

Homeland Security: An Intergovernmental Challenge



An Intergovernmental Solutions Program White Paper



Intergovernmental Solutions Program

Nelson A. Rockefeller College of Public Affairs & Policy
University at Albany

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May 2002

Sydney Cresswell
Terry Maxwell
Jordan Wishy

Designer Stephanie Simon

Intergovernmental Solutions Program
Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy
University at Albany
135 Western Avenue
Albany, NY 12222
Phone: (518) 442-5293
Fax: (518) 442-5298
E-mail: igsp@albany.edu
sgc@albany.edu

Introduction

This paper is an effort to document the governance issues anchoring security debates and planning that occurred following the September terrorist attacks. Knowledgeable people with expertise in risk assessment and terrorism prevention, specialists in disaster recovery, and policy analysts in similar domains have contributed to an emerging dialogue about homeland security. A survey of six months of commentary, reports, and academic articles on security issues shows that there is considerable divergence with respect to the class and scale of risks under discussion. However, these pieces also reveal a consistent concern regarding the role of intergovernmental coordination in any adopted strategy. Among these authors, there is a consensus that intergovernmental coordination problems are a quiet menace to homeland protection efforts. Though intergovernmental interaction has little panache in discussions about extreme peril, the problems (and accompanying risk exposure) linked to inadequate coordination are widespread, costly, and complex. It is clear that intergovernmental management has taken on new meaning and heightened significance since the events of September.

sense that intergovernmental work functions through networks and what that might mean to policy makers. In the final section, we share observations that may be useful in framing the intergovernmental dialogue with respect to homeland security. These observations are drawn from an intergovernmental initiative case study program at the University at Albany's Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy.

Homeland Protection is Distinctly Intergovernmental

“Homeland security isn't simply a federal job, it's everyone's job. It depends on bringing all levels of government together with this country's strong business and civic sectors to forge and pursue shared strategies.”¹

Why is protecting the homeland so distinctly intergovernmental? It is due both to the nature of the American federal system and the “scale, uncertainty, dynamism, and infrequency of” homeland attacks that “constitute the preconditions for intergovernmental intervention.”² Attackers could strike anywhere – Oklahoma, New York City,

Intergovernmental coordination problems are a quiet menace to homeland protection efforts.

We pose this question – can federal, state, and local government effectively integrate their particular competencies to avoid potential attacks and coordinate their responses to actual ones? Homeland security and protection is too large a job for any one governmental jurisdiction, whether that jurisdiction is federal, state, or local. It is apparent that effectiveness in emergency management policy subsystems requires an integrated strategy, and structures that support intergovernmental collaboration.

This paper looks at the recurring aspects of the dialogue surrounding intergovernmental cooperation and homeland security. It examines an emerging

Washington D.C., small towns, metropolitan areas. No governmental jurisdiction alone has the resources, expertise, or infrastructure required for a coordinated response. Because terrorist strikes against the homeland occur irregularly but with tremendous force, individual governmental jurisdictions are ill positioned to develop a comprehensive response-capacity.³ If the United States is to be successful in its homeland protection efforts, federal, state, and municipal government agencies must work together to enhance existing operational response-capacity. Improved intergovernmental and interagency coordination could be achieved through better functioning of those terrorism prevention techniques already in operation.⁴

What is holding officials back? Some experts believe the main limiting factor is satisfactory leadership.⁵ According to Arnold Howitt, director of the Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, terrorism poses "a difficult leadership challenge because preparedness requires coordinating across a large number of agencies and introducing

cle, "America the Unready," underscores this perspective: "The biggest gaps in America's defences lie in neither the federal nor local fortifications, but in the areas where different levels of government fuse together." Overcoming these gaps involves addressing matters of money, coordination, and collaboration.¹¹

Will homeland protection regulations become additional unfunded mandate headaches for municipal governments?

