party. HDZ’s victory over the SKH-SDP in the founding 1990 elections, however, did not signify a full rupture, or comprehensive transition, from Communist-style structures of power that remained intact. An over-confident SKH-SDP mistakenly believed that a majoritarian electoral system would ensure its victory and enable it to consolidate power in the first post-Communist multiparty election. However, the winner-take-all, majoritarian system actually ensured that HDZ’s win of 41.8 percent of the popular vote in the first round of the elections (and about the same in the second round) was translated into 67.5 percent of the seats in parliament (Gagnon, 2004: 139). The constitution adopted in December 1990 established a strong semi-presidential executive that gave the president a great deal of authority for policy making (Zakošek, 2008: 597–8).

Gagnon draws on extensive local data and analysis, convincingly portraying HDZ after its election in 1990 as a conservative party bent on retaining its dominant political power and on using its positions to snatch up what was most valuable of the Croatian economy. HDZ carried on the Communist legacy by ruling with democratic centralism for a decade. Ex-Communist President Tudjman was the central figure in this movement-party who balanced the moderate and far

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2 Thanks to Chip Gagnon for emphasizing this insight.
right factions in a manner somewhat reminiscent of Tito. The right faction was dominated by the Croatian diaspora and Croats from Western Herzegovina, who promoted policies that were subtly or blatantly anti-Serb, including removing Serbs from jobs in government and administration, assigning poorly trained Croatian police officers to patrol Serb-majority regions, and demanding that Croatia’s Serb police officers wear the šahovnica instead of the Communists’ traditional red star.3 While Croatian Serb hardliners did much to disrupt normal life in the “balvan revolucija” near Knin in Summer 1990, SDS and HDZ hard-liners engaged in violent exchanges in mixed towns, particularly in Borovo Selo and Plitvica in early 1991 on the eve of the war.

By 1992, the Croat leadership was pushing for expansion into Croatian areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Gagnon, 2004: 147). The HDZ’s moderate faction of former mid-level party leaders, including future President Stipe Mesić, lost a power struggle to the rightist faction at the party’s Second Congress in early 1994 on a platform of constitutional adjustments with the Serbian minority to solve the Krajina issue, restoration of the Croatian–Muslim alliance against the Bosnian Serbs, and rapid privatization (Djikić, 2004; Cohen, 1997: 96).

In sum, the Croatian political party system was transformed by Croatia’s changing demographics and strategies of political elites into an ethnic party system, that is, a political system where each party’s support stemmed from one ethnic group and each party made appeals only to one ethnic group. These trends combined with Milosevic’s efforts to elevate the power of Serbs within Yugoslavia and to give substantial support Serbs in Croatia, and the victory of a HDZ, whose rightist faction soon dominated policy making in Croatia. These ethnically polarizing dynamics left little place for ideologically oriented parties, or any parties for that matter, capable of attracting voters of different ethnicities.

**Different Communist Party successor parties**

Two ethnically distinct parties that drew significant personnel from the Communist Party occupied the center-left of Croatia’s political spectrum. For the ethnically Croatian electorate and those who did not prioritize ethnicity or religion, SDP represented the social democratic party option,4 while the Independent Democratic Serbian Party (SDSS) provided Croatia’s ethnic Serbs with effective representation. HDZ has moved from the right side of the spectrum that it occupied throughout the 1990s toward the center right after the death of Tudjman and the departure of many of its rightist faction. One feature uniting the successor

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3 The šahovnica is a traditional Croatian symbol that had been used prominently by the Ustaša during World War II, but that had also been used during the socialist era as part of the Croatian coat-of-arms together with a red star.

4 In 2000, 95.4 percent of SDP supporters declared their religious denomination as Catholic, while 3.7 percent of SDP supporters declared their religious denomination as Other (European Values Study Group, 2004).
parties after Tudjman’s death—in fact all major parties in post-Communist Croatia—has been their maintenance of a common party organizational model of rigid structure, organizational uniformity, and low levels of internal party democracy (Čular, 2004: 44).

