Interest on Reserves and Monetary Policy of Targeting Both Interest Rate and Money Supply *

Duong Ngotran†

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University at Albany, State University of New York

Abstract

We build a dynamic model with currency, demand deposits and bank reserves. The monetary base is controlled by the central bank, while the money supply is determined by the interactions between the central bank, banks and public. In banking crises when banks cut loans, a Taylor rule is not efficient. Negative interest on reserves or forward guidance is effective, but deflation is still likely to be persistent. If the central bank simultaneously targets both the interest rate and the money supply by a Taylor rule and a Friedman’s k-percent rule, inflation and output are stabilized.

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†Email: dngo@albany.edu
1 Introduction

In the Great Recession, the federal funds rate was near zero; however, the deflation pressure was still high as banks cut loans. That phenomenon raised many concerns among academics and policy makers on how the central bank’s policy should be designed when the interest rate channel was weak. Possible solutions for pushing up inflation in this circumstance are forward guidance, helicopter money and quantitative easing (Bernanke, 2016). The last two tools can change the money supply directly (rather than indirectly through a money creation process by banks); however they need to be integrated with standard monetary policy frameworks and cannot be a daily tool like an interest rate targeting policy. This paper argues that the central bank can utilize both instruments, interest rate and money supply, to do a better job at hitting the inflation target in a banking crisis.

The common traditional consensus among economists is that the central bank cannot target both interest rate and money supply at the same time. The central bank chooses either the monetary base as its main instrument (Meltzer, 1987; McCallum, 1988; Friedman, 1960) or the common interbank rate (Taylor, 1993). However, the introduction of a new monetary policy tool - interest on reserves (IOR) - and the transformation of the economy from making transactions with currency to with demand deposits will allow the central bank to use both above instruments. With IOR, the price of reserves might disconnect from the quantity of reserves in the banking system. With demand deposits, money can earn a positive nominal interest rate. Therefore, it is a possible scenario that that the central bank can increase the money supply and raise IOR at the same time.

This paper builds a dynamic model with bank reserves, currency, and demand deposits. The monetary base in our model is controlled by the central bank, while the money supply is determined by the interactions between the central bank, banks and the public. The interbank rate is controlled either by open market operations or by adjusting IOR, so a wide range of conventional and unconventional monetary policy can be assessed in this model.

We find that in normal times, an interest rate policy following a Taylor rule is a transparent and effective means of controlling the economy. When the central bank cuts rates, the amount
of the money supply increases because banks create more loans. As the price is sticky in our model, the economy is stimulated due to the rise in the aggregate demand. The effect is identical to the standard New Keynesian model.

However, in banking crises, when banks cannot make loans due to the capital constraints, a policy following a Taylor rule is insufficient for pushing the real interest rate down. Even with the negative IOR or forward guidance, the outcome is only slightly better. The main reason is that the inflationary expectations also depend on the path of the money supply. In the case of banking crisis, the endogenous money supply declines. If the central bank does not inject liquidity directly into the market, the deflation pressure will be huge. Because of deflation and the wedge created by the capital constraint, the real prime rate will be high even though the interbank rate touches the zero lower bound.

Targeting both the money supply and the interest rate is very efficient in this situation. We find that the central bank only needs to follow a simple Taylor rule and a Friedman’s k-percent rule so that both output and inflation will be stabilized. After the crisis time, the central bank can always come back to a simple Taylor rule.

Related Literature

Our model shares many similarities with the standard New Keynesian framework with the existence of the banking sector\(^1\). Banks play a role of intermediaries channeling funds from savers to borrower in these models; while ours focuses on the function of creating money in the banking sector (McLeay, Radia and Thomas, 2014). Banking crises create liquidity problem for agents in the private sector as the money supply declines. In this sense, our model is identical to Benigno and Nisticò (2017), where a shock worsening the liquidity of pseudo-safe assets can create a crisis with a persistent deflation.

The money supply in our model is endogenous. The interest rate channel and the credit channel are interdependent. In this aspect, our model is related to Bianchi and Bigio (2014) and Afonso and Lagos (2015), where these authors apply the search and matching theory to

study the banking sector. On the other hand, our banking sector is perfectly competitive and frictionless, so we can focus more on the impact of monetary policy on output and inflation. On the money demand side, we follow the cash-in-advance literature in (Lucas and Stokey, 1987; Belongia and Ireland, 2006, 2014), so households hold currency and bank deposits as they provide the liquidity. Cash goods and deposit goods are bundled together in a constant elasticity of substitution utility function.

To target both the money supply and interest rate, the central bank has to use IOR. This tool is already mentioned in the literature (Sargent and Wallace, 1985; Goodfriend et al., 2002; Kashyap and Stein, 2012; Ireland, 2014; Cochrane, 2014; Keister, 2016). Our model, different from this line of research, can connect IOR with banking reserves, money supply and the inter-bank rate in a micro-founded dynamic setup.

We also discuss two unconventional monetary policies: negative IOR and forward guidance. Analysis of monetary policy with a negative interest rate can be found in Rognlie (2015). Our model emphasizes the transmission through a negative IOR to the interbank rate and the deposit rate while the framework in Rognlie (2015) assumes directly that the central bank can impose a negative short term rate. In both papers, the negative rate might be an important tool when the interbank rate is near zero. We also examine the effect of the central bank’s forward guidance policy\(^2\) in a banking crisis context.

This paper extends the model in Ngotran (2017) to a more general environment, including both currency and electronic money. Banking crises are the main themes in both paper and the effectiveness of different hypothetical polices are assessed under this context. However, Ngotran (2017) studies the inflation dynamics after the Great Recession and the appropriate policy to get out of the low interest rate environment. This paper focuses on a new type of monetary policy when the central bank targets both the money supply and the interest rate by two common simple monetary rules.

The rest of the paper is divided into six parts. Section 2 and 3 describe the model. Section 4 and 5 study the equilibrium conditions as well as some theoretical results of this model. Section

\(^2\)See (Eggertsson et al., 2003; Levin et al., 2009; Del Negro, Giannoni and Patterson, 2012; Campbell et al., 2012; Keen, Richter and Throckmorton, 2017a)
performs some experiments to assess the efficacy of different policies when banking crises
happen. Section 7 gives the conclusion.

2 The Environment

2.1 Notation:

Let $P_t$ be the price of the final good. We use lowercase letters to represent the real balance of
a variable or its relative price. For example, the real reserves balance $n_t = N_t / P_t$, or the real
price of intermediate goods $p_t^m = P_t^m / P_t$. The timing notation follows this rule: if a variable
is determined or chosen at time $t$, it will have the subscript $t$. The gross inflation rate is $\pi_t =
\frac{P_t}{P_t-1}$.

2.2 Goods and Production Technology

We follow closely the model description in Ngotran (2017). Our model extends Ngotran (2017)
to the environment where currency and demand deposits coexist. There are four types of goods
in the economy: cash-goods $y_{1,t}$ produced by c-retailers who only accept currency as the mean of
payment, deposit-goods $y_{2,t}$ produced by d-retailers who only accept payment through banks,
wholesale goods $y_{j}(j)$ produced by wholesale firm $j$ and intermediate good $y_t^m$ produced by
households.

Each period households self-employ their labor $l_t$ to produce the homogeneous intermediate
good $y_t^m$ under the production function:

$$y_t^m = l_t$$

Households sell $y_t^m$ to wholesale firms in the competitive market with the price $P_t^m$.

There is a continuum of wholesale firms indexed by $j \in [0,1]$. Each wholesale firm purchases
the homogeneous intermediate good $y_t^m$ from households and differentiates it into a distinctive
wholesale goods $y_t(j)$ under the following technology:

$$y_t(j) = y_t^m$$

Wholesale firms faces the Rotemberg adjustment cost when they change their prices.

Two types of retail firms both produce the final good $y_{i,t}$ ($i = 1, 2$) by aggregating a variety of differentiated wholesale goods $y_t(j)$:

$$y_{i,t} = \left( \int_0^1 y_t(j) \frac{e-1}{e} dj \right)^\frac{e}{e-1}, \quad i = 1, 2$$

As the markets for cash-goods and deposit-goods are perfectly competitive and they have the same constant return to scale production function, they have the same price $P_t$.

