Women and Minorities:  
The Impact of War Time Mobilization on Political Rights  

1 August 1999

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ABSTRACT

Tilly (1975) has convincingly argued that warfare in Europe contributed to the development of the modern state. But just what form of strong state is likely to develop in the face of a persistent external threat? Hintze (1906) and Lasswell (1941) propose the "garrison state" hypothesis: states facing a severe security threat are likely to develop autocratic institutions in order to minimize domestic opposition and maximize mobilization potential. A competing argument, which has been proposed by the "extraction" school of thought, argues that warfare can indirectly promote rather than inhibit the development of democratic institutions (Downing 1992). We examine these competing hypotheses by tracing the ebb and flow of political rights of majority males, females, and minority males using a cross-sectional time series of European states (1900-1955). We find that while wars lead to a reduction in rights in the short run, if large-scale mobilization occurs in response to the threat then political rights tend to expand in the long run.

1. INTRODUCTION

How does the level of violence in the external environment influence the political development of a state? Tilly (1975) has convincingly argued that warfare in Europe contributed to the development of the modern state. In response to external conflict, state leaders consciously expanded the power of the state in order to raise armies and defend borders. The centralization of power, the development of bureaucracies, and the integration of economies were all initiated to maximize revenue-taking in order to enhance war-making.

But just what form of strong state is likely to develop in the face of a persistent external threat? Hintze (1906) and Lasswell (1941) propose the "Garrison State" hypothesis: states facing a severe security threat are likely to develop autocratic institutions in order to minimize domestic opposition and maximize mobilization potential. A competing argument, which has been proposed by the "Extraction School" of thought, argues that warfare can indirectly promote rather than inhibit the development of democratic institutions (Downing 1992). Execution of war, particularly large-scale war, requires the mobilization of populations and resources. State leaders must extract these resources from an ordinarily reluctant society (Stein 1980). In most cases, the extraction of resources requires state leaders to extend economic or political rights in exchange for cooperation in resolving the immediate crisis. Large-scale warfare can, therefore, have the unintended long run consequence of expanding political participation within a polity.

This paper examines these competing explanations by comparing and contrasting the experiences of three societal groups: males from the majority group, females, and minority males. How does war time mobilization affect the political and economic positions of disenfranchised men, women, and minorities? Does the impact of direct participation (i.e., conscription) differ from that of indirect participation?

The findings support a synthesis of the garrison state and extraction schools. Involvement in war leads to curtailment of political liberties in the short run. However, as massive mobilization triggers domestic opposition and erases the "rally around the flag" effect associated with the outbreak of conflict, leaders are forced to exchange rights for resources. In the long run, warfare is positively correlated with the expansion of political and economic rights. Rather than the linear relationships proposed in the literature (i.e., the extraction hypothesis proposes a positive linear relationship while the garrison state hypothesis proposes a negative linear relationship), the relationship is best depicted as a "j-curve."

2. GARRISON STATE VERSUS EXTRACTION

Reflecting on the formation of national states in Western Europe, Tilly (1975) argues that war (and the tax systems created to pay for war) played a vital role in the development of strong states. "War made the state and the state made war" (Tilly 1975, 42). Beginning with almost 500 independent political entities in 1500, Europe gradually consolidated into 20+ sovereign states by the 20th century. Many alternatives to the sovereign state, ranging from empires and city states to trading leagues and federations, fell by the wayside during the consolidation process.

Figure 1 summarizes the causal argument proposed by Tilly. The process begins with technical innovations in warfare (e.g., cannons and firearms), tactical changes (e.g., the rise of infantry), and expansion in the size of armies. All three factors led to skyrocketing costs of warfare. Prior to this change, rulers in the largely non-monetized feudal economic and military system had relatively few expenses and could typically suffice on the tax revenue from crown lands. In the feudal system, land was exchanged for military service and the vassals were responsible for equipping and supplying their own troops. After the technical and tactical innovations, the larger mercenary armies and their advanced weapons were horrifically expensive. Desperate for additional revenue, rulers in Europe expanded the tax base and institutionalized the collection process. The first bureaucratic structures were created for revenue collection. The need for ever larger armies led to the extensive use of mercenaries from the 15th to the 18th century, and then for conscripts during the Napoleonic Wars and the total wars of the 20th century. Tilly also argues that the mobilization of fiscal and human resources triggered resistance; the state responded by increasing the coercive apparatus (e.g., police) to minimize disruptions. Finally, the feedback loop (shown with a dashed line in the figure) indicates that the process was a continual spiral. As a
particular ruler fielded an even larger army or equipped his artillery with even more accurate cannon, his neighbors were forced to raise revenue to respond in kind. The upward spiral continued in Europe for at least 600 years.

If war did in fact contribute to the state building process, a second question emerges: just what sort of sovereign state did Mars give birth to? Hintze (1906), like Tilly, argues that state development is inextricably linked to military development. While the domestic distribution of power plays an important role in state development, the level of external threat together with the state’s position in the international political hierarchy are decisive. "All state organization was military organization, organization for war" (1906, 181).

However, Hintze’s argument goes beyond that proposed in Tilly’s classic work *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* by hypothesizing that external threats determine the domestic political structures of states.²

England, with her insular security, was not directly exposed to the danger of these wars. She needed no standing army, at least not one of Continental proportions, but only a navy which served commercial interests as much as war aims. In consequence, she developed no absolutism. Absolutism and militarism go together on the Continent just as self government and militia in England. The main explanation for the difference in the way political and military organizations developed between England and the Continent -- one which became more and more distinct after the middle of the seventeenth century -- lies in the difference in the foreign situations (1906, 199)

England did not become democratic because it was either Protestant (Weber 1958), or industrialized (Smith 1965; Dahrendorf 1967), or agriculturally commercialized (Moore 1966). Rather, the lack of a persistent external threat allowed interest groups to maintain and expand political and economic privileges. This distribution of economic and political power led to the establishment of a democratic state. For Hintze, this path was simply impossible for a state such as Prussia, which had to centralize power and eliminate domestic opposition in order to efficiently mobilize the resources required to maintain independence in an anarchic world.

Lasswell (1941), writing at a time in which the world (but not yet the United States) had plunged into a second world war, takes a similar position. "The purpose of this article is to consider the possibility that we are moving toward a world of "garrison states" -- a world in which the specialists of violence are the most powerful group in society" (1941, 455). While not arguing the outcome was inevitable, Lasswell feared that mobilization for total war encouraged the authoritative allocation of resources at the expense of market allocation and the emphasis of the collective or the public at the expense of the individual or the private. "Decisions will be more dictatorial than democratic, and institutional practices long connected with modern democracy will disappear (1941, 461)." Throughout his essay, Lasswell emphasizes the role of propaganda in mobilizing resources, increasing morale, repressing dissent, socializing the young, and ritualizing democracy. In sum, Lasswell echoes Hintze’s contention that a hostile external environment leads to autocratic institutions but he focuses on the demise of existing modern democracies rather than the embryotic rise of autocratic states.