Consistent with the literature that argues that in most cases (the Czech Republic is the exception), Communist successor parties’ loss in the founding elections compels them to undergo significant reform (Bunce, 2003), the SDP genuinely transformed itself into a European social democratic party after their defeat in 1990 (CSCE, 1992: 13). Following the SKH-SDP’s defeat in 1990, Serbs left the party in great numbers and many found a home in the nationalist Serb Democratic Party (SDS). The SKH-SDP party leadership purged hardliners, embraced its role as a specifically Croatian social-democratic party and embraced social democratic ideas consistent with their West European cousins that emerged from the Socialist International, which it joined in late 1999. SDP’s leadership of the governing center-left coalition from 2000–2003 and its reformist policies that helped move Croatia toward EU membership demonstrated its commitment to democratic principles and processes. Following the death in 2007 of its last Communist and first post-Communist leader, Ivica Račan, the SDP continued to evolve and liberalize. In mid-2004, it changed its statute and leadership in an effort to increase the percentage of young people and women actively involved in the party (European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity, 2008).

The war, which lasted from 1991 until the reintegration of Eastern Slavonia into Croatia in 1998, allowed the HDZ to subordinate all political issues to national security. This allowed HDZ to serve as a “vanguard” or “leading party” of Croatian national unity—much as was the case with the SKH during the period of Yugoslav socialism. The “Homeland War” (Domovinski Rat) enabled a cult of personality to develop around President Tudjman; it permitted the HDZ to monopolize all national policy making in Croatia, although the opposition did control some significant municipalities and counties or županija. The war enabled the HDZ to make real its slogan from the 1990 election: “Our name is our program.” A national-sample survey in 2000 found that supporters of HDZ were disproportionately from rural areas—more than one third (35.6 percent) of HDZ supporters lived in towns with fewer than 2000 residents. The same survey indicated that HDZ supporters also had significantly lower levels of education than SDP supporters (European Values Study Group, 2004). HDZ was not compelled to reform until it lost the 2000 elections and faced concerted international pressure (see below).

The Independent Democratic Serbian Party (SDSS) filled the third corner of the triangle of communist party succession in Croatia as the vehicle that has provided genuine political voice to Serbs seeking to work within the Croatian political system. Unlike the mid-1990s Serb People’s Party (SNS), which was considered by many Serbs as a party tainted by its blessing by the HDZ regime, SDSS sought to independently represent diverse interests of Croatia’s Serbs.
been retired from public life, the party was formed in 1997 to aggregate the political interests of Serbs who remained in Croatia after 1990, Serbs who had left Croatia for Serbia and Republika Srpska in Bosnia, and Serbs who had been active in the “Republic of Serbian Krajina” in Serb-controlled regions of Croatia during the war. Its program was explicitly committed to social democracy, multicultural society, the right of Serb return to Croatia, and for the preservation of Serb identity in Croatia. It called for good relations between Croatia and Serbia, for “permeable and soft borders between the countries” of the former Yugoslavia, for dual citizenship, and for the idea that “minorities can and must be a factor of stability in relations between states in the region…” (Program Samostalne demokratske Srpske stranke, 2008).

It appears that the most prominent explicitly ethnic parties have found a way to work together: SDSS both supported the HDZ-led Government elected in 2004 and is now part of the governing coalition formed in 2008. SDSS leaders are all former members of the SKH. Its president, Dr. Vojislav Stanimirovic, played a prominent role in Eastern Slavonia and Baranja both during the Homeland War and afterward in integrating that region into Croatia in the mid to late 1990s. Its Vice President, Dr. Milorad Pupovac, is a professor at Zagreb University who has played a significant public role in Croatian Serb politics since 1990.

Impact of path dependence on the evolution of successor parties and policies undertaken during the transition

The after effects that long attended the purge of liberals from the Communist Party in 1971 calls into question Kitschelt’s labeling of Croatia’s Communist regime as a “national consensus Communism,” where Communist elites allowed a measure of contestation and interest articulation in exchange for compliance with the basic features of the existing system (Kitschelt, 1995). As was shown above, the Croatian silence deprived Croatia of an extended period of bargaining and compromise that Kitschelt argues is necessary for producing politicians who had learned to play according to the rules of democratic competition.

