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SUNY
at Albany Discussion Papers |
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__________________________________________________________________________________ |
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You
can search SUNY at Albany Economics Discussion Papers by author, title,
keyword, JEL category, and abstract contents via IDEAS
or EconPapers |
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| 2006 | 2005 | 2004 | 2003 | 2002 | 2001
| 2000 | 1999 | 1998
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[06-01] Fang(Annie) Yang. "Consumption Over Life Cycle: How Different is Housing? " |
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Abstract: Micro data over the life cycle shows different patterns of consumption for housing and non-housing goods: the consumption profile of non-housing goods is hump-shaped while the consumption profile for housing first increases monotonically and then flattens out. These patterns hold true at each consumption quartile. This paper develops aquantitative, dynamic general equilibrium model of life-cycle behavior, which generates consumption profiles consistent with the observed data. Borrowing constraints are essential in explaining the accumulation of housing assets early in life, while transaction costs are crucial in generating the slow downsizing of the housing assets later in life. |
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[06-02] George Monokroussos. "Dynamic Limited Dependent Variable Modeling and U.S. Monetary Policy" |
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Abstract: I estimate, using real-time data, a forward-looking, dynamic, discrete-choice monetary policy reaction function for the US economy, that accounts for the fact that there are substantial restrictions in the period-to-period changes of the Fed’s policy instrument (an issue which is however largely ignored in the existing literature). I overcome ensuing computational complications by estimating the model using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods. I find a substantial contrast between the periods before and after Paul Volcker’s appointment as Fed Chairman in 1979, both in terms of the Fed’s response to expected in‡ation and in terms of its response to the (perceived) output gap: In the pre-Volcker era the Fed’s response to in‡ation was substantially weaker than in the Volcker-Greenspan era; conversely, the Fed seems to have been more responsive to (inaccurate real-time estimates of) the output gap in the pre-Volcker era than later. These results, which carry through a series of extensions and robustness checks, provide support for the "policy mistakes" hypothesis (according to which the pre-Volcker Fed made mistakes in its conduct of monetary policy, and starting with Volcker’s appointment the Fed avoided to a substantial extent mistaken practices of the past) as an explanation of the stark contrast in US macroeconomic performance between the pre-Volcker and the Volcker/Greenspan periods. |
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[06-03] Kajal Lahiri (with Zulkarnain Pulungan). "Health Inequality and Its Determinants in New York" |
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Abstract: Self-assessed health status conditioned by several objective measures of health and socio-demographic characteristics are used to measure health inequality. We compare the quality of health and health inequality among different racial/ethnic groups as well as across 10 economic development regions in New York State. In terms of average health and health inequality, American Indian/Alaskan Natives and Hispanics are found to be the worst, and North Country and Southern Tier regions lag behind the rest of the State. Three major contributing factors to health inequality are found to be employment status, education, and income. However, the contribution of each of these determinants varies significantly among racial/ethnic groups as well as across regions, suggesting targeted public health initiatives for vulnerable populations to eliminate overall health disparity. |
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[06-04] Kajal Lahiri (with Gultekin Isiklar). "How Far Ahead Can We Forecast? Evidence From Cross-country Surveys" |
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Abstract: Using monthly GDP forecasts from Consensus Economics Inc. for 18 developed countries reported over 24 different forecast horizons during 1989-2004, we find that the survey forecasts do not have much value when the horizon goes beyond 18 months. Using two alternative approaches to measure the flow of new information in fixed-target survey forecasts, we found that the biggest improvement in forecasting performance comes when the forecast horizon is around 14 months. The dynamics of information accumulation over forecast horizons can provide both the forecasters and their clients with an important clue in their selection of the timing and frequency in the use of forecasting services. The limits to forecasting that these private market forecasters exhibit are indicative of the current state of macroeconomic foresight. |
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[06-05] Kajal Lahiri (with Fushang Liu). "Modeling Multi-Period Inflation Uncertainty Using a Panel of Density Forcasts" |
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Abstract: This paper examines the determinants of inflation forecast uncertainty using a panel of density forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). Based on a dynamic heterogeneous panel data model, we find that the persistence in forecast uncertainty is much less than what the aggregate time series data would suggest. In addition, the strong link between past forecast errors and current forecast uncertainty, as often is noted in the ARCH literature, is largely lost in a multiperiod context with varying forecast horizons. We propose a novel way of estimating “news” and its variance using the Kullback-Leibler Information, and show that the latter is an important determinant of forecast uncertainty. Our evidence suggests a strong relationship of forecast uncertainty with level of inflation, but not with forecaster discord or with the volatility of a number of other macroeconomic indicators. |
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[06-06] Laurence Kranich (with Matteo Cervellati and Joan Esteban). "The Social Contract with Endogenous Sentiments" |