External threats can undermine pluralist institutions and norms in a number of ways. First, prior to any actual military conflict, military establishments may increase their control over economic and political decisions. For example, General Pilsudski used external threats and economic turmoil to justify his military coup in Poland in 1926. Second, the military may insulate itself from civilian oversight and control (often with the assistance of other elements of society) both before and during military conflict. In following the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese military was effectively insulated from parliamentary control. This autonomy would later allow the military to drag the country into numerous conflicts. Third,
during war decision-making power constitutionally vested in the legislature is often shifted to the executive branch in general, and the military in particular. For example, the de facto political system in Germany during World War I shifted from a limited constitutional monarchy to a virtual military dictatorship. Fourth, wartime conditions often trigger the severe curtailment of political rights of "enemy aliens" (e.g., German immigrants in Britain during the First World War (Panayi 1991) and Japanese immigrants in the United States during the Second World War (Daniels 1981)) even when the “aliens” are native born citizens. Finally, in the hope of minimizing opposition to extraction policies, governments often repress free speech (e.g., Espionage Act of 1917 in the United States), suspend due process (e.g., Lincoln's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus during the American Civil War), and alter the electoral process (e.g., the suspension of elections in Britain during both World Wars).

While threats and wars often result in a restriction of political rights, Downing (1992) argues that under certain conditions war may expand rather than contract political rights. Downing focuses on the medieval origins of constitutional government in Europe. Medieval customs and institutions (e.g., reciprocal rights between peasants and lords; the balance of power between the crown, the Catholic Church and local nobles and burghers; prototype parliaments; and the rule of law) laid the foundation for participatory government. The military revolution also plays a decisive role in Downing's story; states which are forced to extract resources domestically are apt to develop autocratic structures capable of squeezing every last cent out of reluctant lords, merchants, and peasants. In sum, the lack of a medieval legacy, the presence of severe security threats, and the reliance on domestic resources to finance military campaigns all increase the probability of an autocratic state.

Downing emphasizes that external threats and the need for war time revenue often triggered an intense battle between the crown and its subjects. New taxes were not dictated by rulers from above; they were negotiated with interests groups from below. Feudal customs and institutions limited the crown’s ability to raise revenue. When the crown "asked" for extraordinary revenue, it was often forced to reward interests groups for compliance.

Moreover, this expansion of rights related to the extraction of human resources as well. As the size of armies grew, the royal treasury simply could not afford to pay the mercenaries for their services. The solution was to enlist volunteers and conscripts. Why would a young peasant from Languedoc or Hanover volunteer for hardship or honor a conscription notice? Because they were citizens -- members of a community which provided rights and demanded obligations. Even though Napoleon's Grand Armée during the invasion of Russia in 1812 was dominated by foreign troops, it contained 300,000 French conscripts and volunteers (Finer 1975, 146). Massive "national armies" would appear again in the "total" wars of the 20th century.

Does military service directly translate into political rights? Clearly there is not a perfect correlation between large-scale conscription and extension of political rights; many autocratic states have conscripted large numbers of men and women without extending suffrage or granting free speech. However, the two are explicitly linked in several cases. At the second reading of the Representation of the People Bill in the middle of the First World War, Home Secretary Sir G. Cave stated his belief that there was a strong national feeling or consensus for expanding suffrage among male subjects.

At the present moment I think this feeling has been strengthened by recent events. The spirit manifested in this War by all classes of our countrymen has brought us nearer together, has opened men’s eyes, and removed
misunderstanding on all sides. It has made it, I think, impossible that ever again, at all events in the lifetime of the present generation, there should be a revival of the old class feeling which was responsible for so much, and, among other things, for the exclusion for a period of so many of our population from the class of electors. I think I need say no more to justify this extension of the franchise.

(Parliamentary Debates 1917, v93, 2135)

With respect to the subject of women’s suffrage, Cave also explicitly links the extension of the vote to the war effort. He asked his fellow members of parliament:

whether it is possible for us, having called upon women for so large a contribution to the work of carrying on this War, and having received so splendid a response to that call, to refuse to women a voice in moulding the future of the country which their help and devoted self sacrifice have done so much to save?

(Parliamentary Debates 1917, v93, 2135)

The bill ensured that “soldiers and sailors, mine sweepers, Army nurses, Red Cross nurses” and other participants in the war effort would not be excluded from the right to vote by the few remaining qualifications, such as the residency requirement of six months. Sir Cave argued “it would be monstrous if they were not brought in” and believed that no one opposed the war service clauses (Parliamentary Debates 1917, v93, 2136).

The link between involvement in war and political rights becomes most vivid in discussions surrounding a particular interest group: conscientious objectors. Conscientious objectors, who refuse to serve in the military based on moral objections to war, have emerged in most, if not all, modern wars involving conscription (Levy 1997). In June of 1917 the House of Commons amended The Representation of the People Act as follows:

A person shall not be entitled to be registered or to vote at a Parliamentary or local government election if he has been exempted on the ground of conscientious objection to military service from any form of military service for which, but for such objection, he would be liable. (Parliamentary Debates 1917, v95, 308).

The Right Honorable R. McNeil, proposed the amendment because he believed conscientious objectors threatened the liberties the rest of the country was fighting for. By refusing to serve, they increased the burden upon others. By escaping the burdens of war, they benefited at the expense of others. If the number of conscientious objectors grew, it could threaten the entire war effort.

The question comes: Are they to be allowed to exercise the franchise after the War is over? In other words, are they, when this peril is over and when the Army returns and peace is restored, to enjoy all the rights and privileges of the State which they would not lift a hand to preserve? When the ship was in danger these men would not soil their hands by taking a turn at the pumps. Are these men to be allowed not only to have enjoyed immunity from the work we are engaged in, but also be allowed to share both the honours and the promotions with the men who have brought the ship into port? (Parliamentary Debates 1917, v95, 313-4).

Interestingly, the conscientious objectors debate in the House of Commons became linked to the extension of suffrage to women. The Representation of the People Act extended the right to vote to wives of men entitled to vote in Parliamentary or local elections. This raised the question: if the husband lost the right to vote based on his successful petition as a conscientious objector, would the wife lose the right to
vote as well? Should we punish a woman because “she has the misfortune, as many of us think it, to be the wife of a conscientious objector” (Parliamentary Debates 1917, v100, 750)?

There are a great many women of valour and zeal for the country whose greatest humiliation it is that at the present time they have husbands of military age who are not in Khaki and serving at the front. I think it would be monstrous that these women, otherwise qualified for the vote, should lose it in these circumstances…(Parliamentary Debates 1917, v100, 751)

A slightly revised form of the amendment was adopted and the Bill was passed. The first parliamentary election using the expanded electoral base is often referred to as the “Khaki” election of 1918.