new operation responsibilities."⁶ In order to be effective, existing networks need to be strengthened and new networks need to be developed. However, this objective requires stewardship. Leaders can steer the networks of which they are part through contributions made by their own organizations.⁷ There are also leadership issues in Congress where more than 25 oversight committees (including 11 in the Senate and 14 in the House) must coordinate to produce a coherent interagency/intergovernmental vision for emergency-response operations oversight and statutory law.⁸

Large-scale emergency-management operations within one governmental jurisdiction often exhaust resources and capacities "because of the extraordinary demands these events impose on the[ir] decision-making and service-delivery systems."⁹ Governmental authorities from other jurisdictions are then called in to provide support for, or supplant, existing efforts. When they arrive, who determines the required division of labor? Who is best positioned to develop a shared vision for the objectives that must be accomplished? Are there existing intergovernmental networks and communities of shared practice that can inform the situation? Answering these questions is the first of many challenges faced by those who will implement intergovernmental emergency-management policy.¹⁰

In the days since September, the problems have gotten easier to recognize. A recent *Economist* arti-

Homeland Security And Intergovernmental Fiscal Coordination

*"Most cities simply don't have enough money to do the job right."*¹²

One essential aspect of intergovernmental emergency-management is fiscal.¹³ Introduced in the U. S. House of Representatives after September 11th, the Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2001 pledged \$600 million toward enhanced community planning and intergovernmental coordination because of an explicit recognition that state and local governments alone do not have the resources to adequately respond to emergency situations. Additionally, the Act pledged \$270 million toward improved organization and coordination of the intelligence community "to remove barriers to efficient information sharing between intelligence collection and information use by law enforcement and first responders."¹⁴

In late October, a group of more than 75 mayors convened to discuss the financial implications of the attacks, claiming that additional security requirements alone would cost their governments \$1.5 billion "at a time when municipal budgets are strained by plummeting revenues, sharp drops in tourism and more than 500,000 layoffs nationwide." Baltimore, Maryland, expects its additional

security costs from September 11th till the end of 2001 to run approximately \$14 million.¹⁵ Of the President's proposed \$10 billion budget to fight terrorism, only \$500 million of it has been allocated to local governments, with states receiving the bulk of the money.¹⁶ California alone expects its security budget, for both state and local governments, to be approximately \$500 million.¹⁷ Skyrocketing security costs are generating concern from municipal umbrella organizations, like the National League of Cities, that some communities will be compelled to trade off between higher security and surveillance costs and existing social service programs.¹⁸

Much of what has been written about the fiscal issues of homeland security and intergovernmental coordination was voiced by mayors and governors. What about small communities? What kind of homeland security regulations will emerge from federal and state government? Will homeland protection regulations become additional unfunded mandate headaches for municipal governments?

challenge even in a period of fiscal plenty.²⁰ By itself money can buy new equipment and hire additional staff, but not create cooperation and coordination. "Domestic preparedness relies on cross-jurisdictional and cross-professional cooperation and coordination between agencies, non-governmental private and not-for-profit organizations, and levels of government that are not accustomed to working together."²¹ It is precisely this coordination and collaboration between governments and their partners that permit each unit to perform those emergency-response roles it is best suited for, and which together ensure the United States' readiness to confront the range of threats to which it is exposed.²² Take the example of responding to potential anthrax outbreaks: State health department officials do not have any jurisdiction over any federal facilities,²³ which can be numerous in urban areas, although it is their citizens who are at risk and their systems that are compromised.

**Coordination and collaboration
between governments and their partners
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To what extent does our previous experience with intergovernmental fiscal coordination provide us with instruction on how to proceed?