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Abstract: In this paper we present a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual self-esteem and relative esteem for others are endogenously determined. Individuals differ in their productivities, and their behaviour and political views are influenced by moral standards concerning work. Agents determine what they take to be proper behaviour and they judge others, and themselves, accordingly, increasing their esteem (or self-esteem) for those who perform in excess of the standard and decreasing their esteem for those who work less. The desired extent of redistribution depends both on individual income and on individual attitudes toward others. The model has two types of equilibria. In a “cohesive" equilibrium, all individuals conform to the standard of proper behaviour, income inequality is low and social esteem is not biased toward any particular type. Under these conditions equilibrium redistribution increases in response to larger inequality. In a “clustered" equilibrium skilled workers work above the mean while unskilled workers work below. In such an equilibrium, income inequality is large and sentiments are biased in favor of the industrious. As inequality increases, this bias may eventually overtake the egoistic demand for greater taxation and equilibrium redistribution decreases. The type of equilibrium to emerge crucially depends on inequality. We contrast the predictions of the model with data on inequality, redistribution, work values and attitudes toward work and toward the poor for a set of OECD countries. |
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[06-07] Michael Jerison (with John K.-H. Quah). "Law of Demand" |
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Abstract: We formulate several laws of individual and market demand and describe their relationship to neoclassical demand theory. The laws have implications for comparative statics and stability of competitive equilibrium. We survey results that offer interpretable sufficient conditions for the laws to hold and we refer to related empirical evidence. The laws for market demand are more likely to be satisfied if commodities are more substitutable. Certain kinds of heterogeneity across individuals make the laws more likely to hold in the aggregate even if they are violated by individuals. |
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[06-08] Michael Jerison. "Nonrepresentative Representative Consumers" |
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Abstract: Single consumer models are often used to focus attention on economic efficiency, leaving aside equity considerations. In general, these “representative consumer" models do not accurately portray the effects of changes in policies, endowments or technology in the multi-consumer economies they are meant to represent; but even when they do, they are not necessarily adequate for evaluating efficiency. The representative consumer can be Pareto inconsistent, preferring a situation B to A even though all the consumers in the represented economy prefer A to B. It is not clear from the literature how serious a defect this can be. The known examples of Pareto inconsistency are not robust. Small changes in the consumers' preferences remove the Pareto inconsistency. It has been an open question whether large robust Pareto inconsistencies are possible.
This paper shows that they are. In one example, the actual consumers require 56% more income than the representative consumer requires in order to be compensated for the doubling of a price. But such large Pareto inconsistencies require that there is a Giffen good for the representative consumer. We argue that the inconsistencies of representative consumers in most macroeconomic applications are likely to be small and we give conditions ruling out inconsistencies entirely.
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[05-01] Kenneth Beauchemin (with Murat Tasci). "On the Cyclicality of Labor Market Mismatch and Aggregate Employment Flows " |
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Abstract: This paper combines a discrete-time dynamic general equilibrium articulation of the standard model of labor market search with observed U.S. time series measures on employment, vacancies, and aggregate output to uncover the cyclical properties of three unobserved forcing variables that comprise the exogenous state of the aggregate labor market: labor productivity, the rate of job separation, and the allocational efficiency of the labor market. We posit the latter variable to be inversely related to the degree of mismatch in the pool of searching workers and vacancies, given numbers of each, and identify its movements as scalar shifts in the standard matching function. Given that the model exactly reconciles observed net employment changes, our procedure also implies measured time series of the flows into and out of employment. We find that labor productivity, the job separation rate and allocational efficiency are all procyclical with the latter two highly variable. These cyclical patterns lead to procyclical implied gross employment flows, thereby concentrating labor force reallocation during booms. We discuss the implications for conventional views of business cycle fluctuations and for the standard search theories of labor market behavior. |
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[05-02] Adrian Masters. "Directed Search without Wage Commitment
and the Role of Labor Market Institutions" |
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Abstract: An urn-ball matching model of directed search is analyzed in which the usual assumption of commitment to posted wages is dropped. One-on-one matches
lead to a Nash bargained wage but when multiple applicants arrive competition drives the workers down to their continuation value. A minimum wage can act as a commitment device when (as in the USA)
willful underpayment carries a stiffer penalty than "inadvertent underpayment. The theory sheds new light on why firms appear to voluntarily bind
themselves into paying higher wages than they would otherwise pay. Robustness to various sources of heterogeneity is considered. |
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[05-03] Kajal Lahiri (with Gultekin Isiklar and Prakash Loungani). "How Quickly Do Forecasters Incorporate News? Evidence from Cross-country Surveys" |
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Abstract: Using forecasts from Consensus Economics Inc., we provide evidence on the efficiency of real GDP growth forecasts by testing if forecast revisions are uncorrelated. As the forecast data used are multi-dimensional—18 countries, 24 monthly forecasts for the current and the following year and 16 target years—the panel estimation takes into account the complex structure of the variance covariance matrix due to propagation of shocks across countries and economic linkages among them. Efficiency is rejected for all 18 countries: forecast revisions show a high degree of serial correlation. We then develop a framework for characterizing the nature of the inefficiency in forecasts. For a smaller set of countries, the G-7, we estimate a VAR model on forecast revisions. The degree of inefficiency, as manifested in the serial correlation of forecast revisions, tends to be smaller in forecasts of the US than in forecasts for European countries. Our framework also shows that one of the sources of the inefficiency in a country’s forecasts is resistance to utilizing foreign news. Thus the quality of forecasts for many of these countries can be significantly improved if forecasters pay more attention to news originating from outside their respective countries. This is particularly the case for Canadian and French forecasts, which would gain by paying greater attention than they do to news from the United States and Germany respectively. |