In sum, the Extraction School posits that raising revenues and armies often requires political compromises. Extraction is unlikely to be popular and can require concessions. Mobilization for large-scale war can, therefore, have the unintended consequence of expanding political rights. The British mobilization for World War I, which eventually involved conscription, led to the expansion of rights for soldiers and sailors but not for conscientious objectors.

3. MEN, WOMEN, AND MINORITIES

At a gathering celebrating the signing of the Definitive Treaty of Peace in Paris in 1783, Sarah Livingston Jay offered a short but ultimately perplexing toast: "May all our Citizens be Soldiers, and all our Soldiers be Citizens" (Kerber 1990, 90). The toast tapped the conventional belief that standing armies were a threat to democratic institutions. The citizens’ militia was considered an ideal bulwark for protecting political liberty. Yet, the toast also raised questions for which there were no easy answers: who is a citizen? Are all citizens equal in terms of rights and obligations? Can women be citizens? Can immigrants or excluded minorities earn citizenship through military service?

In their most general form, the Extraction School and the Garrison State hypotheses focus on society as a whole (e.g., threats directed against society as a whole; mobilization of the entire state; and the political rights of all citizens on average). While threats on most occasions are directed against the entire society, the impact of mobilization and the subsequent offering of rewards can vary greatly across society.

Participation can be divided into two categories: direct and indirect. Direct participation includes serving in combat units, combat service support, and the military/civilian administration. Indirect participation includes working in defense industries, filling voids left by drafted soldiers, buying war bonds, dealing with ration coupons, participating in recycling drives, raising children alone, and contributing to the gross product of the country. American women participated in every one of these activities in major conflicts such as the American Revolution and World War II save one -- serving in combat units. While some women participated as nurses (i.e., combat service support) and office workers in the Army (i.e., military administration), the vast majority served indirectly. Women supported the rebellion in the Revolutionary War by traveling with American soldiers to do washing, cooking, and mending. Despite drawing rations from the American military (i.e., explicit compensation for services rendered), they were not considered "soldiers" (Kerber 1990, 96). Given the belief that only soldiers can be citizens, the political rights of these women are ambiguous.

The distinction between direct and indirect participation emerges explicitly during the House of Commons debate on The Representation of the People Act in 1917. Mr. Blair, a member of parliament opposed to the bill, challenged his colleagues to measure relative sacrifice.

Personally, I think that to talk about giving the vote as a reward to women is an insulting proposal. If you are going to give it as a reward for their services, I should like to ask what reward you are going to give the 1,250,000 young men between the ages of fourteen and eighteen who, we are told by the Minister of Munitions, have been gallantly carrying
on their own shoulders some of the burdens of this War, and I should like to know how you are going to appraise that reward? Are you going to give the same vote to a soldier as to the lady of thirty years of age who has worked very hard indeed in the munition factory or in a canteen kitchen? (Parliamentary Debates 1917, v93, 2215)

The degree to which states rewarded women for supporting the war varied greatly across states. In Belgium, mothers and wives of men killed in combat during the First World War were given the right to vote in 1918 for their "contribution" to the war effort. In France, the lower house passed legislation giving women the right to vote due to their enormous contribution to the war effort, but the upper house blocked the legislation and French women would have to wait for the conclusion of a second world war to obtain the right to vote. Whilst the Italian Senate legislated the extension of suffrage to all males over 21 as well as all those who had served in the military during the war regardless of age, a bill for extending suffrage to women was defeated by right-wing and religious conservatism (Carstairs 1980, 154; Mackie and Rose 1991, 258; Clark 1996, 212).

Comparing the experience of women to other disenfranchised groups in society could be particularly enlightening. Were political rights extended to groups of disenfranchised males for participating directly in combat? If so, does this imply that serving in combat units is necessary and sufficient for obtaining political rights? Was there a division between minority groups? Were "loyal" minorities encouraged to serve while "disloyal" minorities were barred from service (Rousseau and Blauvelt 1998)?

In sum, we hope to address three questions. First, does war affect the political rights of all groups in a similar fashion? Or are majority males, females, and minority males treated very differently? Second, is there a difference between direct participation in combat operations and indirect participation through support of defense production or economic production? Third, when does the change occur and does it persist in the absence of a severe external threat?

4. DIRECTION, PERSISTENCE, AND DEVIATION

The relationship between war and political rights can be assessed in terms of direction, persistence, and deviation. The Garrison State versus Extraction Schools debate focuses on the direction of the change. As Figure 2 depicts, external threats and wartime mobilization can in theory decrease political rights (a), increase political rights (b), have no impact (c), or have a non-linear combination effect (d). While the Garrison State school predicts the negative relationship depicted in part (a) of Figure 2, the Extraction School predicts a positive relationship as shown in part (b) of the Figure.

The debate on the consequences of war with respect to political (and economic) rights has also focused on persistence: how long do the changes triggered by war persist? The three alternative views are graphically depicted in Figure 3. Marwick (1988, 1974) argues that wars trigger social change (see part (a) of Figure 3). While not denying the importance of long run trends, he contends that the precise manner and exact timing of change "can be directly attributed to the experience of war" (1988, xvii). Summerfield (1988) argues that although World War II did not fundamentally alter the sexual division of labor in Britain, it did lead to a permanent increase in employment for older and married women and a permanent change in the self-perception of many women.

In contrast, many argue that the wartime changes were temporary in nature. While the wartime mobilization of men for military service led to the mobilization of women to fill the economic void, these changes were temporary. Women were laid off in massive numbers with the closing of munitions factories and pushed aside as males returning home sought work in the post-war economy. With respect
to France, McMillian argues "In general, then, it would appear that there was no close relationship between war and social change in the case of World War I and urban women in the French population" (1988, 12).

Finally, as part (c) of Figure 3 displays, the short run impact and the long run impact of war may differ. While the short run change may not be permanent, the long run change may well be. While this non-linear relationship has not been explored in the literature, it remains a theoretic possibility.

The final dimension of change relates to deviations from long term trends. From the vantage point of the "long durée," social change is the product of long term trends rather than short run events McMillian 1988, 1). The emancipation of women, for example, has to do with the slow process of industrialization, the rise of the middle class, and the education of women. As part (a) of Figure 4 depicts, short term events such as participation in war has little if any impact on the long run pattern of change. More importantly, if you simply compare society on the eve of war and society at the end of war, you are likely to erroneously attribute the change to the impact of war while the real source of change lies outside of war.

Alternatively, war might have an "acceleration" effect as shown in part (b) of Figure 4. That is, while war might not alter the long run rate of change (i.e., the slope), war time disturbances may accelerate change as indicated by the upward shift in the trend line in part (b). Here, the war affects the precise timing and manner of change without fundamentally altering long-term patterns of change.

