One of the central problems for current pragmatic theories is that sentence meaning vastly underdetermines speaker’s meaning. Consequently, the goal is to explain how the gap between sentence meaning and speaker’s meaning is bridged. However, this explanation is usually given from the perspective of the hearer. The questions of what the speaker really means, what his commitment is, how s/he signals her/his real intention, etc. have been given less attention. The goal of this special issue is to change this situation and focus on the speaker acknowledging that “the speaker’s and the audience’s perspectives on communication are importantly different” (Saul, 2002:370). The contributing authors do not question the importance of utterance interpretation rather they emphasize the differences in perspective.

Grice ([1957]1989, Essay 14) defines his central notion of speaker meaning as follows: a speaker S means something by an utterance U just in case S intends U to produce a certain effect in a hearer H by means of H’s recognition of this intention. The speaker meaning of U in such a case is the effect that S intends to produce in H by means of H’s recognition of that intention. The main idea is that a speaker means something by intending that the hearer recognizes what is meant as intended by the speaker. This is what is usually called “recipient design”.

Although the Gricean theory is speaker-centered current pragmatics research appears to give more attention to the hearer interpreting utterances from the perspective of the audience rather than the producer. This lopsided approach can be explained by two facts: (1) the presence of a powerful Relevance Theory (RT), and (2) the misinterpretation of the Gricean “implicature”. Saul (2002) argued the neo-Gricean approach and RT conceptions of meaning are not as incompatible as it may appear. One discusses what the other ignores. The neo-Griceans give an account of speaker meaning, and RT focuses on developing a cognitive psychological model of utterance interpretation, which does not address the question of how and why the speaker, given what he wants to convey, utters what he utters. (See also the debate between Carston, 2005 and Horn, 2005.)

Researchers in several subfields of pragmatics are inclined to consider the Gricean implicature as an aspect of hearer meaning rather than an aspect of speaker meaning although Horn emphasized that “Speakers implicate, hearers infer (Horn, 2004:6)” Bach (2001) also pointed at this confusion: “People sometimes confuse infer with imply…. When we say that a speaker or sentence implies something, we mean that information is conveyed or suggested without being stated outright…. Inference, on the other hand, is the activity performed by a reader or interpreter in drawing conclusions that are not explicit in what is said.”

The confusion of “infer” with “imply” can be explained by a move by Grice which included the audience into the explanation of implicature. According to Grice, a speaker’s intending to convey that P by saying that Q is not enough for the speaker to implicate that P. The audience must also need to believe that the speaker believes that P to preserve the assumption of the speaker’s cooperativeness. This was a clear attempt from Grice to give some degree of intersubjectivity to the notion of conversational implicature. Speakers have authority over what they utter-implicate, but they can’t fully control what they conversationally implicate (Saul, 2002). What is uttered out there starts to live its own life and can “suffer” all kinds of interpretation. So what really matters from the speaker’s perspective is what the audience is required by the speaker to believe, not what the audience does believe. Davis (1998:122) argued that Grice was wrong to include audience-oriented criteria in his characterization of conversational implicature. The speaker’s intentions do not depend on what anyone else presumes. “To mean or imply something is to have certain intentions”. Saul (2002) made a difference between “utterer-implicatures that are claims that the speaker attempts to conversationally implicate (intended by the speaker, but not necessarily recognized by the addressee), and “audience-implicatures” that are
claims that the audience takes to be conversationally implicated (recognized by the addressee but not necessarily intended by the speaker).

Most attempts in linguistic-philosophical pragmatics to revise or correct the problems of the modular view and to recognize additional pragmatic features of the speaker’s meaning (e.g. Sperber and Wilson, 1986; Carston, 2002; Moeschler, 2004: explicature/implicature; Burton-Roberts, 2005: what-is-A-said/what-is-B-said, Bach, 2001: what is said/implicature/implicature) have arguably not gone far enough because the authors have restricted their purview primarily to speaker meaning and utterance interpretation, without paying due attention to private knowledge, prior experience, salience, and the emergent, rather than just the a priori intentions of the speaker per se. Kecskes (2010) argued that the proposition the speaker produces will hardly be the same as that which will be recovered by the hearer because interlocutors are individuals with different cognitive predispositions, prior experiences, and different histories of use of the same words and expressions.