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[05-04] Kajal Lahiri (with Vincent Wenxiong Yao). "Economic Indicators For the US Transportation Sector" |
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Abstract: Since the transportation sector plays an important role in business cycle propagation, we develop indicators for this sector to identify its current state, and predict its future. We define the reference cycle, including both business and growth cycles, for this sector over the period from 1979 using both the conventional National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) method and modern time series models. A one-to-one correspondence between cycles in the transportation sector and those in the aggregate economy is found; however, both business and growth cycles of transportation often start earlier and end later than those of the overall economy. We also construct an index of leading indicators for the transportation sector using rigorous statistical procedures, and is found to perform well as a forecasting tool. |
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[05-05] Kajal Lahiri (with Fushang Liu). "ARCH Models for Multi-period Forecast Uncertainty–A Reality Check Using a Panel of Density Forecasts"
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Abstract: We develop a theoretical model to compare forecast uncertainty estimated from time series models to those available from survey density forecasts. The sum of the average variance of individual densities and the disagreement is shown to approximate the predictive uncertainty from well-specified time series models when the variance of the aggregate shocks is relatively small compared to that of the idiosyncratic shocks. Due to grouping error problems and compositional heterogeneity in the panel, individual densities are used to estimate aggregate forecast uncertainty. During periods of regime change and structural break, ARCH estimates tend to diverge from survey measures. |
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2004 Discussion Papers |
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[04-01] Nadav Levy. The Organization of Supply: a Vertical Equilibrium Analysis" |
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Abstract: In this paper I study how the make-or-buy decision of a firm depends on the organization of its peers. I consider a multi-firm framework in which firms choose whether to integrate into the supply of an intermediate input or to outsource its production, and choose the size of their supplier network if outsourcing. Firms find it optimal to share the same set of suppliers, as there are economies of scope in investment to suppliers taking multiple designs. These economies are due to spillovers of technical or operational know-how between projects and to savings in the setup costs on physical capital. The model admits multiple vertical equilibria that are Pareto-ranked, the one with the highest level of outsourcing being most efficient. Outsourcing is more likely in larger markets and when the economies of scope are stronger. The size of the optimal supplier network however typically decreases when the spillovers are stronger. These findings provide insight into the patterns of reorganization of vertical supply relations observed over the last two decades.
Keywords: Outsourcing, Vertical Integration, Spillovers, Supply relations
JEL Classification: L22, D23
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[04-02] John Bailey Jones. "Multiple Equilibria and Endogenous Persistence in a
Dynamic Model of Employment"
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Abstract. In this paper, I consider whether: (1) a dynamic forward-looking model with multiple equilibria can generate persistent fluctuations without persistent sunspots; and (2) indeterminacy is important for these persistent fluctuations. The answer to the first question is a tentative no. The answer to the second question is yes. Extending the approach of Howitt and McAfee (1988, 1992), I work with a dynamic model of long-term employment. In this framework, search externalities allow both hiring and not hiring to comprise symmetric Nash equilibria for some values of the i.i.d. hiring cost. Following Cooper (1994), firms implement the hiring strategy of the previous period unless the realized hiring cost makes a change in strategy the dominant strategy. Calibrating the model, I find that with plausible functional forms, the selection rule can lead to persistent economic episodes only if one uses counterfactual parameters. Turning to the second question, I estimate that the economy has multiple equilibria, in the sense that the current hiring decision depends on the previous hiring decision, around 41 percent of the time. Moreover, I find that without some indeterminacy, the model can not generate expansions and recessions that are both persistent. |
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[04-03] Gerald Marschke (with Pascal Courty). "Making Government Accountable: Lessons from a Federal Job Training Program" |
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Abstract: We describe the evolution of a performance measurement system in a government job-training program. In this program, a federal agency establishes performance measures and standards for sub-state agencies. We show that the performance measurement system’s evolution is at least partly explained as a process of trial-and-error, characterized by a feedback loop: the federal agency establishes performance measures, the local managers learn how to game them, the federal agency learns about gaming and reformulates the performance measures, leading to possibly new gaming, and so on. The dynamics suggest that implementing a performance measurement system in government is not a one-time challenge but benefits from careful monitoring and perhaps frequent revision. |
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[04-04] Gerald Marschke (with Pascal Courty). "A General Test of Gaming"
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Abstract : An important lesson from the incentive literature is that explicit incentives may elicit dysfunctional and unintended responses, also known as gaming responses. The existence of these responses, however, is difficult to demonstrate in practice because this behavior is typically hidden from the researcher. We present a simple model showing that one can identify gaming by estimating the correlation between a performance measure and the true goal of the organization before and after the measure has been activated. Our hypothesis is that gaming takes place if this correlation decreases with activation. Using data from a public sector organization, we find evidence consistent with our hypothesis. We draw implications for the selection of performance measures.
Keywords: Performance Incentive, Performance Measurement, Gaming, Multitasking, Government Organization.
JEL Classification H72, J33, L14 |
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[04-05] Gerald Marschke (with Jinyoung Kim and Sangjoon John Lee).