Finally, in part (c) of Figure 4, we see that war changes both the timing and rate of change. In this case, the wartime experience alters the intercept and the slope of the long-term trend line. Without the occurrence of war, the rate in the expansion of political rights would be significantly less.

The following analysis does not definitively resolve the debates surrounding direction, persistence, and deviation. However, we believe that a carefully constructed research design coupled with reliable cross-national data will allow us to begin identifying consistent patterns across time and space. This paper, therefore, represents a first step in this larger research program.

5. HYPOTHESES, VARIABLES, AND THE DATA SET
The analysis focuses on three central hypotheses. First, we hypothesize that under wartime conditions states must extract human and fiscal resources on a massive scale relative to peacetime conditions. Second, the Garrison State hypothesis, predicts that as the external threat increases, governments will respond by restricting political liberties. Third, the Extraction School hypothesis, predicts that as the level of mobilization increases, governments will be compelled to exchange political power for fiscal and human resources.

**H1: Mobilization Hypothesis:**
War forces governments to significantly increase the extraction of human and financial resources from their societies.

**H2: Garrison State Hypothesis:**
As the level of external threat increases, the government increases restrictions on individual and collective political rights.

**H3: Extraction School Hypothesis:**
As the wartime mobilization expands, the government decreases restrictions on individual and collective political rights.

Testing these central hypotheses requires the measurement of the level of external threat, the degree of wartime mobilization, and the level of political rights. The level of threat will be measured in two ways.
First, the dichotomous *War Involvement* variable (1=war; 0=peace) indicates whether or not a state was involved in a war in the current year. The data and definition for war involvement is derived from the Correlates of War (COW) project (Small and Singer 1982). Second, the *Total Disputes* variable measures the total number of militarized disputes the state finds itself in during the given year. In our data set, this variable ranges from 0 to 26 (the latter referring to Germany in 1940). The data source for this variable was the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set (Gochman and Maoz 1984).\(^9\)

The degree of wartime mobilization was measured by dividing the number of regular military troops by the country’s total population. Both pieces of information are available from the COW National Capabilities data set. The variable ranges from 0 to 18%. Although the vast majority of German males between the ages of 18 and 45 were mobilized during the First World War, the number of soldiers in service as a percentage of the total population (including women and children) in any given year peaked at only 13.7 percent in 1918. We also employ a financial mobilization variable in which government spending in current dollars is divided by the gross domestic product in current dollars. Mitchell (1992) and Flora et al. (1983) were the primary sources for these data.

Measuring the level of political rights was the most important and most difficult task. We chose not to rely on existing data set (such as the Polity data sets developed by Gurr and his colleagues) because the coding rules do not distinguish between the rights of majority males from females or minority males. Our eight “political rights” variables, all of which we have coded ourselves, can be divided into two categories of political rights: individual and collective. Individual rights refer to liberties granted to specific individuals or groups. The broader the distribution of individual rights the more inclusive the political system. Individual rights are coded for three groups: majority males, females, and minority males. This allows us to compare and contrast differences in rights granted to these groups.

Collective rights refer to political rights granted to those *included* in the political system; they are directly analogous to "public contestation" or political competition as presented by Dahl (1971). A political system may include all citizens in the political process, but the rules prohibit any real political competition (e.g., the Soviet Union). Similarly, during World War II Britain did not restrict individual voting except to place British Fascist leader Oswald Moseley under house arrest and ban his political party. However, it did suspend national elections for the duration of the war.\(^10\) Collective rights are coded for the entire polity rather than individual groups.

The following coding rules were used for the political rights variables. Part I summarizes individual rights and Part II summarizes collective rights.

**PART I: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS**

**I) Right to Hold Office:**

3) Unrestricted: All adults in the sub-population have the right to hold any public office in the executive, judiciary, or the legislature.

2) Slightly Restricted: Some restrictions exist on the right to hold public office. However, the total number of positions withheld is minimal AND the percentage of the adult sub-population restricted from holding the office is limited to less than 20%.

1) Substantially Restricted: Widespread restrictions on the right to hold public office exist. The total number of positions withheld is extensive AND the percentage of the adult sub-population restricted from holding the office falls between 20% and 80%.

0) Extremely Restricted: Over 80% of the adult sub-population is formally or de facto excluded from holding political office.

**II) Right to Form Political Parties:**

3) Unrestricted: All adults in the sub-population have the right to form political parties, participate in political parties, and actively seek members for these parties.

2) Slightly Restricted: Although most adults can form parties, there are some restrictions. These restrictions affect no more than 20% of the sub-population.
1) Substantially Restricted: The right to form political parties and compete for support is severely curtailed. The number of official parties is very limited; individuals typically need formal permission to start new parties. Most attempts to form a new party are crushed by the government.

0) Extremely Restricted: Only a single party is allowed to exist (or all political parties are outlawed).

III) Right of Vote in National Elections:
3) Unrestricted: All adults in the sub-population have the right to vote in national elections.
2) Slightly Restricted: Although most adults have the right to vote in national elections, there are some restrictions. These restrictions affect no more than 20% of the sub-population.
1) Substantially Restricted: The right to vote in national elections is severely curtailed. Due to numerous types of restrictions, the percentage of the sub-population eligible to vote in national elections falls between 20% and 80%.
0) Extremely Restricted: The right to vote in national elections is restricted to less than 20% of the sub-population.

IV) Freedom of Expression:
3) Unrestricted: All adults in the sub-population have the right to express their political, economic, and ideological views without fear of repercussions from the government or other groups in society.
2) Slightly Restricted: The government formally restricts the right to speech or public on particular topics. During wartime, the government may restrict criticism of the war effort and take actions (e.g., the reading of public mail) which inhibits expression. However, the total number of individuals charged and the scope of the restrictions (e.g., includes military but not economic policy) is limited.
1) Substantially Restricted: Freedoms to speech and publish are severely restricted. Jail sentences are frequent and widespread. Censorship of private material is routine. Public debate is curtailed but not totally eliminated.
0) Extremely Restricted: There is virtually no freedom to publicly or privately discuss topics related to government policies. Public debate is for all practical purposes eliminated.