### 2.3 Time, Demographics and Preferences

Time is discrete, indexed by $t$ and continues forever. The model is in the deterministic setting and has six types of agents: bankers, households, wholesale firms, two types of retail firms, and the consolidated government.

There is a measure one of identical infinitely lived bankers in the economy. Bankers discount the future with the discount factor $\beta$. Each period, they gain utility from consuming a basket $c_t$ that contains cash-goods $c_{1,t}$ and deposit-goods $c_{2,t}$. Their utility at the period $t$ can be written as:

$$\sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s \log(c_{t+s}), \quad \text{with } c_t = \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{2} \alpha_i \beta^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} c_{i,t}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

where $\alpha_i$ is the share of cash-goods or deposit-goods in the basket and $\sigma$ is the elasticity of substitution between two goods in the basket.

There is also a measure one of identical infinitely lived households. Households discount the future with the discount factor $\bar{\beta} < \beta$, so they will borrow from bankers in the steady state. Similar to bankers, each period households gain utility from consuming the basket $\tilde{c}_t$ and lose utility when providing labor $l_t$ to their own production. Household’s utility at the period $t$ can
### 2.4 Assets

There are two types of financial assets: bank loans to households $B^h_t$ and interbank loans $B^f_t$.

(a) **Bank loans to households** $(B^h_t)$: We follow Leland and Toft (1996) and Bianchi and Bigio (2014) to model the loan structure between bankers and households. The market for bank loan is perfectly competitive and the price of loan is $q^h_t$. When a household wants to borrow 1 dollar at time $t$, bankers will create an account for her and deposit $q^h_t$ dollars to her account. In the exchange for that, this household promises to pay $\delta_b$, $\delta_b(1 - \delta_b)$, ..., $\delta_b(1 - \delta_b)^{n-1}$, $\delta_b(1 - \delta_b)^n$... dollars at time $t + 1$, $t + 2$, ..., $t + n$, $t + n + 1$... where $n$ runs to infinity and $0 < \delta_b \leq 1$ (Table 1). Loans are illiquid and bankers cannot sell loans.

Let $B^h_t$ be the nominal balance of loan stock in the period $t$, let $S_t$ be the nominal flow of new loan issuance, we have:

$$B^h_t = (1 - \delta_b)B^h_{t-1} + S_t$$

(b) **Interbank loan** $(B^f_t)$: Bankers can borrow reserves from other bankers in the interbank market. The nominal gross interest rate in the interbank market is the interbank rate $R^f_t$.
2.5 Money and Payment System

There are three types of money in our economy: currency $x_t$, zero-maturity deposits $m_t$ and reserves $n_t$.

(a) **Currency** ($x_t$): is issued by the central bank and held by households. If currency is held by bankers, it is automatically converted to reserve. Currency is used for transactions between households/bankers and c-retailers who sell cash-goods. Currency does not pay nominal interest. The amount of currency in circulation is endogenous in the equilibrium.

(b) **Zero maturity deposit (ZMD)** ($m_t$): is a type of e-money issued by bankers. ZMDs have the same unit of account as currency. When holding these deposits, households earn the gross nominal interest rate $R_m^t$ which is determined by the perfectly competitive banking market. ZMDs are used for settling all transactions in the private sector, except for transactions between households/bankers and c-retailers. When the market between bankers and households open, household can convert ZMDs to currency or currency to ZMDs. They are insured by the central bank, so they are totally safe.

(c) **Reserve** ($n_t$): is a type of e-money issued by the central bank for only bankers. It has the same unit of account with currency. The central bank pays the gross interest rate $R_n^t$ for these reserves. Interest on reserves $R_n^t$ is a monetary policy tool of the central bank. At any moment, bankers can convert these reserves to currency and pay households. Reserves are used for settling transactions between bankers and bankers, bankers and the consolidated government.

Transactions with currency are simple. However, transactions with zero maturity deposits relates to many parties. We repeat the example in Ngotran (2017) to illustrate the connection between the flows of ZMDs and reserves. If wholesale firm A (whose account at bank A) pays 1 dollars to household B (whose account at bank B), the flows of payment will follow Table 2.
2.6 Central Bank and Monetary Policy

The central bank always uses the electronic payment system to conduct monetary policy. Each period, the central bank transfers $\tau_t$ dollars in checks to households. For any transactions between the central bank and households, as the payments are conducted through the banking system, we should think that they contain two sub-transactions: one between the central bank-bankers is settled by reserves, one between bankers-households is settled by ZMDs.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{c|c}
\hline
The Central Bank & \\
Reserves: $+\tau_t$ & Deposits: $+\tau_t$ \\
Net worth: $-\tau_t$ & Net worth: $+\tau_t$ \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Helicopter Money / Lump-sum tax}
\end{table}

2.7 Timing within one period

(i) Production takes place. Households sell goods to wholesalers, who, in turn, sell goods to retailers. All of the payments between households-wholesalers, wholesalers-retailer are delayed until the step (v).

\footnote{This can be seen as a shortcut of an open market operation process when the central bank purchases government bonds from the government. Then the government transfers the payoffs to households. When $\tau_t$ is negative, it is equivalent to a lump-sum tax.}
(ii) The cash-good market opens. Households need cash-in-advance to purchase from c-retailers. Bankers can convert reserves to cash to purchase from c-retailers.

(iii) The loan market between households and bankers opens. All the debt payments and loan issuance will be conducted electronically. The government transfers money to households. Households cannot exchange cash and deposits in this step.

(iv) The deposit-good market opens. Households need ZMD-in-advance to purchase goods from d-retailers. Bankers can create ZMDs to purchase d-goods.

(v) Payments in the non-bank private sector are settled. Profits from firms are transferred back to households under either form of cash or ZMDs. Households can go to banks and readjust their portfolio between cash and deposits.

(vi) The banking market opens. Bankers can adjust the level of reserves by borrowing in the interbank market, receiving new deposits.

3 Agents’ Problems

3.1 Bankers

There is a measure one of identical bankers in the economy. These bankers have to follow the central bank’s regulations. There are three types of assets on a banker’s balance sheet: reserves \(n_t\), loans to households \(b^h_t\), loans to other bankers \(b^f_t\). His liability side contains the zero-maturity deposits that households deposit here \(m_t\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Banker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reserves: (n_t)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero Maturity Deposits: (m_t)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans to households: (b^h_t)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net worth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans to other bankers: (b^f_t)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Cost:** The banker faces a cost of managing loan, which is \(\theta b^h_t\) in terms of deposit-goods. The banker can adjust the level of his deposits and reserves after households and firms pay
each other or when households withdraw currency from bank account. When these happen, the banker can witness that the deposits and reserves outflow from or inflow to his bank. Let $e_t$ be the net inflow of deposits and reserves go into his bank, he will treat $e_t$ as exogenous. When the banking market opens, as the deposit market is perfectly competitive, he can choose any amount $d_t$ of deposit inflows or outflows to his bank.