"Relation of Firm Size to R&D Productivity" |
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Abstract:Many studies have shown that small firms generate more patents per R&D dollar than large firms. Does this mean that small firms are more efficient innovators than large firms? In this paper we exploit a unique data set to reexamine the firm size-innovation relationship. Because firm-reported R&D expenditures may be a biased measure of R&D activities due to under-reporting by small firms, we use the number of inventors in the firm’s employ as a measure of R&D inputs. We focus on the pharmaceutical and semiconductor industries, two industries that are prolific generators of homogenous innovations. As has been found elsewhere in the literature, we find that patents per R&D dollar decline with firm size for both industries. This contrasts with the relationship between patents per inventor and firm size. The average number of patents per inventor increases with size in the semiconductor industry. In the pharmaceutical industry, we show no relationship between the number of patents produced per inventor and firm size.
Key words: Patents; Innovation; Labor productivity; Research; Firm size
JEL Classification: O30, O32, O34, J21, J24 |
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[04-06] Gerald Marschke (with Jinyoung Kim and Sangjoon John Lee). "Research Scientist Productivity and Firm Size: Evidence from Panel Data on Investors" |
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Abstract: It has long been recognized that worker wages and possibly productivity are higher in large firms. Moreover, at least since Schumpeter (1942) economists have been interested in the relative efficiency of large firms in the research and development enterprise. This paper uses longitudinal worker-firm-matched data to examine the relationship between the productivity of workers specifically engaged in innovation and firm size in the pharmaceutical and semiconductor industries. In both industries, we find that inventors’ productivity increases with firm size. This result holds across different specifications and even after controlling for inventors’ experience, education, the quality of other inventors in the firm, and other firm characteristics. We find evidence in the pharmaceutical industry that this is partly accounted for by differences between how large and small firms organize R&D activities. Key words: Patents; Innovation; Labor productivity; Research; Firm size
JEL Classification: O30, O32, O34, J21, J24 |
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[04-07] Ozgen Sayginsoy. "Powerful and Serial Correlation Robust Tests of the Economic Convergence Hypothesis " |
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Abstract: In this paper, a likelihood ratio approach is taken to derive a test of the economic convergence hypothesis in the context of the linear deterministic trend model. The test is designed to directly address the nonstandard nature of the hypothesis, and is a systematic improvement over existing methods for testing convergence in the same context. The test is first derived under the assumption of Gaussian errors with known serial correlation. However, the normality assumption is then relaxed, and the results are naturally extended to the case of covariance stationary errors with unknown serial correlation. The test statistic is a continuous function of individual t-statistics on the intercept and slope parameters of the linear deterministic trend model, and therefore, standard heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent estimators of the long-run variance can be directly implemented. Building upon the likelihood ratio framework, concrete and specific tests are recommended to be used in practice. The recommended tests do not require the knowledge of the form of serial correlation in the data, and they are robust to highly persistent serial correlation, including the case of a unit root in the errors. The recommended tests utilize the nonparametric kernel variance estimators, which are analyzed using the fixed bandwidth (fixed-b) asymptotic framework recently proposed by Kiefer and Vogelsang (2003). The fixed-b framework makes possible the choice of kernel and bandwidth that deliver tests with maximal asymptotic power within a specific class of tests. It is shown that when the Daniell kernel variance estimator is implemented with specific bandwidth choices, the recommended tests have asymptotic power close that of the known variance case, as well as good finite sample size and power properties. Finally, the newly developed tests are used to investigate economic convergence among eight regions of the United States (as defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis) in the post-World-War-II period. Empirical evidence is found for convergence in three of the eight regions.
Keywords: Likelihood Ratio, Economic Convergence, β-convergence Hypothesis, Joint Inequality, HAC Estimator, Fixed-b Asymptotics, Power Envelope, Unit Root, Linear Trend, BEA Regions. |
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[04-08] Ozgen Sayginsoy (with Tim Vogelsang).