As noted above, HDZ’s governance during the “Homeland War” strengthened Tudjman’s ability to retain HDZ’s dominant political position through what Gagnon labels a strategy of demobilization, sapping support for oppositionists arguing for reform. HDZ successfully undermined democratic institutions that could have helped check Tudjman’s power: the lower house of parliament (the Sabor), an independent judiciary and press, and local governance. It is also the case that the fragmentation of the political opposition to the HDZ contributed to its own weakness. Further, HDZ’s control of much of Croatia’s valuable economic resources stunted the development of a middle class independent from the ruling party. The war allowed HDZ to label its critics as “traitors” of the Croatian nation. None of the elections held after 1990 until 2000 were considered free and fair (Freedom House, 2007).

HDZ’s domination of Croatian political life ended with the conclusion of the war and its decreasing capacity to use the threat of violence to demobilize the opposition and, finally, with the death of President Tudjman. Tudjman’s death created a power vacuum that HDZ’s substantially different factions struggled to occupy. In addition,
the political defeat of prominent former Communists and HDZ moderates, Stipe Mesić and Josip Manolić in 1994 (Cohen, 1997: 97), high-level corruption within HDZ’s inner circle, and accumulating economic troubles all helped to strengthen the SDP in its campaign for parliamentary elections in 2000. Electoral reform transformed the electoral system from a winner take all system into a multimember PR system in 1999, and this ensured that the proportion of seats in the lower house more accurately reflected the proportion of the popular vote. A politically more mature public and liberal civil society also contributed to growing demands to end the HDZ’s semi-authoritarian rule (Ottaway, 2003: 121). SDP overcame personality disputes to build the larger of two coalitions in opposition to HDZ together with the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) that was led by former dissident Dražen Budiša.

The SDP–HSLS coalition platform stressed the need for change, particularly by ending support for hard-line, nationalist Croats in Herzegovina and in tackling corruption. These parties also expressed willingness for implementation of the Dayton Accords and full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (CSCE, 2000: 6). The work of internationally-supported domestic civil society organizations also made rigging the elections in 2000 much more difficult than earlier elections held after 1990. Among these organizations, Glas mobilized voters and domestic election monitoring organization, and Citizens Organized to Observe the Vote (Gradjani organizirano nadgledaju glasanje or GONG) increased the transparency and openness of the elections. (Ottaway, 2003: 121). SDP and HSLS won 71 of 151 seats in the Sabor and formed a coalition government with four other parties: the Croatian Peasants Party (HSS), the Croatian People’s Party (HNS), the Liberal Party (LS), and the regional Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS). The high voter turnout of 75.3 percent pointed to a significant mobilization of the Croatian electorate (CSCE, 2000: 8).

HDZ’s electoral defeat by the SDP–HSLS-led coalition ushered in Croatia’s “Second Transition” (Ottaway and Maltz, 2001). Further democratization of the second transition was made possible by the Croatian Government’s reassertion of its sovereignty over its full territory, by the capacity for Serbs to meaningfully participate in Croatian public life, and by developing institutional mechanisms that could address lingering difficulties in Serb–Croat relations, including issues of Serb return to Croatia. Although the 2000 elections saw significant efforts from civil society and were followed by significant political reforms, it seems clear that they do not constitute what Bunce and Wolchik (2006) characterized as an electoral revolution. The key players in Croatian politics remained the same, with the exception of President Tudjman, who died in advance of the election. Party organizations have not been significantly altered, and many in the ethnic Croatian public remained bitter about EU pressure to cooperate with ICTY (Peskin and Boduxzynski, 2003) and improve minority rights.