In each period, the banker treats all the prices as exogenous and chooses $\{c_t, c_{1,t}, c_{2,t}, n_t, b_t^h, s_t, m_t, b_t^f, d_t\}$ to maximize his utility over a stream of consumption:

$$\max_{\beta} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \log(c_t)$$

subject to

$$\frac{R_{t-1}^n n_{t-1}}{\pi_t} + \frac{R_{t-1}^f b_{t-1}^f}{\pi_t} + d_t + e_t + \tau_t = n_t + b_t^f + c_{1,t} \quad \text{(Reserve Flows)} \quad (1)$$

$$m_t = \frac{R_{t-1}^m m_{t-1}}{\pi_t} + d_t s_t + \theta b_t^h - \delta_b b_{t-1}^h \frac{b_{t-1}^h}{\pi_t} + c_{2,t} + d_t + e_t + \tau_t \quad \text{(Deposit Flows)} \quad (2)$$

$$b_t^h = (1 - \delta_b) b_{t-1}^h + s_t \quad \text{(Loan Flows)} \quad (3)$$

$$c_t = \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{2} \alpha_i c_{i,t} \right]^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \quad \text{(Consumption)} \quad (4)$$

$$n_t \geq \phi m_t \quad \text{(Reserves Requirement)} \quad (5)$$

$$n_t + b_t^f + b_t^h - m_t \geq \kappa b_t^h \quad \text{(Capital Requirement)} \quad (6)$$

The equation (1) shows the change in reserves in the banker’s balance sheet. After receiving the IOR, the previous balance of reserves becomes $R_{t-1}^n n_{t-1}/\pi_t$. He also collects the payment from the interbank loans he lends out to other bankers in the previous period $R_{t-1}^f b_{t-1}^f/\pi_t$. He can also increase his reserves by taking more deposits $d_t$. When doing that, his reserves and his liability increase by the same amount $d_t$ (Table 4). That is the reason we see $d_t$ appear on both the equation (1) and (2). The similar effect can be found on $\tau_t$- helicopter money and $e_t$. The banker treats $\tau_t$ and $e_t$ exogenously. Then, he can leave reserves $n_t$ at the central bank’s account to earn interest rate, or lend reserves to another bankers $b_t^f$. To purchase the cash-goods $c_{1,t}$
from c-retailers, he converts reserves into currency (Table 5)$^4$.

The equation (2) shows the change in the banker’s deposits. He makes loans to households by issuing deposits or creating ZMDs (Table 1)$^5$. The banker also issues his own ZMDs to purchase the consumption good from d-retailers ($c_{2,t}$) and to pay for the cost (in terms of deposit-goods) related to lending activities ($\theta b^h_t$) (Table 6). It is noted that he cannot create infinite amount of money for himself to buy consumption goods as there exists the capital requirement. Even without the capital requirement, because deposits are bankers’ debts, the No-Ponzi condition is enough to prevent that from happening.

The banker faces two constraints in every period. At the end of each period, he has to hold enough reserves as a fraction of total deposits, which is showed in the inequation (5).

The second constraint is the capital requirement constraint. The left hand side of (6) is the

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$^4$During one period, his reserves balance can go temporary negative. But in the end of every period, it must be positive and satisfies the regulation. Hence, the constraint in purchasing cash-goods implicitly lies in the reserve requirement

$^5$It is assumed that households have to pay loans from the account at the bank they borrow. So if they want to use money from account at bank B to pay for loans from bank A, they need to transfer deposits from bank B to bank A first. In fact, this assumption does not matter in equilibrium.
banker’s net worth (capital), which is equal to total assets minus total liabilities\textsuperscript{6}. The constraint requires the banker to hold capital greater than a fraction of total loans in his balance sheet. We assume that $\kappa_t$ is a constant $\kappa$ in normal times. We later put the unexpected shock on this $\kappa_t$ to reflect the shock in a banking crisis.

Let $\gamma_t$, $\mu_t^r$ and $\mu_t^c$ be respectively the Lagrangian multipliers attached to the reserves flows, reserves constraint and the capital constraint. Let $r_h^t$ be defined as the real short-term lending rate. The first order conditions of the banker’s problem can be written as:

$$
\gamma_t = \left(\frac{\alpha_t c_t}{c_i,t}\right)^{1/\sigma} \frac{1}{c_i,t}, \quad i = 1, 2
$$

$$
\gamma_t = \frac{\beta R^f_t y_{t+1}^r}{\pi_{t+1}} + \mu_t^c
$$

$$
\gamma_t = \frac{\beta R^m_t y_{t+1}^r}{\pi_{t+1}} + \mu_t^c + \varphi \mu_t^f
$$

$$
\gamma_t = \frac{\beta R^n_t y_{t+1}^r}{\pi_{t+1}} + \mu_t^c + \mu_t^f
$$

$$
(q_t^l + \theta) \gamma_t = \frac{\beta [\delta_b + (1 - \delta_b)q_{t+1}^l]y_{t+1}^r}{\pi_{t+1}} + (1 - \kappa) \mu_t^c
$$

$$
\gamma_t^r = \delta_b + (1 - \delta_b)q_{t+1}^l
$$

And two complimentary slackness conditions:

$$
\mu_t^r \geq 0, \quad n_t - \varphi m_t \geq 0, \quad \mu_t^c (n_t - \varphi m_t) = 0
$$

$$
\mu_t^c \geq 0, \quad n_t + b_t^f + (1 - \kappa) b_t^h - m_t \geq 0, \quad \mu_t^c \left(n_t + b_t^f + (1 - \kappa) b_t^h - m_t\right) = 0
$$

### 3.2 Households

There is a measure one of identical households. These self-employed households produce the homogeneous intermediate good $y_m^m$ to sell to the wholesale firms at the price $P_m$. In each period, a household consumes the cash-goods $(\tilde{c}_1, t)$ from c-retailers and the deposit-goods $(\tilde{c}_2, t)$ from

\textsuperscript{6}We use the book value $B^h_t$ rather than the “market value” of loans $q_t^l B^h_t$ in the capital constraint. The reason is that illiquid bank loans should be treated differently from bonds. In reality, bank loans are often not revalued in the balance sheet when the interest rate changes.
d-retailers.

Let $\tilde{B}^h_t$ be the nominal debt stock that she borrows from bankers. The loan structure follows the description in Table (1). There is an exogenous borrowing constraint for households with the debt limit $\tilde{b}^h_t \leq b^h$.

In each period, households choose $\{\tilde{c}_t, l_t, a_t, x_t, \tilde{b}^h_t, \tilde{m}_t, \tilde{s}_t, \tilde{c}_1,t, \tilde{c}_2,t\}$ to maximize their expected utility:

$$\max \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \tilde{\beta}^t \left( \log(\tilde{c}_t) - \chi l_t \right)$$

subject to

CIA:

$$\tilde{c}_{1,t} \leq \frac{x_{t-1}}{\pi_t}$$

Loan Market:

$$a_t + \delta_b \tilde{b}^h_t = \frac{R^m_{t-1} m_{t-1}}{\pi_t} + q_l s_t + \tau_t$$

DIA:

$$\tilde{c}_{2,t} \leq a_t$$

Budget:

$$\tilde{m}_t + x_t + \tilde{c}_{1,t} + \tilde{c}_{2,t} = a_t + \frac{x_{t-1}}{\pi_t} + p^m_t y^m_t + \frac{\Pi_t}{P_t}$$

Production:

$$y^m_t = l_t$$

Loan flows:

$$\tilde{b}^h_t = (1 - \delta_b) \frac{\tilde{b}^h_{t-1}}{\pi_t} + \tilde{s}_t$$

Constraint:

$$\tilde{b}^h_t \leq \bar{b}^h$$

Consumption:

$$\tilde{c}_t = \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{2} \alpha^{\tilde{c}_i, \sigma} \frac{\tilde{c}_i^{\sigma - 1}}{\sigma} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}}$$

When the cash-good market opens, the household brings $(x_{t-1}/\pi_t)$ in cash to make transactions there. She faces the cash-in-advance (15) constraint when purchasing goods from c-retailers.

The loan market between bankers and households (16) only opens after that. Here the household pays a fraction of her old debts $(\delta_b \tilde{b}^h_{t-1}/\pi_t)$ and borrows new loan $(q_l s_t)$. All of the transactions are conducted electronically. We have assumed that she cannot readjust her portfolio between cash and deposits in this step. In the end, she brings $a_t$ amount of ZMDs to purchase goods from d-retailers.
The equation (18) is the household’s general budget constraint. After receiving the profits \(\Pi_t/P_t\) from wholesalers and revenue \((p^m_t y^m_t)\) from selling the intermediate good, she can go to banks and readjust her portfolio between deposits \((m_t)\) and currency \((x_t)\).