"Powerful Tests of Structural Change That are Robust to Strong Serial Correlation" |
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Abstract: This paper proposes powerful and serial correlation robust test statistics that can be used to test for the presence of structural change in the trend function of a univariate time series. Four models are analyzed, each model corresponding to a different way in which a trend break might occur. Given a model, the proposed tests are designed to detect a single break at an unknown date. The tests do not require the knowledge of the form of serial correlation in the data, and they are made robust to the presence of highly persistent serial correlation and a unit root in the errors by using a more comprehensive version of the scaling factor approach of Vogelsang (1998b). The tests utilize the popular nonparametric kernel variance estimators. The fixed-bandwidth asymptotic framework, proposed by Kiefer and Vogelsang (2003), is used to approximate the effects of the variance estimators on the test statistics. The fixed-bandwidth framework makes possible the choice of kernel and bandwidth that deliver tests with maximal asymptotic power within a specific class of tests. For each of the proposed tests, concrete and specific recommendations are made for the bandwidth and kernel to be used in practice. The recommended tests are shown to have good finite sample size and power properties. |
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[04-09] Adrian Masters (with Abhinay Muthoo). "Ex ante Price Commitment with Renegotation in a Dynamic Market
Equilibrium" |
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Abstract: This paper studies the endogenous determination of the price formation procedure in markets characterized by match-specific heterogeneity. We study a model of a market in which, in each time period, agents on one side (e.g., sellers) choose whether or not to post a price before they encounter agents of the opposite type. After a pair of agents have encountered each other, their match-specific values from trading with each other are realized. If a price was not posted, then the terms of trade (and whether or not it occurs) are determined by bargaining. Otherwise, depending upon the agents' match-specific trading values, trade occurs (if it does) either on the posted price or at a renegotiated price. We analyze the symmetric Markov subgame perfect equilibria of this market game, and address a variety of issues such as the impact of market frictions on the equilibrium proportion of trades that occur at a posted price rather than at a negotiated price. |
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[04-10] Adrian Mastrers (with Melvyn Coles). "Duration Dependent Unemployment Insurance and Stabilisation Policy" |
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Abstract: In the context of a standard equilibrium matching framework, this paper
shows how a duration dependent unemployment insurance (UI) system
stabilises unemployment levels over the business cycle. It establishes
that re-entitlement effects induced by a finite duration UI program
generate intertemporal tranfers from firms that hire in future booms to
firms that hire in current recessions. These transfers imply a net
hiring subsidy in recessions which stabilises unemployment levels over
the cycle. |
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[04-11] Adrian Masters. "Middlemen in Search Equilibrium" |
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Abstract: This paper shows how including divisibility of goods and productive
heterogeneity leads to the emergence of middlemen in an equilibrium
search environment. In the baseline model, middlemen are welfare
reducing and their number increases as market frictions are reduced.
When the model is extended to allow for time taken in production and
increasing returns-to-scale in the market meeting technology, middlemen
can be beneficial to society by speeding up the meeting process. |
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[04-12] Adrian Masters (with Melvyn Coles). "Optimal Unemployment Insurance in a Matching Equilibrium " |
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Abstract: This paper considers the optimal design of unemployment insurance (UI)
within an equilibrium matching framework when wages are determined by
strategic bargaining. Unlike the Nash bargaining approach, reducing UI
payments with duration is welfare increasing. A co-ordinated policy
approach, however, one that chooses job creation subsidies and UI
optimally, implies a much greater welfare gain than one which considers
optimal UI alone. Once job creation subsidies are chosen optimally, the
welfare value of making UI payments duration dependent is small. |
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[04-13] Adrian Masters (with Luis-Raul Rodrigez). "Endogenous Credit-card Acceptance in a Model of Precautionary Demand for
Money " |
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Abstract: A credit-card acceptance decision by retailers is embedded into a simple
model of precautionary demand for money. The model gives a new
explanation for how the use of credit-cards can differ so widely across
countries. Retailers' propensity to accept cards reduces the need for
buyers to hold cash as the chance of a stock-out (of cash) is reduced.
When retailers make their decision with respect to credit-card
acceptance they do not take into account the effect that decision has on
other sellers. This externality generates multiple equilibria over some
portions of the parameter space. |
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[04-14] Adrian Masters. "Firm level hiring policy with culturally biased testing" |
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Abstract: This paper explores the implications for labor market outcomes of
systematic testing of applicants in the hiring process. A matching model
in which productivity is a worker's private information is used. Both
wages and hiring rates are endogenous. A minority is defined as a group
for whom the test is less precise in identifying individual
productivity. Welfare and employment outcomes across various hiring
policies are compared. Simulations suggest that tests are typically too
accurate so that in a laissez faire economy minority group members fair
better than the majority group members. Rules requiring equity in hiring
reverse this result. |
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[03-01]
Stacey H. Chen. “Estimating the Variance of Wages in the Presence of Selection and Unobservable Heterogeneity” (Previous Title:
Is Investing in College Education Risky?) |
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[03-02]
Stacey H. Chen. Nonparametric
Estimation of Average Volatility Differentials in Selection Models
with an Application to Returns to Schooling with Shakeeb
Khan (University of Rochester) |
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[03-03]
Stacey H. Chen. Risk
Aversion and College Attendance |
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[03-04]
Michael Sattinger. A
Kaldor Matching Model of Real Wage Declines |
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Abstract:
A model linking macroeconomic equilibrium and income distribution
in balanced growth equilibria is developed as a variant to the Kaldor
model of factor shares. It departs from the original Kaldor model
in assuming equal saving rates and production determined by a matching
process between workers and jobs. Macroeconomic equilibrium (national
savings equal to investment) combines with competitive microeconomic
behavior to determine the real wage and real interest rate. An increase
in the ratio of national debt to employment reduces the real wage,
explaining recent declines. |
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[03-05]
Michael Sattinger. Capital
Intensity, Neutral Technological Change, and Earnings Inequality |
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Abstract:
The paper furthers the neoclassical theory of earnings inequality.