PART II: COLLECTIVE RIGHTS
I. Free and Fair Elections: Although individuals are often granted the right to vote as individuals, this right is often meaningless because voting process (i.e., the aggregation of preferences of those included in the political system) does not allow competing ideas or candidates. While the individual voting rights variable captures Dahl's (1971) inclusiveness dimension, the Free and Fair Elections variables captures the degree of competition among those included in the system.
3) Free and Fair Elections: Those individuals included in the political system can select their leaders using free and fair voting procedures. Votes are equally weighted and the aggregation process is transparent.
2) Substantially Free and Fair Elections: While some voting rules may be violated and the system may lack transparency and rigor, the overall process appears to produce results which match the distribution of preferences among those included in the political system. Votes may not be equally weighted, but this does not play a decisive or even central role in the outcome of the process.
1) Partially Free and Fair Elections: The voting process heavily favors one interest group within society. This group uses its power to largely determine the outcome of elections (buying voters, stuffing ballot boxes, or simply fabricating results). Votes may be very unequally weighted, resulting in disproportionate power by one group or coalition.
0) No Free or Fair Elections: This category includes states which do not hold elections and those states which hold elections in which the outcome is for all practical purposes determined by the executive or ruling party.
II. **Legislative Power Over the Executive:** We employ the same coding scheme used in the Polity data sets (the EXCONST: Executive Constraint variable). However, we have coded all the data ourselves. For a full description of the Polity coding rules see Gurr et al. (1989, 15-16)

3) Executive Parity or Subordination: Accountability groups have effective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity. Examples of evidence include: 1) a legislature, ruling party, or council of nobles initiates much or most important legislation; 2) the executive (president, premier, king, cabinet, or council) is chosen by the accountability group and is dependent on its continued support to remain in office (as in most parliamentary systems); and 3) in multi-party democracies, there is chronic "cabinet instability."

2) Substantial Limitations on Executive Authority: The executive has more effective authority than any accountability group, but it is subject to substantial controls by them. Examples: 1) a legislature or party council often modifies or defeats executive proposals for action; 2) a council or legislature sometimes refuses funds to the executive; 3) the legislature or party makes important administrative appointments; and 4) the legislature refuses the executive permission to leave the county.

1) Slight to Moderate Limitations on Executive Authority: There are some real, but limited, restraints on the executive. Evidence includes 1) The legislature initiates some categories of legislation; 2) The legislature can delay implementation of executive acts or degrees; 3) the executive fails to reduce constitutional restrictions; 4) the ruling party initiates some legislation or takes some administrative action independent of the executive; 5) the legislature or party approves some categories of appointments; 6) there is an independent judiciary; and 7) a civilian executive exists but military rules for all practical purposes.

0) Unlimited Executive Authority: There are no regular limitations on the executive's authority. Constitutional restrictions on executive authority are ignored. Constitutions and legislatures are suspended. Executives can appoint and remove all key decision makers.

III. **Rule of Law:** Often during wartime, institutional structures and laws are maintained in theory but bypassed in practice. While formal guarantees of individual and collective rights exist on paper, they are often suspended for all practical purposes. While this category overlaps to a degree with the **Legislature Power Over the Executive** variable just discussed, it goes beyond this relationship to include all executive, judicial, and administrative relations between the general population and the government.

3) Maintenance of Constitutional Rights and Rule of Law: The government maintains the constitutional process and rule of law; laws are systematically enforced.

2) Slight Suspension of Constitutional Process or Rule of Law: While the executive branch tends to follow constitutional procedures and support rule of law, there are important instances in which rights and traditional processes as violated. Evidence includes greater rule by executive decree rather than legislative law, executive suspension of legal rights such as habeas corpus, and interment of potential threats or opponents of the war effort by irregular means.

1) Substantial Suspension of Constitutional Process or Rule of Law: The executive routinely bypasses constitutional processes and rule of law. Rule by decree is the norm rather than the exception. Administrative rules and regulations have little or no basis in law passed by the legislature. The civilian courts are penetrated and greatly influenced by the executive.

0) Complete Suspension of Constitutional Rights or Rule of Law: All judicial and legislative functions are controlled by the executive branch. Constitutions and laws are routinely altered by executive decree. Rule is personal or arbitrary in that it can change at any moment to suit the chief executive's or the executive branch's needs.

IV. **Military Intervention in Society**

During war time the military typically extends its control over domestic economic and political functions. The military may take over portions of the economy for production purposes. Conversely, the
military may take over executive, legislative, and judicial functions typically left to civilian officials in non-crisis situations.

3) No Military Intervention: The civilian executive has direct control over all military organizations and policy. The military has little if any control of domestic production outside the defense sector. The military exercise no executive, judicial, or legislative authority outside the military itself. Few if any active military officers serve in the cabinet (or similar executive body).

2) Slight Military Intervention: The military assumes some control over the economy to direct the war effort. However, most production, investment, and consumption decisions continue to be made according to traditional methods (e.g., markets or civilian government agencies). Military administration (combining executive, legislative, and judicial functions) may occur in combat zones.

1) Substantial Military Intervention: The military becomes very influential in all domestic and foreign policy decisions. The military directs a large portion of the economy. Military administration is extended well beyond the front. Military representation in the highest branches of the executive becomes extensive.

0) Extensive Military Intervention: The military assumes control over the domestic economy and domestic politics. Military rule is extended over all or virtually all of the country. The military becomes the center point of the executive branch. Military administrators routinely enact laws outside the regular legislative channels. Military courts routinely try civilians. The military is heavily represented in the executive branch either formally through such mechanisms as a large number of military officers in the Cabinet, or informally such as cases in which the military can dictate domestic and foreign policy positions.

The long durée school argues that slow long run forces are behind the expansion and contraction of political rights; wars, which are typically of very limited duration, have little if any impact on these long run processes. One of the most important long run processes is industrialization. Scholars have long argued that industrialization, by expanding the middle class and educational opportunities, has contributed to the expansion of democracy (Lipset 1960). Proponents of the long durée might argue that failing to control for this long run process could lead to an erroneous interpretation of the impact of war. For this reason, we have included three variables that tap different dimensions of a state’s economic development. First, we predict that energy consumption is positively associated with industrialization and the expansion of rights (Bollen 1979). Energy is essential for the powering of machines and equipment that make the advanced industrialized countries so productive. Per capita energy consumption data was taken from the COW National Capabilities data set. Second, we predict that the percentage of the labor force employed in agriculture is negatively associated with industrialization and the expansion of political rights. Economies evolve through several stages of development (Rostow 1960). Today’s most advanced economies began the modern era as agricultural economies; most workers were employed on the land producing agricultural products. Slowly, the number of workers involved in farming began to fall as the manufacturing and service sectors became increasingly important. Although countries like the United States remain major producers and exporters of agricultural commodities, only a tiny faction of the American workforce is employed on farms. Labor force data was derived from Flora et al. (1983); a complete time series was created by extrapolating between data points generated by national censuses. The national censuses typically were taken at ten-year intervals. Third, we predict that gross domestic product (GDP) per capita will be positively associated with industrialization and the expansion of rights. This is perhaps the broadest and single most used measure of industrialization.

