Computer Communication Networks

Network Security

ICEN/ICSI 416 – Fall 2016
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Network Security

Goals:

➢ understand principles of network security:

- ▪ cryptography and its *many* uses beyond "confidentiality"
- ▪ authentication
- ▪ message integrity

➢ security in practice:

- ▪ firewalls and intrusion detection systems
- ▪ security in application, transport, network, link layers

Motivation

Adversary	Goal
Student	To have fun snooping on people's email
Cracker	To test out someone's security system; steal data
Sales rep	To claim to represent all of Europe, not just Andorra
Businessman	To discover a competitor's strategic marketing plan
Ex-employee	To get revenge for being fired
Accountant	To embezzle money from a company
Stockbroker	To deny a promise made to a customer by email
Con man	To steal credit card numbers for sale
Spy	To learn an enemy's military or industrial secrets
Terrorist	To steal germ warfare secrets

What is network security?

➢ *confidentiality:* only sender, intended receiver should "understand" message contents

- Method — encrypt at sender, decrypt at receiver
- A protocol that prevents an adversary from understanding the message contents is said to provide *confidentiality*.
- Concealing the quantity or destination of communication is called *traffic confidentiality*.

➢ *message integrity:* sender, receiver want to ensure message not altered (in transit, or afterwards) without detection

- A protocol that detects message tampering provides *data integrity*.
- The adversary could alternatively transmit an extra copy of your message in a *replay attack*.
- A protocol that detects message tampering provides *originality*.
- A protocol that detects delaying tactics provides *timeliness*.

What is network security?

➢ *authentication:* sender, receiver want to confirm identity of each other

- A protocol that ensures that you really are talking to whom you think you're talking is said to provide *authentication.*
- Example: DNS Attack [correct URL gets converted to malicious IP]

➢ *access and availability*: services must be accessible and available to users

- A protocol that ensures a degree of access is called *availability.*
- Denial of Service (DoS) Attack
- Example: SYN Flood attack (Client not transmitting 3rd message in TCP 3-way handshake, thus consuming server's resource)
- Example: Ping Flood (attacker transmits ICMP Echo Request packets)

Friends and enemies: Alice, Bob, Trudy

➢ well-known in network security world
➢ Bob, Alice (lovers!) want to communicate "securely"
➢ Trudy (intruder) may intercept, delete, add messages

Who might Bob, Alice be?

➢ ... well, *real-life* Bobs and Alices!

➢ Web browser/server for electronic transactions (e.g., on-line purchases)

➢ on-line banking client/server

➢ DNS servers

➢ routers exchanging routing table updates

➢ other examples?

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# There are bad guys (and girls) out there!

*Q:* What can a "bad guy" do?

A: A lot!

- *eavesdrop:* intercept messages
- actively *insert* messages into connection
- *impersonation:* can fake (spoof) source address in packet (or any field in packet)
- *hijacking:* "take over" ongoing connection by removing sender or receiver, inserting himself in place
- *denial of service*: prevent service from being used by others (e.g., by overloading resources)

Cryptography in Insecure Network

The language of cryptography

m plaintext message

$K_A(m)$ ciphertext, encrypted with key K_A

$m = K_B(K_A(m))$

Symmetric key cryptography

symmetric key crypto: Bob and Alice share same (symmetric) key: K_s

➢ e.g., key is knowing substitution pattern in mono alphabetic substitution cipher

Q: how do Bob and Alice agree on key value?

Simple encryption scheme

substitution cipher: substituting one thing for another

- *monoalphabetic* cipher: substitute one letter for another

plaintext: abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz

ciphertext: mnbvcxzasdfghjklpoiuytrewq

e.g.:

Plaintext: bob. i love you. alice

ciphertext: nkn. s gktc wky. mgsbc

Encryption key: mapping from set of 26 letters to set of 26 letters

Breaking an encryption scheme

➢ cipher-text only attack: Trudy has ciphertext she can analyze

➢ two approaches:

- brute force: search through all keys
- statistical analysis

➢ known-plaintext attack: Trudy has plaintext corresponding to ciphertext [when an intruder knows some of the (plain, cipher) pairings]

- e.g., in monoalphabetic cipher, Trudy determines pairings for a,l,i,c,e,b,o,

➢ chosen-plaintext attack: Trudy can get ciphertext for chosen plaintext

- If Trudy could get Alice to send encrypted message, "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog", then the encryption is broken.