The inequality multiplier is derived as the amount by which inequality
in skills must be multiplied to yield earnings inequality. Neutral
technological change and the real interest rate affect inequality
by changing capital per worker. The effect of capital per worker on
the inequality multiplier is related to skill differentials and capital-skill
complementarity. The results explain increasing inequality from the
mid 1970's into the 1990's. |
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[03-06]
Michael Sattinger. Overlapping
Labour Markets |
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Abstract:
Overlapping labour markets arise when some types of workers do not
meet employers with some types of jobs. For example, skilled workers
could seek high-skill or low-skill jobs, but low skill workers could
be limited to low-skill jobs. The paper derives conditions for equilibrium
and efficiency, distinguishes reducible from irreducible overlapping
labour markets, and describes distributional impacts of proportional
demand shifts and technological change. Many labour models incorporate
the structure of overlapping labour markets, so that the results have
widespread applicability. |
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[03-07]
Michael Sattinger. The
Employment-Productivity Relation with Employment Criteria,
joint with Prof. Sumati Srinivas |
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Abstract:
This paper analyzes labor market responses to productivity shocks
when firms set employment criteria on the basis of the likelihood
of hiring high productivity or low productivity workers. In response
to a positive productivity shock, firms do not raise the criterion
as much as the shock, increasing the proportion of low productivity
workers among the employed. The observed average productivity may
respond negligibly even if employment changes substantially in response
to the shock. Interest rate fluctuations can yield an opposite relation
between productivity and employment, explaining the weak empirical
relationship between the variables. |
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[03-08]
Michael Sattinger. A
Search Version of the Roy Model |
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Abstract:
This paper considers the decisions of workers to search in different
labor markets, in analogy to Roys model of sectoral selection.
In the basic model, a worker can search in one labor market or another
but not both. With non-pecuniary benefits, a worker chooses the labor
market offering the highest reservation utility level. Conditions
for simultaneous search in two markets are also derived under the
assumption that workers suffer a reduction in wage offers. Decisions
of where to search are relevant to self-selection into sectors and
self-selection biases, the formation of interview networks, and generation
of overlapping markets. |
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[03-09]
Michael Sattinger. Price
Dispersion and Short Run Equilibrium in a Queuing Model |
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Abstract:
Price dispersion is analyzed in the context of a queuing market where
customers enter queues to acquire a good or service and may experience
delays. With menu costs, price dispersion arises and can persist in
the medium and long run. The queuing market rations goods in the same
way whether firm prices are optimal or not. Price dispersion reduces
the rate at which customers get the good and reduces customer welfare. |
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[03-10]
Michael Sattinger. Price
Dynamics and the Market for Access to Trading Partners |
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Abstract:
At each point in time, price dynamics in a market are determined by
a market for access to trading partners, implemented by competitive
profit-maximizing brokers. This mechanism is applied to a market in
which the value of a good declines over time and buyers decide optimally
when to reenter the market and buy a new unit. Price adjustment paths
in response to increases and decreases in demand are then derived
using the differential equations generated by the model. |
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[03-11]
Michael Sattinger. Brokers
and the Equilibrium Price Function |
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Abstract:
This paper describes the equilibrium price function generated by brokers
in a market in which heterogeneous buyers meet heterogeneous sellers
through a matching process with frictions. The equilibrium price function
relates the price to alternative ratios of buyers and sellers offered
by different brokers. The paper shows how brokers can enter a matching
market and charge fees that yield a profit while making both buyers
and sellers better off. Computational methods for deriving the equilibrium
price function are developed and the solution is related to the market
for access to trading partners. |
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[03-12]
Kajal Lahiri, Herman O. Stekler, Wenxiong Yao, and Peg Young. Monthly
Output Index for the U.S. Transportation Sector |
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Abstract:
We develop a monthly output index of the U.S. Transportation sector
over 1980:1-2002:4 covering air, rail, water, truck, transit and pipeline
activities. Separate indexes for freight and passenger are also constructed.
Our total transportation output index matches very well with the annual
transportation output figures produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) and the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The strong cyclical
movements in the transportation output appear to be more synchronized
with the growth slowdowns rather than full-fledged recessions of the
U.S. economy. The index has led the turning points of the six NBER-defined
growth cycles over the period with an average lead-time of 6 months
at peaks and 5 months at troughs. |
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[03-13]
Nadav Levy. The
Boundary of the Firm in a Model of Trade Within a Hierarchy" |
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Abstract:
In this paper I present a theory of the boundary of the firm that
accounts for some important characteristics of real-world multidivisional
firms: Operative decisions are in the hands of middle managers who
are rewarded with incentive contracts based on the performance of
their units; Managers' decisions are subject to approval and intervention
by the top management of the firm; and managers are better informed
regarding the affairs of their divisions than their superiors in the
firm's hierarchy. In this setup, the integration of a producer of
an intermediate input and its buyer as separate divisions within a
single firm is unambiguously desirable, as long as the choice of trading
partners can be credibly delegated to the divisions' managers. I show
that this is satisfied not only under the assumption of full commitment
by the general office of the firm, but also interestingly, if it has
no commitment power at all. At the time of trade, the uninformed general
office prefers to delegate the choice of trading partners to the divisions
whose decision is ex-post optimal. An explanation of the boundaries
of the firm emerges only if we assume that the general office retains
some limited commitment power. The general office may then mandate
internal trade in order to encourage the divisions to specialize towards
one another before the trade. In the context examined, I show that
the general office faces a 'time-consistency' problem. It tends to
mandate internal trades in more instances than would have been optimal
with full commitment, adversely affecting the levels of investment
taken by the divisions' managers. Whenever such inconsistency arises,
it may be optimal to have the trade conducted between independent,
non-integrated parties. |
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[03-14]
Kajal Lahiri, Wenxiong Yao, and Peg Young. Cycles
in the Transportation Sector and the Aggregate Economy |
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Abstract:
Transportation plays a central role in facilitating economic activities
across sectors and between regions, and is thus essential to business
cycle research. Using four coincident indicators representing different
aspects of the transportation sector that include an index of transportation
output, payroll, personal consumption and employment, we define the
classical business cycle and growth cycle chronologies for this sector.