Finally, a fourth control variable was added to the analysis: religion. Weber (1958) argues that the Protestant work ethic was a driving force behind the early industrialization of Europe. Catholic countries such as Spain and France lagged behind Protestant states such as England and the Netherlands (Rostow 1978). Moreover, Catholicism may discourage democratization more directly by emphasizing hierarchy and the collective at the expense of the individual. Empirically, Bollen (1979) has shown that Catholic countries were slower to expand political rights.
The hypotheses are tested using a cross-sectional time series consisting of European states from 1900-1955. While the ultimate goal is to include all European states in the analysis, the preliminary results presented here are based on a random sample of 24 states (Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Ottoman/Turkey, Romania, Serbia/Yugoslavia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). The analysis includes all years in which the particular country was an independent state in the international system (except for wartime occupations). While we hope to expand the time dimension in the future, the 1900-1955 period should allow us to distinguish long-term trends from short-term disruptions such as World War I and II. The sources used to code the variables are found in Appendix A.

6. RESULTS

Did war result in the extraction of financial and human resources from European countries during the first half of this century? As hypothesis 1 predicted, the answer is yes. Figure 5 displays data for four countries for which we have extensive (but not complete) data for the time series. The start years and end years for the two world wars (1914-1918 and 1939-1945) have been highlighted. Government spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) jumps dramatically in the United Kingdom from approximately 10% to over 60% during World War I. The percentage of the total British population serving in the military jumps from 1% in 1913 to almost 10% during the peak years of the war. A similar pattern of results occurs for Germany (although German government spending data is missing for the Second World War). Government spending jumps radically during World War I as does the number of troops mobilized. The German government’s fear that high taxation could turn opinion against the war led it to finance the outlays through debt and the printing of money. Italy also fits the pattern: the state extracts financial and human resources on a grand scale during the two world wars. The Italian figure also highlights the distinction between large-scale wars and small-scale wars. The 1911-12 Italian Turkish War (6000 Italian battle deaths) and the 1935-36 Italian-Ethiopian War (4000 Italian battle deaths) did not trigger large-scale mobilizations (although government spending did jump significantly for the year 1936). Finally, Figure 5 demonstrates that even for a neutral power such as Sweden, the world war triggered a steep rise in the number of troops under arms and the level of government spending.

Although the graphical data for the four countries indicates a clear pattern in support of Hypothesis 1, does the relationship hold for the entire data set? The answer appears in Tables 1 and 2. In Table 1, government spending as percentage of GDP is transformed into a categorical variable. During peacetime, we see that most government spending falls within the first two categories—that is, it remains below 20% of GDP. However, for the years in which a war is being fought, government spending exceeds 30% of GDP 45 percent of the time. In contrast, only 6% of the peacetime observations fall in this range. Similarly, the cross tabulation in Table 2 indicates that warfare is positively associated with the mobilization of human resources. During wartime 23% of the states mobilize between 5 and 20 percent of their populations; during peacetime only 2% of the states maintain this level of readiness. The relationships in both tables are statistically significant at better than the .001 level.

What is the relationship between war and collective political rights? Tables 3 through 6 display the results for the four collective variables. The tables compare changes during peacetime (68% of the cases), during wartime (12% of the cases), and five years following the war (20% of the cases). The table focuses on the direction of change (i.e., increase or decrease) rather than the magnitude of the change (i.e., a one point change versus a three point change on the 0-3 scale). Although for the vast majority of country-years no changes takes place, we find that during wartime rights tend to be restricted...
and following wartime rights tend to be expanded. In Table 3, we see that during peacetime in only 1% of the cases do states increase the fairness of the electoral system and in only 2% of the cases do states decrease the fairness of the current system. During wartime, the balance shifts toward decreasing political rights – that is, the number of instances of rights reductions (8%) far exceeds the number of instances of rights expansion (3%). After the war, we see a reversal of the trend – expansion becomes more common (8%) than contraction (4%). A similar pattern of results is found when examining the power of the legislature relative to the executive (Table 4), the degree to which the rule of law is enforced (Table 5), and the level of military intervention in civil society (Table 6). In each case, wartime is associated with restriction relative to peacetime, but immediately after war is associated with expansion relative to peacetime. During war the executive expands its power over the legislature, laws are increasing suspended or ignored, and the military increases its control of executive, legislative, and judicial power. The results in all four tables are statistically significant at better than the .001 level.

How did wartime mobilizations impact the individual political rights of women? Figures 6 and 7 compare the rights of women to those enjoyed by majority males for four countries in the data set (United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Sweden). The left-axis measures the right to vote in national elections in Figure 6 and the right to form and participate in political parties in Figure 7. The x-axis measures time and the right-axis measures the level of mobilization (i.e., troops/total population). In three out of four of the cases, war had an important direct impact on the expansion and contraction of political rights. In all four cases, we see that the rights of women lagged behind their male counterparts. However, war played an important role in the convergence of the two lines. We begin by discussing Figure 6.

In the United Kingdom, suffrage is restricted for majority males despite the series of major electoral reforms in the 19th century (1832, 1867, and 1884). The conscription of males during World War I triggered a demand for the expansion of suffrage; the direct result was The Representation of the People Act, which removed most barriers for males. The United Kingdom figure also displays the expansion in the right to vote in national elections for women (the male and female lines overlap after 1928). Although the women’s suffrage movement in the United Kingdom had a long history quite independent of war and external conflict, it was The Representation of the People Act that first gave some women the right to vote. Suffrage was extended to married women and women over thirty years of age who paid taxes. The removal of all major gender-based restrictions did not occur until 1928. Would women have gotten the right to vote eventually? Yes. However, it was the wartime mobilization that forced the issue of suffrage for poor and working class males onto the agenda. Inevitably, this brought the issue of women’s suffrage to the table. The British government believed “that a Bill only to give our fighting forces the right vote would be impossible because it would open up the question of the franchises; someone would be sure to get up and move to include women suffrage” (Parliamentary Debates 1917, v93, 2171). War clearly influenced the timing of the expansion of suffrage for men and women.

In Germany, we also see restrictions on females prior to World War I. In this case the causal path differed in that war led to the collapse of Imperial Germany and the rise of the democratic Weimar Republic. However, mobilization played a central role in the process. The German government’s desperate attempt to extract resources led to severe restrictions on economic and political liberties. Four years of war-induced deprivation led to the popular uprisings which defeated the German military in a way the French, British, and American armies could not. The Weimar constitution removed most key barriers to political participation for both men and women. Unfortunately, the expansion was limited in duration due to the rise of Hitler. Restrictions, which were rationalized by pointing to external and internal threats, were not lifted until the destruction of the Third Reich.