Homeland Protection and Cross-Jurisdictional Coordination

*"Domestic preparedness relies on cross-jurisdictional and cross-professional cooperation and coordination between agencies, non-governmental private and not-for-profit organizations, and levels of government that are not accustomed to working together."*¹⁹

Financial constraints are not the only or primary concern. Coordination would remain a tremendous

Deciding which level of government should perform which functions is vital to developing deterrence plans and responding to emergencies.²⁴ Indeed, this task is identified by a *USA Today* news analysis as the first order of business.²⁵ The authors of a recent *Public Administration Review* article argued that the federal government's role in emergency management, for example, should be restricted to fiscal coordination, "research and formulation of professional expertise," and "the development and dissemination of a broadly-accepted approach to disaster management to facilitate inter-agency and cross-jurisdictional collaboration and coordination."²⁶ Expertise needs to be developed by the federal government, argued the authors, because "emergency-management is a specialized

field that relies on knowledge that is expensive to acquire”; localities do not have the incentive to commit scarce resources to develop this costly expertise when it’s unlikely they’ll ever have to use it.²⁷ States could best respond to attacks by repairing statewide infrastructure and coordinating resources among state agencies and between state agencies and local governments; coordination is essential lest confusion between local governments develop as surrounding municipalities try to assist their exhausted neighbor. Local governments are

greater flexibility, rapid decision-making capacity, fewer formal structures, more information sharing, and a greater reliance on mutual accountability and trust.³⁵

In an effort to meet these coordination challenges at the federal level, the White House formed the Office of Homeland Security under the direction of former Pennsylvania Gov. Thomas Ridge to coordinate the federal government’s emergency-management efforts.³⁴ His newly formed office

The protection effort...calls for greater flexibility, rapid decision-making capacity, fewer formal structures, more information sharing, and a greater reliance on mutual accountability and trust.

well positioned to carry out cleanup efforts, like debris removal, and restore local infrastructure and normal functioning of public services.^{28 29}

Homeland Protection and Inter-Agency Coordination

“Our past work combating terrorism has shown that the multitude of federal programs requires focus and attention to minimize redundancy of effort and eliminate confusion within the federal government and at the state and local level.”³⁰

Homeland protection and emergency-response coordination require that intergovernmental networks³¹ and communities of shared practices form an information, communication, and resource sharing system. This is true for federal administrative units as well as their state and local counterparts. “Homeland security confronts an organizational field of terrorist organizations of considerable variation and complexity.”³² Traditional hierarchical models do not inform the United States homeland protection effort. The protection effort is characterized by an unstable and complex environment where the resources, authority and expertise are decentralized. This type of environment calls for

“must bring together various aspects of domestic security that are scattered among 40 federal bureaus and offices in 20 government agencies that report to two dozen congressional committees.”³⁵ Several states, for their part, are forming their own homeland security offices³⁶ to coordinate efforts among state agencies, local governments, and federal agencies. Coordination agents at each level of government must now emphasize the intergovernmental component of coordination.

Just after the terrorist attacks, the Comptroller General of the United States, in a prepared statement submitted to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, appealed for improved intergovernmental coordination. Experience teaches, he explained, the importance of developing a shared vision that provides focus and clarity, and keeps superfluity to a minimum, for federal, state, and local government.³⁷ Similarly, in an open memorandum to state and local government officials, the Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, cited turf battles between agencies and officials at all levels of government as a problem to be overcome through the active promotion of interagency coordination.³⁸ While there has been a move to increase

inter-agency cooperation, the January 2001 issue of *Governing* magazine commented on what it views as “the hallmark of the intergovernmental response to the terrorist attacks so far: a lot more window dressing, photo ops and soothing rhetoric rather than genuine substance.”³⁹

Whether federal and state security offices can construct and implement a systemic vision of intergovernmental cooperation is an open question. The de-

gree to which participants at all levels of government can move beyond their individual priorities and expertise may well depend on their willingness to substitute centralized organizational structures and means of communication for networks of shared expertise and communication. In doing so, it is likely they will confront much resistance from stakeholder organizations, whose traditional cultures have emphasized internal command and control, and tight operational security.