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Polyalphabetic Cipher

Plaintext letter:	a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z
$C_1(k = 5)$:	f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z a b c d e
$C_2(k = 19)$:	t u v w x y z a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s

➢ n substitution ciphers, $C_1, C_2, \ldots, C_n$

➢ cycling pattern:

- e.g., n=4 [C_1-C_4], k=key length=5: C_1, C_3, C_4, C_3, C_2; C_1, C_3, C_4, C_3, C_2; ..

➢ for each new plaintext symbol, use subsequent substitution pattern in cyclic pattern

- dog: d from C_1, o from C_3, g from C_4

  Encryption key: n substitution ciphers, and cyclic pattern

- key need not be just n-bit pattern

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Block vs Stream Cipher

➢ Block ciphers process messages into blocks, each of which is then en/decrypted

- 64-bits or more
- Example: DES, AES

➢ Stream ciphers process messages a bit or byte at a time when en/decrypting

- Example: WEP (used in 802.11)

➢ Brute Force attack is possible if few number of bits are chosen

Cipher Block Chaining

➢ **Plaintext block is XORed with the previous block's ciphertext before being encrypted.**

  ▪ Each block's ciphertext depends on the preceding blocks

  ▪ First plaintext block is XORed with a random number.

    ✓ That random number, called an *initialization vector (IV), is included with the series of ciphertext blocks so that the first ciphertext* block can be decrypted.

Plaintext block 3
Plaintext block 2
Plaintext block 1
Plaintext block 0

Encryption function

ciphertext

Initialization vector

(For block 0 only)

➢ **Provides better efficiency for brute force attack**

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# Symmetric key crypto: DES

DES: Data Encryption Standard

➢ US encryption standard [NIST 1993]

➢ 56-bit symmetric key, 64-bit plaintext input

➢ block cipher with cipher block chaining

➢ how secure is DES?

■ DES Challenge: 56-bit-key-encrypted phrase, decrypted (brute force) in less than a day

■ no known good analytic attack

➢ making DES more secure:

■ 3DES: encrypt 3 times with 3 different keys

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Symmetric key crypto: DES

DES operation

- initial permutation (on 64 bits)

- 16 identical "rounds" of function application
  - each using different 48 bits of key
  - rightmost 32 bits are moved to leftmost 32 bits

- final permutation (on 64 bits)

Kaufman, Schneier, 1995

AES: Advanced Encryption Standard

- ➢ symmetric-key NIST standard, replaced DES (Nov 2001)
- ➢ processes data in 128 bit blocks
- ➢ 128, 192, or 256 bit keys
- ➢ brute force decryption (try each key) taking 1 sec on DES, takes 149 trillion years for AES

# Public Key Cryptography

symmetric key crypto

➢ requires sender, receiver know shared secret key

➢ Q: how to agree on key in first place (particularly if never "met")?

public key crypto

▪ radically different approach [Diffie-Hellman76, RSA78]

▪ sender, receiver do *not* share secret key

▪ *public* encryption key known to *all*

▪ *private* decryption key known only to receiver

Public key cryptography

K_B^+ Bob's *public* key

K_B^- Bob's *private* key

plaintext message, m → encryption algorithm → ciphertext $K_B^+(m)$ → decryption algorithm → plaintext message $m = K_B^-\left(K_B^+(m)\right)$

Public key encryption algorithms

requirements:

① need $K_B^+(\cdot)$ and $K_B^-(\cdot)$ such that

$$K_B^-(K_B^+(m)) = m$$

② given public key K_B^+, it should be
impossible to compute private key K_B^-

RSA: Rivest, Shamir, Adelson algorithm [1999]

Prerequisite: modular arithmetic

➢ x mod n = remainder of x when divide by n

➢ facts:

[(a mod n) + (b mod n)] mod n = (a+b) mod n

[(a mod n) - (b mod n)] mod n = (a-b) mod n

[(a mod n) * (b mod n)] mod n = (a*b) mod n

➢ thus

$(a \bmod n)^d \bmod n = a^d \bmod n$

➢ example: x=14, n=10, d=2:

$(x \bmod n)^d \bmod n = 4^2 \bmod 10 = 6$

$x^d = 14^2 = 196$ $x^d \bmod 10 = 6$

RSA: getting ready

➢ message: just a bit pattern

➢ bit pattern can be uniquely represented by an integer number

➢ thus, encrypting a message is equivalent to encrypting a number

example:

➢ m= 10010001 . This message is uniquely represented by the decimal number 145.