We find that, relative to the economy, business cycles in the transportation
sector have an average lead of nearly 6 months at peaks and an average
lag of 2 months at troughs. Similar to transportation business cycles,
growth slowdowns in this sector also last longer than the economy-wide
slowdowns by a few months. This study underscores the importance of
transportation indicators in monitoring cyclical movements in the
aggregate economy. (Keywords: Business cycle, Composite coincident
index, Dynamic factor model, Regime switching, Growth cycle) |
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__________________________________________________________________________________ |
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2002
Discussion Papers |
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[02-01]
Kajal Lahiri (with Guibo Xing). "An
Empirical Analysis of Medicare-eligible Veterans' Demand for Outpatient
Health Care Services" |
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Abstract:
Using data from the 1992 US National Survey of Veterans, we analyze
Medicare-eligible veterans' use of VA and non-VA outpatient health
care services. We apply a utility consistent, combined multinomial
choice and count data model to identify factors that affect these
veterans' outpatient health care usage and facility choices, with
special reference to the effect of out-of-pocket cost, distance to
the medical facility, and supplemental private medical insurance coverage.
Our first stage count data regression shows that the out-of-pocket
cost index calculated from the second stage multinomial choice model
is significant in determining the Medicare-eligible veterans' demand
of outpatient health care services. The calculated cost index elasticity
of outpatient visits is about -0.65. In the second stage, we specify
a multinomial choice model to study veterans' allocation of outpatient
visits between VA and non-VA health care facilities, and we find that
veterans' out-of-pocket cost and the distance to the health care facility
have significantly negative effects on the probability of choosing
the alternative. A number of other factors including family income,
insurance status, means of transportation, home ownership, race, employment,
health, disability status and diagnostic conditions were also found
to be important at various stages of the decision making. We find
no evidence of adverse selection in the market for supplemental private
health insurance. The model is used to simulate the impact of alternative
copayment policies on the demand for VA outpatient health care services.
Key
words: National Survey of Veterans, Health Care Demand, Two Stage
Count Data Model, Nested Logit, Copayments, Shadow Cost, Consumer
Surplus, CBOCs.
JEL
classification: I12, I28, C35.
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[02-02]
John Bailey Jones (with Duc T. Le). "Optimal
Investment with Lumpy Costs" |
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Abstract:
In this paper we solve a continuous-time model of investment with
uncertainty, irreversibility and a broad class of lumpy adjustment
costs. In addition to being general, our solution is quite tractable
and intuitive. We show that, in contrast to standard results, the
marginal value of capital jumps when investment is undertaken. We
also find that firms facing higher uncertainty let their capital
stock depreciate further before they invest, but increase their
capital by a similar proportion once they do invest. We extend both
the user cost and q theories of investment to incorporate lumpy
investment. We confirm that with lumpy investment, a variant of
Tobin's q can be a better predictor of investment than marginal
q.
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[02-03]
John Bailey Jones (with Eric French). "On
the Distribution and Dynamics of Health Costs" |
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Abstract:
Using data from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) and Assets
and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD), this paper presents
estimates of the stochastic process that determines both the distribution
and dynamics of health costs. We find that the data generating process
for health costs is well represented by an ARMA(1,1). Furthermore,
innovations to this process are close to lognormally distributed.
In any given year, .1% of our sample receives a health cost shock
that costs at least $80,000 in present value. Lastly, we discuss
the accuracy of numerical solutions when integrating over health
costs. Assuming lognormality, simple approximation rules work well.
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[02-04]
Traci Mach (with Patricia Reagan). "The Role of Access to Childcare
in the Successful Transitions from Welfare to Work" |
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Abstract:
In August 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility Work
Opportunities Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). This act eliminated Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the largest source of
cash assistance available to needy families, and replaced it with
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), a time-limited program
with stringent work requirements. Because one of the elements vital
to the success of welfare reform is the ability of mothers to transition
from the welfare rolls into the labor market, states are investing
a great deal of money in childcare. In this paper, we find that
the decision to participate in covered-sector jobs of former welfare
recipients is responsive to both the cost of childcare as well as
the density of available childcare. The elasticity with respect
to density is around 0.5, whereas the elasticity with respect to
the price paid is about -0.4. There is no statistically significant
impact of childcare variables on the decision to participate in
jobs that are not covered by unemployment insurance (UI). Since
jobs not covered by UI are likely to be lower paid and less durable
than jobs in the covered sector, our results suggest that both the
price and availability of childcare are important determinant of
transitions from welfare to stable employment.