Non-State Violence: Privateers to Terrorists

Lessons from the Past

What does the past teach us about eradicating threats of terrorism? Following the lead of King Solomon, public policy scholar John Kingdon wrote there is nothing new under the sun in the policy realm.^a Could it be that today’s homeland security challenges parallel problems from the past? Homeland protection involves controlling forms of non-state violence, a major issue faced by world leaders until it was brought under control during the 19th century.

Privateering Emerges

Oddly enough, it was at the hand of European monarchs trying desperately to build their emerging nations that non-state violence by privateers was borne in the modern world system. Privateering was a form of non-state violence whereby a private ship owner might undertake an expedition against the ships or territory of another nation with the permission of the home monarch. It was state authorized, but nonetheless non-state, violence. If the expedition’s outcome were favorable,

the home monarch would share in the spoils. If the expedition caused diplomatic problems, however, the home monarch could deny involvement and responsibility.

Suspicious about the complicity of the home monarch confused the task of determining whether an attack should be classified as a crime perpetrated by individuals or as an act of war carried out by a state. The confusion prevented any systematic effort to rid nations of the scourge of privateering.

Removing the Threat

As the European powers consolidated their power and developed strong naval forces, their reliance on privateering dwindled; it even came to be seen as a nuisance. Great Britain’s naval supremacy across the globe was only limited by the presence of privateers on the seas. Recognizing that non-state violence in the form of privateering had grown out of hand and threatened the harmony of the emerging world order, the great European powers cooperated to dele-

gitimize and set in motion its destruction.^b In the parlance of the policy literature, acts of non-state violence that were previously tolerated came to be defined as a problem^c by consensus of the world’s major powers.^d With the problem defined, and a cooperative agreement in place, nations could turn to crafting the strategies, laws, and punishments necessary to dismantle privateering.

New Non-State Violence

Today the specter of non-state violence haunts us once more. Recent attacks on major American economic and military institutions appear to be crimes on the surface, yet there is evidence of state involvement and encouragement. U.S. leaders have firmly asserted that states supporting non-state terrorist activities will be labeled terrorists and they continue to seek world agreement about defining and dealing with terrorism. Like European rulers in the 19th century, America and its allies have begun to rally in earnest against those forms of non-state violence threatening the current world order.

Homeland Protection and Inter-Agency Information Sharing Challenges

“Only the federal investigators are seeing the whole puzzle as it comes together.”⁴⁰

Efforts to improve federal-state-local coordination cannot be taken lightly. On September 16, 2001, Central Intelligence Agency Director George J. Tenet “directed that employees eliminate turf wars and cut out ‘bureaucratic impediments to success... [for] all the rules have changed.’ There ‘must be absolute and full sharing of ideas and capabilities,’

tions is the one-way upward flow of intelligence information – federal officials are willing to take it but rarely want to send any in the other direction. “Local officials,” for their part, “can’t make much sense of the fragmentary information they’re feeding upward, since only the federal investigators are seeing the whole puzzle as it comes together.”⁴⁶

Inadequate communication between intelligence, prevention, and response organizations at all levels of government can be improved by building successful intergovernmental networks and communities of shared practice. In organizing them, however, agencies engaged in homeland security will be faced with a critical paradox that must be managed if they are to achieve success. They must find

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not only inside the agency but in its dealings with ‘law enforcement, military and other civilian agencies and other intelligence community colleagues.’⁴¹ Similarly, after a congressional Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations hearing, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller agreed to practice more open information sharing with state and local governments and encourage more involvement with intelligence community knowledge networks.⁴² Congress for its part introduced legislation, the Federal-Local Information Sharing Partnership Act (S. 1615),⁴³ that “would allow the federal government to increase intelligence sharing with local and state governments.”⁴⁴

Even with these efforts, however, the mayors of Baltimore, Maryland, Gary, Indiana, and Reno, Nevada reported that efforts to “improve ties between the FBI and local police” caused them to “retreat out of frustration.”⁴⁵ Among their major frustra-

ways to create a network of agencies with shared vision, purpose, and mission, while ensuring the protection of sensitive information and operational safety.