Let \(\eta_{1,t}, \eta_{2,t}, \eta_{b,t}\) be the Lagrangian for the cash-in-advance, the deposit-in-advance and the borrowing constraint. Let \(\lambda_t\) be the Lagrangian for the budget constraint.

\[
\lambda_t + \eta_{i,t} = \left(\frac{\alpha_i \tilde{c}_t}{\tilde{c}_i,t}\right)^{1/\sigma} \frac{1}{\tilde{c}_i,t}, \quad i = 1, 2
\]

(23)

\[
p^m_t \lambda_t = \chi
\]

(24)

\[
\lambda_t = \frac{\tilde{\beta} (\lambda_{t+1} + \eta_{1,t+1})}{\pi_{t+1}}
\]

(25)

\[
\lambda_t = \frac{\tilde{\beta} R^m_t (\lambda_{t+1} + \eta_{2,t+1})}{\pi_{t+1}}
\]

(26)

\[
q^f_t (\lambda_t + \eta_{2,t}) = \frac{\tilde{\beta} [\delta_b + (1 - \delta_b) q^f_{t+1}] (\lambda_{t+1} + \eta_{2,t+1})}{\pi_{t+1}} + \eta_{b,t}
\]

(27)

And three complimentary slackness conditions:

\[
\eta_{1,t} \geq 0, \quad \frac{x_{t-1}}{\pi_t} - \tilde{c}_{1,t} \geq 0, \quad \eta_{1,t} \left(\frac{x_{t-1}}{\pi_t} - \tilde{c}_{1,t}\right) = 0
\]

(28)

\[
\eta_{2,t} \geq 0, \quad a_t - \tilde{c}_{2,t} \geq 0, \quad \eta_{2,t} (a_t - \tilde{c}_{2,t}) = 0
\]

(29)

\[
\eta_{b,t} \geq 0, \quad b^h - b^h_t \geq 0, \quad \eta_{b,t} (b^h - b^h_t) = 0
\]

(30)

### 3.3 Retail Firms and Wholesale Firms

Following Rotemberg pricing, each wholesale firm \(j\) faces a cost of adjusting prices, which is measured in terms of final good and given by:

\[
\frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{P_t(j)}{P_{t-1}(j)} - \bar{\pi} \right)^2 y_t
\]

where \(t\) determines the degree of nominal price rigidity and \(\bar{\pi}\) is the long-run inflation target. The wholesale firm \(j\) discounts the profit in the future with rate \(\tilde{\beta}^j \lambda_{t+1}/\lambda_t\). Her real marginal cost is \(p^m_t\).
In a symmetric equilibrium, all firms will choose the same price and produce the same quantity \( P_t(j) = P_t \) and \( y_t(j) = y_t^m \). The optimal pricing rule then implies that:

\[
1 - \lambda_t \left( \frac{1}{1 - \lambda_t} \right) \pi_t + \lambda_t \left( \frac{1}{1 - \lambda_t} \right) \pi_t \frac{y_t^m}{y_t} = (1 - p_t^m) \epsilon
\]  

(31)

### 3.4 The Central Bank and Government

The consolidated government uses the payoffs from tax or their assets to pay for the IOR, then injects (withdraws) \( \tau_t \) amount of money to (from) households to target the interbank rate. All transactions are conducted in the electronic system.

\[
\tau_t = -\frac{(R_{t-1}^n - 1)n_{t-1}}{\pi_t} + \hat{\tau}_t
\]  

(32)

In the conventional monetary policy, we assume that the IOR \( R_t^n \) is fixed at a constant level \( \bar{R}^n \). The interbank rate follows a common Taylor rule. To connect with the common New Keynesian literature, we assume that the central bank do not want to have excess reserves in the banking system so they never set \( R_t^f \) lower than \( \bar{R}^n + \delta_f \) where \( \delta_f > 0 \). Later, we relax the assumption and examine the situation when the banking system is awash of excess reserves and the central bank controls the interbank rate by adjusting \( R_t^n \).

The conventional monetary policy rule can be described as:

\[
R_t^n = \bar{R}^n
\]  

(33)

\[
R_t^f = \max \left\{ \frac{\pi}{\beta} \left( \frac{\pi_t + 1}{\pi} \right) \phi, \bar{R}^n + \delta_f \right\}
\]  

(34)

### 4 Equilibrium

**Definition:** A perfect foresight equilibrium is a sequence of bankers’ decision choice \( \{c_t, c_{i,t}, n_t, b_t^b, s_t, m_t, b_t^f, d_t\} \), household’s choice \( \{\tilde{c}_t, \tilde{c}_{i,t}, \tilde{b}_t^b, \tilde{s}_t, \tilde{m}_t, x_t, l_t, y_t^m\} \), the firms’ choice \( \{y_t\} \), the

---

\(^7\)When the reserve requirement is no longer binding, there are infinite levels of reserves that can satisfy the interbank rate at its lower bound. In this case, we need a rule governing the motion of reserves and change the standard Taylor Rule.
central bank’ choice \{\tau_t, R^n_t\}, and the market price \{q^L_t, R^L_t, \pi_t, p^m_t\} such that:

i Given the market price, the initial conditions and the central bank’s choices, banker’s choices solve the banker’s problem, household’s choices solve the household’s problem, firm’s choice solves the firm’s problem.

ii All markets clear:

\begin{align*}
\text{Net inflows of deposits:} & \quad d_t + e_t = -(x_t - \frac{x_{t-1}}{\pi_t} - c_{1,t}) \\
The interbank market: & \quad b^f_t = 0 \\
Total ZMDs: & \quad m_t = \tilde{m}_t \\
Loan Market: & \quad b^h_t = \tilde{b}^h_t \\
Good Market: & \quad y_t = \sum_{i=1}^{2} (c_{i,t} + \bar{c}_{i,t}) + \theta b^h_t + \frac{1}{2} \left( \pi_t - \bar{\pi} \right)^2 y_t
\end{align*}

Later, we set some different central bank’s monetary policies subject to a set of equations in this perfect foresight equilibrium. In each case, we might also change the set of the central bank’s monetary policy tools. For convenience, we define (AD) as the set of equations in the perfect foresight equilibrium, excluding the monetary policy and exogenous shocks.

**Definition:** Let (AD) contain the set of equations and conditions in \((C.1)-(C.23)\).

## 5 Theoretical Results

We make the following assumption to ensure that in the steady state, households borrow from bankers.

**Assumption 1.** The discount factors of bankers and households satisfy:

\[
\frac{\beta \delta_b - \theta \pi}{\bar{\pi} - \beta (1 - \delta_b)} > \frac{\tilde{\beta} \delta_b}{\pi - \tilde{\beta} (1 - \delta_b)}
\]

The next assumption ensures that in the steady state, inflation is equal to the central bank’s inflation target.
Assumption 2. The monetary policy tools satisfy:

\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{\hat{\tau}_t}{n_t + x_t} = \frac{\pi - 1}{\pi}
\]

\[
R^n + \delta_f < \frac{\pi}{\beta}
\]

We start with the first result showing the relationship between the interest on reserves, the deposit rate and the interbank rate.

Theorem 1. In equilibrium:

i The lower bound of the interbank rate and the deposit rate is the interest on reserves. In all cases, \( R^n_t \leq R^m_t \leq R^f_t \)

ii When the constraint of reserve requirement is not binding, \( R^f_t = R^m_t = R^n_t \).

The benefits of holding reserves come from two sources. First, bankers earn the interest on reserves. Second, bankers satisfy the reserve requirement, showing in the shadow price of reserve constraint \( \mu_r^f \geq 0 \). When the banking system has a huge amount of excess reserves, second benefit is no longer there \( \mu_r^f = 0 \), and the interbank rate is equal to the interest on reserves.

Theorem 2. In equilibrium, the level of the monetary base, as the sum of reserves and currency in circulation, is decided solely by the central bank:

\[
\frac{n_{t-1} + x_{t-1}}{\pi_t} + \hat{\tau}_t = n_t + x_t
\]

(38)

When households withdraw currency from their bank accounts, it only changes the level of reserves but does not affect the level of monetary base. We assume that the central bank will target the interbank rate, so it implies that the central bank will never leave the banking system with the negative amount of reserves.