Keywords:
Childcare availability, childcare elasticity, welfare reform
JEL
Classification: I38, J22
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[02-05]
Traci Mach. "A Cross-Cohort Examination of Nonmarital Teenage
Childbearing" |
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Abstract:
The current paper looks at the nonmarital teenage childbearing behavior
of two cohorts of NLSY women. It constructs a monthly panel of information
for the teens from the time they are twelve years old until they
have a nonmarital birth, reach the end of their third survey without
giving birth, get married, or reach age 18. The research attempts
to identify the factors that have contributed to the differences
in teenage childbearing behavior that we observe across the cohorts
of women by estimating a Cox proportional hazard model, stratified
on race, age of mother a the birth of her first child, and the rate
of marriage in the state. The model identifies education, living
situations, religion, and welfare policy as factors. Specifically,
for the youths of the 1990s, the introduction of restrictions on
living conditions, the so-called minor parent provisions, act as
a retardant to nonmarital childbearing. The model also shows that
higher education for the youth and her mother delay childbearing
for both cohorts of women. Finally, living with one's biological
father at age 14 is linked with delayed childbearing, with hazard
rates nearly 60 and 40 percent lower for teens of the two cohorts.
Keywords:
Nonmarital childbearing, NLSY79, NLSY97
JEL
Classification: J13, I38
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[02-06]
Gerald Marschke (with Pascal Courty). "An Empirical Investigation
of Gaming Responses to Explicit Performance Incentives" |
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Abstract:
This paper studies a particular kind of gaming responses to explicit
incentives in a large government organization. The gaming responses
we consider occur when agents strategically report their performance
outcomes to maximize their awards. An important contribution of
this work is to examine whether this behavior diverts resources
(e.g. agents' time) from productive activities or whether it simply
reflects an accounting phenomenon. We evaluate the efficiency impact
of the behavior we identify and find that it has a negative impact
on the true goal of the organization.
JEL
Classification: J33, L14
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[02-07]
Gerald Marschke. "Performance
Incentives and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence from a Federal Bureaucracy" |
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Abstact:
This paper examines the effects of performance incentives in a federal
job training program for the economically disadvantaged. I find
that job training bureaucrats respond to incentives in ways that
are consistent with a simple model of bureaucratic behavior. Additionally
I am able to test whether attempts by the program's incentive designers
to improve the precision of performance measures in the late 1980s
increased or decreased efficiency. I discuss my results in the context
of the greater incentive literature, as well as the literature on
incentives in job training programs.
JEL
Classification: J41, J33, D73, I38
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[02-08]
Gerald Marschke (with Pascal Courty). "The Challenge of Measuring
Productivity: A Case Study of Performance Measurement in a Job Training
Program" |
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Abstract:
Despite the broad interest in performance measurement during the
past 20 years, few state and local governments actually use performance
measures as a management tool. A possible reason for this puzzle
is that performance measurement systems are difficult to successfully
implement. In this paper we consider a case study of a public organization
that uses performance measurement to influence decision making,
and we analyze local decision makers' responses. We identify a dynamic
process by which local decision makers respond in unanticipated
and unintended ways, and the designer has to adapt the system to
try to eliminate these responses. These results show that performance
measurement systems have to be continuously monitored. We argue
that this need for constant monitoring may make the use of performance
measures uneconomical because they may generate more management
problems than they actually solve.
JEL
Classification: J41, J33, D73
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[02-09]
Gerald Marschke (with Pascal Courty). "Dynamics of Performance
Measurement Systems" |
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Abstract:
We present a model of how organizations manage performance measures
when gaming is revealed over time. The incentive designer does not
know when it selects a performance measure whether it will communicate
the right behavior. Only over time does the principal find out the
agent's responses and then uses this additional information to update
and finetune the incentive system. Using data from a government
organization, we test the model's main prediction that the correlation
between the performance measure and the true goal of the organization
should change after the performance measure is included in the incentive
system and we find some evidence consistent with this hypothesis.
Keywords:
Performance Incentive, Performance Measurement, Gaming, Multitasking,
Government Organization.
JEL
Classification: H72, J33, L14
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[02-10]
Gerald Marschke (with Jinyoung Kim). "Accounting for the recent
surge in U.S. patenting: Changes in R&D expenditures, patent yields,
and the high tech sector" |
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Abstract:
We present a model of how organizations manage performance measures
when gaming is revealed over time. The incentive designer does not
know when it selects a performance measure whether it will communicate
the right behavior. Only over time does the principal find out the
agent's responses and then uses this additional information to update
and finetune the incentive system. Using data from a government
organization, we test the model's main prediction that the correlation
between the performance measure and the true goal of the organization
should change after the performance measure is included in the incentive
system and we find some evidence consistent with this hypothesis.
Key
words: Patents; Innovation; Technology, Research productivity
JEL
Classification: O30, O32, O34
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[02-11]
Laurence Kranich (with Joan Esteban). "A Theory of Endogenous
Sentiments" |
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Abstract:
We introduce a model in which agents' sentiments toward others are
determined endogenously on the basis of how they perform relative
to a standard of appropriate behavior. As sentiments change, so
too does the optimal behavior of each individual, which in turn
affects other agents' sentiments toward them. We focus on fixed
points of this reciprocal adjustment process. To demonstrate the
potential use and implications of such a model, we present an extended
example involving team production. We consider various standards
of behavior, and we examine stationary patterns of behavior and
sentiments under each.
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