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6 This does not mean that these matters have been fully solved—only that the institutions are in place to address lingering difficulties in Croat-Serb relations in Croatia.
It is nonetheless the case that President Stipe Mesić and the SDP-led governing coalition did introduce reforms that significantly improved political rights and civil liberties, moving Croatia out of Freedom House’s classification as “Partly Free” to “Free” \cite{Freedom_House_2007}. The coalition transformed Croatia into a parliamentary democracy by adopting constitutional amendments that reduced the powers of Presidency. It was no longer possible for a figure, such as President Tudjman, to accumulate authoritarian power via democratic means \cite{Linz_1990}. President Mesić also pushed the government to adopt the Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities, which expanded the special representation for national minorities from 5 to 8 mandates and which guaranteed representation for minorities at all levels of elected government, in the judiciary, and in the administration \cite{OSCE_2003:2}.

The SDP-led coalition, however, did not have an easy time in power. Its large and fragile coalition could not quickly stamp out the authoritarian elements that had taken root in key institutions, such as in the security services, judiciary, bureaucracy, media, and business in a comprehensive reform \cite{Ottaway_2003:123}. And although SDP leader Račan developed SDP as a party of decency and competence, it was “insufficient to offer answers to the country’s toughest challenges, such as unemployment” \cite{Loza_2007}. Ottaway and Maltz \cite{Ottaway_and_Maltz_2001} have argued that the EU and the US exerted too much pressure on the SDP-led government to meet unrealistic international expectations. By doing so and by underestimating the difficulty of implementing the sweeping reforms mandated by “international standards”, the international community contributed to the weakening of popular support for the SDP by compelling it to undervalue the pocket-book issues that were viewed as essential by most citizens of Croatia.

The international election observation mission from the OSCE concluded that parliamentary elections held in November 2003 under the SDP-led coalition government were conducted generally in line with OSCE commitments and international standards for democratic elections \cite{OSCE_2003:1}. For the first time, the two main parties representing the Serb minority in Croatia campaigned for the diaspora constituency. This appears to have contributed to increased participation by Croatian Serbs currently living in Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, even though confusion over voting procedures for Serbs raised the concern of international monitors \cite{OSCE_2003:8–9}.

The death of President Tudjman and defeat of HDZ in 2000: “…opened the door to substantial transformation” of the party \cite{Longo_2006:37}. The relatively modest achievements of SDP-led governing coalition’s reforms and the HDZ’s embrace of EU accession helped the HDZ win the elections held in 2003, although the party was forced to form a coalition government. A relative moderate, Ivo Sanader, narrowly won re-election as president of HDZ in 2002 following a bitter conflict with a leader of the party’s rightist faction, Ivić Pašalić. Pašalić then left the HDZ and formed a rightist party, the Croatian Bloc. In preparation for the 2003 parliamentary campaign, Sanader significantly weakened the power of the party’s Herzegovinian faction, purged many right-wing extremists, and surrounded himself with a circle of mainly young, democratic, and pro-European politicians \cite{Longo_2006:37}. However, Sanader’s commitment to centrism and European
norms may appear more modest when compared with his support of Croatian army generals indicted by the ICTY in 2001 (Longo, 2006: 38). In practice, Sanader has continued to include in his inner circle such rightists as Vladimir Šeks and Luka Bebić. Nevertheless, this has not prevented further departures from the party of the war veterans from Vukovar and war victims, who formed “HDZ 1990”. Nor has it prevented one of HDZ’s founders, Branimir Glavaš, from forming a rightist regional party in eastern Slavonia at the same time that he has been under domestic indictment for war crimes. The defections were not only from the party’s right. Prominent moderates, such as former Foreign Minister Granić or President Tudjman’s Chef de Cabinet Vesna Škare-Ozbolt, also bolted from the “Tudjman-less” HDZ following his death.

These defections have not seriously wounded HDZ. In 2004, HDZ claimed more than half—432,000—of the country’s 770,000 registered members of political parties (Longo, 2006, citing Forto, 2004). In contrast, the SDP could only claim 25,000 members in that same year (European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity, 2008). HDZ also displays greater loyalty from its voters than does SDP. Of the respondents in a University of Zagreb Faculty of Political Science poll who voted for HDZ in 2000, almost 67 percent voted for it again in 2003, while only 35 percent of those who voted for SDP in 2000 voted for them again in 2003 (Longo, 2006: 39). This greater loyalty reflects the HDZ’s control of the levers of power in the 1990s and could also reflect a loyalty of a more rural, religious and previously non-politicized (during the Communist era) population who now support the HDZ’s national and cultural symbols and represent one key constituency of the party.