Theorem 3. Under the Assumption (1)-(2) and if \( \kappa \) satisfies:

\[
\kappa < 1 - \frac{(1 - \varphi) \bar{m}}{b^h}
\]
where $\bar{m}$ is the steady state value of $m$, then there exists a unique steady state. Moreover, in this steady state, the reserve requirement is binding while the capital constraint is not binding.

This unique steady state reflects well the banking system in the US before the Great Recession. There were no excess reserves and the federal funds rate was around 4 percent. The central bank’s main tool was open market operations at that time, rather than the IOR. After the Great Recession, due to many rounds of quantitative easing (unconventional monetary policy), the excess reserves skyrocketed. However, in the long term, the central bank has a plan to scale down its balance sheet’s size to the level before the Great Recession, so this unique steady state might reflect well the long-term position of the central bank.

6 Numerical Experiments

6.1 Calibration

The time period is one quarter. Data are calibrated to match the US economy before the Great Recession. The bankers’ discount factor is set to the standard value 0.99. The reserves requirement is calibrated to reflect the ratio between the total level of reserves and the total ZMDs. In Dec 2007, before the financial crisis, the total level of reserves was around 9 billion dollars. The total MZM (Money Zero Maturity) was approximately 8130 billion, 75-80 percent of which are checkable deposits, saving deposits and money market deposit accounts. The level of ZMDs was therefore 6000 billion, and the ratio between reserves and ZMD is 0.0015, which we round up to 0.002. The monitoring cost and the loan amortization factor are set exogenously. The risk weight is calibrated so that it satisfies the condition in the Theorem 3 to ensure the unique steady state. For $\kappa \geq 0.2$, the capital constraint is binding in the steady state. Therefore, we set $\kappa$ at 0.18.

The consumption basket is calibrated to match the ratio between currency and ZMDs in the economy. In Dec 2007, the total level of currency was 760 billion. Judson (2012) estimates that more than half of US dollar bills are held overseas, so we end up with around 330 billion in currency. At the same time, ZMDs was 6000 billion, so currency accounts for approximately 6
percent of the total money supply (MZM). We calibrate $\alpha_1 = 0.06$ and $\alpha_2 = 0.94$ to match with this fact. The elasticity of substitution between cash goods and deposit goods is set exogenously 10.

For the central bank’s parameters, the only unusual parameter is the interest on reserves. We set it at 25 basis points and consider it as the lower bound for IOR at most cases in our quantitative exercises. All other parameters are in the standard range in the New Keynesian literature.
### 6.2 Shock on the interbank rate

The first numerical experiment is to examine the response of the economy when the central bank cuts the interbank rate. The list of equations for monetary policy and exogenous shock is:

\[
R_t^f = \max \left\{ \frac{\pi}{\beta} \left( \frac{\pi_t + 1}{\pi} \right)^{\phi_{\pi}} \exp(u_t^f), \ R^m + \delta_f \right\}
\]

\[
R_t^n = \overline{R^n}
\]

\[
u_t^f = \rho_f \nu_{t-1}^f, \quad \nu_0^f \text{ is given}
\]

From the steady state, there is an unexpected shock on the interbank rate \(u_0^f\), then agents know the shock will die slowly with the persistence \(\rho_f\). These two parameters’ values are in Table 8. We can summarize this problem as (P1) containing the set of conditions in (AD) and (M1). Figure 1 shows the response of the economy under this experiment.

When the central bank cuts the interbank rate by increasing the level of reserves, \(q^l\) increases and the real lending rate \(r^h\) is lower for households. As bankers lend out by creating money under the form of ZMDs, the money supply increases. It is noting that both currency and ZMD go up after this shock. The aggregate demand is stimulated and inflation goes up.

Basically, this is identical to the reaction in the standard New Keynesian model. The only key difference here is the role of commercial banks in creating money. Money supply is totally endogenous and depends on the interaction between the central bank, banks and the public. Another crucial point is that the effect of monetary policy, in this conventional setting, depends on the transmission from the interbank rate to the lending rate in the loan contract between bankers and households.

### 6.3 Financial Crisis - Taylor Rule

We examine a simple form of banking crisis by imposing an exogenous shock on \(\kappa_t\), reflecting the increase in the bad loans that causes the capital constraint to bind. The central bank is
(a) Interbank rate and real lending rate

(b) Currency and Deposits

(c) Aggregate Consumption

(d) Loan price and New loan issuances

(e) Inflation

(f) Output

Figure 1: Impulse Response to Interest Rate Shock (P1)
assumed to respond to this crisis using a Taylor Rule.

\[ R_f^t = \max \left\{ \frac{\pi}{\bar{\beta}} \left( \frac{\pi_{t+1}}{\pi} \right)^{\phi_\pi}, \ \bar{R} + \delta_f \right\} \]

\[ R_n^t = \bar{R} \]

\[ \kappa_t = \rho_\kappa \kappa_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_\kappa) \bar{\kappa}, \ \kappa_0 \text{ is given} \]

From the steady state, there is an unexpected shock \( \kappa_0 \). After that, the shock dies with the persistence \( \rho_\kappa \). These two parameters’ values are reported in the Table 8. We can summarize this problem as (P2) containing the set of conditions in (AD) and (M2).

As the lower bound on the interbank rate is the IOR, the Taylor rule is constrained by the IOR. To see whether the negative IOR helps the central bank, we conduct another similar experiment but allow the interest on reserves is negative during \( T_e \) periods.

\[ R_f^t = \max \left\{ \frac{\pi}{\bar{\beta}} \left( \frac{\pi_{t+1}}{\pi} \right)^{\phi_\pi}, \ R^n + \delta_f \right\} \]

\[ R_n^t = \begin{cases} R^n, & \text{if } t \leq T_e \\ \bar{R}, & \text{if } t > T_e \end{cases} \]

\[ \kappa_t = \rho_\kappa \kappa_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_\kappa) \bar{\kappa}, \ \kappa_0 \text{ is given} \]

According to Bernanke (2016a), the Fed estimates that the interest rate paid on bank reserves in the U.S. could not practically be brought lower than about -0.35 percent to avoid the bank withdrawal. Hence, we set \( R^n = 1 - 0.35/400 \) and \( T_e = 50 \). We can set the problem (P3) contains the equations in (AD) and (M3). Figure 2 shows the response of the economy under these two experiments. Here are some important remarks:

i. A Taylor rule with a negative IOR is more efficient than the one with zero lower bound. Rognlie (2015) gets the same result from a standard New Keynesian framework. However, the positive effect is very small at dealing with this type of financial crisis.

ii. The banking crisis is dangerous as the the central bank cannot rely on the pass-through from the interbank rate to the prime rate any more. In our simulation, the interbank rate is at its
(a) Interbank rate and IOR

(b) Real lending rate- LR

(c) Deposits and Currency

(d) Money Supply and Household Debt

(e) Inflation

(f) Output

Figure 2: Financial Crisis - Taylor Rule (M2) and (M3)
lower bound for 12 quarters with the IOR at 25 basis points and 4 quarters with the IOR at -35 basis points; however, the real lending rate still goes up. When the capital constraint is binding \( \mu^c_t > 0 \), the wedge between the interbank rate and the prime rate must reflect this shadow price.

iii. The banking crisis is often accompanied by the deflation episode and the insufficient demand. Bankers cut loan; therefore, the total money supply plummets even though the monetary base increases. In our model, the level of currency goes up a little bit during the crisis. The deposit rate is near zero or even negative in our two experiments, making currency more favorable in households’ eyes. However, this change does not affect much the total money supply because currency only accounts 6 percent of the total money supply in the steady state.

iv. Lacking liquidity, households cut their own consumption and output declines. A Taylor rule, even with a negative IOR, is not enough to stimulate the aggregate demand in this case. When the link between the interbank rate and the prime rate breaks, the conventional monetary policy is generally not effective.