➢ to encrypt m, we encrypt the corresponding number, which gives a new number (the ciphertext).

RSA: Creating public/private key pair

1. choose two large prime numbers p, q. (e.g., 1024 bits each)

2. compute $n = pq$, $z = (p-1)(q-1)$

3. choose e (with $e<n$) that has no common factors with z (e, z are "relatively prime").

4. choose d such that $ed-1$ is exactly divisible by z. (in other words: ed mod $z = 1$).

5. *public* key is *(n,e)*. *private* key is *(n,d)*.

$$K_B^+$$ $$K_B^-$$

RSA: encryption, decryption

0. given (n,e) and (n,d) as computed above

1. to encrypt message m (<n), compute

   $c = m^e \bmod n$

2. to decrypt received bit pattern, c, compute

   $m = c^d \bmod n$

*magic happens!* $m = \underbrace{(m^e \bmod n)}_{c}{}^{d} \bmod n$

RSA example:

Bob chooses *p=5, q=7.* Then *n=35, z=24.*

e=5 (so *e, z* relatively prime).
d=29 (so *ed-1* exactly divisible by z).

encrypting 8-bit messages.

encrypt:

bit pattern	m	m^e	$c = m^e \bmod n$
0000l000	12	24832	17

decrypt:

c	c^d	$m = c^d \bmod n$
17	481968572106750915091411825223071697	12

Why does RSA work?

- must show that $c^d \bmod n = m$
  where $c = m^e \bmod n$

- fact: for any x and y: $x^y \bmod n = x^{(y \bmod z)} \bmod n$
  - where $n = pq$ and $z = (p-1)(q-1)$

- thus,

  $c^d \bmod n = (m^e \bmod n)^d \bmod n$

  $\qquad = m^{ed} \bmod n$

  $\qquad = m^{(ed \bmod z)} \bmod n$

  $\qquad = m^1 \bmod n$

  $\qquad = m$

RSA: another important property

The following property will be *very* useful later:

$$K_B^-(K_B^+(m)) = m \;\;\; = \;\;\; K_B^+(K_B^-(m))$$

use public key first, followed by private key

use private key first, followed by public key

result is the same!

How is it possible?

follows directly from modular arithmetic:

$(m^e \bmod n)^d \bmod n = m^{ed} \bmod n$

$$= m^{de} \bmod n$$

$$= (m^d \bmod n)^e \bmod n$$

Why is RSA secure?

➢ suppose you know Bob's public key (n,e). How hard is it to determine d?

➢ essentially need to find factors of n without knowing the two factors p and q

  ▪ fact: factoring a big number is hard

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RSA in practice: session keys

➢ exponentiation in RSA is computationally intensive

➢ DES is at least 100 times faster than RSA

➢ use public key crypto to establish secure connection, then establish second key – symmetric session key – for encrypting data

session key, K_S

➢ Bob and Alice use RSA to exchange a symmetric key K_S

➢ once both have K_S, they use symmetric key cryptography

Authentication

Goal: Bob wants Alice to "prove" her identity to him

Protocol ap1.0: Alice says "I am Alice"

"I am Alice"

Failure scenario??

Authentication

*Goal:* Bob wants Alice to "prove" her identity to him

Protocol ap1.0: Alice says "I am Alice"

"I am Alice"

in a network,
Bob can not "see" Alice, so
Trudy simply declares
herself to be Alice

Authentication: another try

Protocol ap2.0: Alice says "I am Alice" in an IP packet containing her source IP address

Alice's IP address	"I am Alice"

Failure scenario??