Homeland Protection and Building Intergovernmental Management Capacity

“Managing across governments and across organizations within the complex and continuously changing processes of federalism...has become the very heart of public administration and management.”⁴⁷

The challenges and frustrations illustrated in this essay highlight the need to create new, and enhance existing, intergovernmental management capacity. A recent article in *Public Administration Review* reinforced this need, explaining that intergovern-

mental program management is central to the field of public administration.⁴⁸ Now that public managers must rely on the cultivation of intergovernmental networks and communities of shared practice, there is recognition of the growing interdependency between organizations.⁴⁹ In the intergovernmental policy world, “no one is in charge” and policymakers and implementers at all levels must involve themselves in “collective strategy building and programming” if they are to succeed. Such an approach illustrates “an emerging type of work that is substantially different from the core approaches [presented] in standard public administration texts.”⁵⁰

The message to be gleaned is that a fresh approach to public management is necessary, one that recognizes and incorporates the emergent nature of federalism and intergovernmental policy planning and implementation. The events of September 11th have provided an opportunity for learning about the critical need for improved intergovernmental collaboration and coordination. As John Wiltse, direc-

challenge of implementing homeland security initiatives in complex, unstable interorganizational environments.

- ❖ Intergovernmental networks should not be viewed in a top-down manner, but as peer-driven networks where each node provides a perspective and unique expertise. These networks require a level of trust that includes sharing of information and expertise. This is a particular challenge for the law enforcement and defense communities, which have operated in the past on a “need to know” basis.
- ❖ The development of knowledge networks involves a degree of risk, because development expands the circle of trusted individuals beyond traditional professional boundaries. Therefore, stakeholders must articulate their concerns and priorities in order to develop a system of “shared meaning” and confidence in one another’s motives and expertise.

A fresh approach to public management is necessary, one that recognizes and incorporates the emergent nature of federalism and intergovernmental policy planning and implementation.

tor of the Connecticut State Office of Emergency-management (OEMA) states, there are some “side benefits: unprecedented cooperation, a renewed focus, a breaking down of barriers. If we can capitalize on that, we’ll be a stronger state and stronger nation. If we can’t, then shame on us.”⁵¹

Thoughts Toward the Future

At the University at Albany, researchers at the *Intergovernmental Solutions Program* conducted in-depth case studies of successful intergovernmental initiatives to determine the critical success factors in these interventions. The following observations, drawn from our research, are presented as areas for consideration by policy makers confronted with the

- ❖ It is necessary to outline a shared vision of what objectives are to be accomplished. This vision must be shared across organizational boundaries, even without a present crisis, to ensure organizations do not “bureaucratize” their relations with each other, and add friction to the network.
- ❖ Stakeholder analysis and the way in which it is used, is critical for success. The civil liberties controversy, as it relates to homeland security, provides a useful example. The more certain key stakeholders (here, people with civil liberties interests) are excluded from the homeland security process, the more likely the effort will eventually be undermined. The danger here is

that those inside the process will begin to feel threatened by those standing outside, leading them to discount legitimate concerns regarding the proper balance between security and fundamental liberties. Important questions must be addressed about what is to be protected and what is to be relinquished in the rush to feel safe. This is a paradox (freedom/security) that must be acknowledged and managed.

- ❖ Activities need to be focused on specific, time limited, and clearly articulated projects and activities, rather than on broader and more nebulous goals that cannot be measured and accurately managed. While vision is required to insure a coherent direction, specificity is needed to focus resource allocation and day-to-day activities.

If assumptions about intergovernmental networks prove true, knowing how networks develop and prosper serves our interests in creating workable homeland security strategies.