### 6.4 Forward Guidance

The recent literature in monetary economics focuses on the forward guidance policy when interest policy is restricted by the zero lower bound. In this section, we do a simple experiment to see whether the forward guidance policy is useful in the banking crisis. There are two common ways to model how the central bank informs the public about the interest rate path in the future: (i) interest rate peg and (ii) news shock on the Taylor rule. We follow the latter in *Keen, Richter*
and Throckmorton (2017b) to characterize the forward guidance as follows:

\[
R_t^f = \max \left\{ \frac{\pi}{\beta} \left( \frac{\pi_{t+1}}{\pi} \right)^{\delta_{t+1}} \exp(\varepsilon_t), \ R^n + \delta_f \right\}
\]

\[
\varepsilon_t = \begin{cases} \bar{\varepsilon}, & \text{if } t \leq T_{FG} \\ 0, & \text{if } t > T_{FG} \end{cases}
\]

\[
R_t^n = R^n
\]

\[
\kappa_t = \rho \kappa_{t-1} + (1 - \rho) \bar{\kappa}, \quad \kappa_0 \text{ is given}
\]

The central bank still follows the common Taylor rule. However, during the forward guidance period \(0 \leq t \leq T_{FG}\), the central bank commits to lower the intercept of the Taylor rule by \(\exp(\bar{\varepsilon})\). We set \(\bar{\varepsilon} = -1/400\). In the previous experiment, when following the Taylor rule, the interbank rate is bounded by the IOR during the first 12 periods. Hence, we set the horizon for forward guidance as 4 years \((T_{FG} = 16)\) to evaluate its efficacy in pushing up inflation.

The key channel that forward guidance affects the real economy is through increasing the expected inflation. Hence, it lowers the real short-term interbank rate, which in turn passes through to the real lending rate. In comparison to a common Taylor rule, forward guidance is much more effective at pushing up the expected inflation. Like all monetary models with the forward looking feature, path of inflation affects the current activities.

The effectiveness of forward guidance policy depends mostly on how far households look forward in the future. In our model, if the horizon of forward guidance is around 5 years, this policy cannot push up inflation. As banks cut loans due to the capital constraint, inflation should be also consistent with the decline in the money supply path.

6.5 Financial Crisis - Mixed Rule

The previous section shows that a monetary policy targeting only the interbank rate is not efficient to deal with the banking crisis. What can the central bank do to improve the situation? If the problem is a lack of liquidity in the private sector when banks cut loans, a natural guess should be a policy of targeting the money supply directly. In this section, we examine a mod-
Figure 3: Financial Crisis - Forward Guidance
ification of a Taylor rule. In normal times, the central bank still targets the interbank rate by a Taylor rule. However, in crises, when the interbank rate is pushed down to the level of IOR and the deflation is still severe, the central bank will switch to target the growth of money supply \( m_t^s = m_t + x_t \). All the exogenous shocks and monetary policy can be described by the following system of equations:

\[
R_f^t = \frac{\bar{\pi}}{\beta} \left( \frac{\pi_t + 1}{\bar{\pi}} \right) \phi_\pi \left( \frac{m_t^s}{m_{t-1}^s} \right) \phi_m
\]

\[
R_n^t = \bar{m}
\]

\[
\kappa_t = \rho_\kappa \kappa_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_\kappa) \bar{\kappa}, \quad \kappa_0 \text{ is given}
\]

where \( \phi_m = 0.2 \) measures the reaction of the interbank rate to the growth of the money supply. The problem \((P5)\) is defined to contain the equations in \((AD)\) and \((M5)\).

We set \( \phi_m \) small relative to \( \phi_\pi \) for two reasons. First, it means that in normal times, the interbank rate is not influenced much by the growth rate of the money supply. Second, it implies that, in crises, when the interbank rate is not enough for raising inflation, the central bank will respond aggressively by raising the money supply through helicopter money. Why? We can rewrite the modified Taylor rule as:

\[
\frac{m_t^s}{m_{t-1}^s} = \left( \frac{R_f^t}{\bar{\pi}} \right)^{1/\phi_m} \frac{\bar{\pi}}{(\pi_t + 1)} \frac{\phi_\pi}{\phi_m}
\]

When the interbank rate is at its lower bound \( R_f^t = R_n^t = \bar{m} \), it means that \( \phi_\pi/\phi_m \) shows how aggressively the central bank will raise the money supply to deal with inflation. Figure 4 shows the economy’s response under this modified Taylor rule. Here are some important remarks:

i. In this banking crisis, when targeting the interbank rate is not efficient anymore, switching to target the growth rate of the money supply is very effective. Both inflation and output paths in this experiment are smoother and less volatile than a Taylor rule with a negative IOR. A modified Taylor rule can anchor inflationary expectations better; thereby restricting the increase in the real lending rate. This result is similar to Christiano and Rostagno (2001). Their research also shows that when inflation is out of a bounded region, switching from a Taylor rule to target the growth rate of the money supply can reduce the volatility of the
Figure 4: Financial Crisis - Mixed Rule
ii. The interest rate path alone does not reflect the stance of the monetary policy in a banking crisis. If we only look at the paths of the interbank rate, a Taylor rule with a negative IOR keeps the interbank rate not only longer at the lower bound but also lower in every period in comparison to a mixed rule in this section (Figure 4a). If we follow the common New Keynesian logic, inflation should have been higher in the previous experiment. However, this is not the case here. When we model explicitly the microfoundation in the banking sector, the link between the money supply and the interest rate is not as tight as the one in the New Keynesian literature. Money supply is not determined solely by the central bank. Moreover, the central bank do not control the interest rate by directly changing the money supply here.

iii. inflationary expectation is anchored by both the money supply and the interest rate. Seemly, money supply is a more credible signal for the inflation path in banking crises.

6.6 Taylor Rule and Friedman’s k-percent Rule

The new tool IOR allows the central bank to target both the interest rate and money supply at the same time. In this section, the central bank is assumed to follow the Friedman’s k-percent rule during our crisis. The Friedman’s k-percent rule indicates that the growth of the money supply is fixed at a constant level:

\[ \frac{M_t}{M_{t-1}} = \pi \]
At the same time, IOR is adjusted following a Taylor rule. The set of monetary policies and the exogenous shock can be written as:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{m_t}{m_{t-1}} &= \frac{\pi}{\pi_t}, \quad \text{if } t \leq T_e \\
R_f^t &= \max \left[ \frac{\pi}{\beta} \left( \frac{\pi_{t+1}}{\pi} \right)^{\phi_\pi}, \ R^{\text{m}}, \ \delta_f \right], \quad \text{if } t > T_e \\
R_i^n &= \begin{cases} 
(1 - \alpha_n)R^{\text{m}} + \alpha_n \frac{\pi}{\beta} \left( \frac{\pi_{t+1}}{\pi} \right)^{\phi_\pi}, & \text{if } t \leq T_e \\
\frac{R^{\text{m}}}{R^{\text{m}}}, & \text{if } t > T_e
\end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]

(M6)

where \( \alpha_n = 0.8 \) and \( T_e = 50 \). Together with the equations in (AD), (M6) sets up the problem (P6). This experiment can be summarized as followings. Before time \( T_e \), the central bank targets both the IOR and the money supply by, respectively, a Taylor rule and the Friedman’s k-percent rule. After time \( T_e \), the central bank comes back to its Taylor rule and only targets the interbank rate. Figure 5 compares the effect of monetary polices in (P6) with the previous experiment. Here are some important remarks:

i. Targeting both the money supply and the interest rate is extremely efficient. The inflation rate is nearly anchored at the target level for the whole time. As our model does not have any real rigidities, it implies the output is also at the steady state level.

ii. The obvious byproduct of targeting the growth of money supply directly is clearly the sharp increase of reserves and excess reserves. Reserves increase by 25 times in our model and the reserves requirement is no longer binding for 25 periods. Many economists worry that a huge amount of excess reserves might prevent the effectiveness of the monetary policy or create hyperinflation. Our model shows these concerns have no foundations. By using the IOR, the central bank can control the interbank rate. The effect is very similar to the one when the central bank adjusts by using open market operations. There are also no reasons to believe the huge amount of reserves will create a huge amount of money supply. When the reserves requirement is no longer binding, we cannot use the logic in the money
Figure 5: Financial Crisis - a Taylor Rule and the Friedman’s k-percent Rule
multiplier model to create the link between the monetary base and money supply anymore. Until there is still a borrowing constraint and capital requirement, the endogenous money supply is always bounded. Furthermore, the inflation, in the long run, is always determined by the central bank.

iii. Once again, we emphasize that the stance of monetary policy can only be judged when we observe both the nominal interbank rate, the money supply and the real short-term rate. The money supply and the interest rate can move in any directions. It can be the case that the central bank increases the money supply and the IOR at the same time. It might be a serious mistake to infer that it would cause a deflation.

iv. The above point raises an important issue about the central bank’s communication. In reality, the stance of the monetary policy, when sending to the public, is often summarized by only one indicator: the interbank rate. Indeed, this is a common and good practice as the interbank rate is a unique short-term target that the central bank controls completely. In normal times, it is a good predicator of inflation path. However, the current situation is very tricky. The interbank rate in most developed countries has been near zero for a long time and the inflation is persistently lower than its target. The growth rate of the money supply should be included as part of the central bank’s communication with the public.