Authentication: another try

Protocol ap2.0: Alice says "I am Alice" in an IP packet
containing her source IP address

Alice's IP address	"I am Alice"

Trudy can create
a packet "spoofing"
Alice's address

Authentication: another try

Protocol ap3.0: Alice says "I am Alice" and sends her secret password to "prove" it.

| Alice's IP addr | Alice's password | "I'm Alice" |

| Alice's IP addr | OK |

Failure scenario??

Protocol ap3.0: Alice says "I am Alice" and sends her secret password to "prove" it.

Alice's IP addr	Alice's password	"I'm Alice"

Alice's IP addr	OK

Alice's IP addr	Alice's password	"I'm Alice"

playback attack: Trudy records Alice's packet and later plays it back to Bob

Authentication: yet another try

Protocol ap3.1: Alice says "I am Alice" and sends her *encrypted* secret password to "prove" it.

| Alice's IP addr	encrypted password	"I'm Alice"

| Alice's IP addr	OK

Failure scenario??

Authentication: yet another try

Protocol ap3.1: Alice says "I am Alice" and sends her *encrypted* secret password to "prove" it.

Alice's IP addr	encrypted password	"I'm Alice"

Alice's IP addr	OK

Alice's IP addr	encrypted password	"I'm Alice"

record
and
playback
still works!

Authentication: yet another try

Goal: avoid playback attack

nonce: number (R) used only *once-in-a-lifetime*

ap4.0: to prove Alice "live", Bob sends Alice *nonce*, R. Alice must return R, encrypted with shared secret key

"I am Alice"

R

K_{A-B} (R)

Alice is live, and only Alice knows key to encrypt nonce, so it must be Alice!

Failures, drawbacks?

Authentication: ap5.0

ap4.0 requires shared symmetric key
➢   can we authenticate using public key techniques?
ap5.0: use nonce, public key cryptography

"I am Alice"

R

K_A^- (R)

"send me your public key"

K_A^+

Bob computes

$K_A^+ (K_A^-(R)) = R$

and knows only Alice could have the private key, that encrypted R such that

$K_A^+ (K_A^-(R)) = R$

ap5.0: security hole

man (or woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)

I am Alice

I am Alice

R

$K_T^-(R)$

R

Send me your public key

$K_A^-(R)$

K_T^+

Send me your public key

K_A^+

$K_T^+(m)$

Trudy gets
$m = K_T^-(K_T^+(m))$
sends m to Alice
encrypted with Alice's
public key

$K_A^+(m)$

$m = K_A^-(K_A^+(m))$

ap5.0: security hole

man (or woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)

difficult to detect:

- Bob receives everything that Alice sends, and vice versa. (e.g., so Bob, Alice can meet one week later and recall conversation!)
- problem is that Trudy receives all messages as well!

Digital signatures

cryptographic technique analogous to hand-written signatures:

➢ sender (Bob) digitally signs document, establishing he is document owner/creator.

➢ *verifiable, nonforgeable:* recipient (Alice) can prove to someone that Bob, and no one else (including Alice), must have signed document

Digital signatures

simple digital signature for message m:

➢ Bob signs m by encrypting with his private key K_B^-, creating "signed" message, $K_B^-(m)$

Bob's message, m

Dear Alice

Oh, how I have missed you. I think of you all the time! ... (blah blah blah)

Bob

K_B^- Bob's private key

Public key encryption algorithm

$m, K_B^-(m)$

Bob's message, m, signed (encrypted) with his private key

Digital signatures

- suppose Alice receives msg m, with signature: $m, K_B^-(m)$

- Alice verifies m signed by Bob by applying Bob's public key K_B^+ to $K_B^-(m)$ then checks $K_B^+(K_B^-(m)) = m$.

- If $K_B^+(K_B^-(m)) = m$, whoever signed m must have used Bob's private key.

Alice thus verifies that:

- Bob signed m
- no one else signed m
- Bob signed m and not m'

non-repudiation:

- ✓ Alice can take m, and signature $K_B^-(m)$ to court and prove that Bob signed m

Firewalls

isolates organization's internal net from larger Internet, allowing some packets to pass, blocking others

administered network
trusted "good guys"

public Internet
untrusted "bad guys"

firewall

Firewalls: why do we need it?

prevent denial of service attacks:

- SYN flooding: attacker establishes many bogus TCP connections, no resources left for "real" connections

prevent illegal modification/access of internal data

- e.g., attacker replaces CIA's homepage with something else

allow only authorized access to inside network

- set of authenticated users/hosts

three types of firewalls:

- stateless packet filters
- stateful packet filters
- application gateways

Stateless packet filtering

Should arriving packet be allowed in? Departing packet let out?