- ❖ The management capacity of different levels of government is variable, but by focusing on assets and expertise we make use of existing resources and generate a different perspective among the players—positive, leading to increased sense of joint responsibility, and commitment.
- ❖ Organizations with more expertise, resources, and capacity need to be willing to share with organizations that have less capacity. This generates equity and improves the level of expertise among all players.
- ❖ An organization is needed to play a broker and coordinator role across organizations. This organization must have the capacity to coordinate and move resources where needed, but must be viewed as an honest broker, rather than a self-interested organization with its own agenda of cooption and control.
- ❖ Collaboration prospers in a flexible environment where ideas and strategies can be realigned based on new needs and abilities. First steps can be planned with the knowledge that events will modify those plans as you move forward. Planning in an intergovernmental environment is emergent.

End Note

Adapting to the new homeland security environment poses a multi-tiered organizational challenge, the elements of which have been outlined in this paper. If assumptions about the importance of intergovernmental networks prove true, knowing how networks develop and prosper serves our interests in creating workable homeland security strategies. It is our hope that the lessons and observations provided by Intergovernmental Solutions Program case study research will enrich further discourse.

Footnotes

¹ www.regionalstewardship.org/Documents/Letter_Preparedness.pdf

² Donahue, Amy and Philip Joyce. 2001. "A framework for analyzing emergency-management with an application to federal budgeting." *Public Administration Review* 61: 179.

³ Emphasizing the intergovernmental nature of emergency-management, George Foresman, an emergency-management official in Virginia, said next time a major disaster occurs "it's not going to be a federal answer. It's not going to be a state answer. It's not going to be a local answer. It's going to be a national answer." (*USA Today* 9 October 2001, A1, "Struggling to create a homeland defense"). A letter from the Alliance for Regional Affairs to Ruben Barrales, director of the White House Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, similarly affirmed this perspective: "Homeland security isn't simply a federal job, it's everyone's job. It depends on bringing all levels of government together with this country's strong business and civic sectors to forge and pursue shared strategies" (www.regionalstewardship.org/Documents/Letter_Preparedness.pdf).

⁴ KSG Memo, 2 November 2001, 3.

⁵ Charles Wise, for example, explained that "leadership," in the form of "managerial craftsmanship," is "critical to developing interorganizational collaborative capacity" (Wise 2002: 133).

⁶ www.ksg.harvard.edu/press/exec_session_domestic_preparedness_110201.htm

⁷ Wise 2002: 142.

⁸ Wise 2002: 136.

⁹ Donahue and Joyce 2001: 728.

¹⁰ Donahue and Joyce 2001: 729.

¹¹ *The Economist*, 20 December 2001.

¹² *U.S. News & World Report*, 26 November 2001, 72

¹³ Donahue and Joyce 2001: 738.

¹⁴ Homeland Security Task Force of the House Democratic Caucus

¹⁵ *U.S. News & World Report*, 26 November 2001, 72

¹⁶ *St. Louis Dispatch*, 29 October 2001, B6; Econo-

mist, 20 December 2001, "America the unready"

¹⁷ *USA Today*, 9 November 2001, A1

¹⁸ *U.S. News & World Report*, 26 November 2001, 72

¹⁹ KSG Memo, 2 November 2001, 4

²⁰ *The Economist*, 20 December 2001, "America the unready"

²¹ KSG Memo, 2 November 2001, 4

²² KSG Memo, 2 November 2001, 6

²³ Wise 2002: 133.

²⁴ Deciding which level of government should perform which functions is an ongoing federalism question. What President Richard M. Nixon envisioned in his federalism reforms, for example, was a resorting of the tasks of government. By rationalizing and resorting governmental functions, Nixon sought increased intergovernmental management and effectiveness. "Where the nationalization of shared or local functions appeared more likely to enhance the efficiency and rationality of public service - as with welfare or environmental regulation - Nixon recommended that [be done]" (12). Proposals to increase intergovernmental management and effectiveness included the rationalization of governmental functions, grant consolidation, general revenue sharing, and welfare reform. Intergovernmental management reforms included grant simplifications, multistate regional planning, intergovernmental consultation, and coordination of state and local job training programs. (Conlan, Timothy. 1998. *From New Federalism to Devolution: Twenty-Five Years of Intergovernmental Reform*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press).