7 Conclusion

With a huge amount of excess reserves in the banking systems, IOR is now the most crucial tool for the Fed. This tool opens a new opportunity for the conduct of monetary policy as the central bank can target both the interest rate and the growth rate of the money supply at the same time. Of course, in normal times, adjusting the interbank rate alone is always timely and much more transparent than targeting the money supply, which is not entirely controlled by the central bank. However, in banking crises, our research shows that the link between the interbank rate and the lending rate is very weak. If the central bank simultaneously targets both the interbank rate and the money supply, they can hit the inflation target.
References


## A Parameter values in experiments

**Table 8**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Param.</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$u_0^f$</td>
<td>Initial interest shock</td>
<td>-2/400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_f$</td>
<td>The persistence of the interest shock</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Experiment (M1)**

| $\kappa_0$ | Initial shock on the risk weight | 0.224 |
| $\rho_\kappa$ | The persistence of shock | 0.95 |

**Experiment (M2)**

| $R^n_\text{t}$ | The negative lower bound for IOR | 1-0.35/400 |
| $T_e$ | Number of periods $R^n_\text{t} = R^n$ | 50 |

**Experiment (M3)**

| $\bar{\varepsilon}$ | The forward guidance signal | -1/400 |
| $T_{FG}$ | Number of periods in forward guidance | 16 |

**Experiment (M4)**

| $\phi_m$ | Coefficient in mixed rule | 0.2 |

**Experiment (M5)**

| $\alpha_n$ | Coefficient in Taylor Rule | 0.8 |
| $T_e$ | Number of periods targeting both MS and IR | 50 |
B Mathematical Appendix

Proof for Theorem 1:
We rewrite the equation (8), (9) and (10):

\[
\gamma_t = \frac{\beta R^f_t \gamma_{t+1}}{\pi_{t+1}} + \mu^c_t \quad \text{(B.1)}
\]

\[
\gamma_t = \frac{\beta R^m_t \gamma_{t+1}}{\pi_{t+1}} + \mu^c_t + \varphi \mu^r_t \quad \text{(B.2)}
\]

\[
\gamma_t = \frac{\beta R^n_t \gamma_{t+1}}{\pi_{t+1}} + \mu^c_t + \mu^r_t \quad \text{(B.3)}
\]

As \( \mu^c_t \) and \( \mu^r_t \) are non-negative and \( \gamma_t > 0 \), we have \( R^n_t \leq R^m_t \leq R^f_t \).

The "next" happens when \( \mu^r_t = 0 \), or when the reserver requirement is no longer binding.

Proof for Theorem 2:
Substitute (32), (36) and (35) into the reserve flows equation (1), we have:

\[
\frac{n_{t-1} + x_{t-1}}{\pi_t} + \hat{\gamma}_t = n_t + \gamma_t
\]

Proof for Theorem 3:
We omit the subscript "t" to denote the steady state value of a variable. Under the Assumption (2) and the result of the Theorem (2) \( \Rightarrow \pi = \pi^* \). Under the Assumption (2) and the Taylor rule (34) \( \Rightarrow R^f = \pi^*/\beta \). Replace this value of \( R^f \) into (8) \( \Rightarrow \mu^c = 0 \) (the capital requirement is not binding). From (10) and (9) \( \Rightarrow R^m; \) from (11) \( \Rightarrow \).

\[
\frac{\mu^r}{\gamma} = 1 - \frac{\beta R^n}{\pi}
\]

\[
R^m = \left( 1 - \varphi \frac{\mu^r}{\gamma} \right) \frac{\pi}{\beta}
\]

\[
q^f = \frac{\beta \delta_b - \theta \pi}{\pi - \beta (1 - \delta_b)}
\]

\[
\hat{\tau} = \frac{\pi - 1}{\pi}
\]
Under the steady state, (31) ⇒ \( p^m = (\varepsilon - 1)/\varepsilon \). Next we move on the household’s equation and can find the steady state of:

\[
(24) \Rightarrow \quad \lambda = \frac{\chi}{p^m} \\
(25) \Rightarrow \quad \eta_1 = \left( \lambda - \frac{\beta \lambda}{\pi} \right) \frac{\pi}{\beta} \\
(26) \Rightarrow \quad \eta_2 = \left( \lambda - \frac{\beta R^m \lambda}{\pi} \right) \frac{\pi}{\beta R^m} \\
(27) \Rightarrow \quad \eta^b = q^l(\lambda + \eta_2) - \frac{\bar{\beta}[\delta_b + (1 - \delta_b)q^l](\lambda + \eta_2)}{\pi} > 0 \\
(21) \Rightarrow \quad b^h = \bar{b}^h \\
(3) \Rightarrow \quad s = \left( 1 - \frac{1 - \delta_b}{\pi} \right) b^h
\]

From (23), we can perform \( \tilde{c}_i \) as a function of \( \tilde{c} \):

\[
\tilde{c}_i = \frac{\alpha_i(\bar{c})^{1-\sigma}}{(\lambda + \eta_i)^\sigma} \quad \text{(B.4)}
\]

Substituting (B.4) into the aggregate consumptions (22), we can find the steady state value of \( \tilde{c} \), then \( \tilde{c}_1 \) and \( \tilde{c}_2 \):

\[
\tilde{c} = \left( \sum_{i=1}^{2} \frac{\alpha_i}{(\lambda + \eta_i)^{\sigma-1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}
\]

All the constraints (15), (17) are binding:

\[
x = \pi \tilde{c}_1 \\
a = \tilde{c}_2
\]

From (5), (32) and (16), we can find \( m \) and \( n \) from the following equations:

\[
\frac{[R^m - (R^a - 1)\varphi]m}{\pi} = a + \frac{\delta_b b^h}{\pi} - \hat{t} - q^l s \\
n = \varphi m
\]

39
Replacing that into the deposit flows:

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{2} c_i = m - \left( \frac{R^m m}{\pi} + q' s + \theta b^h - \frac{\delta b^h}{\pi} - x + \frac{x}{\pi} - \frac{(R^m - 1)n}{\pi} + \tau \right) \tag{B.5}
\]

From (7), (4) and use (B.5):

\[
c_i = \frac{\alpha c^{1-\sigma}}{\gamma^\sigma}
\]

\[
\frac{c^{1-\sigma}}{\gamma^\sigma} (\alpha_1 + \alpha_2) = c_1 + c_2
\]

\[
c_i = \frac{\alpha_i (c_1 + c_2)}{\alpha_1 + \alpha_2}
\]

\[
c = \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{2} \alpha_i^{1/\sigma} \right]^{\sigma/\tau}
\]

We know that this steady state only exists if \( \kappa \) satisfy the condition such that capital constraint is not binding, so we need the condition:

\[
\kappa < 1 - \frac{(1 - \varphi)m}{b^h}
\]