In Italy, a similar pattern emerges: women start out the period with a lower level of rights than men and war leads to an expansion of rights for both men and women. Although the mobilization line records only a minor upward blip for the 1911-12 Italian-Turkish War, the event directly contributed to the expansion of suffrage for males in that year. The Italian Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti believed that by pushing through the suffrage expansion bill he could increase public support for his administration and the war effort (Therborn 1977; Giolitti 1973). The second major jump for Italian males occurs just
after the end of World War I. Suffrage was extended to all males over 21 as well as veterans failing to meet the age requirement. However, conservative political and religious groups blocked attempts to expand suffrage for women. Unlike their German and British counterparts, Italian women did not benefit politically from the First World War. The right to vote was not extended to women until Mussolini and the fascists took over the political system. Yet, the “right” was meaningless in absence of the right to form and participate in political parties (see Figure 7). Genuine political freedom for both men and women only emerges after the autocratic Italian regime is defeated by a democratic coalition in the Second World War.

Finally, the Swedish figure indicates that direct participation in warfare is not a necessary condition for the expansion of political rights for men and women. Political rights for males were extended slightly (but not enough to shift categories in our coding scheme) in 1906 following the session of Norway in 1905. While a much broader expansion for men and women occurred in 1918, Sweden was neutral during the First World War. Could war have contributed to the expansion of political right?

Suffrage movements existed in Sweden prior to the war but were radicalized by the wartime gains by the left in the legislature as well as the privations of wartime (Andersson 1975, 424). The intellectual basis for the wealth-test of political competence had been discredited by a number of revelations about wartime profiteering (Andersson 1975, 425). However, the still conservative Riksdag refused to put suffrage expansion on the political table when it began its fall 1918 session. When news of the November 4th revolution in Germany reached Sweden, the Riksdag began to debate suffrage. This was intensified when worker demonstrations began in Stockholm on November 11th (the very day the First World War ended). The demonstrations, food riots, and looting led many to believe that Sweden was on the brink of social revolution (Therborn 1977, 16). The government proposed suffrage reform November 14, and the decision to reform was made November 17 (Scott, 1977, 477). Andersson concludes that both the international example set by the German revolution and the threat of domestic revolution, itself an outcome of by wartime privations, caused the suffrage reform (1975, 425-6)

Is the relationship between war and political change highlighted for these four countries generalizable across the continent? Table 7 displays regression results for the data set as a whole. The dependent variable is the sum of the changes in the four individual rights indices (Right to Hold Office, Right to Form Political Parties, Right to Vote in National Elections, and Freedom of Expression). The dependent variables, which capture both direction and magnitude of changes in rights, range from –12 to +12. The dependent variable for Model 1 measures the political rights of majority males. The dependent variables for Models 2 and 3 refer to the political rights for women and minorities, respectively.

In Model 1, we see that involvement in warfare decreases political rights for majority males. As expected, the War coefficient is negative (-0.726) and statistically significant at better than the .01 level. In contrast, the total number of militarized disputes a country finds itself involved in does not significantly affect political rights. The 5-Years After War variable is positive and significant. While in the short run war leads to a reduction in political rights, in the long run warfare triggers an expansion of rights. Together, the two coefficients point to a J-shaped relationship between war and rights. This finding is reinforced by the positive coefficient for the Mobilization variable. States that are forced to extract huge amounts of resources from society are much more likely to extend political rights than those involved in relatively minor wars.

Model 1 also indicates that none of the four control variables (energy consumption per capita, the percentage of labor in agriculture, GDP per capita, and Catholic religion) are statistically distinguishable from zero. While this does not negate the long durée argument, it does call into question the argument that industrialization is a powerful predictor of democratization. Finally, states occupied by democratic states after war (e.g., West Germany after World War II) are much more likely to expand political rights, whereas states occupied by autocratic states after war (e.g., Romania after World War II) are much less likely to experience an expansion in political rights. Both coefficients are large indicating a powerful effect on the outcome of the political process. However, what is particularly interesting is that even for those states not occupied by a democracy after a war, we are likely to see an expansion in political rights
(i.e., the 5-Years After War remains positive and significant even after including the occupation variables).

The results for the women and minority dependent variables shown in Models 2 and 3 of Table 7 indicate a similar pattern. In all cases, while war leads to a decrease in political rights, the “post” war period is associated with expanding political rights. For all groups, mobilization leads to greater political rights. In all cases, the four control variables fail to emerge as important factors in the ebb and flow of political rights. Finally, in all cases democratic occupation is associated with an expansion of rights whereas autocratic occupation is associated with a contraction of rights. Overall, the results in the table indicate that direct participation on the battlefield is NOT a necessary condition for the reward of greater political rights. Women fair no worse than majority males or minority males when it comes to obtaining greater political liberties in the aftermath of war. Sensitivity analysis indicates that these same conclusions are reached using a three-year lag period.

7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

The data analysis supports all three central hypotheses. First, states at war extract far greater human and financial resources from society than during peacetime. Second, the wartime environment leads to a reduction of political rights as predicted by the Garrison State school. Third, in the long run states which mobilize for war experience a marked increase in political rights as predicted by the Extraction school.

The results also indicate that both women and minority males benefit in the post war period. The mobilization for war in Britain and Germany directly contributed to the expansion of suffrage for men and women. While the “long durée” school may be correct in their contention that women would have gotten the vote eventually in the United Kingdom, the fact that the suffrage movement was successful in 1917 is directly related to the on-going war. Support for women’s suffrage expanded enormously in both Parliament and the country at large during the first three years of war. At the very least, the war accelerated the rate of change (see the shift in the intercept in Figure 4(b)).

This paper represents a first product of a larger research program. Future research should focus on four areas. First, the European data set needs to be expanded to include most of the 19th century. In many countries, franchise was expanded significantly during this century. Was the expansion driven by domestic or international factors? The research could contrast the consequences of the relatively short wars of the 19th century with the total wars of the 20th century. Second, the minority data needs to be expanded. The current data set groups the experience of all minorities in a country into a single category. Unfortunately, constructing time series information for specific groups may be extremely difficult. Third, research should extend outside of Europe to the developing world in the post-colonial era. Did revolutionary wars in China, Vietnam, Algeria, and Eritrea influence the political rights of women and minorities, particularly those that participated directly in armed conflict? Fourth, more sophisticated modeling of the proposed “J-curve” needs to be undertaken.
APPENDIX A: Sources Used to Code Cases


Barnes, Samuel H. 1973. 'Italy: Religion and Class in Electoral Behavior', in Rose (ed.).


Hitchins, Diddy RM, and Willian A Jacobs. 1996. 'United Kingdom', in Danopoulus and Watson.


Lancaster, Thomas D and James Larry Taulbee. 1987. 'Spain', in Donnelly and Howard.


Schoeman, Jan R. 1996. 'Netherlands', in Danopoulos and Watson.


Urwin, D. 1973. 'Germany: Continuity and Change in Electoral Politics', in Rose (ed.).