The socio-cognitive approach (SCA) promoted by Kecskes (2008, 2010, 2011, 2012) and Kecskes and Zhang (2009) argues that speaker’s utterance should also be considered from the speaker’s perspective. The speaker’s utterance is a full proposition on its own rights. From the speaker’s perspective the utterance is not underdetermined, it does not need any enrichment, saturation or any other kind of pragmatic process to become a full proposition. All these pragmatic processes are needed for utterance interpretation from the hearer’s perspective. However, they are unnecessary if we analyze the utterance from the speaker’s perspective: what exactly the speaker wanted to say, and why exactly the speaker said what s/he said the way s/he said it (Kecskes, 2012). In the SCA the speaker’s utterance is the result of an intention, which is a private reaction to a communicative situation as it is expressed in lexical items whose selection is affected not only by recipient design (social cooperation) but also by speaker’s egocentrism (individual salience).

According to Carston (2004), the derivation of an explicature may require ‘free’ enrichment, that is, the incorporation of conceptual material that is wholly pragmatically inferred, on the basis of considerations of rational communicative behavior (cf. also Recanati, 2010). In SCA, this enrichment of the uttered sentence is not “free” but the result of the speaker’s private and subjective treatment of the utterance (pragmatically implied) in an actual situational context (Kecskes, 2012). How the hearer will infer this speaker-subjectivized commitment is another issue.

The papers presented in this special issue all demonstrate endeavors to analyze utterance from the speaker’s perspective. Anne Bezuïdenhout addresses the issue of speaker egocentrism and argues that conversational participants are generally not egocentric. She also discusses the issue as to the appropriate methods to use to address the issue of perspective taking in conversation. Noel Burton-Roberts, responding to Robyn Carston’s (2010) defense of explicature as cancellable, examines what Grice meant by ‘cancellable’. His paper offers reasons for thinking that only generalized conversational implicatures are cancellable, not relevance theory’s explicatures and not particularized conversational implicatures. Shir Givoni, Rachel Giora1 and Dafna Bergerbest examine how speakers alert addressees to multiple meanings. They analyze and discuss the practice of explicitly cueing low-salience meanings in speaker production. They argue that given that salient meanings are activated initially, cues may be required, alerting the processor to the possibility that initial outputs of the automatic process of decoding should undergo ‘re-coding’. In his paper Michael Haugh proposes that speaker meaning can also be conceptualized from a social, deontological perspective where the speaker is held accountable to the moral order for what he or she is taken to mean in interaction. Kasja Jaszczolt focuses on the first-person reference as applied in conversation, addressing the question of the meaning of markers of first-person reference, the most typical of which is the first-person pronoun such as the English ‘I’. The paper by Istvan Kecskes discusses the ways salience can affect speaker production and asks the question: why exactly the speaker says what s/he says the way s/he says it. Jacques Moeschler analyzes the semantic and pragmatic inferences that utterances convey. He claims that the two features allow us to draw conclusions on the degree of the speaker’s commitment. Yongping Ran’s study focuses on the metapragmatic construction bushi+(S)+V+(NP) in Chinese interaction, which is a non-denial of speaker intention. Ran considers this structure a rapport-oriented mitigating device in terms of its interpersonal purposes since it helps to manage interpersonal relationship in interaction. Robert Sanders discusses the duality of speaker meaning. He claims that theoretically there must be, a shared, impersonal, basis for forming, implementing, and recognizing speakers’ communicative intentions. This does not subsume speakers’ personal communicative intentions but is intertwined with them to create a duality of speaker meaning.

The contributors hope that this special issue will direct further attention to speaker meaning and generate a debate about the ways we can analyze speaker meaning not only from the audience’s but also from the producer’s perspective.

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References


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