### C System of Equations in Equilibrium

Bankers:

\[
\gamma_i = \left( \frac{\alpha_i c_i}{c_{i,t}} \right)^{1/\sigma} \frac{1}{c_t}, \quad i = 1, 2 \tag{C.1}
\]

\[
\gamma_i = \frac{\beta R_i^f \gamma_{i+1}}{\pi_{t+1}} + \mu_i^c \tag{C.2}
\]

\[
\gamma_i = \frac{\beta R_i^m \gamma_{i+1}}{\pi_{t+1}} + \mu_i^c + \varphi \mu_i^r \tag{C.3}
\]

\[
\gamma_i = \frac{\beta R_i^f \gamma_{i+1}}{\pi_{t+1}} + \mu_i^c + \mu_i^r \tag{C.4}
\]

\[
(q_i^l + \theta) \gamma_i = \frac{\beta [\delta_b + (1 - \delta_b)q_{t+1}^l]}{\pi_{t+1}} \gamma_{t+1} + (1 - \kappa) \mu_i^c \tag{C.5}
\]

\[
\frac{n_t-1}{\pi_t} + \frac{x_t-1}{\pi_t} + \delta_t = n_t + x_t \tag{C.6}
\]
\[
m_t = \frac{R_{m,t-1}m_{t-1}}{\pi_t} + q^l_s + \theta b^h_t - \delta_b b_{t-1}^h + c_{2,t} + c_{1,t} - x_t + \frac{x_{t-1}}{\pi_t} - \frac{(R_{t-1}^n - 1)n_{t-1}}{\pi_t} + \tilde{\tau}_t \quad (C.7)
\]

0 \leq \mu^r \perp (n_t - \varphi m_t) \geq 0 \quad (C.8)

0 \leq \mu^c \perp (n_t + (1 - \kappa_t)b^h_t - m_t) \geq 0 \quad (C.9)

b^h_t = (1 - \delta_b) \frac{b_{t-1}^h}{\pi} + s_t \quad (C.10)

Households:

\[
\lambda_t + \eta_{i,t} = \left(\frac{\alpha_i}{\bar{c}_{i,t}}\right)^{1/\sigma} \frac{1}{\bar{c}_i}, \quad i = 1, 2 \quad (C.11)
\]

\[
p_t^m \lambda_t = \chi \quad (C.12)
\]

\[
\lambda_t = \frac{\tilde{\beta}(\lambda_{t+1} + \eta_{1,t+1})}{\pi_{t+1}} \quad (C.13)
\]

\[
\lambda_t = \frac{\tilde{\beta}R_{m}^n(\lambda_{t+1} + \eta_{2,t+1})}{\pi_{t+1}} \quad (C.14)
\]

\[
q^l_t(\lambda_t + \eta_{2,t}) = \frac{\tilde{\beta}[(\delta_b + (1 - \delta_b)q^l_{t+1})(\lambda_{t+1} + \eta_{2,t+1})]}{\pi_{t+1}} + \eta^b_t \quad (C.15)
\]

0 \leq \eta_{1,t} \perp \left(\frac{x_{t-1}}{\pi_t} - \tilde{c}_{1,t}\right) \geq 0 \quad (C.16)

0 \leq \eta_{2,t} \perp \left(\frac{R_{t-1}^n m_{t-1}}{\pi_t} + q^l_t s_t + \tilde{\tau}_t - \frac{(R_{t-1}^n - 1)n_{t-1}}{\pi_t} - \delta_b b_{t-1}^h - \tilde{c}_{2,t}\right) \geq 0 \quad (C.17)

0 \leq \eta^b_t \perp (\bar{b}^h - b^h_t) \geq 0 \quad (C.18)

Firms:

\[
1 - t (\pi_t - \bar{\pi}) \pi_t + \tilde{\beta} \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \frac{(\pi_{t+1} - \bar{\pi}) \pi_{t+1}}{y_{t+1}} = 1 - p_t^m \epsilon \quad (C.19)
\]

\[y_t = l_t \quad (C.20)\]

Market Clearing:

\[
y_t = \frac{2}{t} \sum_{i=1}^2 (c_{i,t} + \tilde{c}_{i,t}) + \theta b^h_t + \frac{1}{2} (\pi_t - \bar{\pi})^2 y_t \quad (C.21)
\]

\[
c_t = \left[\frac{2}{t} \sum_{i=1}^2 \alpha_i^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} c_{i,t}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right]^{-\sigma/(\sigma-1)} \quad (C.22)
\]
\[
\ddot{c}_t = \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{2} \alpha_{i} \ddot{c}_{i,t} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}}
\]  
\hspace{1cm} (C.23)

Central bank:

\[
R^f_t = \max \left\{ R^f \left( \frac{\pi_{t+1}}{\pi} \right)^{\phi \pi}, \ R^n + \delta_f \right\}
\]  
\hspace{1cm} (C.24)

\[
R^n_t = R^n
\]  
\hspace{1cm} (C.25)

D  Numerical Method

D.1 Inequality Constraints

There are 6 occasionally binding inequality constraints in our model: the reserve requirement, the capital requirement, the deposit-in-advance, the cash-in-advance, the household’s borrowing constraint and the Taylor rule of the central bank. We deal with these occasionally binding constraints by three methods:

Method 1: We apply the method in Zangwill and Garcia (1981) and Schmedders, Judd and Kubler (2002) to transform the complementary conditions into the equality constraints. For example, if we have the following complementary condition:

\[
\mu_t f(x_t) = 0, \quad \mu_t \geq 0, \quad f(x_t) \geq 0
\]

We create a new variable \( \mu_t \) and transforms the above conditions into two following equations:

\[
\mu_t = \max \{ \mu_t, 0 \}^3
\]
\[
f(x_t) = \max \{ -\mu_t, 0 \}^3
\]

We apply this method for the reserves requirement, deposit-in-advance and cash-in-advance constraints.

Method 2: For the capital requirement and the household’s borrowing constraint, we apply the penalty method in McGrattan (1996) to avoid the ill-conditioned of the system and deal with occasionally binding constraints. So the utility of banker and the capital constraint will be
changed as:

\[ U = \log c_t - \frac{\rho_e}{4} \max\{\mu^c, 0\}^4 \]

\[ n_t + b^f_t + (1 - \kappa_t)b^h_t - m_t = -\mu^c \]

where \( \rho_e = 1e6 \) is the penalty coefficient. When the capital constraint is violated, banker will lose the utility. However, when they get positive net worth, they do not get reward for that. The household’s utility also is changed to deal with the borrowing constraint.

**Method 3:** For the Taylor rule of the central bank, we use the soft max constraint to deal with the lower bound on \( R^f_{min} = R^f + \delta_f \) so we can still take derivative to solve the system of equations:

\[
\begin{align*}
U_t &= \frac{\phi_t}{R^f + \delta_f} \\
R^f_t &= \begin{cases} 
    u_t + \frac{\log(1+\exp(s_{max}(R^f_{min}-u_t)))}{s_{max}} & \text{if } u_t \geq R^f_{min} \\
    R^f_{min} + \frac{\log(1+\exp(s_{max}(u_t-R^f_{min})))}{s_{max}} & \text{if } u_t < R^f_{min}
\end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]

When \( s_{max} \rightarrow \infty \), the soft max constraint converges to the hard max constraint. We choose the coefficient \( s_{max} = 1e4 \).

**D.2 Dynamics of Economy**

We solve the perfect foresight equilibrium with the unexpected shock by assuming that after \( T = 300 \) quarters, the economy will converge back to the initial steady state. The initial position before the unexpected shocks is the steady state. Basically, we need to solve a large system of equations to determine the dynamic path of the economy. The transform of occasionally inequality constraints in the previous section ensures that every equation is continuous and differentiable.

For every application, we use homotopy method for solving this large system of equation, with the initial point starting from the steady state or the previous result. We use Ipopt written by Wachter and Biegler (2006) with the linear solver HSL\(^8\) to conduct homotopy.

In all cases, we can solve successfully the perfect foresight path with the accuracy at least

\(^8\)HSL. A collection of Fortran codes for large scale scientific computation. http://www.hsl.rl.ac.uk/
$1e^{-9}$. In some results, only at the last period $T - 1$, we observe that there is a big switch from deposits to currency while the total money supply does not change much. When we increase the length of periods from $T = 300$ to $T = 1000$ the path does not change. We omit the result in the last period to ensure the smoothness of the result.