²⁵ *USA Today*, 9 October 2001, "Struggling to create a homeland defense"

²⁶ Donahue and Joyce 2001: 731

²⁷ A similar tone echoed in a memorandum to Director of Homeland Security Tom Ridge from members of the Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government: "State and local agencies" can "rely on the federal government to develop national priorities, assist state and local governments with threat assessments, determine gaps in national preparedness, and provide technical assistance and specialized resources for state and local planning

that meets national priorities” (2 November 2001: 2).

²⁸ Donahue and Joyce 2001: 732

²⁹ In the words of the Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, “In addition to their proximity to the attack site, state and local agencies already have institutional infrastructure and equipment in place for responding to natural and man-made disasters, which can be leveraged for responding to terrorism.” “County governments,” in particular, “are often the first line of defense in disaster response situations,” and can provide an effective “link between federal and state and local governments” (www.naco.org/leg/bulletin/01-10-26.cfm).

³⁰ U.S. GAO 01-1158T, Pages 3-4

³¹ Networks are distinguished by their lack of sole reliance “on formal authority to foster common action” (Wise 2002: 133).

³² On this matter, Charles Wise (2002: 141) wrote “the fact is that homeland security involves so many dimensions that we are not talking about ‘a’ network of organizations responsible for homeland security, but rather ‘networks.’ Combating biological agents incorporates certain organizations, and developing new technologies incorporates a somewhat different set.”

³³ Wise 2002: 132

³⁴ The Hart-Rudman Commission suggested the creation of a “National Homeland Security Agency” in its final report, issued in January 2001. To it was assigned the responsibility of “planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security” (www.bu.edu/ussi/currentissue/feature.html).

³⁵ *Wall Street Journal*, 24 September 2001, A1

³⁶ *Wall Street Journal*, 30 October 2001, A6

³⁷ U.S. GAO 01-1158T, Pages 3-4

³⁸ KJG Memo, 2 November 2001

³⁹ www.governing.com/1poto.htm, January 2002 issue.

⁴⁰ www.governing.com/1poto.htm

⁴¹ *The Washington Post*, 9 October, 2001, A4

⁴² Opening Statement of Representative Stephen Horn, R-CA Chairman, 13 November 2001

⁴³ As of April 10, 2002, this bill has not been reported out of committee.

⁴⁴ usmayors.org/uscm/us_mayor_newspaper/documents/12_17_01/natl_action_plan.asp

⁴⁵ *The Economist*, 20 December 2001, “America the unready”

⁴⁶ *Governing*, January 2002, “Time to cooperate”

⁴⁷ Agranoff, Robert and Michael McGuire. 2001. “American federalism and the search for models of management.” *Public Administration Review* 61: 671.

⁴⁸ Agranoff and McGuire 2001: 671.

⁴⁹ Agranoff and McGuire: 677

⁵⁰ Agranoff and McGuire: 678

⁵¹ *The Hartford Courant*, 14 November 2001, A2, “Preparation for terror attacks is urged; responded to terrorism.”

^a Kingdon, John. 1995. *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*. New York: HarperCollins College Publishers.

^b Thomson, Janice. 1994. *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. “On 16 April 1856, the governments of France, Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Sardinia, and Turkey signed the treaty of Paris” (70), abolishing privateering.

^c Kingdon, John. 1995. Problem formulation and definition is the first step in policy analysis. Before a problem is formulated and defined, it is merely a “condition.”

^d Thomson, Janice. 1994. For example, “While friendly states, neutrals, and insurance companies periodically defined privateering as a problem, their protests only resulted in the imposition of tighter controls on privateering. It was only when the greatest commercial and military naval power – Great Britain – defined privateering as a problem that it was permanently abolished” (70). We see similarities in our era: An international dialogue has developed in recent months on which forms of non-state violence should be classified as problematic terrorist activities.