BIBLIOGRAPHY


Figure 1: Tilly and the Rise of the State

- Technological Innovation in Warfare
- Tactical Innovations in Warfare
- Expansion in the Size of Armies

Desperate Need for Revenue

- Mobilize Fiscal Resources: Expand Tax System
- Mobilize Human Resources: Recruit Mercenaries and Later Conscripts
- Expand Coercive Apparatus

Figure 2: The Direction of the Relationship

(a) Political Rights
(b) Political Rights
(c) Political Rights
(d) Political Rights

Threat → Mobilization

Figure 3: The Persistence of the Relationship

(a) Positive Short Run and Long Run Impact
(b) Positive Short Run but No Long Run Impact
(c) Negative Short Run and Long Run Positive Impact
Figure 4: Deviation From Long Term Trends

(a) No Long Run Impact
(b) Change in Slope and Intercept
(c) Acceleration in Timing

Figure 5: Government Spending and Mobilization

- Government Spending
- Mobilization

Graphs by Country

UK
1914 1939

Germany
1914 1939

Italy
Sweden

Year

1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950

0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1

0 .5 .5

Mobilization

Government Spending
Figure 6: Voting Rights, Gender, and Mobilization

Graphs by Country
Figure 7: Right to Form Parties, Gender, and Mobilization

Graphs by Country

UK

Germany

Italy

Sweden

• Troops/Total Population

△ Majority Males

+ Females

Right to Form Parties

Year

Mobilization Level

1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950

0 1 2 3

0 .05 .1 .15
Table 1: Government Spending and the Wartime Mobilization of Financial Resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobilization Level (Government Spending/GDP)</th>
<th>0-10%</th>
<th>10-20%</th>
<th>20-30%</th>
<th>Over 30%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peacetime</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=749; Chi Square (3)=159==131.3; Probability = .000
Numbers may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

Table 2: Troops and the Wartime Mobilization of Human Resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobilization Level (Troops/Total Population)</th>
<th>0-1%</th>
<th>1-3%</th>
<th>3-5%</th>
<th>Over 5%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peacetime</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=1047; Chi Square (3)=159.3; Probability = .000
Numbers may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

Table 3: Impact of War on the Free and Fair Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Free and Fair Elections</th>
<th>Decreased Rights</th>
<th>No Change</th>
<th>Increased Rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peacetime</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just After War</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=1141; Chi Square (4)=47.0; Probability = .000
Numbers may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
### Table 4: Impact of War on the Power of the Legislature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislative Power</th>
<th>Decreased</th>
<th>No Change</th>
<th>Increased</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peacetime</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just After War</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=1135; Chi Square (4)=41.2; Probability = .000
Numbers may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

### Table 5: Impact of War on the Rule of Law

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Rule of Law</th>
<th>Decreased</th>
<th>No Change</th>
<th>Increased</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peacetime</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>1%</td>
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<td>Wartime</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just After War</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>8%</td>
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N=1135; Chi Square (4)=43.1; Probability = .000
Numbers may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

### Table 6: Impact of War on Military Intervention in Society

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<th>Increased</th>
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<tr>
<td>Peacetime</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wartime</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Just After War</td>
<td>9%</td>
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<td>6%</td>
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N=1141; Chi Square (4)=27.0; Probability = .000
Numbers may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Table 7: Regression Results

<table>
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<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dependent</td>
<td>Majority</td>
<td>Minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>Males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>-0.726**</td>
<td>-0.750**</td>
<td>-0.768**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.256)</td>
<td>(0.275)</td>
<td>(0.264)</td>
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<td>Total Disputes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-Years After War</td>
<td>0.494**</td>
<td>0.563***</td>
<td>0.492**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.169)</td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization</td>
<td>6.157*</td>
<td>5.677*</td>
<td>6.837*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.987)</td>
<td>(3.213)</td>
<td>(3.087)</td>
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<td>Energy Consumption</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
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<td>(0.007)</td>
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<td>GDP per capita</td>
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<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
<td>-0.046</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.142)</td>
<td>(0.153)</td>
<td>(0.147)</td>
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<td>3.133***</td>
<td>3.501***</td>
<td>5.200***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.982)</td>
<td>(1.056)</td>
<td>(1.015)</td>
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<td>-5.004**</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(1.675)</td>
<td>(1.801)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.337)</td>
<td>(0.362)</td>
<td>(0.348)</td>
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<tr>
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Notes: Regression coefficients appear on the first line and the standard errors appear on the second line in parentheses. * p>.05, **p>.01, *** p>.001. All tests are one-tailed.
Endnotes

1 See Spruyt (1994) for an in depth discussion of competition among different political structures.

2 Tilly’s later works, such as Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992, probe this second issue in greater detail.

3 Some conscientious objectors have been willing to serve in non-combat positions (e.g., medics) in the military.

4 For a discussion of mobilization for war in the United States and the emergence of opposition, see Stein (1980).

5 Immigrants volunteering for the U.S. military are exempt from many requirements for citizenship. In the past the U.S. Army rewarded Native American volunteers with citizenship (Britten 1997).

6 In contrast, some women served in combat units in the Soviet Union during the Second World War.

7 Many in the women’s suffrage movement viewed the vote as a right; they found the “reward” argument deeply disturbing.

8 Governments could also exchange economic rights for fiscal and human resources (see Downing 1992). Three important questions have yet to be explored in this area. First, how does a government choose between economic and political rewards? Second, what factors encourage interest groups to accept economic rewards in lieu of political rewards? Third, are economic or political rewards more successful in terms of quieting opposition to wartime mobilization? Authoritarian states also face this tradeoff between economic and political rewards during peacetime.

9 The unit of observation in the MID data set is a militarized dispute. We transformed this into a time series using the start dates and end dates for each dispute.

10 During the debate on the Representation of the People Act, opponents of the Bill argued that the wartime parliament could only legitimately address issues directly related to the war effort. Major legislation, such as the expansion of suffrage, would have to wait until after new elections.

11 Turkey, which has historically controlled a significant portion of territory in Europe (during the lifetime of the Ottoman Empire) and continues to this day to be intimately tied to European foreign affairs, is also included in the analysis. The importance of the “European” dimension of Turkish identity will be left to others to debate.

12 Regression analysis indicates that the relationships remain statistically significant despite the inclusion of control variables and competing explanations.

13 The results are statistically significant in the expected direction using either a five-year or a three-year lag period. We employ a five-year period throughout the paper.

14 Although the four measures are highly correlated, they are by no means perfectly correlated.

<table>
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<th>Rule of Law</th>
<th>Military Intervention</th>
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15 Green et al. (1999) argue that the international relations literature has failed to address statistical problems arising from the use of pooled cross-sectional data sets. Specifically, they “contend that analyses of pooled cross section-data that make no allowance for fixed unobserved differences between dyads produce biased results” (1999, 1). However, with our data set, re-estimating the coefficients and standard errors using a “fixed effects” model produced no significant changes.

16 Support in the general population is difficult to determine in the pre-polling era. This widely accepted view was expressed by Mr. Cochrane, a member of parliament during the 1917 Representation of the People Act debates.