➢ internal network connected to Internet via *router firewall*

➢ router *filters packet-by-packet,* decision to forward/drop packet based on:

  ▪ source IP address, destination IP address
  ▪ TCP/UDP source and destination port numbers
  ▪ ICMP message type
  ▪ TCP SYN and ACK bits

Stateless packet filtering: example

➢ *example 1:* block incoming and outgoing datagrams with IP protocol field = 17 and with either source or dest port = 23

- ▪ *result:* all incoming, outgoing UDP flows and telnet connections are blocked

➢ *example 2:* block inbound TCP segments with ACK=0.

- ▪ *result:* prevents external clients from making TCP connections with internal clients, but allows internal clients to connect to outside.

Stateless packet filtering: more examples

Policy	Firewall Setting
No outside Web access.	Drop all outgoing packets to any IP address, port 80
No incoming TCP connections, except those for institution's public Web server only.	Drop all incoming TCP SYN packets to any IP except 130.207.244.203, port 80
Prevent Web-radios from eating up the available bandwidth.	Drop all incoming UDP packets - except DNS and router broadcasts.
Prevent your network from being used for a smurf DoS attack.	Drop all ICMP packets going to a "broadcast" address (e.g. 130.207.255.255).
Prevent your network from being tracerouted	Drop all outgoing ICMP TTL expired traffic

Access Control Lists

ACL: table of rules, applied top to bottom to incoming packets: (action, condition) pairs

action	source address	dest address	protocol	source port	dest port	flag bit
allow	222.22/16	outside of 222.22/16	TCP	> 1023	80	any
allow	outside of 222.22/16	222.22/16	TCP	80	> 1023	ACK
allow	222.22/16	outside of 222.22/16	UDP	> 1023	53	---
allow	outside of 222.22/16	222.22/16	UDP	53	> 1023	----
deny	all	all	all	all	all	all

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Stateful packet filtering

➤ *stateless packet filter:* heavy handed tool
  ▪ admits packets that "make no sense," e.g., dest port = 80, ACK bit set, even though no TCP connection established:

action	source address	dest address	protocol	source port	dest port	flag bit
allow	outside of 222.22/16	222.22/16	TCP	80	> 1023	ACK

  ▪ *stateful packet filter:* track status of every TCP connection
    • track connection setup (SYN), teardown (FIN): determine whether incoming, outgoing packets "makes sense"
   • timeout inactive connections at firewall: no longer admit packets

Stateful packet filtering

ACL augmented to indicate need to check connection state table before admitting packet

action	source address	dest address	proto	source port	dest port	flag bit	check conxion
allow	222.22/16	outside of 222.22/16	TCP	> 1023	80	any	
allow	outside of 222.22/16	222.22/16	TCP	80	> 1023	ACK	X
allow	222.22/16	outside of 222.22/16	UDP	> 1023	53	---	
allow	outside of 222.22/16	222.22/16	UDP	53	> 1023	----	X
deny	all	all	all	all	all	all	

Application gateways

➢ filter packets on application data as well as on IP/TCP/UDP fields.

➢ *example:* allow select internal users to telnet outside

host-to-gateway telnet session

application gateway

router and filter

gateway-to-remote host telnet session

1. require all telnet users to telnet through gateway.
2. for authorized users, gateway sets up telnet connection to dest host. Gateway relays data between 2 connections
3. router filter blocks all telnet connections not originating from gateway.

Limitations of firewalls, gateways

- *IP spoofing:* router can't know if data "really" comes from claimed source

- if multiple app's. need special treatment, each has own app. gateway

- client software must know how to contact gateway.
  - e.g., must set IP address of proxy in Web browser

- filters often use all or nothing policy for UDP

- *tradeoff:* degree of communication with outside world, level of security

- many highly protected sites still suffer from attacks