Boosted by the EU’s decision in October 2005 to open negotiations over membership with Croatia, HDZ narrowly held onto power in the 2007 parliamentary elections (Table 1). The 2007 campaign included significant discussion of HDZ and SDP’s dispute over the issue of diaspora voting. Fearing that the HDZ’s hold over Croatian diaspora in Bosnia and Herzegovina might give HDZ a victory, the SDP argued that the party or coalition which gains the most votes only within Croatia should form the government, a position shared by some other opposition parties and much of the international community (OSCE/ODIHR, 2007: 5).

**Role of international assistance in shaping outcomes**

There have been two types of international influences on the domestic politics of Croatia that have pulled Croatian politics in opposite directions: the first consisted

<table>
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<th>Table 1</th>
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<tr>
<td>Percentage of seats won in the Sabor’s most recent elections by the strongest parties—HDZ and SDP—that attracted ex-communist personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
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In 2000, SDP formed a coalition with HSLS. In 2003, it was in coalition with the Istrian Democratic Assembly, the Party of Liberal Democrats, and the Liberal Party.
of nationalist Croats beyond Croatia and the other featured Western actors, particularly the EU. Nationalists in the diaspora and in Herzegovina were responsible for a good many of HDZ’s rightist policies that contributed to authoritarian methods and violence in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war (Cohen, 1997; Pusić, 1998; Gagnon, 2004). On the other hand, the EU initially failed to exert a moderating influence over Tudjman during the war, but has subsequently played a key role in encouraging the Croatian political party system, including the HDZ, to move toward the center and undergo a “second democratic transition.” Much like the EU, the US government failed to exert much of a moderating influence over Tudjman’s HDZ. It played an advisory role in the Croatian military’s efforts to retake Serb-held territory in Operations Flash and Storm. After Tudjman’s death, Washington enjoyed some success in reaching a more receptive SDP and its coalition partners, and eventually a reformed HDZ with the message of EU integration as the solution to a democratic, prosperous, and stable Croatia.

It was HDZ, rather than SDP, that was the target of pressure by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the UN, and the EU in order to democratize Croatia and prepare it for accession. Until 1998, UN peacekeepers remained in Eastern Slavonia in order to facilitate the reintegration of that region into Croatia. In addition, the OSCE deployed a monitoring mission to Croatia in 1996, which was intended to support the Government in dealing with the consequences of the war, the reintegration of the former Serb-controlled areas, and interethnic accommodation and reconciliation. The EU’s pressure on the Croatia Government to make substantial political and economic reforms in order to meet the EU’s criteria for accession significantly enhanced the attractiveness of the HDZ’s opposition (including the SDP) in 2000.

The EU’s formal accession requirements embodied in the Copenhagen criteria—particularly its first dimension of creating stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities—often compel candidate countries to democratize more fully. In the late 1990s to early 2000s, the EU singled out Croatia for its failure to establish functioning democratic institutions that protected minority rights in accordance with international human rights standards. Specific concerns revolved around the Croatian Government’s failure to cooperate fully with ICTY and to demonstrate good-faith efforts to facilitate the return of Serbs displaced from Croatia (EC, 2005). What Vachudova (2005) characterizes as the EU’s “active leverage”—the EU’s influence over domestic politics of “credible” candidate states via its pre-accession process of conditionality—enabled Croatian citizens to see that HDZ’s rightest policies were likely obstructing their chances for being accepted as “European” rather than being denigrated as “Balkan” peoples. On the other hand, many Croats have resented this pressure from the EU.

This EU pressure contributed to HDZ’s loss in the 2000 elections and to its subsequent reform into a more centrist party that accepts European norms in order to meet its citizens’ desire to integrate into the EU. For the 2003 elections, the reformed HDZ vowed to speed up Croatia’s integration into the EU. The 2003 election campaign demonstrated Vachudova’s contention that once a country
becomes a “credible candidate” to the EU, that country’s political party system converged around the need to move further toward European integration. Croatian parties across the political party system in 2003 expressed a consensus on Croatia’s intentions to fulfill its international obligations to join the EU as soon as possible (OSCE/ODIHR, 2003: 11). So the real campaign debates focused on economic policy on which there was far less inter-party agreement. Further, it was only in 2005 that the EU’s intensified pressure on the reformed HDZ-led government that it took steps to apprehend ICTY indictee General Ante Gotovina (Longo, 2006: 41). Again, President Mesić played a prominent role in meeting international expectations.

Although HDZ won the formal support of the Serbs in the SDSS in 2003 and formally included them into the Government—as one of the Deputy Prime Ministers—in 2008, it has been far less successful in achieving widespread reform, particularly at the local level of the party and the state bureaucracy, that would facilitate stable return and reintegration (Longo, 2006: 41). The difficulties over Croatian cooperation with ICTY seemed glossed over by political concerns expressed by Austria, who nudged EU members toward bouncing Croatia forward in the accession process in October 2005 when it linked its willingness to accept progress made by Turkey with the EU’s simultaneous blessing of progress made by Croatia. It is true that Croatia demonstrated increased cooperation with ICTY. But it was not until later that General Gotovina was arrested in the Canary Islands in Spain. Furthermore, other governments have been more critical of Croatia’s cooperation with ICTY, as well as of its effort in practice to facilitate the return of Serb refugees to their homes in Croatia. The EU’s 2007 progress report on Croatia (EC, 2007) concluded that implementation of the Constitutional Law on National Minorities’ presented “a mixed picture,” in practice, with problems persisting particularly in terms of under-representation of minorities in state administration, the judiciary, and the police (EC, 2007: 12–13). Despite these continuing difficulties, the decision of NATO in 2008 to accept Croatia only deepened its integration into Europe and the number of forces with which it was intertwined further encouraged the expansion of an inclusionary democracy in Croatia.

Conclusion

In summary, the dissolution of the League of Communists of Croatia after 1989 as part of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia took place against the background of Yugoslav state dissolution, war, and recovery. In these circumstances, the evolution of the Croatian party system into a multiparty system in which coalition governments have become the norm exerted an important moderating influence on politics. The most logical Communist successor party—the SDP—has contributed to this democratization by providing Croatia’s electorate with a European-oriented social democratic party option. And through their “reincarnation” in organizations of SDP, HDZ, and SDSS, former Communist party members still continue to influence the options available to the Croatian electorate and play prominent roles in Croatian party politics.
Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Chip Gagnon, Taras Kuzio, and participants in the Association for the Study of Nationalities’ 2008 convention panel on Communist successor parties for their comments on a draft of this article.

Appendix A. List of political parties’ acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPY</td>
<td>Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Komunistička partija Jugoslavije)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDZ</td>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNS</td>
<td>Croatian People's Party (Hrvatska narodna stranka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLS</td>
<td>Croatian Social Liberal Party (Hrvatska socijalno liberalna stranka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSS</td>
<td>Croatian Peasant Party (Hrvatska seljacka stranka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDS</td>
<td>Istrian Democratic Assembly (Istarski demokratski sabor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LS</td>
<td>Liberal Party (Liberlna stranka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska demokratska stranka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDSS</td>
<td>Independent Democratic Serbian Party (Samostalna demokratska Srpska stranka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party (Socijaldemokratska stranka Hrvatske)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKH</td>
<td>League of Communists of Croatia—Party of Democratic Change (Savez komunista Hrvatske—Stranka demokratske promjene), which became the SDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>Serbian People’s Party (Srpska narodna stranka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKH</td>
<td>League of Communists of Croatia (Savez komunista Hrvatske)</td>
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References


